with contributions from Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek, Carmen Descamps, Saila Heinikoski, Niklas Helwig, Alex Hoppe, Manuel Müller, Katariina Mustasilta, Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel, Federica Prandin, Antti Viktor Rauhala, Sanna Salo, Claudia Schmucker, Timo R. Stewart, and Kristina Weissenbach
-
-
The best of times, the worst of times: Ursula von der Leyen during the 2026 State of the European Union address.
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times”: Ursula von der Leyen opened this year’s State of the European Union (SOTEU) address with the famous first line of Charles Dickens’ Tale of Two Cities, according to her “a fair description of the world we live in”. The EU, she said, was simultaneously “the strongest” and felt the most “precarious” it had ever been. But at least, in a world “of great possibilities and great perils”, it had “chosen to forge its own path”.
While last year’s SOTEU was full of fighting spirit, this year’s speech struck a somewhat more measured tone. While it still emphasised the many challenges facing the EU, it also featured a number of success stories. Unlike last year’s “European independence moment”, it did not feature a memorable new catchphrase. However, it had a remarkable special guest: Mark Carney, the Canadian prime minister, who attended the speech and was showered with compliments by the Commission president.
Of course, the good relations between Europe and Canada was not the only topic of this SOTEU. This article provides a collection of short analyses, written by experts from several universities and think tanks, of how she covered many of the key issues currently on the EU’s agenda: economic policy, AI, social media, climate, energy, migration, Schengen, the budget negotiations, cohesion policy, democracy, hybrid threats, security, global relations, Russia and Ukraine, EU-US relations, trade with China, the Middle East, enlargement policy and institutional reform. Some of these issues played a central role in von der Leyen’s speech, others were only mentioned in passing or omitted at all.
Further information on the speech can be found on the Commission’s website, along with the original multilingual text and an English translation.
Economic policy: Naming the fight, still building for it
Geoeconomics is now at the heart of the EU’s economic policy: Growth is no longer just about prosperity, but about security and strategic interest. “A fight for industrial capacities is shaping global competition,” von der Leyen said, recasting the EU’s incomplete single market not as an efficiency problem but as a strategic one. Critical minerals are one of the key battlegrounds in that fight, and China dominates them. The US has already abandoned free-market principles there for direct equity stakes, price floors and other direct interventions, and the EU seems to be following. The single most important new economic announcement was the new European Corporation on Critical Raw Materials, tasked to build shared stockpiles of minerals that European industry depends on.
At the same time, especially the northern member states (including Germany) still stay skeptical about the need for the EU to assume a more hands-on attitude in safeguarding its strategic economic interests. In a notable absence, the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce “Made in EU” preferences, was missing from the speech. Put forward in March as a flagship initiative after months of delay, it has since stalled in committee. While the more contested nature of the world economy is now a widely accepted premise, the EU is still to convince skeptics that it should move beyond the grind of completing the single market.
Most of the speech focused on the less interventionist, market-opening parts of the agenda, easier for member states to rally behind. With a focus on implementation of the Draghi reform agenda, von der Leyen focused on the One Europe, One Market Roadmap, agreed this spring and setting up the end of 2027 as a deadline for completing the most important reforms across closing loopholes between member states, faster permitting, bank and transport rules simplification. Independent tracking finds none of the Draghi report’s flagship recommendations delivered two years on; an independent assessment puts implementation at 16% overall. Tellingly, the one reform that moved fast, a 70% due-diligence cut in a year, was deregulation. It is easier to cut regulations than introduce the ones needed for completing the single market.
Realistically, the EU is unlikely to hit its own 2027 target. Still, von der Leyen tried to inspire hope, citing the EU’s better than expected resilience through the Hormuz crisis as well as the success story of ICEYE, a Finnish-Polish space-tech company built on Horizon funding, private capital and the freedom to operate across member states. In the fight for independence, a year from now, the honest scorecard will likely read the same as today’s: real progress, just not at the pace a fight like it demands.
Antti Viktor Rauhala • link
AI: A cross-cutting foundation for Europe
Artificial Intelligence (AI) was one of the clearest cross-cutting themes of the speech. Von der Leyen described it as a “foundational layer for the economy and security” and linked it to Europe’s competitiveness, strategic independence, defence, healthcare, industry, employment and education. Her starting point was deliberately optimistic: Europe should “make the most of AI”, which had “the potential to benefit humanity – if we get it right.” At the same time, she stressed that the balance between opportunities and risks was changing rapidly. She pointed to increasingly powerful hacking capabilities, the possibility that advanced systems could fall into the hands of adversaries, and warnings from developers about self-improving models. Europe, she argued, should therefore help shape the global debate, including by bringing the leading frontier AI labs into a discussion about what can be done.
This was followed by a strong European capability and sovereignty agenda: Europe needs its own computing capacity, investment and AI infrastructure in order to protect its security and independence. Public and private capital should be mobilised to support European start-ups and companies, including through large-scale computing infrastructure. At the same time, von der Leyen explicitly rejected the idea that Europe has to win a race in developing the most advanced frontier models. Rather, the objective is to “move AI from the screen to the real economy” and create value from AI in sectors where Europe is already strong. She highlighted health, transport, agrifood, advanced manufacturing, defence and space as areas with particularly high potential, announcing further “game-changing initiatives” in these sectors.
At the same time, the European approach should remain centred on human agency: “AI needs to empower our doctors, not to replace them.” In the social market economy, AI should help people acquire new skills and give workers a fair chance, rather than deepen inequalities between generations, regions, or skill levels.
Against this background, the announced Quality Jobs Act, to be delivered before the end of the year, will be an important concrete next step. It will translate the speech’s broader AI narrative – more European capacity, more investment, more applications, and more skills – into a forthcoming legislative initiative.
Kristina Weissenbach • link
Social media: From technology policy to the protection of children
Social media was an unusually personal theme in the SOTEU. In this part of the speech, von der Leyen expressed her distinctive female political style, bringing a family- and women-centred perspective to a regulatory agenda. Von der Leyen focused on the amount of time young Europeans spend on screens and on platform designs that are deliberately built to capture attention and keep users scrolling. Her argument was that children need time away from screens: time to interact with others, experience “real life”, even to “get bored”, develop their imagination and form their own opinions.
She illustrated this with a deeply personal example of a Belgian girl who died by suicide after online bullying. This turned an abstract debate about algorithms and platform regulation into an issue of real families, children and individual lives. The speech framed social-media regulation not simply as technology policy, but as a question of childhood, parental responsibility and human autonomy.
On a policy level, von der Leyen stated that the Commission’s planned EU Kids Act will provide the most immediate regulatory response: a gradual and differentiated approach to age restrictions, including no social media for children under 13, only limited “mini-accounts” under 15, and stronger safe-design requirements for older teenagers. This builds on the Commission’s broader work on age verification and child safety online.
Alongside this, von der Leyen announced a Digital Fairness Act, planned for the autumn. Its focus goes beyond children alone: Addictive design, attention-capture techniques, complex contracts and subscription traps are to be addressed – with the underlying principle that politics, rather than Big Tech. should set the rules.
Taken together, AI and social media represented two complementary dimensions of the same digital agenda in the SOTEU. While AI was presented as a strategic opportunity, social media was treated as a regulatory challenge. What made both strands particularly prominent was the use of individual stories and everyday examples. Cancer screening, doctors, workers and European companies made the AI agenda tangible; children, smartphones, online bullying and families did the same for social media. Digitalisation was therefore not presented as a purely technological project, but repeatedly brought back to a central political question: How can Europe capture the benefits of technology while ensuring that it remains in the service of people?
Kristina Weissenbach • link
Climate: The bureaucratic way?
Von der Leyen called this Europe’s “summer of truth”. Wildfires, disappearing glaciers, water scarcity, crop losses and heat-related deaths provided the backdrop to an unequivocal commitment: Europe “can, must and will stay the course” on its climate targets. Yet while insisting that mitigation and adaptation are equally necessary, the substance of the speech suggested a focus from preventing climate change to managing its increasingly unavoidable consequences.
Resilience, preparedness and risk management dominated the agenda. Von der Leyen announced a new climate resilience framework, a Climate Insurance Alliance, a European Heatwave Plan and a European Water initiative, alongside stronger wildfire preparedness. Adaptation was also presented as an economic opportunity, with Europe aspiring to lead emerging markets for drought-resistant crops, flood prevention and energy-efficient cooling. Climate policy is thus increasingly intertwined with the protection of European economies, territories and citizens against disruption.
However, the sheer number of new policies announced raises a key question. As climate impacts become increasingly concrete, does Europe primarily need additional frameworks – or more effective implementation of the targets and policies it already has? The challenge for the EU may increasingly be less about demonstrating political ambition through new plans than ensuring that existing commitments are followed through. Nothing on those has been reported.
Federica Prandin • link
Energy: Prioritising economic growth and independence
Energy issues continued to feature prominently in the SOTEU address, although to a lesser extent than in previous years. The focus remained on energy security and independence, industrial competitiveness, and the transition towards a clean energy mix.
Von der Leyen once again reminded that Europe intends to strengthen its (energy) sovereignty and prevent energy from being used as a geopolitical instrument, as it was the case with Russia in the past. In light of previous measures such as the Affordable Energy Action Plan (2025) and AccelerateEU (2026) to strengthen energy resilience, she also highlighted that affordable energy prices were essential to safeguard Europe’s competitiveness. To this end, the Commission president reiterated Europe’s willingness to further increase the use of “home-grown, clean energy sources” such as renewables, nuclear and biomethane. This SOTEU declaration, too, is nothing new. At the same time, Europe is to become significantly more electrified by 2040. The EU Electrification Action Plan, presented in July 2026 and including an indicative electrification target, plays a key role here. In that context, Von der Leyen also stressed that electricity grids and storage need to be expanded more rapidly, as significant renewable energy capacity is currently awaiting grid connection.
The completion of the European single market, including the energy market, also featured prominently in the economic policy agenda of this year’s SOTEU. Von der Leyen reaffirmed the Commission’s intention to strengthen European economic capacity and accelerate necessary investments through reducing bureaucracy and a new “pact against gold-plating”. Permitting procedures and grid connection requests are likewise to be simplified and accelerated, for example under the EU grids package that is currently negotiated. Energy grids were also mentioned in other policy areas, including artificial intelligence (seen as a means to facilitate digital/smart grids and technical maintenance) and critical infrastructure considering recent deliberate attacks.
Carmen Descamps • link
Migration: Compromising fundamental rights to “protect borders”?
On migration, the SOTEU speech largely confirmed what had already been reported. As expected, she referred to Ceuta and assured Spain that “Europe will be there for you.” She also drew parallels with border crossings in Crete and along the EU’s eastern border, apparently referring to Belarus. Yet this expression of solidarity may not be enough for Ceutans and Spaniards to forget the accusations from several member states that blamed Spain for the situation and called for suspending Schengen rules in relation to Spain.
With regard to policy, von der Leyen’s key announcement was the expected proposal of a New Emergency Response Instrument. This instrument was presented as providing greater “flexibility” while respecting values and fundamental rights. In reality, however, it appears designed to allow derogations from core protections, notably the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in EU and international law. Several countries affected by what the Commission terms the “weaponisation” of migration have already adopted legislation permitting pushbacks in certain circumstances. The Commission now seems intent on introducing a similar logic at the European level, marking another step in the erosion of asylum rights.
In addition, von der Leyen announced a new Mediterranean Youth Skills and Jobs Initiative, which appears intended to balance this restrictive approach by promoting legal migration. Yet, like previous Commission initiatives such as the Talent Partnerships with Mediterranean countries, participation will be voluntary for member states, as legal migration is a national competence. This makes significant uptake unlikely. Beyond this, the speech contained the usual self-congratulatory references to the Migration and Asylum Pact (linking it to declining irregular border crossings over the past two years, despite the lack of a clear causal connection), as well as recurring promises to strengthen Frontex and to address the root causes of migration.
The real turning point, however, may be the attempt to introduce legislation that departs from the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees the right to seek asylum under the Geneva Convention. Once Europe begins to set aside its values and fundamental rights in the name of emergency, it risks entering a slippery slope where increasingly broad exceptions become acceptable. In the end, protecting borders could come at the cost of the very values and democratic principles Europe claims to defend.
Saila Heinikoski • link
Schengen: Not a word about illegal internal border controls
If you only heard Ursula von der Leyen’s SOTEU address, you would never think that the Schengen area was facing an existential crisis.
According to the Schengen Regulation, checks at Europe’s internal borders are only permitted “temporarily”, “exceptionally” and “as a last resort” if there is “a serious threat to public policy or internal security”. However, several member states, including Germany and France, have continuously been carrying out checks at their borders with neighbouring European countries for eleven years now – using varying, but increasingly flimsy, justifications, and in spite of national court rulings which found controls incompatible with Schengen obligations.
What is more: Following the events in Ceuta at the end of July, Italy introduced border controls with Spain – although mandatory identity checks are already in place between Ceuta and the Spanish mainland, meaning that public order and security in Italy were not jeopardised by the border storm in any way. In response to this blatant breach of Schengen law, Spain introduced counter-checks, which are, of course, equally illegal. Just one day before the SOTEU address, Italy extended the checks for an additional two weeks. Member states’ respect for their legal obligation to provide an area free of internal border controls is clearly lower than ever before.
Von der Leyen, however, remained silent about all of this. The only action the Commission has recently taken to protect the Schengen law has been the publication of lacklustre opinions and the announcement of consultations with nine member states that have maintained border controls for a particularly long time. More far-reaching measures, such as infringement proceedings, have been awaited in vain for many years. The failure to tackle member states’ violations of Schengen law is undoubtedly one of Ursula von der Leyen’s most egregious shortcomings as Commission president. And this SOTEU was no exception.
Manuel Müller • link
Budget: “Any modern budget needs new own resources”
The Commission president was not very expansive on the subject of the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF) – maybe also because negotiations are ongoing, and heads of state and government hope to finalise the overall negotiations on the long-term budget by the end of the year (with negotiations on individual programmes’ regulations likely to continue beyond that).
Von der Leyen made just one comment directed at member states: The EU needs its own resources. The not-so-implicit ask is a sufficiently large budget to tackle a growing number of challenges – especially with parts of it already earmarked to repay the Covid-19 recovery loans. But since member states remain reluctant to send additional national money to Brussels, the EU needs more resources of its own. This reads as a pointed address to the “frugals,” Germany included: Only a week ago, Chancellor Merz had publicly called for “hundreds of billions of euros of cuts” to the EU budget – just as the EU needs more resources, not fewer.
While von der Leyen emphasised the link between the rule of law and the EU budget, she could have gone further and pressed member states not to cut democracy funding in the next EU budget. Any cuts in this area, which is currently only around 0.5% of the MFF, would bring minimal savings but have a disproportionate impact on democratic actors, such as civil society, independent media, or the cultural sector. However, this issue was not raised by the Commission president in her speech.
Sophie Pornschlegel • link
Cohesion policy: Silence about the local and regional level
In the current MFF negotiations, cohesion is a hot topic. Financially speaking, the fight for more or less money dedicated to cohesion policy is nothing new. A new aspect in the debate is structural: The restructuring of the new EU budget and the merging of different funding lines in a single fund, as well as the introduction of National and Regional Partnership Plans, have triggered criticism from subnational authorities in the EU, fearing a renationalization of political decision-making and a watering down of cohesion policy.
In her speech, Ursula von der Leyen was remarkably silent on these issues. Clearly not a priority, the local level was mentioned only once, when the president acknowledged its central role in realizing climate adaptation and resilience. When talking about social issues, Von der Leyen stressed that the EU “will invest in our regions” to allow citizens to stay where they live – something that, in von der Leyen’s words, is a right, not a privilege. Yet von der Leyen did not say a single word on the question of regional and local competences, influence on political decisions, and long-term priorities. European regions, municipalities, and arguably citizens have clearly not been the main focus of this year’s SOTEU.
This lack of focus on the local might be due to the current complex global challenges. But it will trigger criticism of the neglect of citizens and those levels of government closest to them. The fact that most group leaders did refer to cohesion in their responses to von der Leyen might be a first sign that the question is higher on the political agenda than the president herself acknowledged. This speech likely won’t increase regions’ and municipalities’ trust that their voice is heard in the Berlaymont’s top floors.
Alex Hoppe • link
Democracy: External, internal, and technological threats
Democracy was a defining topic of the 2026 State of the Union. This is telling of the gravity of the perceived threats to European liberal democracy. Remarkably, von der Leyen framed democracy as a strategic – not intrinsic – value and a tool for defending European sovereignty. She identified both external, internal, and technological threats to Europe’s democracies. On the external side, von der Leyen warned against a “battle of narratives” by “puppets of authoritarians”. Internally, such “cognitive warfare” is amplified by the rise of extremist, “anti-democratic, anti-European forces” and a lack of nuance in political debate. Democratic skills, required in such debate, are in her view undermined by excessive use of smartphones, especially by the youth.
As internal solutions, she showcased the EU’s newly established Centre for Democratic Resilience, the Commission’s pre-emptive Rule of Law Reports, and a stronger link between EU funds and respect for the rule of law in the member states. Externally, von der Leyen envisioned the EU’s future international partnerships as conditional on shared democratic norms, an “alliance of democratic states”, as she invited Canada to become the EU’s first “associate member”. Remarkably, the speech omitted altogether the United States, which, one might deduce, is in its current configuration not welcome to such an alliance.
The EU indeed finds itself at the nexus of internal, external, and technological challenges to liberal democracy. Yet, institutional cycles and economic sanctions are unlikely to stem the tide of authoritarian populism within the EU. It rather rises or falls with the EU being able to deliver on the crucial “tipping points” of climate, economy, and security. Democracy is not a strategy, nor is it external to politics, but rather thrives on policies that live up to the EU’s core values of sustainability, freedom, peace, and prosperity.
Sanna Salo • link
Hybrid threats: Strong rhetoric, but few resources to protect democracy
Hybrid threats, von der Leyen said, “are less and less hybrid and less and less threats” – meaning they increasingly look like direct military attacks rather than covert operations. To ramp up the EU’s response, the Commission president made three announcements.
First, a new European Security Strategy to update the doctrines, institutions and decision-making. Second, a European Security Council, together with partners such as Britain, Canada, Norway and Ukraine. And third, she proposed an own “counter-hybrid playbook” for the EU, a so-called Emergency Security Protocol which could be triggered when a member state is attacked below the threshold of armed aggression. Von der Leyen described this as the EU’s equivalent of NATO’s Article 4. How it will differ from the EU’s existing Article 222 TFEU, the so-called “solidarity clause”, is not yet fully clear.
The Democracy Shield was briefly mentioned at the end – with a note that the Centre for Democratic Resilience, the flagship initiative of the Democracy Shield, “is already delivering with all the Member States and this House.” That can be considered a bit of a stretch: The European Parliament adopted its report on the Democracy Shield only one day before the speech. Among other recommendations, it has suggested to give sufficient resources to the Centre for Democratic Resilience, which for now has almost no budgetary resources and is simply a small unit within the European Commission.
As in previous speeches, it seems that democracy is mostly used as a rhetorical device rather than treated as a policy field in its own right. Adequate funding and genuine proposals – to truly combat disinformation, for instance, to tackle the disproportionate influence of Big Tech on our public sphere, and to treat democracy as infrastructure just like energy or telecoms – have not yet materialised.
Sophie Pornschlegel • link
Security: Proposing new procedures
Ursula von der Leyen used her SOTEU speech to preview elements of the European Security Strategy expected in early October. Her proposals underline the Commission president’s ambition to expand the role of her institution in security and defence, despite the member states’ powers in this policy field. While they address genuine weaknesses, they will face difficult questions about competences and implementation.
The proposed European Security Protocol addresses a real gap that the EU faces in its crisis response. NATO’s Article 4 provides a mechanism through which allies can request consultations when their security is threatened. The EU, by contrast, lacks a similarly clear trigger for jointly addressing ambiguous incidents below the threshold at which invoking the mutual-assistance clause in Article 42(7) TEU would appear appropriate. As recent hybrid incidents such as the drone attack in Leipzig demonstrated, there is value in a mechanism that allows member states to establish a shared situational picture, agree on attribution and assess possible responses.
However, the EU does not lack consultation procedures altogether. The Council’s Integrated Political Crisis Response has been activated during major international crises, including Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Hamas’s attack on Israel in 2023. The chair of the Political and Security Committee can also convene emergency meetings. The added value of a new protocol would therefore depend on whether it can bring existing Council and Commission instruments together, rather than simply adding another mechanism.
Von der Leyen also promised to “set out our ideas” for a European Security Council. Proposals for a smaller forum in which selected EU leaders and close European partners could discuss urgent security matters have circulated for decades. One recent proposal envisaged six permanent members – Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland and the United Kingdom – alongside rotating representation for smaller EU states. Such a format could facilitate quicker decisions and closer coordination with non-EU partners, particularly the United Kingdom. But it would also revive familiar concerns about creating structures outside the EU treaties and marginalising smaller member states.
In the end, Europe’s weakness is not a shortage of institutions, but a lack of political unity and shared strategic culture. Whether these proposals help the EU develop a common understanding of how to act in today’s turbulent world will depend on their implementation.
Niklas Helwig • link
Global relations: Doubling down on “like-minded partners”
In last year’s SOTEU blog post, I named this section Global relations: Enter like-minded partners, exit development cooperation. This year’s iteration of the SOTEU continues and doubles down on that path, with a strong focus on geopolitically motivated cooperation with like-minded countries. Such as Canada, to which the door is now opened as the “first associate member” of the EU.
In a world described as “openly hostile” and with the rules-based order fractured, von der Leyen called the EU to “reimagine” partnerships and to build “global coalitions for our resilience and democracy”. Exactly what this means, outside the ambitions regarding Canada’s association, remained somewhat vague. The direction is clear, though: Rather than through existing multilateral institutions (once again, the UN was not mentioned) or by stepping up as a global development actor, international partnerships are increasingly re-imagined as bilateral and coalition-based trade deals, connectivity projects and energy-, tech- and security-focused initiatives that ultimately serve to decrease the EU’s critical dependencies.
Many traditional elements in the EU’s global agency were largely, yet unsurprisingly, absent. Whilst climate change adaptation and mitigation in Europe featured high on the agenda, the SOTEU was quiet about the global dimension of climate policy. Similarly, even though the battle line between democracies and autocracies was used to frame the global context, there was no mention of EU support to democratic actors around the world. Democracy was portrayed as a selection criterion and a framing for geopolitics, but not as a transformative objective of external action.
In terms of instruments, the Global Gateway, the EU’s by now established new blueprint for international cooperation, and particularly the new connectivity initiative linking South Caucasus and Central Asia to the European markets, were talked about in connection to investments in trade. The EU’s humanitarian agency was mentioned only in connection to relief aid to Palestine, indirectly underlining the otherwise weak agency of the Union in the Middle East.
For those concerned about the EU’s inward turn and the future of its external action, it is of course positive to see the SOTEU acknowledge the importance of international partnerships and the Commission’s recommitment to defend the rules-based system. Yet there was an ever clearer instrumental tone to these, as first and foremost means to secure the EU’s interests. Concerning the EU’s leading role in defending the rules-based system, the SOTEU was remarkably silent on a key aspect: the role of the EU’s wide range of diplomatic tools and resources to try to prevent, respond to and resolve violations of international norms and rules.
Katariina Mustasilta • link
Russia and Ukraine: Steadfast, but not still
On Russia and Ukraine, the speech offered continuity, not news. Von der Leyen repeated Europe’s unwavering support for Kyiv, sustained pressure on Moscow, and named hybrid threats and disinformation as real dangers to unity. No new policy moves were announced: no fresh sanctions package, financing mechanism, or diplomatic opening.
The war itself has shifted more than the rhetorical continuity lets on. Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries have brought fuel shortages home to ordinary Russians for the first time, while Putin shows no sign of relenting. Moscow is reportedly weighing a new mobilisation once this month’s Duma elections are over. Attacks have grown bolder too, from a drone at Leipzig airport to a strike on a Ukrainian train near the Polish border. Ukraine, while able to hit Russia harder, is also more exposed than a year ago: Its air defences are stretched thin, and civilian casualties are climbing. Washington has pulled back even as Europe fills more of the gap, and the outlook for a negotiated settlement remains stalled.
Even the speech’s resolve to emphasise continued unwavering support is on shakier ground than the confident tone let on. Just the day before the SOTEU, France, joined by Slovakia, blocked the EU’s routine sanctions renewal, not out of opposition to sanctions on Russia but as leverage on an unrelated matter: Paris wants a Russian-linked businessman de-listed to help secure the release of French nationals held in Azerbaijan. The two governments most central to Europe’s commitment to Ukraine are also under mounting pressure: Germany’s AfD, which wants to cut aid to Ukraine and restore ties with Moscow, just won a state election, and France’s National Rally, which is leading the 2027 presidential race, voted against the European Parliament’s own Ukraine resolution in July. Whether the EU can still deliver on its message of steadfast support is the quiet question the speech left unanswered.
Antti Viktor Rauhala • link
EU-US relations: O Canada!
As with last year, the United States was barely mentioned directly in von der Leyen’s speech. Barely on Greenland or defense or Ukraine. Not on tech. Not on trade. Not on energy. And yet the US was there in all her references to those topics.
She mentioned that Europe stood up for Greenland when it was threatened – but without saying who Greenland was threatened by. She talked about how the EU approved, for the first time, the purchase of American Patriot interceptor missiles, but then immediately followed that by stating that the EU needed to reduce dependence on a single supplier – in this case, the unspoken United States. She proposed a European Security Council and an emergency security protocol, describing these proposals as compatible with NATO – but without addressing the debate over the US role in European security. She kept to the line that Europe sets is own rules, not “Big Tech” – again, with US tech companies looming large in their absence.
The same selective silence ran through her economic argument. Von der Leyen spoke bluntly about the EU’s trade deficit with China, celebrated new free trade agreements – India, Mercosur, Mexico, Australia, and Indonesia – and called for more routes and partners. But she offered no comparable account of trade with the United States. There were no tariffs, no EU-US trade deal, and no discussion of whether Europe’s growing preferences might be seen as protectionism in Washington.
Energy followed a similar formula. Von der Leyen noted that Europe had diversified its supplies after Russia cut off gas, but she did not name the US among its suppliers. (According to Eurostat, in the first quarter of 2026, more than half of the EU’s LNG imports came from the US.) She mentioned the Strait of Hormuz, but not the US role in the region. She advocated for more European domestic energy sources, but did not explain where that leaves the US energy commitments she defended a year ago.
The most significant wild card in-which-the-US-was-not-mentioned was the proposal to open a door for Canada to become the EU’s first “associate member”. This was framed within the idea of moving beyond CETA to an “Alliance for the Future”. The scope of included areas was large: the Arctic, energy, critical minerals, batteries, AI and quantum technology, and cybersecurity. It came at a part in von der Leyen’s speech where she underlined that democracies must be free to choose their partners and that power ought not to be left only for the “strongest, richest or loudest”. It is hard not to hear these words in light of, say, Trump’s social media post last week that showed a strong Trump, in US national hockey gear, standing over a cowering Canadian-clad Carney.
Von der Leyen’s proposal was a bold move and does not have a very clear path. “Associate membership” is not defined as an EU category. There was no clarity on the legal rights or status, market access, or decision-making power. Would Canadians be eligible for something as simple as a visa waiver? Even CETA is still awaiting full ratification by several EU member states.
Still, the boldness of von der Leyen’s announcement itself sent a clear message. Since Canada has been advocating over the past year for a closer relationship with Europe, I had wondered whether Europe would embrace the relationship or play it cool to avoid antagonizing Trump. Now we have our answer. Rhetorically, at least, von der Leyen appears to be plunging in.
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek • link
China: Tough in tone, but vague on trade defence measures
In her SOTEU address, Ursula von der Leyen addressed the issues with China head on. She emphasised that the EU was already experiencing a China shock 2.0, with a daily trade deficit of one billion euros. She stated that this was no longer sustainable and was leading to deindustrialisation in Europe. She also drew attention to the EU’s heavy reliance on critical raw materials from China, which accounts for up to 90 per cent of rare earths.
Von der Leyen thus emphasized the challenging competitive situation with China, which is putting pressure on key sectors of European industries. According to the OECD, one of the problems is that Chinese companies receive up to eight times more subsidies than their competitors in other countries. At the same time, market barriers to the Chinese market remain very high.
Consequently, EU member states and the Commission have been discussing possible EU responses for some time. As a first step, a structured dialogue with China was established in June 2026. Initial results are expected in early October. In her speech, Ursula von der Leyen referred directly to this negotiation process and called for concrete results.
However, it was highly anticipated whether von der Leyen would propose specific trade defence instruments or provide further clarification on the diversification instrument she had hinted at. Unlike in her 2023 speech – in which she announced that the European Commission would launch an anti-subsidy investigation into electric vehicles from China –, she remained very vague this time on trade defence instruments. While she emphasised that the EU would “use all available instruments” to restore balance to relations with China, the only specific announcement was the establishment of a “European Corporation on Critical Raw Materials” to reduce Europe’s dependence on China.
The tone is firm and resolute. But fundamental decisions will not be taken until the European Council in October, when the initial results of the dialogue are known.
Claudia Schmucker • link
Middle East: A payer, not a player
Despite the turmoil of the past year, the Middle East featured in von der Leyen’s speech hardly at all. The only allusion to the Iran War and the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz was included in a brief comment on the economy having weathered the impact of “the Middle East wars” better than anticipated. The escalation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia was not mentioned, neither was Iran, Lebanon or Syria, or even Turkey for that matter.
The sole exception were Israel and the Palestinians, even though they featured much less than in last year’s SOTEU. Von der Leyen recalled that speech and her call to act. While it was never explicitly spelled out, the measures outlined in 2025 aimed at pressuring Israel, whose government was seen as actively undermining the two-state solution. Regretfully, von der Leyen noted not much had happened. While the Commission was able to freeze its modest bilateral aid to Israel, discussions with the member states have not resulted in necessary majorities.
The speech carried something of an air of resignation at the EU’s political impotence in confronting even clear violations of its positions. At least from a political point of view, if not a humane one, the most glaring challenge comes from Israel moving ahead with the much-condemned E1 settlement project. While the Israeli government’s actions were characterised by von der Leyen as “unacceptable”, the reality seems to be the exact opposite: Israeli violations of EU positions, international law, human rights and the political rights of Palestinians may not be popular, but they seem to be something key member states are willing to accept in the interest of trade and good relations.
With action remaining elusive, von der Leyen tried to take pride in the fact that the EU had delivered more aid to the Palestinians than anyone else. A payer, not a player, is how analysts have for decades described the EU’s role of throwing money to alleviate symptoms of a political problem it will not address. This, von der Leyen seems to be saying, is “Europe’s role” in the year to come as well.
Timo R. Stewart • link
Enlargement: And the next state to join the EU is … Canada!
A few months ago, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz launched the idea of “associate EU membership” for Ukraine. Taking up this term, the Commission president now invited the attending Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to the European family. While Merz’s proposal had already given priority to the geopolitical logic over the logic of modernisation in enlargement policy, the symbolic expansion of the EU from Vancouver to Lugansk would turn it entirely into a geopolitical instrument.
For sure, this idea resonates with current feelings in transatlantic relations and would be a strong signal on the global stage after Iceland decided not to reapply for EU membership. However, there are risks: First, it would overstretch the concept of membership beyond Article 49 TEU. Second, a Canada catching up and overtaking other candidate countries on the waiting list would send a devastating signal to their pro-European citizens. Third, with the ratification of CETA – several times mentioned today – still pending, there is work to be completed in Canadian-European relations before the next steps are taken. Otherwise, “associate membership” would turn into a hollow shell.
To mitigate these risks, “associate membership” has to be embedded in a coherent concept of external differentiation, and progress in Canadian association to the EU must be in step with at least one or two other candidate countries. Will the “autumn of enlargement” – with the “Pre-enlargement Policy Reviews” in September (a delayed delivery to a promise of the 2023 SOTEU), the European Council’s strategic discussion in October, the annual enlargement package, and the “EU Enlargement Forum” in November – deliver on this?
For now, the Commission president only announced “roadmaps for the candidates that have made most progress”. An advance notice of major steps in the next weeks would sound different. Since it is unlikely that von der Leyen deliberately missed this opportunity, it seems that there is no political agreement (yet). Whether it can be reached, remains an open question for now. In any case, von der Leyen’s emphasis on the merit-based process and on the fact that “respect for [European] values is non-negotiable” clearly sounded like a “no” to any uts and special deals.
Julian Plottka • link
Institutional reform: A new “Congress of Europe”?
Two concrete institutional ideas stood out in the SOTEU: First, Ursula von der Leyen proposed a new “Congress of Europe” to mark the upcoming 70th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. However, she stayed vague on what it would actually look like and how it would be different from the Conference on the Future of Europe of 2021/22. Von der Leyen only alluded to the idea that it could be modelled on the original Congress of Europe of 1948. That gathering brought together 750 delegates from across the continent (politicians, intellectuals, trade unionists, and business figures) and launched the call for a political, economic and monetary Union of Europe. Is this a less political, more societal approach to rethinking the EU?
The second idea is to make Canada the first “associate member” of the EU. Canada’s Prime Minister Carney floated this earlier in the week, and von der Leyen endorsed it. What could that look like? As we proposed here, associate membership could centre on the single market. While opting out of deeper integration in areas like Justice and Home Affairs or EU citizenship, it would still require full buy-in to the EU’s core values – democracy and the rule of law chief among them. As for the budget, associate members could contribute at a reduced rate to cover shared institutional costs and receive fewer benefits. Institutionally, associate members could potentially have the right to attend and speak (not to vote) in relevant EU institutions. Still, none of these ideas were spelled out in von der Leyen’s SOTEU, in which the concept of “associate membership” remained vague.
In general, there were few, if any, concrete institutional reform proposals in the speech. In particular, von der Leyen did not call for unanimity reform, a retreat from 2025, when she explicitly called for qualified majority voting in foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether the Commission’s “pre-enlargement policy reviews”, which are scheduled for the end of September, will be any more specific on governance reform.
Sophia Russack • link
|
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek is a
Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
(FIIA)
and a
Clarendon Scholar and doctoral candidate at the University of
Oxford.
|
 |
Carmen Descamps works as Manager for EU Energy and Digital policies for the German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW) in Brussels. |
|
Saila Heinikoski is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. |
 |
Niklas Helwig is a Brussels-based Leading Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). |
 |
|
Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.
|
|
Katariina Mustasilta is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. |
|
Julian Plottka is a
Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für
Europäische Politik (IEP)
in Berlin.
|
 |
Sophie Pornschlegel is a Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre in Brussels and research at Maastricht University. |
|
Federica Prandin is a doctoral candidate at the University of Helsinki, with research affiliations at Columbia University, and a member of the EU Green Diplomacy Network. |
|
Antti Viktor Rauhala is Chief Operating Officer of the Economic Security Forum and a doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki. |
 |
Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. |
|
Sanna Salo is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. |
 |
Claudia Schmucker is Head of the Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). |
|
Timo R. Stewart is a researcher at the Centre for European Studies (CES) of the University of Helsinki. |
 |
Kristina Weissenbach is substitute professor for Ethics in Political Management and Society at the University of Duisburg-Essen and co-director of the NRW School of Governance. |
The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.
