Economic deprivation reduces political trust

Deutsch

By Henrik Serup Christensen and Janette Huttunen

The Horizon Europe project Activating European Citizens’ Trust in Times of Crisis and Polarisation (ActEU) examines questions of political trust and democratic legitimacy in Europe. This article is part of a series in which ActEU researchers present their findings.

“Whether people feel that they are able to cope on their household income is of key importance for political trust in society.”

Political trust is a fundamental precondition for the stability and legitimacy of the political system. For our societies to function smoothly, we need to hold at least some level of trust in the actors and institutions that make authoritative decisions on our behalf. We do not have to agree with everything they do, but a general belief that the system works for the common good is nonetheless favourable. For this reason, the study of political trust has been a central theme within political science.

Trust varies across social groups

Studies show that levels of political trust change across time and place, but it can be difficult to find a common pattern in these developments. All countries experience ups and downs in their levels of trust that are shaped by historical legacies, international crises, and domestic political events. It may therefore be difficult to identify a common trend in these developments.

A more enduring finding is that there seem to be persistent differences in levels of political trust across groups in society. Several studies show that levels of trust differ across factors such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Especially in our times of crises – from the climate crisis to increasing security threats in Europe, rising anti-democratic sentiments, and the competitiveness and innovation gap in EU – the question of how we can sustain different societal groups’ trust in our political system becomes ever more imperative. Without high levels of political trust, democratic states may be incapable of navigating through this turmoil.

Disadvantaged groups are expected to have less trust

Disadvantaged groups are often expected to hold lower levels of political trust. For example, women, young people, and people with lower educational attainment tend to hold lower levels of trust compared to their male, older, and well-educated counterparts. This finding is explained by political economy theories and the “winner hypothesis”, which hold that groups with greater resources in the form of either human (e.g., education, skills, and health) or economic capital (such as income) are most likely to trust political institutions since they benefit most from the status quo of the social and political system.

People in higher social strata have more political influence, which allows them to defend their interests and therefore have more trust in political institutions. Since disadvantaged groups do not benefit as much from the political system they place less trust in these institutions.

This theoretical proposition has been examined in several studies. The findings are generally supportive. For example, higher income is associated with higher levels of political trust, and belonging to the middle or upper class is associated with higher trust in national political institutions, compared to other social classes.

Which factors can really explain differences in trust?

But the extent to which sociodemographic inequalities can account for differences in levels of political trust is still unclear. Furthermore, we still don’t know which of these inequalities are more important in shaping differences in political trust. Within the framework of the Horizon Europe funded project ActEU, we delved into the question of how socio-demographic characters and status affect citizens’ political trust across Europe. With the help of time series data from the European Social Survey (ESS) covering 2002-2023, we mapped the extent to which seven socioeconomic factors can help explain differences in political trust: age, gender, migrant origin, urbanicity, educational attainment, social class, and subjective feelings about household income.

We examined the relationship between these factors and political trust at both the national and European levels of government. Figure 1 shows results of regression analyses where we compare the association of each of these with political trust at the European and national level.

Figure 1: Multilevel regression coefficients, ESS2002-2023 (click to enlarge).

Our analysis shows, first of all, that many of the suggested differences are not that large when taking into account other factors. However, it would be a mistake to interpret this as evidence that socio-demographic factors are largely irrelevant. Instead, it shows that they are closely connected and that certain groups may combine several traits that depress the level of trust.

Subjective income strongly impacts the level of trust

For one factor, however, there are clear differences in levels of trust at both the national and EU institutions: subjective income. This variable concerns the extent to which respondents feel that they can get by on their current household income. Europe has in recent years undergone a string of turmoil that has had a negative effect on average citizens’ spending capacity and depressed their sense of security. Inflation, the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, among others, have tested citizens’ confidence in their personal economy, making the measure especially relevant currently.

The result shows that people who experience difficulties getting by on their current household income on average hold lower levels of trust in the political system at both the national and European government levels. The differences are quite pronounced, and they are all the more remarkable considering that the results adjust for differences in factors such as education and social class. Across all other factors, people who feel that they have difficulties getting by economically express lower levels of political trust. While we are unable to establish causality with our data, this finding suggests that material insecurity is a key driving force explaining differences in political trust.

Since, as for example Thomas Piketty noted in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, economic inequality is at least partially a result of political decisions, its effect on trust in the very institutions responsible for the policymaking is logical. It is nevertheless remarkable that economic hardship manifests itself so clearly in feelings of animosity toward the political system.

The effect is visible across countries …

The pervasive effect of economic hardship is also evident when we examine country-level differences in how economic hardship shape political trust over time. In Figure 2, we show country-by-country bivariate relationships between subjective income feeling and political trust over the time period 2002-2023. To make the comparison easier to follow, we only display differences between the two extreme categories here (Living comfortably vs. Very difficult to get by).

Figure 2: Country-level differences in political trust depending on feelings about income, ESS2002-2023I (click to enlarge).

These results show that those who are living comfortably generally have higher trust at both the European and national level, whereas those who are struggling tend to have lower trust. This pattern is found in all countries, although the magnitude of the differences differs. While some fluctuations occur, the pattern is remarkably consistent across countries. Furthermore, it seems like the gap has been widening in most countries over time. This suggests that the differences are growing even more pronounced over time.

… and holds for trust in the European, national, and regional level

Economic hardship is thus a strong and consistent predictor of lower levels of political trust in both European and national levels across Europe. But what do we find at the regional level? In Figure 3, we visualize the differences in trust between those who are well off and those who are struggling at the regional level. This only shows the situation for the year 2020.

Figure 3: Subjective income ratios of trust at the regional level (NUTS 2 + 3), ESS2020 (click to enlarge).

Ratios around 1 indicate that economic hardship plays less of a role in shaping levels of trust. Ratios above 1 (darker colours) mean that those who experience economic hardship have higher trust than those without problems getting by, while ratios below 1 (lighter colours) indicate that those who experience economic hardship have lower trust. These results clearly demonstrate that both European and national level trust tend to be lower among groups who experience economic hardship in most regions across Europe. Hence economic hardship is a strong predictor for political trust even at the regional level.

Feelings matter

The extent to which people feel that they are able to cope on their household income is therefore of key importance for understanding differences in political trust in society. Economic hardship is a pivotal factor that can undermine levels of trust.

The implications of this finding are manyfold. Perhaps most importantly, it points to concrete solutions for increasing levels of political trust. First of all, it is worth noting that what matters is not only the economic reality of citizens, calculable by euros, i.e., the money they have in their household to spend, but also people’s subjective feelings about their household’s economic state. Improving citizens’ trust in their economic situation is important for increasing political trust. To boost political trust, it is imperative to increase the economic security of the European populations.

Equitable growth, affordable basic commodities, welfare policies

One way to achieve this is increasing the amount of money that households have for their basic needs. Policies that aim to ensure economic growth may be part of the solution since sustained economic growth can make the pie bigger for everyone. But it is essential that this growth benefits those who have a hard time getting by. Economic growth that only benefits those at the top of society may inadvertently damage political trust, since those who do not benefit will feel even worse about their economic situation when others are thriving. A functioning labour market that provides opportunities for all is therefore also part of the solution.

Furthermore, economic fortune is not only about the amount of money in your pocket. It is also about how far that money goes – how well basic human needs can be met. This entails that the prices of basic essentials such as groceries, housing, heating, and healthcare are of primary importance. To increase levels of trust, individuals need to be sure that they will be able to buy these basic commodities. To boost political trust, helpful economic policies may include measures that aim to ensure low and stable inflation, especially on food and basic commodities. Establishing a sense of economic security will also be beneficial. Hence, welfare policies that ensure the basic needs of all can help boost political trust.

These solutions may be costly, but they seem to be decisive if we want to ensure the legitimacy of our political system in the future.

Henrik Serup Christensen is a Senior University Lecturer at Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finland.

Janette Huttunen is a Post-doc Researcher at Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finland.

This article is based on the authors’ contributions to the ActEU project’s “Report on how trends in trust among specific social and political groups, including ethnic and territorial identities, territorial attachment and regime types at subnational level impact on varying levels of trust across European subnational units”, published in March 2025.

Economic deprivation reduces political trust [DE/EN] ● Henrik Serup Christensen and Janette Huttunen

Pictures: Grey buildings: Luca [Unsplash license], via Unsplash [cropped]; graphs: Henrik Serup Christensen, Janette Huttunen; portraits: private [all rights reserved].