| Left | G/EFA | S&D | RE | EPP | ECR | PfE | ESN | NI | other | |
| EP2024 | 46 | 53 | 136 | 77 | 188 | 78 | 84 | 25 | 33 | – |
| EP today | 46 | 53 | 136 | 75 | 188 | 79 | 85 | 27 | 31 | – |
| Sep. 25 (B) | 55 | 40 | 123 | 66 | 176 | 85 | 105 | 37 | 21 | 12 |
| Nov. 25 (B) | 51 | 37 | 124 | 71 | 175 | 81 | 105 | 39 | 24 | 13 |
| Nov. 25 (D) | 52 | 37 | 126 | 73 | 175 | 86 | 109 | 39 | 23 | – |




- Baseline scenario,
as of 10 November 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)






- Dynamic scenario,
as of 10 November 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)
In recent weeks, the EU saw two national parliamentary elections with seemingly contradictory outcomes: In the Czech election at the beginning of October, the populist far-right ANO (PfE) party scored a clear victory. In the Dutch election at the end of the month, on the other hand, the far-right PVV (PfE) fell short of expectations and was even overtaken by the left-liberal D66 (RE) in the final stages of the campaign. But the “turn to the centre” that some media outlets wanted to see in the Dutch election did not really materialise. The overall share of the far-right vote remained relatively stable, as the PVV’s losses were offset by gains from smaller, even more extreme parties. While there is a good chance that the next Dutch government will be formed by centrist parties, the political mood remains far to the right.
In the current seat projection, a somewhat similar picture emerges for the EU as a whole. The recent electoral success in the Netherlands is boosting the European Liberals, making up for most of the heavy losses that they had suffered in the last projection at the beginning of September. But this is unlikely to represent a democratic turnaround. The two largest centrist groups, the EPP and the S&D, are holding steady at best, while the Greens and the Left are losing ground. Meanwhile, within the far-right spectrum, the relatively moderate ECR group is declining, while the small, radical ESN group as well as non-attached far-right parties continue to rise.
Mixed results for EPP and S&D
Examining the polls in more detail, the outlook for the centre-right EPP group is mixed. In the Netherlands, EPP member parties CDA and BBB experienced a sharp decline in the final stages of the national election campaign, and the BBB would now no longer be represented in the European Parliament. In addition, the EPP is also struggling in other major member states: Germany’s CDU/CSU now only ranks second in national polls behind the AfD (ESN), while Spain’s PP continues to lose ground to the far-right Vox (PfE).
The situation looks somewhat better for EPP member parties in medium-sized member states – such as Greece and Hungary, where ND and Tisza were able to further strengthen their respective national leadership positions. Overall, the EPP group remains largely stable in the seat projection, falling only minimally to 175 seats (–1 compared to September). However, the September projection had already indicated significant losses for the EPP; and the current figure in fact represents its worst result since the 2024 European elections.
The centre-left S&D group also has little reason to celebrate. The Socialists recently gained ground in some major member states, in particular France, Spain, and Romania. But in the Dutch election, the campaign of the social democratic-green alliance GL/PvdA, led by former Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans, fell far short of expectations. Overall, the S&D has only marginally improved its position, now reaching a total of 124 seats (+1).
RE: only partial recovery
The biggest winner in recent weeks has been the liberal RE group, which has benefited above all from the successful election campaigns of its two Dutch member parties, D66 and VVD. In addition, the Estonian KE has also seen an increase in popularity; and in Italy, an alliance between the two small centrist parties IV and +Europa would now narrowly pass the national four per cent threshold again.
However, RE member parties have suffered slight losses in recent polls in several other member states, such as Romania, Portugal, Austria and Finland. While not a dramatic collapse, this development is a continuation of the gradual decline that Liberals have been experiencing across Europe for about three years now. Thanks to the recent success in the Netherlands, RE has made up for a large part of its massive losses from the September projection (71 seats/+5). But this partial recovery should not obscure the fact that this is still its second-worst result in more than a decade.
Left loses previous gains
On the left side of the political spectrum, both the Left group and the Greens/EFA group have suffered losses.
While the Left could celebrate gains in several member states in September, both France’s LFI and Spain’s Podemos have now lost ground to their respective centre-left rivals PS and PSOE (both S&D). Moreover, the Dutch left-wing party SP performed poorly in the national elections and would not win a seat in the European Parliament any more.
In Ireland and Cyprus, on the other hand, the Left is making further gains, now topping the national polls of both countries. Still, the group falls back to an overall result of 51 seats (–4), undoing the gains it made in September.
Greens/EFA smallest group again
The situation looks even more dire for the European Greens. Among other places, they have recently struggled in the Netherlands and in Denmark, and in Luxembourg they would not secure any seat in the European Parliament now. This continues the Greens’ downward trend since the 2024 European Parliament election. With only 37 seats (–3), they are recording their worst result in over three years and are now projected to be the smallest parliamentary group again, even behind the far-right ESN.
The European Greens can take some comfort in the fact that, historically, they have often performed rather poorly in the middle of the European election period, but significantly better in the elections themselves. But European politics is not only determined by European Parliament elections, but also by the member states’ national elections. And here, the Greens are currently facing a strong headwind from the Europe-wide trend.
ECR loses ground, remains strong
At the other end of the political spectrum, all three of the far-right groups – ECR, PfE, and ESN – had reached new historic highs in the September projection. Since then, however, their development has diverged. The most moderate of the three, the ECR, has slid back a bit in recent weeks. These losses can be attributed to its member parties in Poland (PiS), Romania (AUR) and Belgium (N-VA), all of which have lost ground to more extreme parties (KKP/NI, POT/other, and VB/PfE).
By contrast, the ECR made slight gains in Czechia, where the ODS performed slightly better than expected in the national parliamentary elections in October. Moreover, the Finnish PS, which had lost support in the spring due to widespread popular dissatisfaction with the national economic situation, has now managed to reverse the trend in the polls by intensifying its anti-immigration rhetoric. Overall, the ECR now stands at 81 seats (–4), which is still the second-best result the group has ever achieved in the projection.
PfE stable, ESN still on the rise
The largest far-right group, PfE, sees few changes in the current projection. While its member parties in Spain, Belgium and Austria are gaining ground, the group is being dragged down by the poor election results of the Dutch PVV and the weakness of the Hungarian Fidesz. Overall, the PfE remains at the record level of 105 seats (±0) that it achieved in September.
Meanwhile, the smallest and most extreme far-right group, ESN, is projected to gain ground again – for the eighth time in a row. After the 2024 European elections, ESN was founded with 25 MEPs, barely meeting the requirements to form an independent group. Today, it is projected to win 39 seats (+2 compared to September), overtaking the Greens.
These recent gains of the ESN are owed to the Dutch FvD, which is benefitting from the PVV’s weakness. If European elections took place today, the FvD would re-enter the European Parliament, where it was previously represented from 2019 to 2024. While it was part of the ECR group at that time, the party has since moved further to the right, is entertaining ties with the Russian government, and has joined the ESN party.
Non-attached far-right parties strengthened
The radicalisation within the far-right camp is also evident from the recent poll successes of non-aligned far-right parties – namely Poland’s KKP, which holds a mix of monarchist, antisemitic and pro-Russian views, and Luxembourg’s ADR, which was expelled from the ECR group in the summer due to its pro-Russian stance. Unlike in September, both parties would now secure seats in the European Parliament again.
Meanwhile, the non-aligned left-conservative parties, which had made slight gains in the September projection, performed less well this time around. While Germany’s BSW is struggling to maintain its political relevance, the Czech Stačilo failed to secure enough votes in the October national parliamentary elections to be represented in the European Parliament. Overall, non-aligned parties would now hold 24 seats (+3).
Finally, there are the “other” parties, which are not currently represented in the European Parliament and do not belong to any European party, so that they cannot be clearly assigned to any political group. Among them, the Romanian party POT would now narrowly clear the national five-percent threshold again – a far-right populist party that supported the independent pro-Russian candidate, Călin Georgescu, in the annulled Romanian presidential election of 2024. In total, the “other” parties now stand at 13 seats (+1), slightly more than half of which can be attributed to the right-wing populist or far-right camp.
The overview
The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.
In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest. In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.
In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.
| Left | G/EFA | S&D | RE | EPP | ECR | PfE | ESN | NI | other | |
| EP2024 | 46 | 53 | 136 | 77 | 188 | 78 | 84 | 25 | 33 | – |
| EP today | 46 | 53 | 136 | 75 | 188 | 79 | 85 | 27 | 31 | – |
| Sep. 25 (B) | 55 | 40 | 123 | 66 | 176 | 85 | 105 | 37 | 21 | 12 |
| Nov. 25 (B) | 51 | 37 | 124 | 71 | 175 | 81 | 105 | 39 | 24 | 13 |
| Nov. 25 (D) | 52 | 37 | 126 | 73 | 175 | 86 | 109 | 39 | 23 | – |
| Left | G/EFA | S&D | RE | EPP | ECR | PfE | ESN | NI | other | |
| DE |
9 Linke 1 Tier |
11 Grüne 3 Volt |
13 SPD |
3 FDP 3 FW |
22 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP |
23 AfD | 3 BSW 2 Partei 1 PdF |
|||
| FR | 8 LFI |
|
13 PS | 14 RE | 12 LR | 34 RN |
|
|||
| IT |
11 M5S 2 SI |
3 EV | 18 PD |
3 IV/+E
|
6 FI 1 SVP |
25 FdI | 7 Lega | |||
| ES | 2 Sumar 2 Pod 1 Bildu |
2 Sumar 1 ERC |
18 PSOE |
|
21 PP | 1 SALF | 12 Vox |
1 Junts |
||
| PL | 3 Lewica |
|
19 KO |
16 PiS | 5 Konf | 6 Konf | 4 KKP | |||
| RO | 8 PSD |
3 USR 1 PMP |
5 PNL |
14 AUR |
|
2 POT |
||||
| NL |
|
2 GL |
2 PvdA |
7 D66 6 VVD |
4 CDA |
|
6 PVV | 2 FvD |
|
|
| BE | 3 PTB |
1 Groen |
2 Vooruit 2 PS |
2 MR 2 LE |
2 CD&V 1 CSP |
3 N-VA | 4 VB | |||
| CZ | 2 Piráti |
2 STAN 1 TOP09 1 KDU-ČSL |
4 ODS |
8 ANO 1 AUTO |
2 SPD |
|
||||
| EL | 1 Syriza | 3 PASOK | 1 KD | 7 ND | 3 EL | 1 FL |
2 PE 2 KKE |
1 MéRA |
||
| HU |
1 DK |
|
11 TISZA |
8 Fidesz | 1 MHM |
|
||||
| PT |
|
1 Livre |
6 PS | 1 IL | 7 AD | 6 Chega | ||||
| SE | 2 V | 1 MP | 7 S |
1 C |
4 M 1 KD |
5 SD | ||||
| AT | 2 Grüne | 4 SPÖ | 1 Neos | 4 ÖVP | 9 FPÖ |
|
||||
| BG | 2 BSP |
2 PP |
5 GERB 1 DB |
|
3 V | 3 DPS-NN |
1 MECh |
|||
| DK | 1 Enhl. | 2 SF | 4 S |
2 V 1 RV |
2 LA 1 K |
1 DD |
1 DF |
|||
| SK | 4 PS |
1 KDH 1 D 1 Slov |
1 SaS
|
2 REP |
3 Smer 2 Hlas |
|||||
| FI | 1 Vas | 1 Vihreät | 5 SDP |
2 Kesk |
3 Kok |
3 PS | ||||
| IE |
5 SF |
|
|
3 FF |
4 FG | 2 SD | ||||
| HR | 2 Možemo | 4 SDP | 5 HDZ |
|
1 Most |
|||||
| LT | 2 DSVL | 3 LSDP |
1 LS |
3 TS-LKD |
1 LVŽS |
|
1 NA |
|||
| LV | 1 Prog |
|
|
1 JV |
2 NA 1 LRA |
2 LPV |
1 ZZS 1 ST! |
|||
| SI |
|
|
1 SD | 3 GS |
4 SDS 1 N.Si |
|
||||
| EE | 1 SDE |
1 RE 2 KE |
2 Isamaa | 1 EKRE | ||||||
| CY | 2 AKEL |
|
2 DISY | 1 ELAM |
|
1 ALMA | ||||
| LU |
|
1 LSAP | 2 DP | 2 CSV |
1 ADR
|
|||||
| MT | 3 PL | 3 PN |
| Left | G/EFA | S&D | RE | EPP | ECR | PfE | ESN | NI | other | |
| 25-11-10 | 51 | 37 | 124 | 71 | 175 | 81 | 105 | 39 | 24 | 13 |
| 25-09-01 | 55 | 40 | 123 | 66 | 176 | 85 | 105 | 37 | 21 | 12 |
| 25-07-01 | 51 | 44 | 124 | 73 | 181 | 80 | 99 | 36 | 20 | 12 |
| 25-05-19 | 49 | 40 | 130 | 76 | 179 | 79 | 100 | 35 | 23 | 9 |
| 25-03-24 | 52 | 41 | 131 | 73 | 177 | 79 | 99 | 33 | 24 | 11 |
| 25-01-27 | 48 | 43 | 130 | 81 | 185 | 77 | 93 | 29 | 24 | 10 |
| 24-12-02 | 43 | 41 | 131 | 83 | 186 | 73 | 100 | 27 | 24 | 12 |
| 24-10-07 | 44 | 41 | 136 | 79 | 186 | 74 | 96 | 26 | 29 | 9 |
| 24-08-12 | 44 | 45 | 137 | 77 | 191 | 73 | 88 | 25 | 31 | 9 |
| EP 2024 | 46 | 53 | 136 | 77 | 188 | 78 | 84 | 25 | 33 | – |
| Left | G/EFA | S&D | RE | EPP | ECR | PfE | ESN | NI | other | |
| 25-11-10 | 52 | 37 | 126 | 73 | 175 | 86 | 109 | 39 | 23 | – |
| 25-09-01 | 56 | 40 | 125 | 68 | 177 | 89 | 107 | 37 | 21 | – |
| 25-07-01 | 52 | 44 | 126 | 75 | 181 | 84 | 101 | 37 | 20 | – |
| 25-05-19 | 49 | 40 | 132 | 78 | 179 | 82 | 101 | 36 | 23 | – |
| 25-03-24 | 52 | 41 | 132 | 74 | 179 | 82 | 103 | 33 | 24 | – |
| 25-01-27 | 49 | 43 | 132 | 82 | 185 | 80 | 96 | 29 | 24 | – |
| 24-12-02 | 43 | 42 | 133 | 82 | 186 | 77 | 104 | 27 | 26 | – |
| 24-10-07 | 46 | 41 | 137 | 79 | 187 | 77 | 97 | 26 | 30 | – |
| 24-08-12 | 45 | 46 | 138 | 78 | 191 | 76 | 89 | 25 | 32 | – |
| EP 2024 | 46 | 53 | 136 | 77 | 188 | 78 | 84 | 25 | 33 | – |
The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).
Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.
According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.
Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.
The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.
If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.
For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.
As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.
In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).
In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Czechia: Spolu: TOP09 (1, 3, 5 etc.) and KDU-ČSL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Stačilo: Stačilo (1, 3, 5 etc.) and SOCDEM (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.), RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Czechia, some polls combine ODS (ECR), TOP09 and KDU-ČSL (both EPP); in these cases, two thirds of the seats are allocated to the ODS and one third to the alliance of TOP09 and KDU-ČSL. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.
Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.
The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:
Germany: national polls, 3-7/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Italy: national polls, 22/10-3/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Spain: national polls, 26/10-8/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Poland: national polls, 26/10-5/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Romania: national polls, 26/10-2/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Netherlands: national polls, 8/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 23/9/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemish polls for the national parliamentary election, 23/9/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024/
Czechia: national parliamentary election results, 3-4/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Greece: national polls, 20/10-2/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Hungary: national polls, 22-31/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Portugal: national polls, 26-27/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Sweden: national polls, 19-27/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Austria: national polls, 4/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Bulgaria: national polls, 12/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Denmark: national polls, 6-9/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovakia: national polls, 18-20/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Finland: national polls, 4/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Ireland: national polls, 21-31/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Croatia: national polls, 6/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Lithuania: national polls, 27/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Latvia: national polls, Juli 2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovenia: national polls, 29/9-9/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Estonia: national polls, 2/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Cyprus: national polls, 22/9/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Luxembourg: national polls, 29/9/2024, source: Wikipedia.
Malta: national polls, 2/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.




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