The European Policy Quartet: Beyond the West – the EU’s new role in global politics

Deutsch

With:

• Niklas Helwig, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Brussels
• Manuel Müller, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki
• Julian Plottka, University of Passau / Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
• Sophie Pornschlegel, Europe Jacques Delors, Brussels

This conversation was conducted as a written online chat in German. The text below has been edited and translated.

The smallest among the largest: Europasaurus went extinct because it was not strong enough to defend itself against its predators.

Manuel
Let’s start today’s European Policy Quartet with the (true) history of Europasaurus. Europasaurus belonged to the Sauropoda group, which comprises the largest land creatures of all time. At just six meters, however, it was the smallest genus in this group. This can be attributed to the phenomenon of “insular dwarfism”: Europasaurs only lived on an island in what is now northern Germany, where there were no large carnivorous dinosaurs. They therefore did not need to deter predators and could afford a smaller, more energetically efficient physique. However, this only worked well for so long before the sea level dropped and a land bridge was created, across which large carnivorous carnosaurs reached the island. As a result, the Europasaurus became extinct around 150 million years ago.

Now, animal allegories about political processes are always problematic, and we can deconstruct this one in a moment if you like. But let’s stay in the picture for now: In today’s geopolitical world, there also seem to be some carnosaurs on the move – aggressive great powers that want to expand their imperial spheres of influence. The USA, under whose protection Europe long prospered like an Isle of the Blessed, can no longer be relied on under Donald Trump. As a result, the EU is under pressure to evolve and no longer be the political dwarf among the economic giant lizards. But what should its role be in this changed global landscape? How can it survive without becoming a predatory dinosaur itself?

Today’s special guest in the European Policy Quartet is my colleague Niklas Helwig, an expert on European foreign and security policy and lead author of a FIIA paper published in April entitled The EU in an age of empires. Welcome, Niklas!

The return of the empires …

Niklas
Hello everyone! We wanted to write this paper because much of the current political debate is focused on defence issues and the future of Ukraine – which are undoubtedly important, but we believe that the challenges facing the EU are much broader. The EU must assert itself in an environment where its liberal political and social model is under threat from a resurgent imperialism.

Imperialism was believed to be a thing of the past in the 1990s, but it has been on the rise again for at least fifteen years: Examples include Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and China’s economic aspirations in Asia and beyond. And now, the USA under Trump. Rather than rule-based cooperation between equal states, we have hierarchies defined by power relations.

So, what should the EU do? Rather than succumbing itself to raw imperialism, it should build on the strength of its liberal system. It should defend democracy internally, build equal partnerships externally, and make better use of its economic strength. This will not be easy; it will require courageous policies and reforms. However, now is not the time to hesitate.

Sophie
On a fundamental level, I agree with you that the world has become more Machiavellian. But I find it a bit strange to speak of a “returning” imperialism. Even in the seemingly peaceful times of recent decades, democracies have behaved imperialistically – consider colonialism, for example, or the exploitation of the Global South for our own prosperity. If, from a European perspective, we are seeing a return of Machiavellian power politics and more violent relations, this is primarily due to the fact that these are now “closer” to us.

Incidentally, I wrote a book about this two years ago. It’s in German and entitled Am Ende der gewohnten Ordnung: Warum wir Macht neu denken müssen.

… or were they never gone?

Julian
I am with Sophie there. When discussing the return of empires, we cannot portray the EU as a Gallic village of the free world, pitted against evil empires in the West, East and Far East. The EU is not and has never been a non-imperial power – if we want to try to understand the world using this concept. There are historical studies that attempt to show that the founding of the Communities was, among other things, based on the idea that France could save its colonies in this way. There is also a legitimate debate about the idea that EU foreign policy, particularly with regard to African countries, exhibits neo-colonial traits.

Furthermore, some member states (without wishing to single out France again) exploit EU foreign policy to advance their own neo-colonial ambitions. Finally, there is a debate about whether the EU’s enlargement policy has neo-colonial characteristics, too. (Personally, I am open to a critical discussion of enlargement policy, but I believe that in this latter case the concept of colonialism is being overstretched and should not be applied).

If we accept this continuity of imperial action, the question becomes whether the nature of imperialism is shifting from soft to hard power – and how the EU with its focus on non-military instruments can keep playing a role there.

Manuel
The question of whether imperialism – in the sense of global political power imbalances, especially vis-à-vis the Global South – has ever really gone away is something we naturally also discussed internally at FIIA when writing our briefing paper. In my view, there is a big difference in the way we talk about it: In recent decades, the major global political players have, at least rhetorically, embraced the concept of a liberal world order of equal states. Today, Russia, but also China and the USA, are talking much more openly about “spheres of influence”, which presupposes the inequality of states also at a normative level.

In addition, I would like to point out that the EU’s own supranational model was developed as an alternative to the imperialist power struggles that had dominated European politics in earlier times. The intention was to create a political order that would transcend nationalism, ensuring that all member states had an equal say and that none dominated the others.

Externally, of course, the EU has repeatedly acted as a quasi-imperial player – particularly in its trade policies towards the Global South (and, in my view, to some extent also in its neighbourhood and enlargement policy, especially towards the “eternal accession candidates” that have been kept circling in the EU’s political orbit for a long time without ever being fully admitted).

Values narratives with double standards

Niklas
It is true that Western democracies and the EU have never been perfect. We certainly have an imperialist past, and we have not always upheld the rules we set ourselves (think of Iraq, the Middle East, etc.), so we have also contributed to the imperialist turn. However, as a principle, we still adhere to the rules-based world order. In our paper, we argue that Europe must demonstrate an even greater commitment to these ideas also in its practices, for example by developing equal partnerships in the Global South. This will not be an easy task.

Sophie
Yes, Europe is in a difficult position today. We live in a Machiavellian world, where power is seen as a zero-sum game – if I win, you lose. Power is mainly exercised through violence.

The problem is that we have undermined our own values by not adhering to them (see our attitude towards Viktor Orbán, our support for the genocide in Gaza, or the failure of many European countries to come to terms with their colonial past). Of course, by adhering to certain standards, we make things “more difficult” for ourselves than other – authoritarian – countries. But when we fail to live up to our own values and allow so many double standards, we lose legitimacy and appear hypocritical.

The EU must adapt its political narrative to this new world. This does not mean that we should abandon democracy, human rights and the rule of law entirely – quite the opposite, in fact. But we should adopt a less moralising approach and refrain from attempting to “export” values. And we would benefit from being more honest about our own interests.

Niklas
The debate about the actual founding motives of the EU has been very intense in recent years: Is the EU a force for peace, overcoming nationalism and promoting integration? Or does the colonialist past live on within the EU, as, for example, Hans Kundnani suggests? If the latter is true, the idea of the EU as a herbivore among carnivores would be inaccurate.

Internally herbivores, externally carnivores?

Julian
But are these things mutually exclusive? Couldn’t the EU have been founded with the intention of securing peace internally while simultaneously pursuing imperial goals externally? It certainly doesn’t make things any better if the EU applies different standards internally and externally. However, a political community can do both things simultaneously: eating plants on its island and meat outside it.

Sophie
Quite controversially, I think that both interpretations are correct. The EU has secured peace and prosperity for its member states, which is an extremely positive achievement. At the same time, we have not always been “the good guys”, even if that is still a widespread self-perception.

Manuel
I also think that the EU is playing such a 🦕🦖 hybrid role in global politics. I think it can still be credited with attempting to leverage its global political influence (for example in development aid, in concluding trade agreements or through measures such as the Supply Chain Act) to strengthen values such as democracy and human rights globally. “Exporting values” in this sense is not necessarily a bad thing. But of course, this has time and again been associated with a very selfish pursuit of short-term economic interests, which has cost the EU a great deal of credibility.

Sophie
The problem is that neither the EU nor its member states are particularly interested in reflecting on their role in the world. In recent decades, we have enjoyed a very comfortable position: cheap Russian gas, a thriving export economy, and the convenient US security guarantee. Those days are over. This means that we are losing power – and the criticism of the EU is becoming more pronounced as a result.

This does not mean that we should abandon everything – democracy and peace within the EU are still important goals. But we must redefine our role in this (carnivore) world. To do this, we should maintain as much room for manoeuvre as possible (for example by examining our supply chains and not making them dependent on any single country), think strategically instead of acting naively (for example, by not selling our critical infrastructure to third countries without considering the consequences), and continue to do everything we can to uphold values such as democracy and human rights (for example, by finally stopping the supply of arms to the Israeli government).

Niklas
The so-called Global South is sometimes portrayed as turning away from the rules-based system, for example when its representatives appear at Russian military parades. In reality, however, many in the Global South are primarily disappointed with how we have acted in the Global North. They don’t reject the system itself; they just want a seat at the table.

Global supranationalism and other utopias

Manuel
My favourite utopia in this context is the establishment of a global, supranational union of democracies from all continents with real legislative powers in areas such as climate or migration policy. In a sense, applying the EU’s positive experiences in overcoming power imbalances between European states to the global level.

Julian
Welcome back to the Hertenstein Programme (thesis 12)! 😂

Sophie
Manuel is a friend of utopias! But that's a good thing – we lack positive images of the future. (Florence Gaub says that, too.)

Niklas
As a utopia, that’s fine, Manuel, but given the current world situation, we should be happy if we can keep the existing multilateral institutions just about functional. If you look at how the USA behaves in the United Nations … And even within the EU, the pushback from populists makes it pretty unlikely that we will pursue any utopias of world democracy at the moment.

Manuel
That may be true. But if we are always afraid of how the populists will react, we won’t achieve anything in the foreseeable future.

Sophie
That is right. There is currently extreme pessimism among those who want a less “imperial”, chaotic and Machiavellian world. However, we certainly won’t be able to combat the visions of the far right by simply maintaining the status quo. That’s why we need a counter-narrative that shows not everything is lost: A world worth living in is possible. Peace is not an unattainable utopia. There are welfare states that enable people to live healthy lives and carry out meaningful work.

Niklas
This reminds me of SITRA, the Finnish public innovation fund, which uses its foresight model not only to create different scenarios of the future, but also to emphasize that everyone can contribute to define it in a positive way. In the sense of “making the future yourself”.

And it is precisely because we need these positive counter-models that we have developed this idea of the EU as a liberal geopolitical power in our FIIA paper! 😉

The dismantling of the liberal world order has limits

Julian
I see your points and I also agree that we are currently in a phase in which the rule-based order is under massive attack. But how far does it really go? Hasn’t the reaction of the US economy to Trump’s tariff announcement shown that the dismantling of the liberal world order also has its limits? If the reactionary actors go too far, they will drain themselves of the resources they need to finance their imperialism.

The same applies to China, where regime stability may be called into question if economic development stalls. That’s why I still have some hope that we can realistically save the multilateral institutions – not in the form that we would like them to have, but still with a minimum of functionality.

I cannot imagine that there is a massive movement of populists who are prepared to sacrifice their wealth just to destroy the world order. Even Viktor Orbán is, above all, just a kleptocrat, not a missionary.

Sophie
We have talked so much about imperialism – perhaps it is time to turn our attention to liberalism now!

The new role of the US

Manuel
Then let’s talk about the role of America next. What do you think: Is the US tipping into the camp of imperial autocracies? Or does the “democratic West” still have a future? Or is Trump undermining the global influence of the US so severely that in a few years’ time it will no longer be a decisive factor anyway?

Niklas
The question is to what extent Trump is an ideologue. There is the idea that he is more likely to associate with autocrats like Putin, and that he finds Eurovision-liberal Europe repugnant. In fact, while Trump’s rhetoric and actions do support the illiberal tendency, but he himself is more of a businessman than an ideologue.

J.D. Vance, on the other hand, is actually an ideologue in the Trump administration. As vice president, he is not yet setting the tone. But if he comes to power after Trump, ideology will also have arrived in the Oval Office.

Sophie
Three points. First: In my view, the USA is already an oligarchy – the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision means that financial power can easily be converted into political power. Trump is in the process of turning the country into a fascist police state. It remains unclear how this will develop, or whether the courts will be able to save democracy. But the situation is more than serious.

Second, regarding the “democratic West”: I find myself asking more and more what “the West” actually means. Is it cultural similarities? Or is it simply the fact that the countries that make up the West are the richest and most powerful in the world? (That’s a rather blunt way of putting it, but it’s still a question we should ask ourselves).

Third, on the future of US foreign policy: The US has been pursuing an isolationist course for some time now. It remains to be seen what effect this will have on global power dynamics. However, my conclusion is that Europe must become more independent of the US – without falling prey to the idea that we could be completely autonomous (as many far-right extremists dream of). The key is to negotiate interdependencies strategically – in our interests and without losing sight of our values.

Euro-American estrangement

Julian
Slightly contradicting Manuel’s formulation of the questions and agreeing with Sophie’s third point, I believe in both. I see a great danger that the US will tip over into an autocracy while simultaneously losing its foreign policy influence. If you consider the US’s current lack of influence within international organisations, the closure of the Voice of America and the cuts to USAID funding: All of these developments point to isolationism. A missionary ideologue would not have abolished these instruments, but rather used them to promote Trumpism.

Manuel
There is no contradiction; I see things very similarly myself. And, of course, it comes down to the same thing for the EU: whether the USA becomes less friendly or less important or both, we will have to become more independent and seek out other partners.

And there are many democratic partners with whom the EU could intensify its relations – Canada, South Korea, the South American and African democracies …

Niklas
I agree. Even under future Democratic US presidents, we won’t see a return to the Obama years. They will not reinstate USAID to its former level or redeploy troops to Europe. There is also a generation of young people in the US who, having witnessed the DOGE mess, will decide against pursuing a career in public service or diplomacy. There will be long-term consequences.

Julian
Yes, we are witnessing a long-term trend that even began during Obama’s presidency. He already called for greater commitment from the EU in terms of foreign, security and defence policy. In addition, many developments initiated by the Trump II administration will, of course, continue. The EU must prepare for this, even if a more rational administration takes over after Trump.

Potential for conflict over Big Tech

Niklas
As for Sophie’s first point about the oligarchy, it is largely centred around big tech. Individuals such as Elon Musk, Sam Altman and Peter Thiel exert significant influence over the Trump administration.

Here, too, there is great potential for conflict with the EU and its liberal approach to policy implementation. Even if the EU only enforces its own internal rules against X and Co. and imposes fines,  the US government could take offence. And with Trump, there is no separation between policy areas – he could hit back in terms of security policy, for example by questioning security guarantees.

Julian
Do you really think that the US techies would let it come down to a battle between Europe and the US? Isn’t there too great a risk that China would win in this case? On tariffs, Trump was also quick to row back when the US economy slumped.

Niklas
The EU rules are a thorn in the side of US techies. With China, they have less of a problem; tech in the US has benefited greatly from China.

Julian
In any case, it is striking that Trump’s current strategy deliberately does not address the entire area of services. Otherwise, it would become clear that the trade between the EU and the US is not as imbalanced as the Trump II administration claims.

The jobs that Trump wants to bring back with his tariffs are industrial, not IT. I therefore think that the US tech industry could face problems with China, not in terms of regulation, but in terms of economic competition. If Europe and the US engage in a trade war in the services sector, Chinese tech companies could take over market share.

Global institution building

Sophie
The Trump administration is a bully – and if Europe turns to China, the US will use its power ruthlessly. This was evident in their dealings with the Dutch semiconductor company ASML. I very much hope that EU decision-makers will not be too keen to appease the Trump administration, and that we will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed into reversing our tech regulation. This could be difficult, though, if, for example, Ukraine is dependent on Elon Musk’s Starlink. That’s why we need to take a very close look at our weak points now (such as critical infrastructure and supply chains) and ensure that we expand our room for manoeuvre as much as possible, rather than reducing it.

Manuel
One thing I would like to see from the EU is a stronger focus on global institution building. Apart from NATO structures, the focus with the USA has primarily been on diplomatic relations and the assumption of shared values in the democratic West. However, in the world of diplomacy, every state ultimately prioritises its own interests, and you cannot rely on common values being maintained indefinitely.

What can change this are strong supranational institutions that protect these common values. We do not yet have this in perfect form within the EU (see Hungary), but thanks to European law and the European Court of Justice, the protection of common values is much more effective here than within any intergovernmental framework at global level.

This is another reason why I keep coming back to the idea of a supranational global union. In my view, it would make sense to share some sovereign rights (such as the power to decide on climate policy) with the democracies of the Global South – and, in return, create institutions that ensure a lasting anchoring of shared democratic values and keep our fundamental interests aligned by raising the price of national unilateralism. A solidarité de fait, as Robert Schuman would have said. 😉

Sophie
Indeed, we need structures to negotiate opposing interests, such as in climate policy. We already have the COP in this area, but many more coalitions of the willing are needed at an international level to promote ambitious political proposals.

Manuel
And most importantly, unlike the COP, it should be an organisation with supranational decision-making powers, without national vetoes and with its own budget. A genuine sharing of sovereign rights, bringing the world’s democracies together institutionally, and providing a more stable and reliable alternative to short-term coalitions of the willing.

A Schuman Plan for European defence

Niklas
While we’re on the subject of Schuman: Integration is not achieved through conferences, but by solving concrete problems. In my view, defence is more likely than climate policy to see progress on integration in the coming years, because the threat is more tangible.

Manuel
I think that is true for the EU. But on a global level, the risk perceptions in defence policy vary greatly between democratic countries around the world. And if you look at the Global South, many African countries, for example, have a fairly concrete interest in climate protection.

Sophie
Nevertheless, the point about European security is correct: We need a Schuman Plan to integrate our defence. We are currently seeing that many EU member states are increasing their arms spending; Friedrich Merz has just announced his intention to make the Bundeswehr the “strongest conventional army in Europe”.

Rebuilding national armies without integrating them on a supranational level is dangerous. The far right is not only in power in the United States, but also gaining ground in Europe. If right-wing extremists who think little of peace come to power in numerous EU member states, they will have all the tools they need to attack their neighbours. The fact that there hasn’t been a war in the EU since the Second World War doesn’t mean that it will stay that way forever.

Niklas
One initial step could be to make much greater use of Eurobonds for arms procurement. This would promote military cooperation and European defence, while also entailing a deeper political integration of the EU.

Julian
But then we also urgently need to address the issue of the European internal defence market. As long as the member states insist on their economic egoism when it comes to procurement, progress will be difficult here. While I think your proposals are sensible and important, I can already anticipate the objections of the national governments, and it is these governments that we need to convince.

Adapting to the new conditions

Manuel
Let’s go back to the dinosaurs, which are known to have all become extinct (except for the birds) because they were unable to adapt to changed living conditions following the impact of a meteorite at the end of the Maastricht era. 🌠

Short final round: If the EU is to avoid the same fate, how must it adapt to the new global political conditions?

Niklas
Very generally speaking, Europe must regain its defensive capabilities. But it must also reach out to the Global South and develop partnerships on equal terms. Overall, this means developing an alternative to the US-led West of recent decades.

Julian
We urgently need internal reforms that increase the EU’s capability of taking action (especially with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union, and social policy), restore its credibility with regard to democracy and the rule of law, and make the EU resilient against populists and extremists in national governments – see Sophie’s point on rearmament.

Sophie
The meteorite impact that caused the extinction of our dinosaurs, along with many other plants and animals, triggered a climate catastrophe. My point may have less to do with the EU – but if we want to continue living in Europe in the future, we must finally take the climate crisis seriously. Even if it’s not currently a priority on the political agenda, the fact that we’re currently living in a difficult geopolitical context doesn’t mean we can simply ignore systemic crises. Burying our heads in the sand certainly won’t help.

Niklas Helwig is a Brussels-based Leading Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).

Manuel Müller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and runs the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Julian Plottka is a research associate at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics at the University of Passau and a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophie Pornschlegel is Director of Studies and Development at Europe Jacques Delors in Brussels.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

All issues of the European Policy Quartet can be found here.

Pictures: Europasaurus: Gerhard Boeggemann [CC BY-SA 2.5], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Niklas Helwig, Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved]; portrait Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel: private [all rights reserved].