EU Analytics – April 2026 review: EP presents itself fragmented for the multi-year EU budget fight

By Nicolai von Ondarza

The budgetary tightrope, as illustrated by ChatGPT.

Despite further geopolitical turmoil, April was another month in which the EU institutional machine rumbled on. The highlighted vote this month is on the EU’s multiannual budget, the MFF, which showed that for the fundamental decisions, the “von der Leyen” platform from the centre-right and centre-left is still required, and still working.

The other votes in the EP also point in this direction: At least for now, the majorities with the far-right remain the exception and the votes around the centre the norm. In the Council, we had only four public votes, but two of them were quite controversial – and in both cases Germany, among others, was outvoted.

Time to dive in:

Highlight of the month: EP vote on its position regarding the MFF

For this month’s highlight, I choose a closer look at the EP’s vote regarding the EU’s long-term budget, in EU speak the “multiannual financial framework” or, in short, MFF. The MFF sets the overall EU budget for a seven-year timeframe, with the next one covering 2028-2034. The negotiations on the MFF are usually among the most difficult in the EU: Although the EU budget covers only just above 1% of EU GDP (the EP is calling for 1.27% this time), as it stretches over seven years it sounds like an enormous amount of money, and it is of course highly relevant for all discussion of how much member states “pay into” the EU or “get out” of it.

The main action of these negotiations takes place in the European Council between the member states. In the past, there was usually at least one summit where negotiations broke down, including lots of hard bargaining between net payers and recipients, friends of cohesion, supporters of other policy areas, advocates of the EU showing it can also do austerity, and more. In 2020, of course, the negotiations were overshadowed by the Covid-19 pandemic, which eventually enabled the adoption of the “Recovery and Resilience Facility” on top of the usual MFF.

Pushing for changes in the MFF proposal

Currently, the aim of António Costa is to get an agreement in the European Council by the end of this year so as not to run into the 2027 French presidential election, though I am personally quite sceptical that this will be achieved. What is important for this analysis is that, after an agreement in the European Council, the European Parliament also has to vote in favour of the MFF.

In the past, this has allowed the EP to push for some marginal changes. Usually in the process, the EP asks for more money than the Commission or member states are willing to provide, and then the EP accepts the European Council result with some adaptations. The vote this month points in a similar direction: In its interim report, the EP is calling for a higher EU budget than the Commission proposed (while many net payers such as Germany want to set it lower). While the EP politically calls for defence and competitiveness as priorities, most of the additions it suggests are in agriculture and cohesion.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Politically, two aspects of the vote are worth highlighting: First, on this fundamental issue for the functioning of the EU, it is still the “von der Leyen” platform of centre-right and centre-left parties that matter. With a few rebels, the EPP, S&D and Renew voted in favour, plus the Greens. The number of rebels shows that depending on the final decision, this time it could become a close call: Overall, only 56% of the EP voted in favour. On the other side, all of the “Patriots for Europe” (PfE) voted against, all of the AfD-led “Europe of Sovereign Nations” (ESN) voted against and most of the ECR abstained. This includes the Italian ECR deputies from Meloni’s party FdI, who all abstained. Together, this shows that if the “von der Leyen” platform ever really breaks down, it will be hard for the EPP to get a majority for the EU budget with the far-right.

Secondly, the vote also creates an interesting map showing which national MEPs are reluctant to support the MFF in the form proposed by the EP. The report did not gain a majority amongst MEPs from France, Italy (due to FdI’s abstentions), from frugals such as the Netherlands, Austria or Denmark, from Central Europe (Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia) or from Malta. The reasons are different, but just like the negotiations within the European Council could be even more difficult this time, the vote suggests the MFF will not have smooth sailing in the EP either.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Final votes in the European Parliament

In April 2026, the EP had one plenary session, from 28-30 April in Strasbourg. In terms of the votes, there were a total of 51 votes recorded at HowTheyVote.EU. The comparably high number of votes for one plenary session is due to a series of budget/discharge votes on all the different EU institutions.

Looking at the data from these votes, the picture now familiar to readers of EU Analytics emerges:

On the one hand, the “von der Leyen” platform of centre-right EPP, liberal Renew and centre-left S&D remains the dominant majority. This month, Renew returned to its old centre position by being part of the majority in every single vote, though partially with the far-right. This meant that the S&D and EPP followed behind. But even the Greens were part of the majority in over 85% of the cases, not only in the budgetary vote analysed above but also in the many discharge votes. On the other side of the plenary, the ECR dropped below the Left, while the PfE (47.1%) and the ESN (27.5%) slipped back into a more oppositional role.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

The high degree of institutionalised votes was also visible in the co-voting behaviour. Here too, April 2026 was a month of more “traditional” pro-European votes, with EPP, S&D and Renew having the highest overlap, and the Greens not far behind. In contrast, the ECR was torn between worlds, neither having a strong overlap with the more far-right PfE nor, this month, with the centre-right EPP.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Notably, in my “far-right watch” category, there were two votes for which (parts) of the far-right were decisive for the majority. However, they looked more like weird majorities than like the “Venezuela” majority cases of previous months, where the EPP together with the ECR, PfE and ESN brought whole dossiers through the EP in a semi-coordinated fashion.

The first case was a vote on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group, which the S&D, Greens, the Left and also the ESN rejected, so the EPP and Renew got a majority with the ECR and PfE. The second was a rejection of a report on the Protection of the EU’s financial interests (combating fraud – annual report 2024), where only the EPP and (parts of the) ECR voted in favour, so S&D, Renew, Greens, Left, PfE and ESN together formed the rejecting majority. Both look more like accidental majorities to me, but I would need to dig deeper into the individual cases to be sure.

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always fewer. For April 2026, only four public votes were recorded, among the lowest number I have seen while doing this series. Of these, two were adopted by unanimity, but the other two had a notably high number of “no votes”:

• The first contested vote was on a regulation on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques, thus falling in the often contested area of how to deal with GMO food in the EU. Here, six countries voted against (Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and three abstained (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany). That meant that it was both one of the closest votes I ever recorded – with only 66.5% of the represented population voting in favour – and showed that the largest EU country, Germany, can still be outvoted even when eight other governments also vote against or abstain:

Public vote on the regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques and their products. Source: Council of the EU.

• The second contested vote regarded the production and marketing of forest reproductive material and had three no votes (Austria, Germany, Slovakia) plus Slovenia abstaining. Again, Germany was outvoted, this time with a full no vote.
• Since Hungary had its important election in April, I will be curious how its voting behaviour changes over the course of the coming months. For now, the Orbán government is still technically in power. Nevertheless, the lifting of the veto on the €90bn loan for Ukraine (which was not a public vote) was already an important shift in policy.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.

Pictures: all graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

EU to go – EU Inc.: Gamechanger für Europas Startups?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Wer als junges Unternehmen in Europa heute über nationale Grenzen hinaus wachsen will, stößt schnell auf einen Flickenteppich aus unterschiedlichen Unternehmensrechten, bürokratischen Hürden und hohen Kosten. Das bremst Expansion, schreckt internationale Investor:innen ab und trägt dazu bei, dass Risikokapital meist im nationalen Rahmen bleibt.

Genau darauf zielt EU Inc. ab: mit einer digitalen Gründung in 48 Stunden, europaweit einheitlichen Regeln und als ein sogenanntes 28. Regime – also eine freiwillige, EU-weite Rechtsform. Doch hält der Vorschlag, was er verspricht? Wo liegen seine Stärken und Schwächen, etwa bei den Mitbestimmungsrechten für Angestellte oder dem Rückgriff auf nationales Recht? Und wie fügt sich EU Inc. in die größeren Bemühungen ein, Europas Startup- und Scaleup-Ökosystem zu stärken, etwa durch den neuen Scaleup Europe Fund?

In der neuen Folge von EU to go diskutiert Thu Nguyen mit Marlene Schörner, Policy Fellow für EU-Finanzmärkte am Jacques Delors Centre, über den Vorschlag der EU-Kommission.

Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen: Ein neuer Podcast zur politischen Stimmung in der EU

Die Podcastserie „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ ist eine Kooperation zwischen dem Europapodcast und dem Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“. Anhand von aktuellen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament sprechen Christoph Siekermann, Manuel Knapp und Manuel Müller über die politische Stimmung in der EU.

„Monitoring Europe“ ist auch auf der Homepage des Europapodcast sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Seit 2014 erscheinen auf diesem Blog alle acht Wochen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament und Analysen, wie sich die Parteienlandschaft in der Europäischen Union entwickelt. Künftig gibt es dazu auch eine Audio-Erweiterung: In der neuen Sendung „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ spreche ich mit den Hosts des Europapodcasts, Manuel Knapp und Christoph Siekermann, über die Ergebnisse der letzten Projektion, die jüngsten Wahlen in EU-Mitgliedstaaten und andere Ereignisse, die sich auf die politische Stimmung in Europa niederschlagen.

Die Sendung verbindet fundierte Datenanalyse mit politischer Einordnung. Sie macht sichtbar, welche Dynamiken sich in den Mitgliedstaaten abzeichnen, welche Lager im Europäischen Parlament zulegen oder verlieren und welche Folgen das für zentrale europäische Debatten haben kann. Dabei greifen wir die Artikel auf dem Blog auf, tauchen darüber hinaus aber auch noch tiefer in einzelne Aspekte ein. Die einzelnen Folgen der Sendung sollen im Zweimonatsrhythmus immer in der Woche nach der Sitzprojektion erscheinen.

In der ersten Folge sprechen wir darüber, wie und warum die Sitzprojektion überhaupt entsteht, und nehmen dann die Ausgabe von letzter Woche in den Blick.

European Parliament seat projection (April 2026): Has the far-right wave in Europe broken?

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	135	77	185	81	85	27	31	–
Feb. 26 (B)	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
April 26 (B)	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
April 26 (D)	53	39	126	72	173	84	106	36	31	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 20 April 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 20 April 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

After 16 years in power, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz (PfE) suffered a crushing defeat in Hungary’s national parliamentary election two weeks ago, bringing a sigh of relief to democratic politicians far beyond Hungary’s borders. Speaking at the Global Progressive Mobilisation, a global social democratic network meeting held in Barcelona last weekend, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/S&D) was confident: “The time for the reactionary ultra-right is over!” 

Orbán’s defeat also received widespread media coverage far beyond national borders. Newspapers across Europe and around the world raised the question whether the downfall of the Hungarian prime minister, one of the most prominent leaders of the international New Right, means that the recent rise of the far right will also begin to recede elsewhere.

European trend reversal?

The answer to this question is complex, as demonstrated by two other political developments in EU member states over the past few days: In Bulgaria’s national parliamentary election last weekend, former president Rumen Radev’s newly founded PB (–) party won an absolute majority with a combination of economically left-wing, socially right-wing and geopolitically Eurosceptic-Russophile positions. Meanwhile, in Slovenia, liberal Prime Minister Robert Golob (GS/RE) has failed to form a governing coalition following his narrow parliamentary election victory in March. This could pave the way for either new elections or a return to power for Janez Janša (SDS/EPP), the right-wing authoritarian but reliably pro-Ukrainian former head of government.

There is no clear pattern emerging from this chain of events: While transnational figureheads such as Viktor Orbán certainly play an important role, the national party-political developments in the individual EU member states are intricate and sometimes contradictory. Whether the far-right wave has broken or not will not become evident from individual national elections, but rather from how the poll numbers for far-right parties are developing across Europe as a whole – in short: from the trajectory of the European Parliament seat projections reflecting the European political mood.

The rise ended in autumn 2025

In fact, the projection data has given centrist parties reasons to be cautiously optimistic, not only following Orbán’s defeat, but already since the beginning of the year. After the combined number of seats held by the three far-right groups in the European Parliament (ECR, PfE, and ESN) had grown almost continuously for several years, this trend halted in late autumn 2025.

It is difficult to determine whether there was a single cause for this. The most plausible explanation may be that the erratic behaviour of US President Donald Trump (R/IDU), the world’s most visible far-right leader, had such a deterrent effect on European voters that it also affected his ideological allies here.

Since then, the slight downward trend among Europe’s far-right bloc has continued. The current projection shows that the three groups combined will lose another seven seats compared to the last edition in late February. These losses are not due to a significant decline in one country, but are spread across several member states. This is consistent with the idea of a Europe-wide trend reversal: Almost everywhere in the EU, far-right parties are currently struggling a bit more than they were six months ago.

The losses are still small

It should also be noted, however, that these losses for the far-right bloc have so far been quite modest. Currently, the three groups together hold 217 seats. This is only ten fewer than at their peak in September 2025, and still thirty more than in the 2024 European election – in which, in turn, they performed better than in any previous election. Thus, by historical standards, the political mood in Europe still remains very far to the right. If there has been a trend reversal, it is, at best, in its very early stages.

In this situation, the Viktor Orbáns removal from power could well have a catalytic effect. The ousting of this prominent figure signals that the far right is not invincible, which can encourage and mobilise centrist and left-wing supporters in other member states. But whether the European far-right wave has been broken for good or whether Orbán’s defeat will soon be overshadowed by new developments in other countries, remains to be seen.

EPP weaker, S&D unchanged

A more detailed look at the current seat projection shows that, in addition to the three far-right parties, the centre-right European People’s Party has also suffered losses in recent weeks. Centre-right parties have recently seen a slight decline in Germany, Spain, Belgium and Latvia, among other countries, and Bulgaria’s GERB fell well short of expectations in the national parliamentary election.

In Poland, Greece, and Lithuania, however, EPP member parties were able to further consolidate their position as the strongest national force; and in Hungary, Péter Magyar’s Tisza party won the election by a wider margin than predicted by the polls. Overall, the EPP still reaches 173 seats (–⁠2 compared to February) in the baseline scenario of the projection: its worst result since the 2024 European elections, but still in line with the long-term average of the past five years.

For the centre-left S&D group, in turn, slight gains in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Belgium are offset by slight losses in Germany and Romania, among other countries. Overall, the group’s seat total remains unchanged at 124 (±⁠0), stuck on a historically low level since last summer.

Liberals make up for losses

The biggest winner of the last weeks has been the liberal RE group. In the February projection, it had fallen to a 12-year low, although this was primarily due to rather small poll fluctuations across several member states, all of which happened to point downwards.

Now, the Liberals can make up for some of these setbacks and are also seeing gains in a few other countries, such as Romania and Slovenia. This is only partly offset by new losses in the Netherlands, where D66 is slipping back in the polls following its unexpected national parliamentary election victory in autumn 2025. Overall, the RE group now stands at 70 seats (+⁠6) in the projection, which is a significant improvement on February’s figures, but remains one of the group’s weakest positions in recent years.

Greens are gaining ground

The Greens/EFA group is also projected to make significant gains. They are receiving a strong boost particularly in Germany, where their success in the Baden-Württemberg state election in March provided a morale boost and where they are also benefiting from the erratic course of the governing coalition of the CDU/CSU (EPP) and SPD (S&D) during the current oil crisis. Green/EFA member parties are also projected to make slight gains in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, while they are expected to lose ground in Lithuania and Latvia. Overall, the group is now projected to hold 39 seats (+2), its best result since fall 2025.

The Greens/EFA group is also gaining ground. They are increasing their support in Germany in particular, where their success in the Baden-Württemberg regional election in March boosted morale, and where they are also benefiting from the haphazard handling of the current oil crisis by the governing CDU/CSU (EPP) and SPD (S&D) coalition. Greens/EFA member parties are also making slight gains in the Netherlands and Czechia, while they are falling behind in Lithuania and Latvia. Overall, the group has increased to 39 seats (+⁠2), their best result since autumn 2025.

The Left, on the other hand, is performing slightly worse than in February, though this is due to very minor and, in some cases, likely random fluctuations in the polls in a few member states. Overall, it now stands at 52 seats (–⁠2), roughly in line with its long-term average.

Clear losses for ECR, slight decline for PfE and ESN

Within the far-right camp, the ECR group suffers the most significant losses due to slightly weaker poll numbers for its member parties in Greece, Lithuania, and Latvia, among other countries. Overall, the ECR group drops to 78 seats (–⁠5), its lowest level in over a year.

In the PfE group, in addition to Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, the member parties from Spain (Vox) and Portugal (Chega) are also experiencing a slight decline. Both parties had previously enjoyed several months of growth, but this now appears to be coming to an end. However, the opposite is true in Denmark, where the PfE member party DF made significant inroads in the national parliamentary election in March and has continued to perform well in subsequent polls. Overall, the PfE group has therefore decreased only slightly (103 seats/–⁠1).

Finally, the extremist ESN group is also suffering slight losses. While its largest member party, Germany’s AfD, recently achieved record-high results at the national level, the other parties in the group have been less successful. For instance, following its poor performance in the national parliamentary election, Bulgaria’s Vǎzraždane would now fail to win any seats at the European level. Overall, the ESN group now holds 36 seats (–⁠1), making it once again the smallest group in the European Parliament, behind the Greens/EFA.

Compared to their respective high-water marks (September 2025 for ECR and PfE, November 2025 for ESN), the ECR group has thus lost seven seats, while PfE and ESN have each lost two.

“Others” considerably stronger

Also down is the number of seats held by non-attached parties (21 seats/–⁠3). In Bulgaria, the liberal-populist DPS performed even worse than expected in the national parliamentary election. In Greece, the high-flying left-nationalist PE, which was still the strongest opposition party in the polls just a few months ago, seems to have reached the end of its run. Furthermore, the small German party PdF joined the RE group in March and therefore no longer appears among the non-attached.

By contrast, the “other” parties, which are not currently represented in the European Parliament and cannot be clearly assigned to any political group, have made considerable gains once again (24 seats/+6). By far the largest single party in this diverse group is Rumen Radev’s PB. If it were to replicate its performance in last weekend’s Bulgarian election in the upcoming European Parliament election, it could secure no fewer than ten seats. However, it is difficult to say whether any political group might welcome it. For what it’s worth, its arguably closest policy counterparts, the Slovak governing party Smer and the German BSW, both remain non-attached.

Another party that has gained ground is the Dutch far-right JA21, which was previously part of the ECR group and could return there if it wins seats in the European Parliament again. In addition, there are several small parties from Latvia that are new to the lineup:

• ZZS is a heterogeneous electoral alliance that primarily advocates agrarian-conservative and moderate Eurosceptic positions. It previously held a seat in the European Parliament from 2014 to 2019, first as part of a Eurosceptic group and then with the Liberals.
• SV is a right-wing Christian conservative Russian minority party. At the European level, it is a member of the European Christian Political Party (ECPP), whose members are divided between the ECR and EPP groups. However, it is unlikely that either of these groups would accept the very pro-Russian SV. It seems more plausible that they would join the PfE group or remain unaffiliated.
• MMN is a centrist-populist party that advocates more direct democracy and wants non-partisan members of parliament and ministers. Given its opposition to party-based democracy, it would likely remain unaffiliated if elected to the European Parliament.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest, and also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. As a result, the ECR group and the group of non-attached parties are currently slightly stronger in the dynamic than in the baseline scenario. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	135	77	185	81	85	27	31	–
Feb. 26 (B)	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
April 26 (B)	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
April 26 (D)	53	39	126	72	173	84	106	36	31	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	9 Linke 1 Tier	12 Grüne 3 Volt	12 SPD	3 FDP 3 FW 1 PdF	22 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			23 AfD	3 BSW 2 Partei
FR	8 LFI		13 PS	14 RE	12 LR		34 RN
IT	11 M5S 2 SI	4 EV	20 PD		7 FI 1 SVP	25 FdI	6 Lega
ES	2 Pod 2 Sumar 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	18 PSOE	1 PNV	21 PP		12 Vox		1 SALF
PL			3 Lewica		19 KO	14 PiS	6 Konf	6 Konf	5 KKP
RO			7 PSD	4 USR 1 PMP	6 PNL	15 AUR
NL		3 GL	3 PvdA	5 D66 5 VVD	4 CDA		4 PVV	3 FvD		4 JA21
BE	2 PTB	1 Groen	2 Vooruit 3 PS	2 MR 2 LE	1 CD&V 1 CSP	4 N-VA	4 VB
CZ		2 Piráti			4 STAN 1 TOP09	4 ODS	9 ANO	1 SPD
EL	1 Syriza		4 PASOK		8 ND	2 EL	1 FL		2 PE 2 KKE	1 MéRA
HU					12 TISZA		8 Fidesz	1 MHM
PT		1 Livre	7 PS	2 IL	6 AD		5 Chega
SE	2 V	1 MP	7 S	1 C	4 M 1 KD	5 SD
AT		2 Grüne	4 SPÖ	1 Neos	4 ÖVP		9 FPÖ
BG				2 PP	3 GERB 1 DB				1 DPS	10 PB
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	1 V 1 RV 1 M	1 LA 1 K	1 DD	2 DF
SK				4 PS	2 Slov 1 KDH 1 D	1 SaS		2 REP	3 Smer 1 Hlas
FI	2 Vas	1 Vihreät	4 SDP	3 Kesk	3 Kok	2 PS
IE	5 SF			3 FF 1 II	3 FG					2 SD
HR		2 Možemo	4 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT		1 DSVL	2 LSDP	2 LS	3 TS-LKD	1 LVŽS				2 NA
LV		1 Prog			1 JV	1 NA 1 LRA	2 LPV			1 ZZS 1 SV 1 MMN
SI	1 Levica		1 SD	3 GS	3 SDS 1 N.Si
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 1 KE	2 Isamaa	1 KE	1 EKRE
CY	2 AKEL		1 DIKO		1 DISY	1 ELAM				1 ALMA
LU			1 LSAP	2 DP	2 CSV				1 ADR
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-04-20	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
26-02-23	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
26-01-07	53	37	122	71	177	80	104	38	27	11
25-11-10	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
25-09-01	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
25-07-01	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
25-05-19	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-04-20	53	39	126	72	173	84	106	36	31	–
26-02-23	55	37	126	65	176	90	104	37	30	–
26-01-07	54	37	123	73	177	86	106	38	26	–
25-11-10	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–
25-09-01	56	40	125	68	177	89	107	37	21	–
25-07-01	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
25-05-19	49	40	132	78	179	82	101	36	23	–
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.) and RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). Occasionally, members of a single national party split into several political groups after the election; in such cases, a plausibility assumption (usually based on the status quo) is made about their distribution after the next European election. This currently applies to KE from Estonia. In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 7-17/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Italy: national polls, 3-16/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Spain: national polls, 8-18/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Poland: national polls, 3-15/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Romania: national polls, 4-10/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Netherlands: national polls, 13-18/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemis polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024;
Greece: national polls, 31/3-4/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Hungary: national parliamentary election results, 12/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Portugal: national polls, 14-15/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Sweden: national polls, 24/3-5/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Austria: national polls, 14-16/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Bulgaria: national parliamentary election results, 19/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Denmark: national polls, 19/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovakia: national polls, 13/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Finland: national polls, 7/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Ireland: national polls, 25/3-3/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Croatia: national polls, 26/3-5/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Lithuania: national polls, 28-30/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Latvia: national polls, 7/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovenia: national polls, 9-10/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Estonia: national polls, 5-8/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Cyprus: national polls, 26/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Luxembourg: national polls, 29/9/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Malta: national polls, 16/4/2026, source: Wikipedia.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

Correction note, 29/4/2026: In an earlier version of this article, the Lithuanian party NA was assigned to the ECR group in the dynamic scenario. In fact, it is likely to join the PfE group.
Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].