Expanding EU majority voting is in the interest of small member states

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

Apart from EU majority decisions, small states rarely have the power to force large ones to participate in policies.

On 1 September, a group of eleven EU member states published a joint letter calling for an end to obstructive vetoes in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. While the proposals are fairly moderate, aiming more to change political practice than formal procedures, the eleven states are also calling for greater use of majority decisions based on the passerelle clause.

The list of signatory states largely coincides with the members of the informal “Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP”, established in 2023. And in both cases, there is a striking imbalance: Six of the nine largest member states (Germany, France, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands and Belgium) are involved in the initiative – but only two of the nine smallest (Slovenia and Luxembourg).

Should small countries fear being outvoted by large ones?

Large member states are pushing for more majority decisions, while small ones insist on national veto rights: This pattern has become typical of EU reform debates in recent years, and not only in the area of foreign and security policy. The key argument put forward by the larger countries is the Union’s capability to act. The position of the smaller states, on the other hand, is usually justified by their concern for national sovereignty. Without the safeguard of the national veto, they fear being systematically outvoted by the larger ones and marginalised in the decision-making process. But would that really be the case?

An analysis of public votes in the EU Council in 2025/26 paints a very different picture. In policy areas where majority voting is already in place, the smaller member states by no means find themselves regularly in the minority. Overall, size does not appear to be a key factor at all; after Hungary, Spain and Germany are among the member states that are most frequently outvoted.

Admittedly, these figures are of limited significance on their own. In the Council, compromises are usually only put to a vote once a majority in favour has already been secured. Whether a government then goes along with the compromise or allows itself to be outvoted is often driven more by symbolic considerations than by power politics. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that EU majority decisions do not necessarily serve the interests of larger member states – but rather those of smaller ones.

Veto powers entrench traditional power imbalances

In traditional international relations, power imbalances between countries play an important role. Large states can exert pressure on smaller states in various ways, forcing them to participate in policies that the small states actually oppose. The reverse, however, is rarely true: If large states oppose a policy measure, they simply do not participate in it. And without the (economic, diplomatic, military) resources of the large countries, many international policies are doomed to failure from the outset.

The majority voting system in the EU Council subverts this logic, at least to some extent. Here, too, the larger countries carry greater weight in negotiations than the smaller ones, due to both their greater resources and to the weighting of votes. However, the large countries cannot form majorities without getting the support of at least a considerable number of smaller ones. And if there is a broad consensus among the smaller countries, they can even outvote the largest ones and force them to participate in policies which they did not initially support.

EU policy areas governed by unanimity rules, on the other hand, tend to follow the logic of traditional intergovernmental politics. When large member states threaten to use their veto, the smaller ones generally have little power to counter this alone. Meanwhile, the vetoes of smaller countries can often be circumvented, as demonstrated by the handling of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. In practice, insisting on national veto rights will primarily lead to an increasing normalisation of flexible intergovernmental “coalitions of the willing”, in which the larger states agree on a common line and then rally as many smaller states around them as possible – while each individual small state is ultimately dispensable and can be sidelined.

More majority voting would strengthen the smaller states

Remarkably, the smaller states were very much aware of this danger during the early years of European integration. During the “empty chair” crisis of 1965/66, it was large and powerful France that insisted on retaining national veto rights. In contrast, the small Benelux states, fearing a “Franco-German directorate”, advocated more majority voting in the Council and a strong European Commission that would safeguard the common European interest.

Today, too, the abolition of unanimity rules remains the most effective way for small EU member states to preserve their national sovereignty. Small countries, in particular, have a vested interest in an EU capable of taking action, for example to protect against external threats or to promote the single market. At the same time, a return to an intergovernmental ‘concert of powers’, in which the large countries set the tone, would certainly not be in their interests. Therefore, if small countries wish to make their voices heard in the long term, they should be prepared to waive their national veto in as many policy areas as possible, and ensure that the larger countries do the same in return.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

A version of this article was originally published as a column in the Europe.Table newsletter and can also be found on the Table.Briefings website.

Translation: Manuel Müller.
Pictures: Gulliver’s Travels: Unknown author, from Gulliver’s Travels: Coloured Picture Book for the Nursery, 1883 [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].