From awkward ex to security partner: Germany and Britain ten years after the Brexit referendum

By Nicolai von Ondarza

Ten years after the Brexit referendum, the UK has lost relevance for Germany in many policy areas. But in others, notably foreign and defence, the relations have even intensified.

When the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union on 23 June 2016, Berlin woke to a shock the next morning. Although the polls were quite close, the overwhelming expectation was that the “pragmatic” British would, despite their long tradition of EU scepticism, vote to remain a fellow member of the EU. Over the following decade, not only did the UK leave the EU in a tumultuous process, but British-German bilateral relations also changed significantly.

The relationship developed, however, in a counterintuitive way: British-German bilateral ties suffered most during the Brexit process whilst the UK was still formally a member of the EU, also because the German government explicitly wanted to avoid making negotiating Brexit a bilateral issue. In contrast, bilateral relations first stabilised and, after EU-UK relations also improved, even entered a new phase under the 2025 Kensington friendship treaty. By June 2026, Berlin and London cooperate more deeply in some areas on a bilateral and minilateral level on questions of foreign, security and defence policy, even if Brexit has created an indisputable gap in bilateral relations, too.

Keeping the distance during the Brexit negotiations

In the initial Brexit negotiations following the referendum, the main aim of the German government was to protect the integrity of the remaining EU-27 and the single market. Whereas some Brexiteers hoped for “German car-makers” to push for a British-friendly negotiation stance, in practice the opposite happened: From 24 June 2016 onwards, the German government under then Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear that it wanted to avoid any semblance of bilateral negotiations between Berlin and London (or Paris and London) on the terms of Brexit.

Instead, it put its weight behind Michel Barnier as the common EU negotiator, insisting that all questions concerning Brexit between 2016 and 2020 be handled between the EU institutions and the UK. Within the EU-27, the German government as well as German businesses also supported a clear line of rejecting any UK attempts at cherry picking the single market. This included particularly strong support for the Republic of Ireland as an EU member with its interest in keeping the border with Northern Ireland open.

Consequently, although the UK only fully exited the EU in January 2020 (with a transition period until December 2020, until which it remained in the EU’s single market and customs union), it was during this last period of joint EU membership in which bilateral relations cooled the most. This was an explicit choice driven by Berlin who wanted to avoid a bilateralisation of the Brexit negotiations. A notable exception remained foreign, security and defence policy, where both countries – often together with France as E3 – continued their cooperation, but in other areas Berlin in particular insisted on visible distance from the UK.

From normalisation to intensification

After the UK had formally exited the EU and entered the new post-Brexit relationship with the EU, the first cautious steps to rebuild bilateral ties began. The first step was a joint declaration on foreign policy cooperation in June 2021 by the two countries’ foreign ministers. This constituted the first creation of new institutionalised ties between Berlin and London, including an annual “Strategic Dialogue” between the two foreign ministers. It was also the first of a series of bilateral agreements the UK struck with other EU countries on foreign policy cooperation. Notably, due to the continued political instability in the UK, the Strategic Dialogue not once brought the same two foreign ministers together twice in succession.

In addition, the relationship continued to be limited by the political tensions between the UK government and the EU. In particular, the threats from the government under Boris Johnson to unilaterally violate the Withdrawal Agreement with the EU over Northern Ireland were regarded in Berlin and Brussels as a significant violation of trust that also impacted the willingness to work with the UK on the bilateral level. EU-UK relations started to improve with the closer cooperation on Ukraine after the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. The real turning point was the Windsor Framework Agreement under Rishi Sunak in 2023, which laid the tensions over Northern Ireland to rest and therefore also eased the conditions for the bilateral relationship.

Since then, supported by the 2024 election of the Labour government in the UK and the social democratic connections on both sides, the two governments have agreed a series of bilateral initiatives and agreements. After the joint declaration on foreign policy came agreements on energy and climate cooperation, in particular hydrogen and North Sea offshore wind, as well as in security and defence in the form of the 2024 “Trinity House Agreement”. Often, these also had an EU-UK element, for instance with the UK joining a memorandum of understanding for North Sea offshore wind with several EU countries and the EU institutions, or the cautious re-establishment of EU-UK defence ties by British participation in the military mobility Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project.

The Kensington friendship treaty

This path of normalisation of bilateral ties transitioned into intensification with the 2025 Kensington friendship treaty between Germany and the UK, whose negotiations started under the SPD and Labour-led governments, but were quickly picked up and concluded after the snap elections in Germany in early 2025.

In the narrative of the two governments, this first-ever friendship treaty completes a triangle of deepened bilateral relationships between Germany and France (Élysée Treaty / Aachen Treaty), France and the UK (the defence-focused Lancaster House treaties) and now Germany and the UK. For this, the treaty itself both builds upon the initiatives agreed since Brexit – in particular in foreign affairs, security and defence, as well as energy – and establishes a regular institutionalised exchange. This includes bilateral summits every two years on a government-to-government level as well as regular ministerial dialogues across the board, including a continuation of the yearly foreign minister’s Strategic Dialogue.

In policy terms, the Kensington treaty is aimed at filling areas not covered by EU-UK relations and is thus intended to complement rather than compete with them. Foreign, security and defence policy form the core of the treaty, including a bilateral mutual defence commitment. Migration and internal security are also part of the extended cooperation, an area highlighted particularly by the UK government in its public communication. Additional elements include cooperation on energy, climate policy, strengthening economic links and people-to-people contacts. To put all this into practice, the treaty is accompanied by a list of joint “lighthouse projects” which range from defence to train connections from London to Berlin or easier school trips.

Anchoring the UK in flexible formats

The policy area where the relationship has developed the most is foreign, security and defence cooperation, given the vastly changed security environment. This was not a consequence of Brexit, but still an explicit choice by both governments to continue and intensify cooperation despite Brexit. Here, in the combination of NATO, the EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership, and the bilateral Trinity House and Kensington treaties, Berlin sought to keep the UK closely integrated into European security structures. Bilateral and minilateral formats often intertwined.

Two examples underline this: First, Germany and the UK cooperated closely on support for Ukraine. By public figures, they are the two largest backers of Ukraine in Europe, and the largest overall since the US under Donald Trump reduced its direct military support to close to zero in 2025. As an expression of that, Germany and the UK took over the co-leadership of the “Ukraine Defence Contact Group” closely attached to NATO. As part of the Trinity House Agreement, Berlin and London also started work on a European deep precision strike capability that is, at least in principle, also open to other European countries.

One response to the confrontation with the second Trump administration over burden-shifting to European allies has also been a renewed focus on flexible formats with the “E3” – France, Germany and the UK – at its core. Since late 2024, Berlin in particular has preferred to work on questions of hard global security, from managing Trump and US-Russia talks to the fallout of the 2026 US/Israel-Iran war, in formats that include the UK and often are only loosely attached to EU or NATO institutions. These include the E3, the Weimar-Plus (France, Germany, Poland plus UK and sometimes Italy or Spain) and other variations of the large member states.

Outlook

The British-German bilateral relationship ten years after the Brexit referendum (and around five and a half since the actual exit) has clearly entered a new stage. There is no doubt that leaving the EU and the difficult withdrawal process itself has also left a deep mark on the bilateral relationship. There are far fewer interactions between the governments, and for many policy areas, in which the EU is the primary framework for Germany, the UK is no longer as relevant for Berlin. Direct people-to-people contacts, especially among students but also workers, have dropped significantly, for school trips by 80 percent. The UK is less important for German trade than in 2016, dropping from its 3^rd (2016) to 8^th largest export destination (2025).

On the other hand, driven both by the political commitment from both sides and by the changing security environment, there has been a willingness to first normalise and then in some areas – notably foreign, security and defence – even intensify the bilateral relationship. The Kensington friendship treaty puts the UK in an elevated position among Germany’s partners – probably, alongside Ukraine, its most regular non-EU partner at present. On core questions of European security, Berlin coordinates most closely with London and Paris.

Balancing flexible formats with the UK with a stronger geostrategic EU

Looking forward, the British and German governments have set a solid framework with the Kensington Treaty despite turbulent politics in both countries. The challenge now is to get a balance right: In the bilateral relationship, the many ambitions of the Kensington Treaty will need to be filled with life and put into practice. Early signs in the defence sector or political relations – with a failure to set up a parliamentary cooperation program between the House of Commons and the Bundestag – suggests that more than initial political will is necessary to sustain a long-term intensive bilateral relationship if the common framework of the EU is missing.

Within the broader relationship, Berlin will have to balance the ambition to integrate the UK in flexible formats with strengthening the EU in times of geostrategic rivalries. This means continuing to avoid making Brexit/EU-UK a bilateral or big three/E3 issue but rather working within the EU to continue to defend joint EU interests where necessary, and find flexible solutions in the EU-UK relationship where possible.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

This article was first published in the Berlin Perspectives series of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP).

The Berlin Perspectives series presents analyses of Germany’s European policy to an English-speaking audience. The authors analyse German positions on current topics and debates and provide policy recommendations based on their findings.

Pictures: Flags: istock / masterSergeant [all rights reserved]; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

European Parliament seat projection (June 2026): Continuing decline of the far right

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	45	53	136	77	185	81	85	27	31	–
April 26 (B)	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
June 26 (B)	49	40	122	71	181	74	98	39	19	27
June 26 (D)	52	40	124	74	181	80	101	39	29	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 15 June 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 15 June 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

Far-right polling trend
(current polls compared to highest point between 09/25 and 02/26).

What seemed like an uncertain possibility at the start of the year has now become a clear trend: For the time being, support for far-right parties in Europe has passed its peak and is in decline. Compared with the latest seat projection from April, the two major far-right groups in the European Parliament, PfE and ECR, have recently incurred further losses. Overall, the far-right bloc is currently at its lowest level since early 2025, though this remains well above the result of the last European elections.

As always, we will take a detailed look at the developments of the last eight weeks below. But first, let us make a broader comparison with the situation six to eight months ago. Which countries have seen a decline in support for the far right, what might be the reasons for this, and which other parties stand to benefit from it?

A transnational trend

If a political group falls significantly behind in the EU-wide seat projection, there are usually two possible reasons: Either a single member party has suffered significant losses in a large member state, or a broad transnational trend is at play. In the case of the current decline of the far right, it is evidently the latter.

Admittedly, some parties were hit harder than others. In particular, Hungary’s Fidesz (PfE) suffered a massive collapse following the national parliamentary election in April. Overall, however, around a dozen EU countries have been affected, including several large and medium-sized member states, such as Spain, Poland and Romania. By contrast, there are only four EU countries where far-right parties have made significant gains since the start of the year: Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Lithuania.

In a further dozen countries – mainly smaller states – the poll ratings of far-right parties have remained stable over the last six months. But this group also includes countries such as Ireland and Malta, where there are no significant far-right parties to begin with. In some cases, there were also shifts within the right-wing camp: In Italy, for example, the governing parties FdI (ECR) and Lega (PfE) lost ground to the even more extreme newcomer party FN (ESN); in Czechia, losses for the far-right SPD (ESN) went alongside gains for the national-conservative ODS (ECR).

France is a special case, as no new opinion polls for parliamentary elections have been published there since autumn 2025. However, the most recent opinion polls for the 2027 presidential election show a slight decline in support for the far-right candidate Jordan Bardella (RN/PfE).

No obvious common cause

After several years of growth, far-right parties are thus currently losing support in many EU member states – albeit to varying degrees and not everywhere. The exact point at which support began to decline varies from country to country. In some cases, the turnaround occurred as early as autumn 2025; in others, it did not happen until spring 2026.

Nor is it entirely straightforward to identify a single common cause. One obvious factor appears to be the negative influence of US President Donald Trump (Rep./IDU), who is unpopular in Europe and may be damaging the reputation of the far-right camp as a whole. Furthermore, far-right parties have lost their key issue: According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, immigration is now only the seventh most important issue to Europeans, behind economic and geopolitical concerns such as inflation and the conflict in the Middle East.

By contrast, it seems to make little difference how the political centre has been dealing with the far-right parties, or whether or not these parties are in government in their respective member states. Far-right parties have recently suffered losses both in countries with a cordon sanitaire (such as Portugal) and in countries where they are part of a governing majority (such as Sweden). Conversely, even among the few countries where far-right parties continue to grow, there are examples of both strategies (cordon sanitaire in Germany, government participation in Lithuania).

Growing fragmentation

The parties gaining ground in the polls at the expense of the far right can also vary from country to country. In Hungary and Romania, for instance, voters have turned primarily to the member parties of the European People’s Party (EPP) in recent months; in Portugal, they have favoured the Socialists. In Bulgaria, the left-wing nationalist newcomer party PB, which cannot be clearly assigned to any European political group, recorded massive gains in the national parliamentary election in April. Also across Europe as a whole, the “other” parties without a clear EU-level affiliation have seen the strongest increase in the seat projection since the start of the year.

In other words, the emerging shift away from far-right parties among European voters is not linked to a transnational shift in sentiment towards another political movement. Instead, the fragmented national developments and the gains made by newcomer parties suggest a certain disorientation. So far, no party has managed to formulate a sufficiently convincing strategy for how Europe should deal with the permanent polycrisis that has become part of everyday political life.

EPP gaining ground

If we take a closer look at the changes over the last eight weeks, the EPP in particular has much to celebrate. In the baseline scenario of the projection, it jumps to 181 seats (+8 compared with April), which is the highest figure it has achieved in almost a year.

The biggest individual gain is being made by the Hungarian Tisza party, which has surged further in the polls following the election of its leader, Péter Magyar, as national prime minister. If European elections were held today, Tisza would even provide the fourth-largest delegation within the EPP group. Furthermore, Romania’s governing party PNL has so far benefited from the national government crisis brought about by its social-democratic coalition partner. EPP member parties are strengthening their position also in Spain and Poland, but losing ground in Germany, Italy and Greece.

S&D still weak

The centre-left S&D group is performing slightly worse than in April. This is due to the ongoing weakness of the German SPD, as well as to the Greek PASOK, which now faces competition at national level from the newly formed left-wing party ELAS (“others”). Meanwhile, the Polish S&D member party has made slight gains.

In total, the S&D group now holds 122 seats (–⁠2), equalling its all-time low set last January. The gap between the EPP and the S&D has widened to 59 seats, reaching its widest margin in over five years.

Liberals stronger in Italy

The liberal RE group (71 seats/+1) is making slight gains. This is mainly due to Italy, where an alliance of two small centrist parties, Italia Viva and Più Europa, would now once again narrowly exceed the national four-percent threshold. The German FDP has also seen a small increase in support, thanks to the significant media attention surrounding the election of its new party leader, Wolfgang Kubicki. Furthermore, the Flemish Liberals (who changed their name from OpenVLD to Anders in January) would now win back a seat in the European Parliament.

Less successful is the performance of the Liberals in the Netherlands, where the coalition government led by Rob Jetten (D66/RE) has lost support rapidly since taking office in February. Support for RE member parties has also waned recently in Slovakia, Portugal and Romania.

Greens make gains, Left loses ground

The Greens/EFA group is benefitting particularly from the upward trend of the German Grüne, who are currently the strongest centre-left party in German national polls. The Greens are also making slight gains in Sweden and Austria. On the other hand, the Lithuanian DSVL, who have just returned to the national coalition government, would no longer be represented in the European Parliament. Overall, the Greens/EFA group now stands at 40 seats in the projection (+1), marking a slight increase for the second time in a row.

Among those who have lost support in recent weeks is the Left group, which has experienced a slight drop in both Spain and Ireland. In Greece, the former governing party Syriza would now fail to secure even a single seat in the European Parliament, having lost almost its entire voter base to ELAS – a new party founded by former Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras, with which it may form a political alliance.

The losses of the Left group are partly offset by the improved position of the Portuguese CDU, which is set to regain a single seat in the European Parliament. Overall, the Left now has 49 seats (–⁠3), its lowest figure in over a year.

ECR and PfE fall behind

On the right of the political spectrum, the ECR group is suffering significant losses. Its member parties are losing ground in Italy, Romania, Belgium and Sweden in particular, whereas Poland’s PiS has stabilised somewhat following a prolonged decline since autumn 2025. Overall, the ECR group now stands at 74 seats (–⁠4) in the projection, making it the first far-right group to fall below its result in the 2024 European election.

The PfE group also loses a significant number of seats in the projection (98 seats/–⁠5). Apart from Hungary, where Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party continues to plummet following its defeat in the national parliamentary election, the group is also losing ground in Poland and other countries. Only its Dutch member party, the PVV, is making slight gains in the polls, benefitting from the weakness of the centrist-liberal government.

ESN gains ground – despite a possible European party ban

Finally, on the far right of the Parliament, the ESN group is bucking the downward trend. With 39 seats (+3), it has equalled its all-time high from late autumn 2025. This is due, on the one hand, to the continued rise of Germany’s AfD, which, according to the latest polls, would now be the second-largest delegation in the entire European Parliament (surpassed only by France’s RN/PfE). On the other hand, the ESN group is also gaining ground in Italy, where the small party FN – which has been in development for some time and was officially founded last weekend – could clear the national four-percent threshold. The ESN group’s gains are partly offset only by losses suffered by its Polish member party, Konfederacja.

As an aside, the possible ban on the ESN party – which the European Political Parties Authority has been investigating since the end of May – would have no impact on the seat projection. If the ban is implemented, the ESN party would be deregistered and lose its entitlement to EU budget funding. The ESN group, however, is legally independent of this and would continue to exist without any changes.

Non-attached parties weaker, “other” parties stronger

Finally, the non-attached parties experience slight losses, with Germany’s left-conservative BSW, Poland’s far-right KKP and Greece’s left-nationalist PE performing slightly worse than in April. Overall, the non-attached parties now hold 19 seats in the projection (–⁠2).

Meanwhile, the “other” parties – those not currently represented in the European Parliament and which cannot be clearly assigned to any political group – are making further gains (27 seats/+⁠3). New to the table are two parties from Greece:

• The aforementioned left-wing party ELAS, led by former Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, was founded at the end of May and has immediately started to poll as the strongest opposition party. ELAS is the de facto successor to Tsipras’s former party, Syriza, and, like Syriza, is likely to join the Left group in the European Parliament.
• The ELPIDA party, also founded in May, is more difficult to position politically. It is chaired by the former president of the association of victims of the 2023 Tempi train accident, in which nearly 60 people died and which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has linked to fraud in the use of EU subsidies. Accordingly, ELPIDA’s central programmatic focus is the fight against corruption; many of its other demands align with mainstream centrist or centre-right positions. At the same time, however, the party also presents itself with a sharp anti-establishment rhetoric that is reminiscent of right-wing populism. Depending on which of these characteristics ultimately prevails, the party could find itself in either the RE group or one of the far-right groups in the European Parliament.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest, and also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. As a result, the ECR group and the group of non-attached parties are currently slightly stronger in the dynamic than in the baseline scenario. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	45	53	136	77	185	81	85	27	31	–
April 26 (B)	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
June 26 (B)	49	40	122	71	181	74	98	39	19	27
June 26 (D)	52	40	124	74	181	80	101	39	29	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	9 Linke 1 Tier	13 Grüne 3 Volt	11 SPD	4 FDP 3 FW 1 PdF	21 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			24 AfD	2 BSW 2 Partei
FR	8 LFI		13 PS	14 RE	12 LR		34 RN
IT	10 M5S 2 SI	3 EV	18 PD	3 IV/+E	6 FI 1 SVP	23 FdI	6 Lega	4 FN
ES	2 Sumar 1 Pod 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	18 PSOE	1 PNV	22 PP		12 Vox		1 SALF
PL			5 Lewica		20 KO	16 PiS	4 Konf	4 Konf	4 KKP
RO			7 PSD	3 USR 1 PMP	8 PNL 1 UDMR	13 AUR
NL		3 PRO	3 PRO	4 D66 5 VVD	4 CDA		5 PVV	3 FvD		4 JA21
BE	2 PTB	1 Groen	2 Vooruit 3 PS	1 Anders 2 MR 2 LE	1 CD&V 1 CSP	3 N-VA	4 VB
CZ		2 Piráti			4 STAN 1 TOP09	4 ODS	8 ANO 1 AUTO	1 SPD
EL			3 PASOK		7 ND	2 EL	1 FL		2 KKE 1 PE	3 ELAS 2 Elpída
HU					15 TISZA		5 Fidesz	1 MHM
PT	1 CDU	1 Livre	7 PS	1 IL	6 AD		5 Chega
SE	2 V	2 MP	7 S	1 C	4 M 1 KD	4 SD
AT		3 Grüne	4 SPÖ	1 Neos	4 ÖVP		8 FPÖ
BG				2 PP	3 GERB 1 DB				1 DPS	10 PB
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	1 V 1 RV 1 M	1 LA 1 K	1 DD	2 DF
SK				3 PS	2 Slov 1 KDH 1 D	1 SaS		2 REP	3 Smer 2 Hlas
FI	2 Vas	1 Vihreät	4 SDP	3 Kesk	3 Kok	2 PS
IE	4 SF			3 FF 1 II	4 FG					2 SD
HR		2 Možemo	4 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT			2 LSDP	2 LS	4 TS-LKD	1 LVŽS				2 NA
LV		1 Prog			1 JV	1 NA 1 LRA	2 LPV			1 ZZS 1 SV 1 MMN
SI	1 Levica		1 SD	3 GS	3 SDS 1 N.Si
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 1 KE	2 Isamaa	1 KE	1 EKRE
CY	2 AKEL		1 DIKO		2 DISY	1 ELAM
LU			1 LSAP	2 DP	2 CSV				1 ADR
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-06-15	49	40	122	71	181	74	98	39	19	27
26-04-20	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
26-02-23	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
26-01-07	53	37	122	71	177	80	104	38	27	11
25-11-10	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
25-09-01	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
25-07-01	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
25-05-19	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-06-15	52	40	124	74	181	80	101	39	29	–
26-04-20	53	39	126	72	173	84	106	36	31	–
26-02-23	55	37	126	65	176	90	104	37	30	–
26-01-07	54	37	123	73	177	86	106	38	26	–
25-11-10	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–
25-09-01	56	40	125	68	177	89	107	37	21	–
25-07-01	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
25-05-19	49	40	132	78	179	82	101	36	23	–
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7); Slovenia: Levica (1) and Vesna (2). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.) and RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). Occasionally, members of a single national party split into several political groups after the election; in such cases, a plausibility assumption (usually based on the status quo) is made about their distribution after the next European election. This currently applies to PRO from the Netherlands and KE from Estonia. In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 1-12/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Italy: national polls, 31/5-12/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Spain: national polls, 30/5-12/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Poland: national polls, 29/5-10/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Romania: national polls, 1-14/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Netherlands: national polls, 23-25/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemish polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024;
Czechia: national polls, 5-8/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Greece: national polls, 2-8/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Hungary: national polls, 3-8/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Portugal: national polls, 14-24/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Sweden: national polls, 17-28/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Austria: national polls, 20/5-2/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Bulgaria: national polls, 27/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Denmark: national polls, 28/5-7/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovakia: national polls, 11-21/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Finland: national polls, 1/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Ireland: national polls, 27/5-5/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Croatia: national polls, 26/5-7/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Lithuania: national polls, 30/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Latvia: national polls, May 2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovenia: national polls, 12-21/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Estonia: national polls, 5/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Cyprus: results of the national parliamentary election, 24/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Luxembourg: national polls, 24/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Malta: results of the national parliamentary election, 30/5/2026, source: Wikipedia.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller (map created with MapChart [CC BY-SA 4.0]); portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].