By Manuel Müller
|
Left |
G/EFA |
S&D |
RE |
EPP |
ECR |
ID |
NI |
other |
EP today |
37 | 72 | 139 | 102 | 176 | 69 | 49 | 61 | – |
April 24 |
35 | 51 | 132 | 86 | 173 | 81 | 83 | 35 | 44
|
May 24 |
37 | 57 | 136 | 81 | 172 | 79 | 66 | 50 | 42
|
dynamic |
40 | 58 | 137 | 85 | 186 | 80 | 78 | 56 | – |
- Baseline scenario,
as of 29/05/2024.
- Dynamic scenario,
as of 29/05/2024.
European elections do not usually lead to sudden political upheavals. Unlike in national parliaments, there are no stable coalitions and no clear contrast between governing and opposition parties in the European Parliament; majorities are formed flexibly depending on the issues, are usually very broad and have always been based on an “informal grand coalition of the centre”.
This year, however, there has been much more discussion than usual about how well the various parliamentary groups will perform and what majorities will be possible after the election. And with good reason, because the stakes are actually higher than usual. This final seat projection before the European elections provides an overview of the latest poll results – and of the key questions of this election, some of which will only be answered on election night and in the weeks that follow.
Who will be the strongest force?
At the latest since the introduction of the lead candidates system, the role of the strongest political group in the Parliament has taken on a special significance. It is associated with a claim to the Commission presidency – or at least with a claim to the right to make the first attempt to form a parliamentary majority in order to obtain it.
However, the question of who will be the strongest force this year is not all that exciting. In the seat projections of recent years, the centre-right EPP has always held a lead over the second-placed centre-left S&D. By the end of 2021, halfway through the legislature, that lead had shrunk to less than a dozen seats. Currently, however, the EPP has 172 seats to the S&D’s 136, meaning that the gap between the two groups would be similar to the one in the current Parliament (EPP 176, S&D 139).
In the dynamic scenario of the seat projection, which also takes into account possible group changes and newcomers after the European elections, the lead is even slightly higher (EPP 186, S&D 137). So will Ursula von der Leyen automatically become Commission president again? More on this below.
How much will the far right grow?
The big issue that has dominated the election campaign across Europe is the rise of the far right. Groups to the right of the EPP have made gains in every European election since 2009. According to the seat projection, they are now set to surpass their previous high in 1984, when they won just under 22 per cent of the seats (although two of the three right-wing groups of that time were much more moderate than the ECR and ID are today).
The seat projection puts the ECR at 79 MEPs (dynamic scenario: 80) and ID at 66 (dynamic scenario: 78). Both groups would thus be significantly stronger than in the current Parliament (ECR 69, ID 49). In addition, there will be several far-right parties that do not belong to any group: the German AfD, recently expelled from the ID, the Polish Konfederacja, and other, smaller parties. These non-attached far-right MEPs account for a further 25 seats in the seat projection, compared to 36 in the current Parliament.
All in all, this gives the far-right a bit more than a quarter of all seats in the Parliament. That is quite a lot – but still far from a majority.
Will there be new groups?
Even when all the votes have been counted, the exact distribution of seats between the political groups will not be known immediately. This is because many national parties decide only in the days and weeks after the election which European family they will join. A kind of “bazaar” usually develops around the many small newcomer parties entering Parliament for the first time, where they negotiate the terms of their entry with the various political groups.
There are also likely to be two attempts to form entirely new parliamentary groups. First, the German BSW, which is entering the Parliament for the first time, wants to gather left-conservative parties. Second, the German AfD, which has been excluded first from the ECR and then from ID in recent years, may try to form a new, third, far-right group. To do so, at least 23 MEPs from at least seven member states are needed. Both the BSW and the AfD are likely to find it difficult to reach this threshold.
There could also be other movement in Parliament after the elections. The Italian M5S wants to join a centre-left group. Marine Le Pen’s RN is seeking a rapprochement with Giorgia Meloni’s FdI – possibly in the form of a joint parliamentary group, which would also appeal to Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz. However, the formation of such a large right-wing group has often failed in the past and is likely to fail again this time. Exactly who will end up in which parliamentary group will only become clear in the weeks after the elections.
The dynamic scenario of the seat projection takes into account some plausible changes in political groups. Of course, it can only show one possible scenario. Depending on post-election developments, the final composition of the parliament could be very different. An overview with a wider range of possible developments can be found here.
How far will Greens and RE fall?
While the polls suggest that far-right parties will make strong gains, the centre-left will suffer significant losses. This is particularly true of the liberal RE and the Greens/EFA. Both of these groups made significant gains in the 2019 European elections, each reaching a new record number of seats in the European Parliament. In the case of the Liberals, this was largely due to the performance of French President Emmanuel Macron, who was successful on a decidedly cosmopolitan agenda. The Greens, on the other hand, benefited from the Fridays for the Future movement, which brought climate change to the forefront of public debate in the months leading up to the 2019 European elections.
Although both parties tried to build on their successes this year – Macron gave a new big speech on Europe, and climate activists took to the streets again –, they could now lose much of their gains. According to the projection, the RE group would fall from its current 102 seats to 81 (dynamic scenario: 85). The Greens/EFA face a drop from 72 to 57 seats (dynamic scenario: 58), despite making up some ground in recent weeks.
In a long-term perspective, however, even these results would still be in the upper range. For the Greens it would be the second best European election result ever after 2019, and for the Liberals the third best after 2019 and 2004. From this point of view, things look more problematic for the two largest groups: Both the EPP and the S&D performed very poorly in 2019 and cannot improve significantly this year. The Social Democrats are even on the verge of a new negative record – for the first time they could end up with less than a fifth of all seats in the Parliament.
Will the grand coalition retain a majority?
The decline of the EPP and the S&D already began around the turn of the millennium. Ever since the first European election in 1979, they had formed an “informal grand coalition”, sharing responsibility for the vast majority of decisions in the Parliament. Since the 2019 election, however, the two parties no longer have a majority together.
Today’s “von der Leyen coalition” therefore includes not only the EPP and S&D, but also the liberal RE. This three-party alliance achieves a solid majority, which it is likely to maintain after the election despite the losses of the Liberals. In the dynamic scenario of the projection, the three groups together have 408 out of 720 seats (57 per cent), compared to 417 out of 705 seats (59 per cent) in the current Parliament.
Alternatively, the EPP and S&D could form a narrow majority with the Greens/EFA group. Such an alliance currently has 387 seats (55 per cent) and would still have 381 seats (53 per cent) in the dynamic scenario of the projection. Often the majority is formed by an even broader alliance, bringing together all four parties of the centre. This constellation currently has 489 seats (69 per cent) and could reach 466 (66 per cent) in the future. Even allowing for the fact that there is less group discipline at European than at national level, the centre parties will still be able to outvote the far-right bloc in the Parliament.
What will happen to the centre-left majority?
For the majority situation in the Parliament, something else is likely to be more important than the rise of the far right: namely the question of how strongly the four groups to the left of the EPP perform together. In addition to S&D, RE and Greens/EFA, this includes the Left group, which according to the seat projection would be about as strong as in the current Parliament (37 seats / dynamic scenario: 40 / today: 37). In recent years, the centre-left alliance has come very close to a majority in the Parliament (350 out of 705 seats, 49.6 per cent). With the support of some non-attached parties, such as the Italian M5S, it has repeatedly offered an alternative to the grand coalition.
In the future, however, the losses of the Liberals and the Greens could leave the centre-left alliance further from a majority than ever before in the history of the European Parliament (320 seats / 44 per cent). Above all, this means a major shift of power towards the EPP, without which no plausible majority on either the left or the right of the Parliament may be possible after the elections. This is likely to be felt in areas such as climate or social and employment policy, where the centre-left majority has been particularly important since 2019.
Will there be an alliance between the EPP and the far right?
But that is not all. In order to make the most of its new pivotal position, the EPP has a strategic interest in opening up possibilities for cooperation on the right. Two options are conceivable: a centre-right alliance of EPP, RE and ECR, or a far-right alliance of EPP, ECR and ID.
However, both would probably need the support of some non-attached MEPs or dissenters from other parliamentary groups to achieve a majority. Moreover, a stable right-wing alliance is also very unlikely for political reasons. The RE has ruled out any systematic cooperation with the ECR, and the EPP itself does not want to open up to the ID. Finally, some EPP and ECR member parties – notably PO and PiS in Poland – are deeply hostile at national level.
The EPP will therefore probably have no choice but to continue working with Social Democrats and Liberals in the future. However, the inclusion of at least some ECR parties in the majority-building process could allow it to dispense with the Greens and the left wing of the S&D and RE. This also seems to be the EPP’s current strategy when it tries to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable far-right parties on the basis of the – not very clear-cut – “pro-EU, pro-Ukraine, pro-rule of law” criteria. (An alternative could be to directly integrate some current ECR parties, such as Meloni’s FdI, into the EPP; but it is doubtful whether Meloni herself wants this).
The S&D, RE and Greens, on the other hand, are currently trying to get the EPP to rule out cooperation with far-right parties in as binding a way as possible. The EPP has regularly avoided such a commitment during the election campaign.
Will Ursula von der Leyen remain Commission president?
However, as mentioned above, the EPP will not be able to form a majority without the S&D and RE. This could become important shortly after the election if Ursula von der Leyen seeks re-election as Commission president. In principle, she should be in a better position now than in 2019, when a number of MEPs rejected her simply because she had not previously stood as a lead candidate in the European election. Today, there are only few in the S&D, RE and G/EFA groups who would not vote for von der Leyen under any circumstances.
But the three parliamentary groups have repeatedly made it clear in recent weeks that they will make von der Leyen’s re-election conditional on her ruling out any cooperation with the ECR and ID. A showdown within the “informal grand coalition” is therefore on the cards shortly after the elections. Indeed, it is probably the best opportunity for the S&D, RE and Greens to secure concessions from the EPP on cooperation in the coming years. In the best case, this could even lead to a genuine coalition agreement at European level for the first time.
Will voter turnout increase?
But all this is still up in the air. First of all, the European elections themselves are due to take place at the end of this week. Rarely have the majorities in the new European Parliament been so contested, rarely has the political scope of the election been so clear as it is this year.
This gives hope that turnout will rise again. Surveys show that many more people are interested and want to take part in the European election than in the past. We will know more on Sunday.
The overview
The following table breaks down the distribution of seats in the projection by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.
In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest, and also takes into account other possible future group changes of individual national parties. In the table, the changes in the dynamic scenario compared to the baseline scenario are indicated by a coloured font and a mouseover text.
hier.In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.
|
Left |
G/EFA |
S&D |
RE |
EPP |
ECR |
ID |
NI |
other |
EP today |
37 | 72 | 139 | 102 | 176 | 69 | 49 | 61 | – |
April 24 |
35 | 51 | 132 | 86 | 173 | 81 | 83 | 35 | 44
|
May 24 |
37 | 57 | 136 | 81 | 172 | 79 | 66 | 50 | 42
|
dynamic |
40 | 58 | 137 | 85 | 186 | 80 | 78 | 56 | – |
|
Left |
G/EFA |
S&D |
RE |
EPP |
ECR |
ID |
NI |
other |
DE |
4 Linke |
14 Grüne
1 Piraten
1 ÖDP
1 Volt
|
14 SPD |
4 FDP
2 FW |
30 Union
1 Familie |
|
|
17 AfD
2 Partei
|
6 BSW
1 Tier
|
FR |
7 LFI
|
5 EELV |
13 PS |
15 Ens |
6 LR |
5 Rec |
30 RN |
|
|
IT |
2 SI |
2 EV |
18 PD |
4 SUE |
6 FI
1 SVP |
23 FdI |
7 Lega |
13 M5S |
|
ES |
2 Pod 1 IU
1 Bildu
|
1 ERC
1 BNG
1 CatComù
1 Comp
|
20 PSOE |
1 PNV
|
23 PP |
6 Vox |
|
1 Junts
|
1 Sumar
1 SALF
|
PL |
|
|
4 Lewica |
4 PL2050
|
18 KO
3 KP
|
18 PiS |
|
|
6 Konf |
RO |
|
|
7 PSD
1 PUSL |
5 USR |
7 PNL
2 UDMR
1 PMP
|
9 AUR |
|
|
1 FD
|
NL |
1 SP
|
4 GL
2 Volt |
4 PvdA |
5 VVD
2 D66
|
2 CDA |
|
9 PVV |
|
1 NSC
1 BBB
|
BE |
2 PTB |
1 Groen
1 Ecolo
|
2 Vooruit
2 PS
|
1 O-VLD
2 MR
|
1 CD&V
2 LE
1 CSP
|
3 N-VA |
4 VB |
|
|
CZ |
3 Stačilo
|
3 Piráti
|
|
7 ANO |
3 STAN
1 TOP09
1 KDU-ČSL |
3 ODS |
2 SPD |
|
|
EL |
4 Syriza |
|
3 PASOK |
|
8 ND |
2 EL |
|
2 KKE |
1 PE
1 NIKI
|
HU |
|
|
4 DK
|
|
1 KDNP |
|
|
10 Fidesz |
5 TISZA
1 MKKP
|
PT |
1 BE
|
1 Livre
|
7 PS |
2 IL |
7 PSD |
|
3 CH |
|
|
SE |
2 V |
2 MP |
7 S |
1 C
|
4 M
|
5 SD |
|
|
|
AT |
|
2 Grüne |
5 SPÖ |
2 Neos |
5 ÖVP |
|
6 FPÖ |
|
|
BG |
|
|
2 BSP |
3 DPS |
5 GERB
|
|
3 V |
|
4 PP-DB
|
DK |
1 Enhl. |
3 SF |
3 S |
2 V
1 M
|
1 K |
|
1 DF |
|
2 LA
1 DD |
SK |
|
|
|
4 PS |
1 OĽANO
1 KDH
|
1 SASKA |
|
4 Smer
2 REP
|
2 Hlas
|
FI |
2 Vas |
2 Vihreät |
3 SDP |
2 Kesk |
4 Kok
|
2 PS |
|
|
|
IE |
4 SF |
1 GP |
1 Labour |
4 FF |
4 FG |
|
|
|
|
HR |
|
2 Možemo |
3 SDP |
|
5 HDZ |
|
|
|
1 Most
1 DP
|
LT |
|
2 DSVL
1 LVŽS
|
3 LSDP |
1 LRLS
|
2 TS-LKD |
|
|
1 DP |
1 LRP
|
LV |
|
1 Prog |
1 SDPS |
1 LA |
1 JV
|
2 NA |
|
|
1 LRA
1 LPV
1 ST!
|
SI |
|
1 Vesna |
1 SD |
2 GS |
4 SDS
1 NSi
|
|
|
|
|
EE |
|
|
2 SDE |
2 RE
1 KE |
1 Isamaa |
|
1 EKRE |
|
|
CY |
2 AKEL |
|
1 DIKO
|
|
2 DISY |
|
|
|
1 ELAM |
LU |
|
|
2 LSAP |
1 DP |
3 CSV |
|
|
|
|
MT |
|
|
3 PL |
|
3 PN |
|
|
|
|
Timeline (baseline scenario)
The “EP 2019” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 2, 2019, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in May 2019.
The table shows the values of the baseline scenario without the United Kingdom. Until September 2023, the seat projection is based on 705 seats, thereafter on 720 seats. In the figures for September 2023, the transition is marked by superscript numbers.
An overview of the values including the United Kingdom for the period up to January 2020 can be found
here. An overview of older projections from the 2014-2019 electoral period is
here.
The full names of the parliamentary groups and of the national parties appear as mouseover text when the mouse pointer is held motionless on the designation in the table for a short time. If a party is attributed to a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario than in the baseline scenario, this is also indicated in the mouseover text.
Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups
Baseline scenario: For the projection, parties that are already represented in the European Parliament are assigned to their current parliamentary group, unless they have explicitly declared that they will change group after the next European election. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament, but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.
According to the
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.
Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned to a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the table with the colour of that group; moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouseover text. The attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties and can therefore be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario. For a more detailed overview of possible group changes after the European election,
click here.
Data source
If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.
For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns
France and
Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.
As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly converted to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without proportional representation (currently
Belgium and
Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is still calculated for each constituency individually, but using the overall national polling data in each case. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.
In
Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).
In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually. So far, the following electoral alliances have been confirmed:
Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más
País (5);
Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3);
PNV: PNV (1) and CC (2);
Romania: CNR: PSD (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17), PNL (2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18) and PUSL (10);
ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6);
Netherlands: GL-PvdA:
GL (1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14 etc.) and PvdA (2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13 etc.);
Czechia: Spolu: ODS (1-2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20), TOP09 (3, 6, 10, 12, 16, 18) and KDU-ČSL (4, 7, 9, 13, 15, 19);
Hungary: Fidesz: Fidesz (1-4, 6-15, from 17) and KDNP (5, 16);
DK:
DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5), PM (7). In some countries, the exact distribution of seats among the parties in an electoral alliance depends on regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases:
Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4);
Poland: TD: PL2050 (1, 3, 5 etc.), KP (2, 4, 6 etc.). In
Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a few votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. This is the case for
the SVP in alliance with the FI.
Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results at the last European election (2 seats each for PARTEI and FW, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Piraten, Volt and Familienpartei). Only if a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.
The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:
Germany: European election polls, 24-29/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
France: European election polls, 16-28/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Italy: European election polls, 21-24/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Spain: European election polls, 13-26/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Poland: European election polls, 14-26/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Romania: European election polls, 15-25/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Netherlands: European election polls, 18-27/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Belgium, Dutch-speaking community: regional polls (Flanders) for the national election, 20/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Belgium, French-speaking community: regional polls (Wallonia) for the national election, 20/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Belgium, German-speaking community: European election results, 26/5/2019.
Tschechien: European election polls, 7-13/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Greece: European election polls, 13-15/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Hungary: European election polls, 29.4-10/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Portugal: European election polls, 13-20/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Sweden: European election polls, 19-20/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Austria: European election polls, 17-24/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Bulgaria: European election polls, 5-18/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Denmark: European election polls, 14-24/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Slovakia: European election polls, 14-21/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Finland: European election polls, 29/4/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Ireland: European election polls, 15-22/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Croatia: European election polls, 25/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Lithuania: European election polls, 21/4/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Latvia: European election polls, 7/3/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Slovenia: European election polls, 16-24/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Estonia: European election polls, 15-20/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Cyprus: European election polls, 14-25/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Luxembourg: results of the national parliamentary election, 8/10/2023, source:
Wikipedia.
Malta: European election polls, 10/5/2024, source:
Wikipedia.
Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller.