In October 2026, a vote in the European Parliament showed how the political map of Europe is changing. When MEPs voted on a recommendation on EU-China relations, the right was remarkably united, with only the AfD-led ESN opposed, while about half of the centre-left S&D abstained. This is one of three key takeaways from my look at October’s votes in the European Parliament and the Council.
Across all EP votes, the EPP once again confirmed how firmly it sits in the driving seat: On most votes, it continued its cooperation with the centre-left and liberals, but formed majorities with the far right on eight votes, including on softening parts of the Green Deal and on a resolution on countering Islamic entryism and the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the Council, in the shadow of difficult budget negotiations, consensus was the rule. In only two of 16 public votes did a member state vote no, and in both cases it was a large country being outvoted: Germany and Spain, respectively.
Highlight of the month: EP recommendation on EU-China relations
This month, a recommendation on EU-China policy, adopted on 7 October 2026, stood out to me as being interesting to highlight. The vote itself was on a recommendation proposed by Rapporteur Hilde Vautmans (Renew, Belgium) and called for a hardening of EU policy towards China. Passed by a majority of 454 against 86 with 110 abstentions, MEPs called for a robust economic approach by the EU to China and for pressure on Beijing to use its influence on Russia to help end the war in Ukraine.
It thus fit right into the growing EU discussion on how to deal with the “China shock 2.0”. This was both a topic at the European Council in October and the subject of a Franco-German input paper also calling for much harder EU trade defence instruments. The basis for this was, in particular, a policy shift in Berlin, which used to oppose tough trade measures against China. In 2024, for instance, the previous German government voted against protective tariffs against Chinese EVs in the Council.
A united right, a split centre-left
Four aspects of the vote were particularly noteworthy to me. First, it showed how much the EPP has swung behind a tough trade line vis-à-vis China. In the past, EPP parliamentarians from the German CDU or Central/Eastern Europe would likely have objected to a tough trade policy towards China, but after the changes in Berlin, the EPP has firmly swung behind the hard approach.
As a second point, this vote showed once again that the far right is split on foreign policy: Whereas the ECR and the “Patriots for Europe” overwhelmingly voted for the recommendation, the ESN, led by the China-friendly AfD, overwhelmingly voted against. This, however, is also a shift for me. In the past, quite a few member parties of the PfE like the Italian Lega would have voted against. Even the Hungarian Fidesz – under Orbán very pro-China – abstained:

- Data source: HowTheyVote.EU.
The counter development then was, thirdly, that roughly one half of the S&D group abstained – mostly socialist parliamentarians from Southern Europe, in particular Spain and Italy, but also Portugal, Romania and Greece. In my view, this was another case of Spain becoming an outsider in the EU under Pedro Sánchez, who opened up to China while most of the rest of Europe is hardening. The PSOE said it abstained because the text was lacking “balance” in its view. A similar logic was followed by the Italian PD.
Finally, this also played into the geographic distribution of the vote. Due to the Partido Popular and Vox votes, Spain was not such an outlier here. More notable was Greece – without a single vote in favour –, as well as Romania and Slovakia. Hungary was also an interesting case: Not only did Fidesz abstain, but all MEPs from the new government party Tisza (EPP) chose not to vote. In contrast to the overall distribution of the votes, only the lone Hungarian S&D MEP voted in favour:
Overall, the vote highlighted to me how the changes in the EU’s positioning towards China led to more unity on the right (with only the ESN fully opposed) while creating new frictions within the centre-left.
Final votes in the European Parliament
In October 2026, the EP had two plenary sessions, one from 5 to 8 October in Strasbourg and one from 19 to 22 October in Brussels. Overall, the two plenaries had 53 final votes recorded on HowTheyVote.eu. Key topics of the plenary sessions in Strasbourg and Brussels were the debates ahead of and after the October European Council, quite a few votes on adopting various omnibus regulations for simplification/deregulation (depending on your political views), as well as the EP adopting its position for the 2027 budget and foreign policy issues such as the EU-China recommendation highlighted above:
Overall, the two plenaries showed the different majorities at play in the European Parliament: About 75 per cent of the votes were passed in broad consensus from (almost) all parts of the political spectrum, with the “von der Leyen platform” of EPP, S&D and Renew at its core. However, only four votes (7.5 per cent) were based on the von der Leyen platform alone. Taken together, the three pro-European centre groups EPP, S&D and Renew still form the basis of the majority for most votes in the EU Parliament. At the same time, the small number of “thin” majorities based on these three groups alone suggests to me that the centre is reluctant to push through narrow votes on its own.

- This graph shows the different majorities in this legislative period. Note the relatively low share of votes this month where the “von der Leyen” majority was decisive on its own.
The second observation is that, this month, the EPP has been back to being the most successful group, being part of the majority in 98.1 per cent of the votes. This is also reflected in the fact that eight votes (~15 per cent) were based on a majority formed by the EPP with several of the far-right groups, and in some cases also including Renew.
In particular, there were two politically controversial votes on the methane regulation, where the EPP softened another part of the Green Deal in cooperation with the far right. Another controversial vote was a resolution on the “need for an EU strategy to counter Islamic entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood”, which was celebrated by the far right as a triumph in its fight against (radical) Islam. The resolution itself was tabled by the EPP, and adopted together with the ECR, PfE, ESN and also Renew, in a “classic” left-right division against the S&D, Greens and Left.
Co-voting matrix
The co-voting matrix confirms this complex picture: There is a definitive cluster around the “von der Leyen platform” of EPP, S&D and Renew. However, the distance between the S&D and the EPP is also clearly visible; the overlap between EPP and S&D in one direction (83 per cent), and EPP and ECR in the other direction (79 per cent), is almost equally high.
Finally, the ESN remains in full opposition mode, with strong distances to everyone but the PfE. Interestingly, a small sign of the “horseshoe” theory is also visible: The overlap of the ESN with the Left is just a touch higher than with the Greens, S&D or Renew – precisely because of votes like the one on China highlighted above.

- Heatmap of co-voting behaviour in the October plenary. Note the strong centre around the “von der Leyen platform”, but also the distance between S&D and EPP.
Public votes in the Council of the EU
For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always far fewer than the Parliament’s roll-call votes. October is usually a busy month for the Council, so there were 16 public votes in the various Council formations (after just four in September). Among these, 12 were adopted by unanimity and two more had only abstentions, which means an 87.5 per cent consensus rate.
The remaining two votes had one no vote each, so this was a month without highly controversial votes in the Council. Still, a few interesting points stood out:
- Belgium abstained twice, highlighting the increasing frictions within its coalition government, which then collapsed in early November.
- The only two countries which voted no were Germany and Spain. This fits the argument by Manuel Müller that it is actually small countries which increasingly benefit from QMV, as it allows them to outvote larger countries at times.
- Spain voted against the return regulation allowing return hubs. This is both another expression of the minority position Spain finds itself in on migration – at least until the Spanish elections at the end of November – and one of the few cases I could find where a national government voted against a proposal in the Council because it rejected a compromise achieved in the EP on the basis of a centre-right-to-far-right majority.
Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). |
EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack.




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