Freedom vs tyranny? On the European reactions to the US’s war of aggression against Iran

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

Pedro Sánchez was the only European head of government to clearly call out the US attack on Iran as a violation of international law.

Less than two months after the US, in violation of international law, invaded Venezuela in order to kidnap President Nicolás Maduro (PSUV/–), it has now, again in violation of international law, launched a war of aggression against Iran together with Israel. In both cases, the reaction of the EU was conspicuously restrained: It voiced “concern”, called for de-escalation, and demanded the protection of the protection of civilians. However, it did not explicitly condemn the US attacks in either case.

The individual member states reacted in similar ways. The German federal government under Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP), for example, explicitly addressed international law in both cases – but only to emphasize its alleged “complexity” and avoid making a “final assessment”. The only exception was Spain, whose head of government, Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/PES), left no doubt about his rejection of the American-Israeli attack – whereupon US President Donald Trump (Rep./IDU) threatened Spain with a trade embargo.

Hesitating to confront the USA

The fact that, besides Malta and Slovenia, Spain is the only EU member state with a centre-left government, and that the conservative opposition leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo (PP/EPP) promptly criticized Sánchez’s stance, suggests that there is also a party-political dimension to Spain’s special role.

But why is it so difficult for most EU countries to find a clear response to the US actions in Venezuela and Iran? One obvious reason is that Europe remains heavily dependent on the US for security. Even though the Trump administration is very open about its hostility towards the EU, European countries feel too weak to openly criticise their former NATO ally on global political issues.

International law, but not for everyone?

Beyond this evasive attitude, however, there is also a significant section of the European public that clearly sympathises with American actions. After all, wasn’t Maduro an authoritarian ruler who only managed to stay in power by rigging elections? And doesn’t the Iranian regime have a decades-long history of human rights violations, culminating in the recent massacre of tens of thousands of its own citizens? Shouldn’t we show solidarity with the Iranians who after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took to the streets in celebration?

In the words of German right-wing commentator Jan Fleischhauer, international law would become a “joke” if it protected “blood-suckers” like Khamenei. The far more moderate Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen (Kok./EPP) called the Iranian dictatorship “a shackle on its own citizens” and Khamenei’s death “a window for long-awaited change”. In the German Bundestag, CSU/EPP politician Alexander Hoffmann declared that international law could be “of the utmost importance to us, but it must not become a terror clause for terrorist regimes”. And Alberto Núñez Feijóo summed up the Iran question in one simple choice: “For freedom or for the tyrants.”

Dilemma between democracy and the ban on aggression?

At its core, this argument revisits an old debate about the relative importance of democracy and human rights on the one hand, and principles such as state sovereignty and the prohibition of wars of aggression on the other.

Established international law provides a clear, albeit unsatisfactory, answer to this question. On the one hand, democracy and human rights are enshrined in international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as numerous regional agreements. On the other hand, it offers little scope for direct action if governments fail to comply.

“Responsibility to protect” – but only with a UN mandate

True: The concept of the “responsibility to protect”, developed by the United Nations in the early 2000s, relativised the absolute sovereignty of states, behind which authoritarian regimes had long been able to hide. It permits external armed intervention in extreme situations, such as genocide or crimes against humanity – a threshold that Iran may have crossed.

In any case, however, such interventions require a mandate from the UN Security Council, a body that regularly includes authoritarian regimes with no interest at all in protecting human rights. Russia and China even have permanent seats with veto power. Therefore all Iran had to do to prevent Security Council action was to secure Russia’s support, which it did, among other things, by supplying combat drones for Russia’s own war of aggression against Ukraine.

The “liberal interventionism” of the 1990s

Thus, discussions about whether armed action might be legitimate without a UN mandate have been ongoing in Western democracies since the 1990s. The prime example of such a constellation is the Kosovo War of 1999, which was justified as the prevention of a genocide against the Kosovo-Albanian population.

This “liberal interventionism” was also fuelled by the belief that, following the end of the Cold War, democracy would soon become the dominant form of government worldwide. Although serious human rights violations continued to occur, they appeared to stem only from individual authoritarian leaders. It therefore seemed reasonable to hope that these violations could be gradually eliminated, either peacefully or through armed intervention, in order to ultimately achieve lasting democratic peace.

Democracy on the defensive

In practice, liberal interventionism was quickly discredited by the neoconservative foreign policy of the US administration under George W. Bush (Rep./IDU), which used the spread of democracy as an excuse to disregard international law and the United Nations also in pursuit of other foreign policy interests. The numerous falsehoods used to justify the 2003 Iraq War, in particular, led to a massive loss of credibility that even subsequent Democratic US administrations under Barack Obama and Joe Biden (both Dem./PA) were unable to fully compensate for.

In addition, democracy has come under increasing pressure worldwide, both internally due to the rise of right-wing extremist parties and externally due to the strengthening of authoritarian great powers. Rather than on liberal interventions, the debate in recent years has centred on how to safeguard the liberal order against the imperial ambitions of states such as Russia and China.

Paradoxical lessons from the Russian aggression of 2022

In this context, a key shock moment for the EU was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It led the European public to learn two somewhat paradoxical lessons: On the one hand, Europeans rediscovered the importance of national sovereignty under international law as a protective mechanism against authoritarian expansionism and attempts to exert influence. The fact that the Russian invasion had violated the ban on wars of aggression was the West’s main argument when seeking support for Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly.

On the other hand, growing global competition between democratic and authoritarian regimes also led to an increasing willingness among Europeans to openly confront systemic conflicts, if necessary even by military means. As early as 2019, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) had called on Europe to learn the “language of power”. Ukraine’s experience in 2022 then demonstrated to all EU countries that the survival of a democracy can sometimes depend on the strength of its weapons.

International law as an obstacle in a global systemic conflict?

This perspective, however, has an inherent tendency to blur boundaries: If an armed global systemic conflict is deemed to be inevitable, the question immediately arises as to whether it should also be proactively waged and, if necessary, escalated. The various armed disputes of the present then no longer appear as individual conflicts, but rather as a kind of global civil war between democratic and authoritarian actors. In that vein, numerous European politicians recently pointed to Iran’s drone deliveries to Russia as an argument to justify the military strikes of the US.

From this perspective, international law, which is designed to contain conflicts, can easily become “annoying” – as the newly elected Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten (D66/ALDE) put it – if it acts as an obstacle to democracies and thereby gives an advantage to authoritarian regimes. Even if they do not openly approve, many Europeans seem to respect and secretly admire the American and Israeli governments’ demonstrations of power. After all, as Friedrich Merz said regarding the 2025 Israeli attack on Iran, they are “doing the dirty work for us”.

But does this ambivalence toward international law really correspond to Europe’s values and interests? In my view, there are four main points that argue against it.

Violence is always violence

Firstly, violence always remains violence. It is no coincidence that the UN Charter begins with the desire “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which […] has brought untold sorrow to mankind”. While some in Iran rejoiced at the dictator’s death, others mourned the more than 160 civilian casualties killed in the bombing of a primary school – probably a mistake in target selection, but mistakes of this kind are a common occurrence in armed attacks.

The victims of war cannot be ignored any more than the victims of dictatorship. While military strikes may sometimes be necessary to prevent serious human rights violations, there are good reasons why international law restricts their use. And granted, the UN Security Council is dysfunctional, particularly with regard to the veto power of the five permanent members. But a world in which each state decides for itself whether and when a war of aggression is justified would hardly be a safer place.

Military interventions rarely truly lead to democracy

Secondly, the track record of liberal interventionism is poor. The major military interventions by Western states since the turn of the millennium – in addition to Iraq in 2003, this includes, for example, Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011 – have usually not resulted in the establishment of stable democracies, but rather in years of civil war.

Democratization processes take time and require intensive and sustained civil support. The US under Donald Trump has obviously no interest in providing this: By closing the national development aid agency USAID, the Trump administration has destroyed its most important instrument for promoting democracy abroad. In Venezuela, the US has come to terms with Maduro’s successor, Delcy Rodríguez (PSUV/–), whose regime is just as authoritarian as her predecessor’s. And in Iran, Trump recently announced that he wants to choose the next leader himself.

The Trump administration is not fighting for democracy

Thirdly, this also makes it obvious that the simple good-versus-evil paradigm used by Alberto Núñez Feijóo and others is not helpful in today’s world. For many Europeans, particularly within the conservative camp, the threat posed by Russia stirs up memories of the Cold War, when the transatlantic alliance was considered vital to the survival of the democratic West.

But Western democracy today is under threat not only from outside forces, but also from within. Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud/IDU), in particular, clearly harbour authoritarian ambitions in their domestic policies. And the threats against Canada and Greenland should have been the last wake-up call for everyone in Europe to realise that also Trump’s foreign policy follows a neo-imperial pattern that is not aimed at spreading democracy, but at US dominance over other states.

Of course, the US is not yet a stable dictatorship like the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, this war is not about “freedom versus tyranny”, but rather the aggression of one authoritarian actor against another.

The EU’s credibility is at stake

And this, fourthly, also puts the EU’s own global credibility as a pro-democratic actor at stake. In view of the global systemic conflict, it has often been argued that the EU must strengthen its relations with democratic states in the Global South – countries such as Brazil, which share Europe’s fundamental political values while also offering significant potential for economic cooperation.

From bitter experience, many of these countries place great importance on the ban of aggressive warfare in international law, while also being extremely wary of imperial ambitions by Western states. In addition, they are often sceptical of the traditional “liberal world order”, which has entrenched significant economic, social and political inequalities on a global scale.

While they almost unanimously rejected Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the conflict is more distant for them and therefore does not carry the same existential significance as it does for Europe. In particular, they do not see it as a reason to disregard legal boundaries and turn a blind eye to American or Israeli violations of international law simply because they were committed “for us”.

Do not encourage global nihilism

For the EU to be able to stand up for its values on a global level, it is essential that it remains credible among these democratic partners. The fact that most European countries (again with the exception of Spain) have cut back on their development aid in recent years is already a serious problem.

It would be even more disastrous if European governments were now to give the impression that they are also applying double standards to fundamental norms of international law, such as the ban on wars of aggression. What is at stake here is not only Europe’s influence in global politics and the willingness of the Global South to continue supporting Ukraine. If EU states undermine international law, they encourage a global nihilism that skilled authoritarian regimes such as China will exploit to their advantage. Ultimately, this will jeopardise the cause of democracy itself.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Pictures: Pedro Sánchez: Finnish Government [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].

Freiheit vs. Tyrannei? Gedanken zu den europäischen Reaktionen auf den US-Angriffskrieg in Iran

English

Von Manuel Müller

Pedro Sánchez war der einzige europäische Regierungschef, der den US-Angriff auf Iran klar als Völkerrechtsbruch bezeichnete.

Keine zwei Monate, nachdem die USA völkerrechtswidrig Venezuela überfallen hatten, um dessen Präsidenten Nicolás Maduro (PSUV/–) zu entführen, haben sie nun ebenfalls völkerrechtswidrig zusammen mit Israel einen Angriffskrieg gegen Iran begonnen. In beiden Fällen fiel die Reaktion der EU auffällig zurückhaltend aus: Man äußerte „Besorgnis“, forderte Deeskalation und den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung. Eine explizite Verurteilung der US-Angriffe jedoch gab es in beiden Fällen nicht.

Auch die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten reagierten ähnlich. Die deutsche Bundesregierung unter Friedrich Merz (CDU/EVP) etwa thematisierte zwar in beiden Fällen ausdrücklich das Völkerrecht – aber jeweils nur, um dessen angebliche „Komplexität“ zu betonen und sich einer „endgültigen Bewertung“ zu entziehen. Die einzige Ausnahme war Spanien, dessen Regierungschef Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/SPE) keine Zweifel an seiner Ablehnung des amerikanisch-israelischen Angriffs ließ – woraufhin US-Präsident Donald Trump (Rep./IDU) Spanien mit einem Handelsembargo drohte.

Keine Verurteilung der USA

Dass Spanien neben Malta und Slowenien der einzige EU-Mitgliedstaat mit einer Mitte-links-Regierung ist und der konservative Oppositionsführer Alberto Núñez Feijóo (PP/EVP) prompt scharfe Kritik an Sánchez’ Haltung übte, verdeutlicht, dass dem spanischen Sonderweg durchaus auch eine parteipolitische Dimension zugrunde liegt.

Aber warum tun sich die meisten EU-Staaten so schwer damit, eine Antwort auf die US-Politik in Venezuela und Iran zu finden? Ein offensichtlicher Grund dafür ist, dass Europa sicherheitspolitisch nach wie vor stark von den USA abhängig ist. Selbst wenn die Trump-Regierung keinen Hehl aus ihrer Abneigung gegenüber der EU macht, fühlen sich die europäischen Staaten zu schwach, um in weltpolitischen Fragen explizite Kritik an ihrem alten NATO-Partner zu äußern, und drücken sich deshalb vor einer klaren Stellungnahme.

Völkerrecht ja, aber nicht für alle?

Darüber hinaus gibt es allerdings auch einen nennenswerten Teil der europäischen Öffentlichkeit, der deutliche Sympathie für die amerikanischen Aktionen zeigt. Denn war Maduro nicht ein autoritärer Herrscher, der sich nur durch Wahlfälschung an der Macht halten konnte? Hat das iranische Regime nicht eine jahrzehntelange Geschichte von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die jüngst in einem Massaker an zehntausenden eigenen Bürger:innen gipfelten? Soll man sich nicht mit den Iraner:innen solidarisieren, die nach dem Tod von Ayatollah Ali Chamenei feiernd durch die Straßen zogen?

In den Worten des rechtskonservativen deutschen Publizisten Jan Fleischhauer mache sich ein Völkerrecht, das „Blutsäufer“ wie Chamenei schütze, zum „Witzbegriff“. Die weitaus gemäßigtere finnische Außenministerin Elina Valtonen (Kok./EVP) bezeichnete die iranische Diktatur als „Fessel für die eigenen Bürger:innen“ und den Tod Chameneis als „Gelegenheitsfenster für lang erwarteten Wandel“. Im deutschen Bundestag erklärte der CSU/EVP-Politiker Alexander Hoffmann, das Völkerrecht könne „für uns allerhöchsten Stellenwert haben, aber es darf ‌nicht zur Terrorklausel werden für terroristische Regime“. Und Alberto Núñez Feijóo fasste die Iran-Frage in einem Satz zusammen: „Für die Freiheit oder für die Tyrannen.“

Dilemma zwischen Demokratie und Angriffskriegsverbot?

Im Kern greift dieses Argument eine alte Auseinandersetzung auf, in der es um den Stellenwert von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einerseits und Prinzipien wie der Staatensouveränität und des Angriffskriegsverbots andererseits geht.

Das klassische Völkerrecht enthält darauf eine eigentlich klare, aber nicht vollkommen befriedigende Antwort: Einerseits sind durch die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte, den UN-Zivil- und -Sozialpakt sowie zahlreiche regionale Abkommen auch Demokratie und Menschenrechte im Völkerrecht verankert. Andererseits bietet es aber nur wenig direkte Handlungsmöglichkeiten, wenn Regierungen sich nicht daran halten.

„Schutzverantwortung“ – nur mit Mandat des UN-Sicherheitsrats

Das Anfang der 2000er Jahre von den Vereinten Nationen entwickelte Konzept der responsibility to protect („Schutzverantwortung“) relativierte zwar die absolute Staatensouveränität, hinter die sich autoritäre Regime lange zurückziehen konnten. Es erlaubt externe bewaffnete Eingriffe in Extremsituationen wie Völkermord oder Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit – eine Schwelle, die im Iran durchaus erreicht sein könnte.

In jedem Fall aber wäre dafür ein Mandat des UN-Sicherheitsrates erforderlich. Dort wiederum sind regelmäßig auch autoritäre Regime vertreten, die an einem konsequenten Schutz der Menschenrechte keinerlei Interesse haben. Russland und China verfügen sogar über einen ständigen Sitz mit Vetorecht. Um Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrates zu verhindern, genügte es Iran also schon, sich die Unterstützung Russlands zu sichern, unter anderem durch die Lieferung von Kampfdrohnen für dessen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine.

Der „liberale Interventionismus“ der 1990er Jahre

Schon seit den 1990er Jahren gab es in den westlichen Demokratien deshalb immer wieder Diskussionen darüber, ob unter bestimmten Umständen nicht auch bewaffnete Aktionen ohne UN-Mandat legitim sein könnten – mit dem Kosovo-Krieg 1999 zur Verhinderung eines Völkermords an der kosovo-albanischen Bevölkerung als Musterfall.

Dieser „liberale Interventionismus“ wurde auch von der Vorstellung getragen, dass die Demokratie sich nach dem Ende des Kalten Kriegs bald weltweit durchgesetzt haben würde. Schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen gab es zwar weiterhin, doch sie schienen nur noch von einzelnen autoritären Machthabern auszugehen. Man konnte deshalb plausiblerweise hoffen, dass es möglich sein würde, diese nach und nach zu beseitigen – auf friedlichem Weg oder eben durch bewaffnete Interventionen –, um in einer demokratischen Welt schließlich dauerhaften Frieden zu erreichen.

Demokratie in der Defensive

In der Praxis wurde der liberale Interventionismus allerdings recht schnell durch die „neokonservative“ Außenpolitik der US-Regierung unter George W. Bush (Rep./IDU) diskreditiert, die die Ausbreitung der Demokratie zum Vorwand nahm, um das Völkerrecht und die Vereinten auch bei der Verfolgung anderer außenpolitischer Interessen links liegen zu lassen. Insbesondere die zahlreichen Unwahrheiten bei der Rechtfertigung des Irak-Kriegs 2003 mündeten in einen massiven Verlust an Glaubwürdigkeit, den auch die späteren demokratischen US-Regierungen unter Barack Obama (Dem./PA) und Joe Biden (Dem./PA) nicht vollständig ausgleichen konnten.

Zudem geriet die Demokratie weltweit immer stärker in die Defensive – intern durch den Aufstieg rechtsextremer Parteien, extern durch das Erstarken autoritärer Großmächte. Statt über liberale Interventionen konzentrierte sich die Debatte in den letzten Jahren deshalb auf den Schutz der liberalen Ordnung gegen die imperialen Ambitionen von Staaten wie Russland und China.

Paradoxe Lehren aus dem russischen Überfall 2022

Zum Schock-Moment für die EU wurde schließlich der russische Überfall auf die Ukraine 2022. In der europäischen Öffentlichkeit führte dieses Ereignis zu zwei teilweise paradoxen Lernerfahrungen. Auf der einen Seite entdeckten die Europäer:innen wieder vermehrt die Bedeutung der völkerrechtlich garantierten Souveränität als Schutzmechanismus gegen autoritäre Expansions- und Beeinflussungsversuche. Dass die russische Invasion gegen das Angriffskrieg-Verbot verstieß, war das zentrale Argument des Westens, um bei den Vereinten Nationen um Unterstützung für die Ukraine zu werben.

Auf der anderen Seite führte die wachsende globale Konkurrenz zwischen demokratischen und autoritären Regimen aber auch zu einer zunehmenden europäischen Bereitschaft, Systemkonflikte offen und, wenn nötig, mit militärischen Mitteln auszutragen. Schon 2019 hatte Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EVP) gefordert, Europa müsse die „Sprache der Macht“ erlernen. Die Erfahrung der Ukraine 2022 führte dann allen europäischen Ländern vor Augen, dass das Überleben einer Demokratie zuweilen an der Stärke der eigenen Waffen hängt.

Das Völkerrecht als Hemmschuh im globalen Systemkonflikt?

Dieser Perspektive wohnt jedoch eine Tendenz zur Entgrenzung inne: Sieht man einen bewaffneten globalen Systemkonflikt als unvermeidlich an, dann liegt die Frage nahe, ob man diesen nicht auch proaktiv führen und gegebenenfalls eskalieren sollte. Die verschiedenen bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen der Gegenwart erscheinen dann nicht mehr als einzelne Konflikte, sondern als eine Art globaler Bürgerkrieg zwischen demokratischen und autoritären Akteuren. So verwiesen zuletzt zahlreiche europäische Politiker:innen auch auf die iranischen Drohnenlieferungen an Russland als ein Argument zur Rechtfertigung der amerikanischen Militärschläge.

Das auf Einhegung von Konflikten angelegte Völkerrecht kann aus dieser Sicht – in den Worten des neu gewählten niederländischen Regierungschefs Rob Jetten (D66/ALDE) – „lästig“ werden, wenn es die Demokratien behindert und dadurch autoritären Regimen Vorteile verschafft. Wenn schon keine offene Zustimmung, so scheinen die Machtdemonstrationen der amerikanischen und israelischen Regierung vielen Europäer:innen deshalb eine gewisse Anerkennung und heimliche Bewunderung abzuringen: Schließlich machen sie, wie Friedrich Merz bereits über den israelischen Angriff auf Iran 2025 formulierte, „für uns die Drecksarbeit“.

Aber entspricht diese Ambivalenz gegenüber dem Völkerrecht wirklich den Werten und Interessen Europas? Vier Punkte sprechen aus meiner Sicht dagegen.

Gewalt bleibt Gewalt

Erstens bleibt Gewalt eben doch immer Gewalt: Nicht zufällig beginnt die UN-Charta mit dem Wunsch, „künftige Geschlechter vor der Geißel des Krieges zu bewahren, die […] unsagbares Leid über die Menschheit gebracht hat“. Während im Iran die einen über den Tod des Diktators jubelten, trauerten andere über mehr als 160 zivile Opfer, die bei der Bombardierung einer Schule ums Leben gekommen waren – wohl ein Missgeschick bei der Zielauswahl, wie sie bei bewaffneten Angriffen dieser Art aber zum Alltag gehören.

Die Opfer des Krieges lassen sich ebenso wenig ignorieren wie die Opfer der Diktatur; und auch wenn Militärschläge in bestimmten Fällen geeignet und legitim sein können, um schwere Menschenrechtsverstöße zu unterbinden, gibt es doch gute Gründe, dass das Völkerrecht ihre Anwendung restriktiv handhabt. Und ja: Der UN-Sicherheitsrat ist dysfunktional, speziell das Vetorecht der fünf ständigen Mitglieder. Aber eine Entwicklung, in der jeder Staat für sich selbst entscheidet, ob und wann ein Angriffskrieg gerechtfertigt ist, wird die Welt kaum sicherer machen.

Militärische Interventionen führen selten wirklich zu Demokratie

Zweitens die schlechte Erfolgsbilanz des „liberalen Interventionismus“: Die großen militärischen Interventionen westlicher Staaten seit der Jahrtausendwende (neben Irak etwa auch Afghanistan 2001 oder Libyen 2011) führten bislang in aller Regel nicht zum Aufbau stabiler Demokratien, sondern eher zu jahrelangen Bürgerkriegen.

Gesellschaftliche Demokratisierungsprozesse brauchen Zeit und eine intensive und nachhaltige zivile Unterstützung. Dass die USA unter Donald Trump daran kein Interesse haben, ist offensichtlich: Mit der Schließung der nationalen Entwicklungshilfe-Agentur USAID hat die Trump-Regierung ihr wichtigstes Instrument der externen Demokratieförderung zerstört. In Venezuela hat sie sich mit Maduros Nachfolgerin Delcy Rodríguez (PSUV/–) arrangiert, die nicht weniger autoritär herrscht als ihr Vorgänger. Und für Iran hat Trump jüngst angekündigt, den nächsten Machthaber selbst aussuchen zu wollen.

Die Trump-Regierung kämpft nicht für die Demokratie

Das macht, drittens, auch deutlich, dass das einfache Gut-Böse-Schema, mit dem etwa Alberto Núñez Feijóo argumentiert, in der heutigen Weltlage nicht weiterhilft. Die Bedrohung durch Russland weckt bei vielen Europäer:innen Erinnerungen an den Kalten Krieg, in dem – zumal im konservativen Lager – das transatlantische Bündnis als entscheidender Schlüssel für das Überleben des demokratischen Westens galt.

Aber die westliche Demokratie ist heute nicht nur von außen, sondern auch von innen bedroht. Gerade Donald Trump und Israels Regierungschef Benjamin Netanjahu (Likud/IDU) hegen in ihrer Innenpolitik klar erkennbar selbst autoritäre Ambitionen. Und spätestens seit den Drohungen gegen Kanada und Grönland sollte doch jede:r in Europa verstanden haben, dass auch Trumps Außenpolitik einem neo-imperialen Muster folgt, das nicht die Ausbreitung der Demokratie, sondern US-amerikanische Dominanz über andere Staaten zum Ziel hat.

Natürlich sind die USA noch keine stabile Diktatur wie das iranische Regime. Dennoch geht es in diesem Krieg nicht um „Freiheit oder Tyrannei“, sondern um die Aggression eines autoritären Akteurs gegen einen anderen.

Die Glaubwürdigkeit der EU steht auf dem Spiel

Und damit steht, viertens, auch die weltweite Glaubwürdigkeit der EU als pro-demokratischer Akteur auf dem Spiel. Angesichts des globalen Systemkonflikts wurde immer wieder argumentiert, dass die EU ihre Beziehungen zu anderen demokratischen Staaten insbesondere im Globalen Süden intensivieren müsse – etwa zu Ländern wie Brasilien, die politische Grundwerte mit Europa teilen und zugleich großes wirtschaftliches Kooperationspotenzial bieten.

Aus eigener bitterer Erfahrung legen viele dieser Länder großen Wert auf das völkerrechtliche Aggressionsverbot und sind zugleich äußerst misstrauisch gegenüber imperialen Ambitionen westlicher Staaten. Zudem sind sie häufig skeptisch gegenüber der alten „liberalen“ Weltordnung, die auf globaler Ebene massive wirtschaftliche, soziale und politische Ungleichheiten zementiert hat.

Den russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine lehnten sie 2022 zwar nahezu geschlossen ab, doch er ist für sie weiter entfernt und hat daher nicht dieselbe existenzielle Bedeutung wie für Europa. Insbesondere sehen sie darin keinen Anlass für eine Logik der Entgrenzung, bei der man gegenüber amerikanischen oder israelischen Völkerrechtsverstößen ein Auge zudrücken sollte, weil sie ja „für uns“ geschähen.

Nicht dem globalen Nihilismus Vorschub leisten

Wenn die EU in der Lage sein will, auf globaler Ebene für ihre Werte einzutreten, dann ist es essenziell, unter diesen demokratischen Partnern glaubwürdig zu bleiben. Dass die meisten europäischen Länder (wiederum mit Ausnahme von Spanien) in den letzten Jahren ihre Entwicklungshilfe zurückgefahren haben, ist dabei schon ein ernsthaftes Problem.

Umso fataler wäre es, wenn die europäischen Regierungen nun darüber hinaus auch noch den Eindruck erwecken, sie würden auch bei wesentlichen Völkerrechtsnormen wie dem Verbot von Angriffskriegen doppelte Standards anwenden. Auf dem Spiel steht dabei nicht nur der weltpolitische Einfluss Europas und die Bereitschaft des globalen Südens zur weiteren Unterstützung der Ukraine. Vielmehr leistet das Untergraben des Völkerrechts einem globalen Nihilismus Vorschub, den geschickte autoritäre Regime wie China zu nutzen verstehen werden – und der letztlich auch die Sache der Demokratie selbst gefährdet.

Manuel Müller ist Europawissenschaftler und Herausgeber des Blogs „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Bilder: Pedro Sánchez: Finnish Government [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Porträt Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

EU Analytics – February 2026 review: The power shifts in EU migration policy

By Nicolai von Ondarza

EU migration policy is now effectively decided by a centre-right to far-right majority in the European Parliament.

February certainly ended with another seismic event for European politics, with the US/Israel war against Iran starting and quickly spiralling out to the wider region. As I am writing this monthly review in early March, the military threat comes closer and closer, all the way to hits to Cyprus (on the sovereign territory of UK bases).

To some extent, this overshadows the fact that February has been another month of high-stakes votes in both the EU Parliament and the Council, in particular regarding the designation of “safe third countries of origin” in asylum policy. The votes in both legislative chambers underlined how much the political mood has swung in the EU, and how strongly the now regular cooperation of centre-right and far right is determining EU policy in this area.

At the same time, votes on foreign policy such as the Ukraine loan and on Iran show where the centre is holding, and where it is fracturing. Time to dive in:

Highlight of the month: Twin votes on list of “safe third countries”

For the deep dive of this month, I was torn between the votes on the Ukraine loan (which I have looked into on Bluesky), which showed where the centre held and where it was fractured (hint: France), and the twin votes in the EP and Council on the “safe third countries” list. I decided to opt for the latter since it shows how much the EU political majorities on migration are shifting.

In terms of policies, the debate on “safe third countries” hides a large shift. It is essentially a debate about which countries EU member states can deport migrants back to. This was not just a question of law and whether the respective countries are indeed safe. Rather, much like the Rwanda scheme in the UK and the Albania scheme in Italy, the decisions adopted in the EU in February were aimed at making a political decision on which third countries are deemed safe, in order to speed up and widen deportations. This is a policy aim first advocated by the far right, but increasingly also adopted by the centre-right and parts of the centre-left, such as the Social Democrats in Denmark.

Data source: Council of the EU. (Click to enlarge.)

In consequence, the votes in both the EP and the Council revealed new divisions. Let us start with the Council, which adopted a “Regulation as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept” on the 23 of February 2026. The vote was highly unusual in two ways: On the one hand, it was adopted by a surprisingly close margin, with only 71.2% in favour and 28.8% against (the required quorum in qualified majority voting is 65%).

On the other hand, it was also about who was outvoted: France, which is almost never outvoted, together with Spain and Portugal, who are now at the margins of EU migration policy. Instead, amongst national governments, the dominant forces are now those from the centre-right, Nordic centre-left, and far right, driving the EU towards a hardening of its stance.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Now, let us look at the European Parliament. Here, the vote in the graph above shows a picture that is familiar by now: a clear left-right division, with a majority composed of the centre-right EPP plus the three far-right groups ECR, PfE and ESN winning the vote. There are a few rebels from the centre-left S&D and the liberal Renew, so that at least those in the EPP can say that the most extreme MEPs from the AfD-led ESN were not crucial to winning the vote.

What is novel here is that, unlike the Omnibus I votes, there was never any doubt in the plenary which majority would win the day: The EPP was clear that it would vote with the far right, even if it still says that there is no official coordination. What is clear from the data is that there were three votes on migration in the February session, and all of them were won by the “Venezuela” majority – clearly no accident or political coincidence.

Source: Own calculation, based on data from HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

The pattern becomes even more revealing if you look at the political groups’ co-voting behaviour in all the plenary votes in this legislative period on migration policy. Here the real switch becomes apparent: The EPP has, on migration policy, voted more often with the national-conservative ECR, the right-wing populist “Patriots for Europe” of Viktor Orbán and Jordan Bardella and even the more extremist “Europe of Sovereign Nations” led by the AfD than it has voted with the centre-left or the Liberals.

Taken together, EU migration policy in this legislative period is effectively decided by a centre-right to far-right majority in the European Parliament and a majority of right-wing leaning national governments in the Council.

Final votes in the European Parliament

In February 2026, the EP had one major plenary session from 9-12 February and a short, symbolic one focused on Ukraine on 24 February. In terms of the votes, the plenary session had 22 votes recorded at HowTheyVote.EU. On those, I already wrote a flash analysis with a look at who won the votes, the coalitions, where the far right mattered, and on the group coherence. This will therefore be a shorter cross-cutting look.

First, as expected, the snapback to the “von der Leyen” majority observed in January turned out to be an outlier. In February, the EP had more of the characteristics of a parliament with a minority government. The “von der Leyen” platform won only about 75 per cent of the votes, while five votes, including all those on migration, were won by the “Venezuela” majority of centre-right and far right.

If this continues, to me it really means that effectively the European Parliament is working on two separate, but clearly established formations now. This graph of voting agreements between the blocks show the downward trend amongst the centre-right and centre-left “von der Leyen” platform, as well as the inverse trend of all three far-right parties voting with each other.

Source: Own calculation based on voting data from HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

The other notable data point is the behaviour of the S&D and Renew towards the EPP. Although there is now a pattern of the EPP voting with the far right on several issues, there is an equally clear dynamic that the centre-left and Liberals are not willing to break the von der Leyen platform. As they have no ability to construct a majority with the left alone, they each face the difficult choice of either accepting that the EPP now regularly goes against their interests or going into opposition mode, knowing that then the far right would be even more influential.

So far, it is clear that both opt for option 1. Overall, the S&D now votes noticeably more often with Renew and the Greens than with the EPP, and in February even more often with the Left than the EPP. A further move towards a left-right division in European politics.

Additionally, a sizeable number of rebels in the S&D, and even more in Renew, regularly also votes with the EPP even when it votes with the far right. This has the “bonus” that, technically, the most extremist AfD-led group ESN is not required for the Venezuela majority then. It also underscores that, in particular on migration, there are quite a few MEPs from the centre-left and liberal spectrum who also want to take the hard turn.

Source: Own calculation based on voting data from HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always fewer. For February 2026, there were a total of 10 public votes, which included quite a few important ones:

• Of the 10 votes, only 4 were adopted unanimously. The other six had at least abstentions (3) or one or several no votes (3). This continues the trend of recent months that less decisions are adopted by consensus.
• The decisions with no votes included setting up the Ukraine loan facility, where only Hungary voted against, despite not contributing to the Enhanced Cooperation. While this vote was by QMV, the loan also needs a unanimous decision to borrow on the EU budget, which Hungary is currently blocking – contrary to the promises given by Orbán at the December European Council.
• The vote covered above on “list of safe third countries” is also notable for being the first instance in years that France was outvoted on a public vote – right on the back of also being outvoted on the Mercosur Trade Agreement.
• Finally, I noted that Czechia, under the new Babiš government, is moving a bit to the margins. After not having been outvoted at all in the previous 12 months, in February it abstained and voted no once each, plus staying on the outside of the Enhanced Cooperation for the Ukraine loan.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.

Pictures: EP plenary cartoon: Nicolai von Ondarza, with Google Gemini [all rights reserved]; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

European Parliament seat projection (February 2026): Heavy losses for the Liberals as S&D and ECR recover

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	187	79	84	28	32	–
Jan. 26 (B)	53	37	122	71	177	80	104	38	27	11
Feb. 26 (B)	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
Feb. 26 (D)	55	37	126	65	176	90	104	37	30	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 23 February 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 23 February 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

In recent years, the political wind in the EU has rarely blown to the left: Since the 2024 election, there has not been a single seat projection in which none of the three left-of-centre political groups – the social democratic S&D, the green G/EFA, and the Left – has suffered losses. Taken together, they have lost almost a tenth of their seats, slipping from 235 seats in the election (already a historic low) to 212 in the January 2026 projection.

In this downward trend, the current projection offers a silver lining for the left-of-centre parties. Both S&D and the Left are gaining slightly, while the Greens/EFA are holding steady at their January levels. Admittedly, the changes are far too small to speak of a trend reversal. But after the slight setbacks for the far-right parties in the November and January projections, this recovery of the left-wing parties is another small sign that the shift to the right in European polls has recently lost momentum.

Silver lining for left-wing parties

The biggest loser of the recent weeks, however, is not the far right, which has actually gained slightly compared to the January projection. Instead, it is the Liberals who are suffering heavy losses: With only 64 seats, they have fallen to their lowest level since the beginning of regular European Parliament seat projections in the summer of 2014. Also the centre-right EPP group has lost some ground, achieving its worst result of this legislative term.

Examining the survey data in detail reveals that, just as in January, there are hardly any dramatic changes in any member state – with one exception which will be discussed below. Most individual national parties are experiencing only minor shifts, causing them to rise or fall by a maximum of one or two seats in the projection. For the parliamentary groups, this means in some cases that gains in one member state will offset losses in another; in other cases, however, several small changes into the same direction can add up to a larger shift. Only time can tell if such a development will then consolidate into a broader Europe-wide trend.

Mixed bag for the EPP

In the case of the EPP, polls in recent weeks have certainly shown a mixed bag of successes and setbacks. On the one hand, the Czech STAN party has gained ground, significantly increasing its popularity since entering opposition after the 2025 national parliamentary election. Also Hungary’s Tisza party has seen a slight increase in support at the start of the campaign for the Hungarian parliamentary election next April – although, as already described here in January, Hungarian polls are heavily influenced by the political bias of the respective polling institutes and are therefore only of limited reliability.

However, these gains are offset by losses for the EPP in various other member states – such as Bulgaria, where there is also an upcoming national parliamentary election, in Portugal, where the candidate of the ruling EPP member party did not even make it to the runoff in the national presidential election in January, and in Romania. In total, the EPP threfore suffers a slight setback. It now stands at 175 seats (–⁠2 compared to the January projection), equalling its worst result since the 2024 European election.

S&D recovery

For the S&D group, recent polls have also yielded mixed results. The Social Democrats have strengthened their position as the strongest national force in Denmark and Finland, and have also made gains in Cyprus. The Spanish PSOE, on the other hand, has recently performed more weakly, and the Bulgarian BSP would even fail to reach the national threshold according to current polls.

Still, the S&D manages a slight overall gain to 124 seats (+⁠2). While this remains one of the group’s worst ever results in a long-term comparison, it is at least a small improvement after the sequence of historic lows of recent months.

Liberals in a twelve-year low

Also among the liberal RE group, the losses suffered by individual national parties in recent weeks have been minor. Its member parties in Spain (PNV), Austria (Neos), Bulgaria (PP), Slovakia (PS), Slovenia (GS), Ireland (FF) and Denmark (RV) have only slipped slightly in the polls – enough for all of them to lose just one seat in the projection.

However, these losses for the Liberals are hardly matched by gains anywhere else. Only the Danish Moderaterne have improved their standing in the polls so that they would now win a seat in the European Parliament again.

In total, the RE group therefore experiences a substantial decline and drops to 64 seats (–⁠7), its lowest level in at least twelve years. Since autumn 2022 alone, the Liberals have lost more than a third of their projected seats.

Greens stable, Left minimally up

For the Greens/EFA group, slight gains in Italy and Latvia are offset by slight losses in Czechia and Denmark. In the projection, the Greens therefore remain unchanged at 37 seats (±⁠0) for the third time in a row. After heavy losses in the first few months following the 2024 election, they now appear to have stabilised, albeit at a low level.

The changes in the Left group are also minor. On the one hand, Ireland’s SF has suffered slight losses but remains the strongest national party. On the other hand, Slovenia’s Levica and Cyprus’s AKEL are both gaining ground in the run-up to their respective national parliamentary elections (which will take place in Slovenia in March and in Cyprus in May). Overall, the Left group has made slight gains and now stands at 54 seats (+⁠1).

ECR gaining, ESN losing ground

At the right-wing end of the political spectrum, the ECR group is among the winners of recent weeks. Its member parties are gaining ground in Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia, among other countries. This is partly offset by slight losses in Poland and Finland. Overall, however, the ECR group rises to 83 seats (+⁠3) in the projection, putting it close to its previous high of 85 seats in September 2025.

The PfE group, which stands even further to the right than the ECR and has replaced it as the strongest far-right group since the 2024 election, remains unchanged overall. Among others, Spain’s Vox and Portugal’s Chega have continued their rise in recent weeks. The Dutch PVV, on the other hand, is losing support after fierce internal conflicts. These changes balance each other out, meaning that the PfE groups continues to stand at 104 seats (±⁠0) in the projection – just below its peak last autumn.

Finally, the extremist ESN group suffers slight losses. While its Dutch member party FvD benefits from the weakness of the PVV, Germany’s AfD and Bulgaria’s Vǎzraždane experience setbacks. Overall, the ESN now has 37 seats (–⁠1) in the projection, putting it back on a par with the Greens/EFA.

Non-attached and “other” parties

Meanwhile, the group of non-attached parties has suffered clear losses, particularly affecting Slovakia’s ruling left-conservative party, Hlas, and the liberal-populist DPS-NN from Bulgaria. Germany’s left-conservative BSW also fell slightly; and the populist ADK party from Cyprus, founded only a few months ago by YouTuber and current MEP Fidías Panayiótou, would now fail to enter the European Parliament altogether. Conversely, the Spanish far-right party SALF is back in the tableau. Overall, the non-attached parties would now hold 24 seats (–⁠3).

Finally, the “other” parties (which are not represented in the European Parliament so far and cannot be clearly assigned to any political group) have made the biggest gains among all groups in recent weeks and now hold 18 seats (+⁠7). The Dutch far-right party JA21, the Irish centre-left party SD and the Slovenian centre-right party Demokrati have all improved their standing in the polls. Conversely, the agrarian-conservative ZZS and the Russian minority party Stabilitātei from Latvia, as well as the right-wing populist MECh from Bulgaria, all of which were included in the tableau in January, would now fail to win a seat.

Strong newcomer from Bulgaria

However, the biggest growth is being experienced by a party that has not even been officially established yet: the party of Rumen Radev, who has resigned as Bulgarian president in January. Radev is a national populist who in recent times has spoken out against military aid for Ukraine and criticised Bulgaria for adopting the euro without holding a referendum.

He was elected president twice as an independent candidate: in 2016, when he was proposed by the centre-left BSP (S&D), and in 2021, when he also had the backing of the liberal PP (RE). However, he has since fallen out with both parties. With Boyko Borisov, the leader of the conservative GERB (EPP) party, he has been in long-running feuds anyway. Nevertheless, Radev’s presidency has been one of the few institutional continuities in Bulgaria’s otherwise very unstable political landscape in recent years.

Will the biggest fish among the “others” remain non-attached?

Ahead of the early national parliamentary election scheduled for April – the eighth in five years – Radev has now resigned from office in order to become actively involved in day-to-day politics with his own party. For administrative reasons, this party will probably not be founded until after the election; in fact, it does not even have a name yet. Nevertheless, it is already included in all Bulgarian polls – and is currently in first place by a wide margin.

If such a Radev formation were to enter the European Parliament one day, it would be by far the biggest fish among the “other” parties. However, it is dubious whether any political group would be willing to accept it: When it comes to potential allies, Radev’s Eurosceptic and Russophile profile seems to bear the closest resemblance to that of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, whose Smer party is also non-attached in the European Parliament.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest. In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	187	79	84	28	32	–
Jan. 26 (B)	53	37	122	71	177	80	104	38	27	11
Feb. 26 (B)	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
Feb. 26 (D)	55	37	126	65	176	90	104	37	30	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	10 Linke 1 Tier	10 Grüne 3 Volt	13 SPD	3 FDP 3 FW	23 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			22 AfD	3 BSW 2 Partei 1 PdF
FR	8 LFI		13 PS	14 RE	12 LR		34 RN
IT	11 M5S 2 SI	4 EV	20 PD		6 FI 1 SVP	26 FdI	6 Lega
ES	2 Pod 2 Sumar 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	17 PSOE		22 PP		13 Vox		1 SALF
PL			4 Lewica		18 KO	14 PiS	6 Konf	6 Konf	5 KKP
RO			8 PSD	3 USR 1 PMP	6 PNL	15 AUR
NL		2 GL	3 PvdA	7 D66 5 VVD	4 CDA		4 PVV	3 FvD		3 JA21
BE	3 PTB	1 Groen	1 Vooruit 3 PS	1 Anders 2 MR 1 LE	2 CD&V 1 CSP	4 N-VA	3 VB
CZ		1 Piráti			4 STAN 1 TOP09	4 ODS	9 ANO	2 SPD
EL	1 Syriza		3 PASOK		7 ND	3 EL	1 FL		3 PE 2 KKE	1 MéRA
HU					11 TISZA		9 Fidesz	1 MHM
PT		1 Livre	6 PS	2 IL	6 AD		6 Chega
SE	2 V	1 MP	7 S	1 C	4 M 1 KD	5 SD
AT		2 Grüne	4 SPÖ	1 Neos	4 ÖVP		9 FPÖ
BG				2 PP	4 GERB 1 DB			1 V	2 DPS-NN	7 Radev
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	2 V 1 M	2 LA 1 K	1 DD	1 DF
SK				3 PS	2 Slov 1 KDH 1 D	2 SaS		2 REP	3 Smer 1 Hlas
FI	2 Vas	1 Vihreät	5 SDP	2 Kesk	3 Kok	2 PS
IE	5 SF			3 FF	4 FG					2 SD
HR		2 Možemo	4 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT		2 DSVL	2 LSDP	1 LS	2 TS-LKD	2 LVŽS				2 NA
LV		2 Prog			2 JV	2 NA 1 LRA	2 LPV
SI	1 Levica		1 SD	2 GS	3 SDS 1 N.Si					1 D
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 1 KE	2 Isamaa	1 KE	1 EKRE
CY	2 AKEL		1 DIKO		1 DISY	1 ELAM				1 ALMA
LU			1 LSAP	2 DP	2 CSV				1 ADR
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-02-23	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
26-01-07	53	37	122	71	177	80	104	38	27	11
25-11-10	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
25-09-01	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
25-07-01	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
25-05-19	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-02-23	55	37	126	65	176	90	104	37	30	–
26-01-07	54	37	123	73	177	86	106	38	26	–
25-11-10	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–
25-09-01	56	40	125	68	177	89	107	37	21	–
25-07-01	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
25-05-19	49	40	132	78	179	82	101	36	23	–
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.) and RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). Occasionally, members of a single national party split into several political groups after the election; in such cases, a plausibility assumption (usually based on the status quo) is made about their distribution after the next European election. This currently applies to KE from Estonia. In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 10-23/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Italy: national polls, 19-23/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Spain: national polls, 10-20/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Poland: national polls, 4-17/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Romania: national polls, 15-23/1/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Netherlands: national polls, 16-21/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/12/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemis polls for the national parliamentary election,9/12/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024;
Czechia: national polls, 17/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Greece: national polls, 9-17/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Hungary: national polls, 6-17/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Portugal: national polls, 13/1/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Sweden: national polls, 26/1-8/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Austria: national polls, 17/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Bulgaria: national polls, 13-18/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Denmark: national polls, 3-15/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovakia: national polls, 8-9/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Finland: national polls, 3-16/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Ireland: national polls, 3-19/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Croatia: national polls, 20/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Lithuania: national polls, 24-29/1/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Latvia: national polls, 26/12/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Slovenia: national polls, 8-14/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Estonia: national polls, 9-18/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Cyprus: national polls, 14/2/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Luxembourg: national polls, 29/9/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Malta: national polls, 19/2/2026, source: Wikipedia.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].