Is the Dutch red-green PRO party closer to the European Greens or to the European Socialists?

By Simon Otjes

Red or green? The Dutch PRO party needs to make a choice.

In 2026, the Dutch Green party, GroenLinks (GL/EGP), and the Dutch social-democratic party, Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA/PES), merged to form one party, Progressief Nederland (PRO). This was the result of more than fifty years of discussions on progressive cooperation. The motivation for the merger was primarily motivated by national concerns, but it has implications on the European level: Should the party join the European Green Party which GL founded, or the Party of European Socialists which the PvdA founded?

To solve this question, the new party has decided to organize a referendum from 18 to 25 September. This important moment for PRO creates an opportunity to discuss the role and character of the two parties.

European political parties

European political parties play an important role at the European level. Which European political party a party joins determines which positions it gets in the European Parliament. It also matters for decision-making within the European Council, as the different government leaders of the same European party meet before summit meetings. The European Socialists currently have four prime ministers: in Spain (Pedro Sánchez), Denmark (Mette Frederiksen), Lithuania (Mindaugas Sinkevičius) and Malta (Robert Abela). The European Greens have no prime ministers, but do have ministers under Sánchez, Frederiksen and Sinkevičius.

Parties that are members of the same European party also exchange experiences and ideas through their European political party, the corresponding think tank (formally called European foundation), and bilateral contacts. The choice of a European political party thus matters for the identity and power position of political parties.

The European political parties, such as the PES and EGP, are extraparliamentary organizations through which national parties cooperate. In the European Parliament, their member parties work together in a parliamentary group. The composition of the groups and the parties overlap but the two are not identical.

Comparing party positions from a substantive perspective

In this article, I look at this decision from a substantive perspective. Is PRO a better fit for the European Green Party or the Party of European Socialists? To this end, I use the 2024 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Every four years, they ask political science experts to position parties on different dimensions. That provides a good picture of the scientific consensus on the substantive policy positions of parties. I also consult other expert surveys, such as the PopuList. Finally, I look at news reporting in the media and, where possible, scientific articles to understand outliers and extreme parties.

Of the many CHES items, I look at the pro-/anti-EU integration dimension, the economic left-right dimension, positions on climate change, positions on same-sex marriage, positions on immigration, positions on the relation between the EU and Russia and positions on the rule of law.

European party landscape

Figure 1 shows the positions of different parties on the economic left-right dimension and the pro-/anti-EU integration dimension. Before we analyse the dimensions, it is useful to consider the parties shown in the Figure, as EU politics can be complex. The red circles are members of the Party of European Socialists. This is the European political party that consists of social-democratic parties such as the Spanish PSOE led by PM Sánchez. The green circles are the members of the European Green Party. This is the European political party that consists of green parties from all over Europe, including the German Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.

The green-red squares show the positions of GL and PvdA. In the 2024 study, experts assessed these parties independently. PRO might end up somewhere between these two parties. Where exactly PRO will position itself is unclear and may depend on all kinds of internal decisions.

The red triangle represents the mean position of members of the Party of European Socialists weighted by their seats in the European Parliament. The green triangle represents the weighted mean of the members of the European Green Party.

Members of the political group that do not belong to the European party

But European politics is quite a bit more complex. The Group of the European Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) in the European Parliament also includes MEPs that are not members of the European Green Party. It is also the home of Volt, the Czech Pirate Party and regionalist and separatist parties from Spain (like the Catalan separatist ERC and the Galician regionalist BNG, who are representatives of the European Free Alliance). These parties are represented by purple circles.

The Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) also includes MEPs from parties that are not members of the Party of European Socialists. Only one of them is in the CHES, DIKO, a centrist Greek-Cypriot nationalist party. This party is represented by the pink circle.

Social-democrats from Slovakia

The dark red circle is the Slovak party Hlas, which is currently suspended as a member of the PES. To understand this, we need to dive into Slovak politics. The PES has seen a major row over Smer. This is the largest government party in Slovakia, led by Robert Fico. Smer was a member of the PES, but was expelled from the PES and the S&D group over a conflict of values: Smer entered government with the ultranationalist SNS for a third time. That is the kind of party that believes that the territory of other countries should be part of Slovakia. Smer opposes sanctions against Russia and has strong ties with Putin due to fossil interests. Fico stepped down as prime minister in 2020 after massive protests following the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak. Kuciak studied the relationship between important figures in the Slovak government and the mob. Smer was suspended in 2023 and expelled from the PES in 2025.

Smer is not the only social-democratic party in Slovakia, however. The other one is Hlas, which is seen as more progressive than Smer. After the 2023 elections, Hlas faced a choice between forming a government with the pro-Russian and nationalist Smer or with Progresívne Slovensko (PS/ALDE), the social-liberal, pro-European alternative. Hlas chose Smer and the SNS and was subsequently suspended, but not fully expelled, by the PES. Hlas is represented by the dark red circle.

The gray circles represent other parties in EU member states that are not a member of the Greens/EFA or the S&D groups in the European Parliament.

Economy: European Socialists are more right-wing than Greens

In general, the most important divisions in European politics are between the economic left and right and between pro- and anti-EU parties. We show these in Figure 1. The vertical dimension is the pro-/anti-EU dimension. It concerns the question of whether the party favours European integration or resists it. The horizontal dimension is the economic left-right dimension. This dimension concerns the question whether there should be a greater or a smaller role for the government in the economy.

Figure 1. (Click to enlarge.)

GL and PvdA both have clearly pro-European and left-wing positions. The European Greens have almost the same position as the PvdA. The Party of European Socialists is on average more right-wing than GL and PvdA. The European Socialists are more right-wing than the European Greens. This is true not only for this general dimension but also for more specific questions on redistribution, taxation and regulation. All in all, when it comes to European integration and economic affairs, PvdA and GroenLinks are both closer to the European Greens than the European Socialists.

Odd ones out

There are three odd ones out in the social-democratic group in Figure 1: the first is the Maltese Partit Laburista (PL) of PM Abela. This party is quite a bit more right-wing than the rest of the social-democrats. The PL are similar to liberals on economic issues. Basically, the Maltese social-democrats embraced the Third Way and never looked back. They are quite enthusiastic about privatization of hospitals, in particular when prominent social-democrats can earn a pretty penny in the process. The PL is not a small player on some insignificant island. They have been in government since 2013 and supply three MEPs (half of the Maltese EP delegation), including a member of the bureau of the S&D group.

The other two parties that deviate strongly are the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and Saskaņa. The BSP is the successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party from the Soviet period, Saskaņa is a social-democratic party from Latvia. Both parties are quite a bit more Eurosceptic than the mainstream social-democrat. The BSP has two MEPs and Saskaņa one. At the national level, both parties used to be important players in their respective countries, but lost all their seats in recent elections (in 2026 and 2022). All other members of the EGP and the PES are economically left-wing a pro-European.

Climate policy: The European Greens are as climate-oriented as PvdA

In addition to economic questions, the EU plays a major role in climate policies. The vertical dimension in Figure 2 shows the party positions on climate. For reasons of comparability, we kept the horizontal dimension from Figure 1. The vertical dimension shows whether parties are willing to take measures to mitigate climate change when these measures may weaken economic growth, or whether they prioritise economic growth over mitigating climate change.

Figure 2. (Click to enlarge.)

The GL, like many European Greens, takes a clear green position. The mean of the European Greens, however, is nearly identical in climate matters to the PvdA. The social-democrats are on average quite a bit closer to the centre of the vertical dimension than the PvdA or GroenLinks.

Four social-democratic parties are notably far away from the climate-oriented positions of GL and PvdA: the Maltese PL, the Bulgarian BSP, the Latvian Saskaņa and the Czech SocDem. The latter lost its seats in the European and Czech Parliament after it had helped bring the agrarian business man Andrej Babiš (ANO/Patriots) into power. The climate policy of these parties is similar to that of the German CSU (EPP), the political arm of BMW. All these parties are even less supportive of climate action than the Romanian PSD (PES), a party that argues for reopening of the coal power plants.

Same-sex marriage: GL and PvdA are close to the European Greens

A key feature of left-wing politics is the idea of equality. Allowing same-sex marriage, which the Germans so eloquently call “Ehe für alle” (“marriage for all”), was invented in the Netherlands and then spread all over Europe, like a beautiful rainbow-coloured oil spill.

Figure 3. (Click to enlarge.)

The vertical dimension in Figure 3 shows the division of parties on same-sex marriage. GL and PvdA occupy an extreme position on the progressive side. They are among the strongest advocates for same-sex marriage. The European Greens are closely aligned to both of them. The variation among social-democrats is greater. Six parties are against same-sex marriage: the Bulgarian BSP, the Latvian Saskaņa, but also the Lithuanian LSDP, de Romanian PSD and the Cypriot-nationalist EDEK from the European Socialists, and the Lithuanian DSVL from the European Greens.

Left parties against equality

The PSD is currently the largest party in Romania. With 10 seats, it is the fourth largest PES member party in the EP. They were in government until spring 2026. The party has its roots in the Soviet-period Romanian Communist Party. Romanian political scientist Sorin Ionita calls the party “nationalist, populist, sensitive to conspiracies, against the West and against the Hungarian minority”. Experts of the PopuList described the PSD as “nominally social-democratic, the PSD is nationalist, economically liberal, socially conservative, and has at times expressed Eurosceptic views”. The party is opposed to same-sex marriage: it favours a traditional definition of marriage and fosters strong ties to the Romanian Orthodox Church. In 2018, the PSD organised a referendum to define a marriage as being between and man and woman in the constitution. Political scientists Gherghina and Silagadze see a tension between the shared European social-democratic ideology, which emphasises equality, and the party denying rights to same-sex couples.

The BSP deserves special attention. In 2024, the party supported a law that forbade “propaganda” of non-traditional sexual orientations and gender identifications. The party spoke out against gender ideology and worried about non-binary persons winning Eurovision. The party opposed a bill to combat domestic violence because it did not just apply to married couples but to all those in intimate relationships. BSP saw this as “an effort to legalise same-sex relationships” or “a third gender”. When in 2022 a cinema in Varna, the third largest city in Bulgaria wanted to screen Close, an award-winning movie about a complicated friendship between two male teenagers, BSP supporters protested, “threw bottles and other objects at attendees” and had the screening cancelled.

This is not to say that the PES as such is anti-LBGT+, rather than they tolerate a party with positions very contrary to their mainstream. In fact, BSP has openly defied the PES majority, calling the idea that the they should align themselves with the PES majority on these matters “Bolshevism [that] was more popular 100 years ago”.

Two outliers from Lithuania

In 2026, the social-democratic LSDP and the DSVL, a member of the EGP, proposed to re-write the article in the Lithuanian constitution that defines marriage as between a man and a woman. They did so to make it more difficult for same-sex partners to be recognised legally as the parents of their kids. The LSDP has been a key party in Lithuanian politics in the last decades. They have two MEPs. Though formally in favour of civil unions, a minority of their national parliament group voted against a bill legalising such unions.

The DSVL is a relatively new party that has only been part of the European Greens since 2024. It has one seat in the European Parliament. This is a green-conservative party that formed as a split in the LVŽS, a green-conservative farmers’ party. The founders represented the moderate wing of the party. This party also voted against civil partnerships in 2022. During the election campaign, they did favour it.

In their opposition to equality, these six are far away from social-democratic and green parties elsewhere in Europe. Their anti-gender ideology rhetoric is more similar to the US Republican Party.

Migration policy: Greens are more liberal than Socialists

Migration is a key issue in many member states and at the European level. The vertical dimension in Figure 4 concerns migration. GL and PvdA both favour a relatively liberal migration policy, with PvdA being a bit more conservative than GL. The member parties of the European Greens are more progressive than the member parties of the PES. The PvdA is slightly closer to the PES than to the EGP. This is one of the few themes where this is the case.

Figure 4. (Click to enlarge.)

Once again, the variation among the European Socialists is greater than among the Greens. Six social-democratic parties are quite a bit more conservative than the mainstream in the PES. This includes the Bulgarian BSP, the Czech SocDem, the Cypriot EDEK and the Maltese PL.

“Mass immigration is a threat for Europe”

But this also includes the Swedish SAP and the Danish Socialdemokratiet (S). These are not small players: the Danish social-democrats have been in government since 2019. Their leader, Mette Frederiksen, is currently one of the longest-serving prime ministers in the EU. They are often cited as the prime example of a social-democratic party with conservative positions on migration. Frederiksen has said: “I consider this mass migration into Europe as a threat to the daily life in Europe.” That is the kind of language we are used to from the radical right.

The policy of the Danish social-democrats is focused on making Denmark so unattractive for asylum seekers that no one wants to come to the country. Asylum seekers need to hand over personal possessions when they enter the country. The party also uses harsh anti-Islamic rhetoric. The Danish social-democratic minister of immigration has called for outlawing the Muslim call to prayer as some parts of Denmark resemble “a suburb of Islamabad”. The SAP, the largest party in Sweden, has taken over this line from their Danish sister party.

Calling for “lethal means” to stop immigrants

With the Greens, the DSVL again deviates from the progressive line. Between 2024 and 2025, the DSVL governed together the LSDP and the party Nemuno Aušra, a right-wing populist, pro-Russian Eurosceptic party whose leader made antisemitic statements. After that government collapsed due to a conflict within the LSDP, the LSDP and Nemuno Aušra continued governing together without the support of the DSVL. In 2026, this government also collapsed due to disagreements between the two parties. The DSVL returned to government together with the LSDP and the farmers’ party LVŽS.

All three favour a restrictive migration policy, in particular oriented at strengthening the Belarussian border. The minister of home affairs, responsible for migration is Martynas Katelynas (LSDP). He previously was a member of the far-right Nacionalinis Susivienijimas and called for “lethal means” to stop immigrants.

EU-Russia relations: Pro-Russian elements in the PES

The relation between the EU and Russia is of vital importance for Europe given the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The CHES asked experts whether parties favour defence investments to deter Russian aggression or whether they favour trade and diplomacy to improve EU-Russia relations. Figure 5 shows these party positions. GroenLinks, the PvdA, and the European Greens favour defence investments. The European Socialists are on average closer to the centre. That is in par because the second-largest party in the PES, the Italian Partito Democratico, is strongly opposed to defence investments.

Figure 5. (Click to enlarge.)

The PD is not the only party in the PES with this position. The PL, BSP and Saskaņa also oppose defence investments. The last two parties are clearly pro-Russian. Saskaņa is the party for the Latvia’s Russian minority. Until 2017, the party had a cooperation agreement with Yedinaya Rossiya, the party of Putin. The BSP is also pro-Russian: the party opposed arming Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Within the European Greens, the Portuguese party Livre is opposed to defence investments, but it has no MEPs.

Rule of law: Greens more unified than PES

Finally, there are big debates about the state of democracy and the rule of law in Europe. Radical right parties are undermining the rule of law all over Europe. But they are not the only parties that do so. To examine parties’ views about the rule of law, we look at an item from the CHES on whether the executive should have power over the judiciary or whether they should be independent. We depict this dimension on the vertical dimension in Figure 6. The parties that strongly favour an independent judiciary include GL, the PvdA, and the European Greens.

Figure 6. (Click to enlarge.)

The mean of the PES is quite a bit higher. The diversity is also greater among the Socialists than the Greens. This is partially the result of the parties that are above the line, i.e. favour executive control over the judiciary. This includes the Bulgarian BSP, the Romanian PSD, the Maltese PL, but also the Spanish PSOE.

Undermining the rule of law

The Romanian PSD was one of the driving forces behind the dismantling of the Romanian system of rule of law between 2017 and 2019. The government proposed a decree that included proposals to limit the autonomy of judges and, in the words of the British newspaper The Independent, was aimed at “decriminalising corruption”. This led to major protests. The leader of the social-democrats, Liviu Dragnea, was forced to resign and was ultimately convicted for corruption.

The Maltese PL also scores high on wanting to limit judicial independence. The PL is haunted by the murder of the journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017. Before her death, she was studying tax evasion by people around then prime minister Joseph Muscat (PL) on the basis of the Panama Papers. In 2020, Muscat stepped down after protests when he wanted to pardon people allegedly involved with the murder. He is currently prosecuted in connection to another corruption scandal involving hospital privatisation. Meanwhile, the murder of the journalist keeps haunting also his successor as prime minister, Roberto Abela.

The high score for the PSOE is possibly the result of the corruption scandals that have embroiled the party: there are cases against a former PSOE prime minister, a former organisation secretary and a former minister. PSOE leader and prime minister Sánchez considers some of the prosecutions to be politically motivated. The PSOE is not a small player in the PES: It is the largest party in the S&D group, provides the group chair and the prime minister of one of the largest EU member states.

The European Socialists are the only political family that has to deal with corruption. The green-conservative DSVL was also hit by a scandal: DSVL founder, party leader, parliamentary speaker and former prime minister Saulius Skvernelis faces a bribery charge. Despite denying allegations, Skvernelis has asked for his parliamentary immunity to be lifted and has left the DSVL.

Conclusion: Overall, PRO is closer to the EGP than the PES

On themes as diverse as the economy, EU integration, climate, LGBT+ rights, EU-Russia relations and the rule of law, experts place the Dutch PvdA (as well as GroenLinks) closer to the European Green Party than the Party of European Socialists. Only with regard to migration, experts place the PvdA closer to the PES average than the EGP average, while GL is closer to the EGP. When looking at policy substance, PRO is thus closer to the EGP than to the PES.

The Greens appear to be a very cohesive group around a set of shared, pro-European, progressive, green and left-wing ideas. The European Socialists, by contrast, appear to be a big tent where there is space for many different flavours, including parties that are rather distant from social-democratic ideals on economic, ecological, moral and cultural issues.

Cohesive Greens, big-tent PES

The PSD, the largest party in Romania, stands out here: This party deviates from the social-democratic consensus on issues like the equal treatment of LGBT+ persons, the relationships with Russia and the rule of law. But also the Danish social-democrats led by prime minister Frederiksen, the Latvian LSDP of prime minister Sinkevičius and the Maltese PL of prime minister Abela deviate from the progressive course of the PES. The same is true for the PD and the SAP, the leading opposition parties in Italy and Sweden. Of the six largest parties in the PES, four deviate markedly from the rest of the S&D group on at least one issue.

Perhaps this tension is clearest if we look at the recent row between Sánchez and Frederiksen about the events in Ceuta. While Frederiksen decided to align herself with the Italian radical right-wing prime minister Giorgia Meloni (FdI/ECR) to suspend Spain’s membership of the Schengen Area, the Spanish and Italian social-democrats wrote: “It is unacceptable that, while another European partner was facing exceptional pressure, a member of our own political family chose to align themselves – in a coordinated manner – with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who had just decided to suspend Schengen in a purely propagandistic move, given that there is no freedom of movement from Ceuta into the EU.”

Within the Greens, there is only one odd one out: The green conservative DSVL differs from the European Greens when it comes to migration and LGBT+ rights. They are quite similar to the social-democratic LSDP, with which they are in government.

In the end, it is a political question

That PRO is more closely aligned with the Greens than the PES, is also evident from a recent analysis of voting behaviour: When Socialists and Greens vote differently in the European Parliament, PRO is twice as likely to vote with the Greens/EFA as to vote with the S&D group.

It is important to note, however, that this analysis says nothing about the question of which European family is strategically the most attractive for PRO. The PES has heads of government (Frederiksen, Sánchez, Sinkevičius and Abela – though they might not be best of friends), and the S&D is the second largest group in the EP. Science cannot answer what is, in the end, a political question.

Simon Otjes is an Associate Professor for Dutch Politics at the University of Leiden.

This article was originally published in Dutch on the blog StukRoodVlees.

Pictures: Red and green apples: ngader [CC BY 2.0], via Flickr (cropped); all graphs: Simon Otjes; portrait Simon Otjes: private [all rights reserved].

EU Analytics – Council votes 2025/26: Putting capacity to act over unity, and a new outlier

By Nicolai von Ondarza

Meeting of the General Affairs Council, 17 March 2026.

August remains a quiet month for European politics. There was no plenary of the European Parliament, and there were no formal Council sessions or public votes. So I am using this month’s EU Analytics column to take a deeper look into the Council votes of the past year (July 2025 to July 2026). 

Overall, there were 97 public votes in the Council in these thirteen months. Looking back, a subtle change becomes visible: EU member states are more willing to go for controversial votes based on slim majorities, and there is a new outlier in town.

Still a compromise machine, but with less consensus

Traditionally, the Council is often viewed as a “compromise machine”, where governments negotiate until they reach a consensus, even when majority votes would be possible. The last year, however, showed that frictions in national politics are also making themselves felt in the Council. Before we dive in, an important caveat: These are only the public votes of the Council, which are still only part of the votes that take place in it. Additionally, the Council usually only votes once governments have negotiated a large degree of agreement – which is why we never see a rejection in the Council. With these limitations in mind, let us look at the data.

First, while consensus was still high, it is noticeably lower than in previous years. Of the 97 votes, “only” 52 (53.6 per cent) were adopted by unanimity, with a further 19 (19.6 per cent) adopted with abstentions only. This is still a remarkable degree of consensus for today’s fractured EU politics, but in other years up to 90 per cent of Council votes were in consensus, i.e. either unanimous or with only abstentions. In particular, the first half of 2026 saw this consensus rate fall to just above 70 per cent, amongst the lowest in the last decade.

Willingness to move faster

At the same time, there were 26 votes with at least one “no” vote, 14 of which had two or more national governments saying no to an EU proposal. In previous years, such votes were rare. Even where the Council can decide by qualified majority, governments usually strive for consensus to retain legitimacy. Add high-profile contested votes, such as on the trade agreement with Mercosur, and you can see a growing willingness to put “capacity to act” above unity.

In a mature, democratic union challenged by geopolitical empires of the US, Russia and China, the willingness to move faster is important. But it also opens the Union to criticism over its legitimacy if countries are regularly outvoted on critical issues. For now, with a consensus rate of slightly above 70 per cent, I would argue this is still not the case. But if it dipped much lower, that would become problematic.

The different stories behind outvoted governments

I count a government as outvoted whenever it did not vote in favour, either by abstaining or by voting no. On that measure, the past thirteen months tell quite different stories. First, it is noteworthy who was not outvoted at all over the past year: These were all small states, Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Luxembourg. This does not mean that they always agreed, but that they negotiated well enough to carve out something for themselves and accept the final compromise. Smart small state diplomacy in the EU.

In contrast, France and Germany are both in their own ways less successful in the Council than before. The French government used to be almost never outvoted, but was outvoted twice in the last year alone, after just three times in more than 1500 votes over the previous fifteen years. Germany, with seven instances of being outvoted (three abstentions, four no votes), was even among the EU countries that were outvoted most often. As can be seen, in an EU where the Council is more willing to outvote national governments, this does not only or even predominantly concern small states. Even the largest EU countries were on the receiving end of being outvoted.

Spain also deserves to be highlighted: It voted no five times, together with Sweden the second-highest number of straight no votes after Hungary. As the last large EU member state government from the social democratic camp, Spain has found itself increasingly on the margins of EU politics in a very different way from Hungary under Orbán.

Number of abstentions and no votes in the Council from July 2025 to July 2026. Own compilation based on data from the Council of the EU (click to enlarge).

At the overall top of the list of countries most often outvoted, there were two different groups of countries:

• National governments that often abstained, either due to national government crises (Bulgaria, 8 abstentions), internal fights in coalitions (Austria, 12 abstentions), or both (Belgium, 9 abstentions).
• Governments drifting further from the rest of the EU: Slovakia (outvoted 9 times) and Hungary under Viktor Orbán (outvoted 14 times). But even Hungary still voted with the rest of the EU in 84 per cent of the votes.

Taken together, and compared to last year’s analysis of Council voting data, the shifts in EU politics remain subtle but noticeable. The last thirteen months saw a little bit less consensus and more willingness for tight majorities. What struck me the most is the exposed position of Spain, which I will keep a special eye on in the future, especially now that Hungary after Orbán is a lot closer to the EU mainstream.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does additional institutional analysis.

Pictures: EU Council meeting: © EU 2026, architecture Europa building: © Philippe Samyn and Partners architects and engineers - lead and design Partner Studio Valle Progettazioni architects Buro Happold engineers, colour compositions: © Georges Meurant [license], via EU Council Newsroom; graph: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen: Was bedeuten Dürre, Waldbrände und Ceuta für das Wahlverhalten der Europäer:innen?

Dürre, Waldbrände und eine neue Migrationskrise: Der Sommer 2026 hat Europa mit gleich mehreren politischen Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Doch schlagen sich solche Ereignisse auch in der politischen Stimmung nieder?

In der neuen Ausgabe von „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ blicken Christoph Siekermann und Manuel Müller auf die neuesten Entwicklungen in der Sitzprojektion für das Europäische Parlament. Dabei zeigt sich ein bemerkenswertes Bild: Während die politische Mitte weiter an Sitzen verliert und sich die Rechtsaußenfraktionen nach ihrem Rückgang in der ersten Jahreshälfte wieder stabilisieren, bleiben die Grünen trotz des extremen Hitzesommers nahezu unverändert. Die sichtbaren Folgen des Klimawandels scheinen ihnen bislang keinen zusätzlichen politischen Rückenwind zu verschaffen.

Trotzdem könnte die Bedeutung der Grünen/EFA (unsere Fraktion des Monats) in Zukunft wachsen. Denn mit nur noch 361 Sitzen (unsere Zahl des Monats) kommen EVP, S&D und Renew Europe in der Projektion gemeinsam gerade einmal auf die Hälfte des Europäischen Parlaments. Die klassische pro-europäische Mehrheit wird damit zunehmend fragil. Die Frage nach möglichen neuen Allianzen stellt sich immer dringlicher.

Unser Land des Monats ist Spanien: Die Ereignisse rund um die spanische Exklave Ceuta haben die europäische Migrationsdebatte neu entfacht und gezeigt, wie schnell sich politische Fronten verschieben können. Was bedeutet es für die europäische Parteienlandschaft, wenn Parteien der politischen Mitte zunehmend Themen und Positionen der politischen Rechten übernehmen?

Die Podcastserie „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ ist eine Kooperation zwischen dem Europapodcast und dem Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“. Anhand von aktuellen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament sprechen Christoph Siekermann, Manuel Knapp und Manuel Müller über die politische Stimmung in der EU.

„Monitoring Europe“ ist auch auf der Homepage des Europapodcast sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

European Parliament seat projection (August 2026): Following a hot summer and the Ceuta crisis, the centre struggles while the far right recovers

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	45	53	135	78	184	84	85	27	29	–
June 26 (B)	49	40	122	71	181	74	98	39	19	27
Aug. 26 (B)	51	40	118	68	175	77	99	45	19	28
Aug. 26 (D)	56	40	119	70	175	84	103	45	28	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 17 August 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 17 August 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

Summer is a difficult time for electoral polling. Many people are on holiday, which makes them difficult to reach and distorts the sample. Consequently, many polling organisations conduct fewer or no surveys at all during this period. This means that small fluctuations carry greater weight when calculating averages, such as those used for these European Parliament election seat projections. In addition, the summer lull can thrust seemingly random issues into the public spotlight, influencing short-term sentiment but having little relevance for long-term political debates.

At least the latter, however, was not the case this summer. Instead, two key events with very clear links to major societal debates have dominated the headlines across Europe in recent weeks. Firstly, heatwaves, wildfires and low water levels have highlighted just how acute the threat of climate change has become. Secondly, the Ceuta crisis has refocused attention on migration issues as well as on the EU’s vulnerability to hybrid attacks.

Heat waves and wildfires

At the same time, there was little new to report on the domestic political scene in most EU member states (apart from a few countries such as Romania, where a national government crisis is rumbling on). This summer therefore provides an interesting case study of how cross-border European events can – or cannot – influence the political mood.

For example, one might expect the Greens, who have long been warning of the consequences of climate change, to gain support in the face of extreme weather events. Politicians from other parties, however, sought to play down this connection. French President Emmanuel Macron (RE/RE), for instance, described the heatwave as an exceptional event that could not have been anticipated. Meanwhile, the spokesperson for German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP) stated that the government simply could not “change the weather”. Furthermore, a certain societal climate fatigue was reflected in a decline in activist mobilisation.

Ceuta crisis

The events in Ceuta, for their part, could have provided a success story for European social democrats. After all, the Spanish centre-left government led by Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/S&D) managed to bring the difficult situation under control within 24 hours.

Alternatively, the many deaths resulting from the crisis, the barely questioned pushbacks and collective expulsions, as well as the brutality of the Moroccan police in preventing a second border storm in mid-August, could also have provided grounds for leftist criticism of the EU’s border-sealing policies.

A far-right propaganda win

In reality, however, a different narrative prevailed in the public debate: Backed by a Russian disinformation campaign, far-right figures such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (FdI/ECR) and Finnish Minister for the Interior Mari Rantanen (PS/ECR) claimed that the Ceuta crisis was endangering the security of the Schengen area.

This was obviously untrue. But rather than standing up to Meloni and Rantanen, centre-right politicians such as EPP leader Manfred Weber (CSU/EPP) joined them in criticising what they see as Spain’s overly permissive migration policy. What is more, even Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen (S/S&D) demonstratively sided with Meloni, thereby provoking an open row among European social democrats. Consequently, the Ceuta crisis became a symbol of European disunity and a propaganda victory for the far right.

Von der Leyen coalition in decline

And indeed, the far-right bloc has emerged as the biggest winner in the European seat projection in recent weeks. After losing substantial support in the first half of the year, the two large far-right groups, ECR and PfE, have now stabilised. The smallest and most extreme far-right group, the ESN, has even seen a significant increase, reaching a new all-time high.

Meanwhile, the big losers are the centrist groups: the centre-right EPP, the centre-left S&D, and the liberal RE. All three have fallen significantly short of last June’s projection. Together, the so-called “Von der Leyen coalition” would now only secure 361 seats in the seat projection’s baseline scenario – the mathematical minimum required for an absolute majority.

Finally, the Greens experienced hardly any changes over the summer: Despite the heatwave, they failed to gain ground and would now be the smallest group in the European Parliament once again.

EPP: Reversion to the mean

Taking a closer look at the individual groups, the EPP has suffered the greatest losses. In part, this is simply a reversion to the mean: In the June projection, the group had gained an unusually large number of seats due to random fluctuations in the polls, some of which (for example in Hungary or Romania) are now being lost again.

Elsewhere, however, the EPP member parties are actually losing ground. The German CDU/CSU in particular, but also the Dutch CDA and the Polish KO, are now in a weaker position than they were before the summer. In contrast, the small Swedish Christian democratic party KD has made slight gains. All in all, the EPP Group now stands at 175 seats in the baseline scenario of the seat projection (–⁠6 in comparison to June).

S&D: New all-time low

The S&D group also sees a decline in its projected number of seats. Among others, the Spanish PSOE slipped slightly in the polls over the summer – although this did not happen as a result of the Ceuta crisis, but rather in the weeks leading up to it. Meanwhile, in Greece, the S&D member party PASOK is suffering as a result of the success of the emerging left-wing rival party ELAS.

In addition, the Social Democrats experienced modest losses in Poland, Portugal, Austria and Slovenia, while gaining some ground in Romania. In all these cases, however, the fluctuations in the polls are minor and should not be overinterpreted, given the limited polling data available during the summer. Still, the overall result is a bitter blow for the S&D, which the projection now puts at a new all-time low of just 118 seats (–⁠4).

No heat boost for the Greens

The losses suffered by the liberal RE group are primarily attributable to Italy, where the two small liberal parties, Italia Viva and Più Europa, would now fail to clear the national four-percent threshold even if they joined forces. In addition, the Finnish Keskusta party has also seen a slight decline in voter support. Overall, the RE group now holds 68 seats (–⁠3).

The European Greens see only minor changes, if any, across all member states – so far, the polls show no indication that the scorching summer has had any significant impact on the political mood. In any case, the Greens/EFA is the only group of the pro-European centre that did not lose any seats over the summer, remaining at 40 (±⁠0).

The numbers for the Left group are somewhat better. Most notably, Germany’s Die Linke has recently gained ground and is now neck and neck with, or even ahead of, the SPD (S&D) in several polls. In addition, the Austrian KPÖ won the local elections in Graz at the end of June and has since begun to narrowly but consistently clear the national four-percent threshold in country-wide polls. Overall, the Left group now stands at 51 seats (+⁠2) in the seat projection.

ECR makes slight gains – and splits in Poland

On the right of the political spectrum, the ECR group made slight gains (77 seats/+⁠3). While the Czech ODS suffered moderate losses, the Finnish PS and the Slovak SaS both gained ground over the summer. The Latvian AS (a coalition of parties comprising regionalist, eco-conservative and Eurosceptic elements) even shot to the top of the national polls just a few weeks before the parliamentary election in early October. Furthermore, the ECR group has benefited from the accession of the previously non-aligned Bulgarian DPS party.

Meanwhile, the Polish ECR member party PiS split at the end of July, after a group led by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki refused to sign a declaration of loyalty and was expelled from the party. Morawiecki subsequently resigned as ECR party leader and is now planning to turn his group, Rozwój Plus, into an independent national party. However, the MEPs allied with him have remained in the ECR group for the time being – presumably also because all the other far-right groups in the European Parliament already have member parties from Poland.

PfE up slightly, ESN hits a new high

The PfE group also made slight gains over the summer (99 seats/+⁠1). While the Italian Lega continues to lose voters to the new, even more extreme rival party FN (ESN), PfE members from Austria and Portugal are now performing slightly better than before. In Czechia, ANO is gaining ground, while the pro-car party Motoristé, which also belongs to the PfE, has fallen below the national five-percent threshold again.

Even more notable are the gains made by the ESN group. With 45 seats (+6), the smallest and most extreme of the three far-right groups has reached a new high in the seat projection. The German AfD in particular continues to gain ground: With 25 seats, it would now be the second-largest single party in the entire Parliament, surpassed only by the French RN (PfE, 34 seats). The Italian FN is also climbing in the polls once again. Moreover, the seat projection also shows slight gains for ESN member parties in the Netherlands, Czechia and Hungary, but each of these is based on a single poll only and could therefore be due to random fluctuations.

The far right is stabilising

Having previously lost ground in the seat projections since the end of 2025, the far-right camp is now showing signs of stabilisation. This is not solely due to reactions to the Ceuta crisis: In several member states, a slight recovery for far-right parties began already in June or July. However, the fact that there is once again public debate about alleged “uncontrolled migration” is likely to further bolster their position.

Still, due to the lower number of polls in summer, all these observations are subject to a certain degree of uncertainty. Only time will tell whether the downward trend of the far-right camp has truly come to an end or whether it will resume in autumn.

Non-aligned unchanged, “others” increasing slightly

Finally, there have been only minor changes among the non-aligned parties. The Polish far-right, anti-establishment KKP has gained ground here, while the Marxist-Leninist KKE from Greece has lost support. Overall, the non-aligned parties continue to hold 19 seats (±⁠0).

The “other” parties, which are not currently represented in the European Parliament and cannot be clearly assigned to any political group, have once again increased their number of seats in the projection – for the fourth time in a row (29 seats/+⁠2). Among them, the following stand out in particular:

• the Greek left-wing party ELAS, led by former Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, which is now clearly the strongest national opposition party in the polls,
• the Christian right-wing populist and pro-Russian party SV from Latvia, which is currently in second place in the national polls ahead of the parliamentary election in October,
• the national-conservative anti-abortion party Aontú from Ireland, which could now win a seat in the European Parliament for the first time.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest, and also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. As a result, the ECR group and the group of non-attached parties are currently slightly stronger in the dynamic than in the baseline scenario. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	45	53	135	78	184	84	85	27	29	–
June 26 (B)	49	40	122	71	181	74	98	39	19	27
Aug. 26 (B)	51	40	118	68	175	77	99	45	19	28
Aug. 26 (D)	56	40	119	70	175	84	103	45	28	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	10 Linke 1 Tier	13 Grüne 3 Volt	11 SPD	4 FDP 3 FW 1 PdF	18 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			25 AfD	3 BSW 2 Partei
FR	8 LFI		13 PS	14 RE	12 LR		34 RN
IT	11 M5S 2 SI	4 EV	18 PD		6 FI 1 SVP	23 FdI	5 Lega	6 FN
ES	2 Sumar 2 Pod 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	17 PSOE	1 PNV	22 PP		12 Vox		1 SALF
PL			4 Lewica		19 KO	13 PiS 3 R+	4 Konf	4 Konf	6 KKP
RO			9 PSD	2 USR 1 PMP	8 PNL	13 AUR
NL		3 PRO	3 PRO	5 D66 4 VVD	3 CDA		5 PVV	4 FvD		4 JA21
BE	2 PTB	1 Groen	2 Vooruit 3 PS	1 Anders 2 MR 2 LE	1 CD&V 1 CSP	3 N-VA	4 VB
CZ		2 Piráti			4 STAN 1 TOP09	3 ODS	9 ANO	2 SPD
EL			2 PASOK		7 ND	2 EL	1 FL		1 KKE 1 PE	4 ELAS 2 Elpída 1 MéRA
HU					14 TISZA		5 Fidesz	2 MHM
PT		1 Livre	6 PS	2 IL	6 AD		6 Chega
SE	1 V	1 MP	7 S	2 C	4 M 2 KD	4 SD
AT	1 KPÖ	2 Grüne	3 SPÖ	1 Neos	4 ÖVP		9 FPÖ
BG				2 PP	3 GERB 1 DB	1 DPS				10 PB
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	1 V 1 RV 1 M	1 LA 1 K	1 DD	2 DF
SK				3 PS	2 Slov 1 KDH 1 D	2 SaS		2 REP	3 Smer 1 Hlas
FI	2 Vas	1 Vihreät	4 SDP	2 Kesk	3 Kok	3 PS
IE	4 SF			3 FF 1 II	4 FG					1 SD 1 Aontú
HR		2 Možemo	4 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT		1 DSVL	2 LSDP	2 LS 1 LP	3 TS-LKD	1 LVŽS				2 NA
LV		1 Prog			1 JV	2 AS 1 NA	2 LPV			2 SV
SI	1 Levica			3 GS	4 SDS 1 N.Si
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 1 KE	2 Isamaa	1 KE	1 EKRE
CY	2 AKEL		1 DIKO		2 DISY	1 ELAM
LU			1 LSAP	2 DP	2 CSV				1 ADR
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-08-17	51	40	118	68	175	77	99	45	19	28
26-06-15	49	40	122	71	181	74	98	39	19	27
26-04-20	52	39	124	70	173	78	103	36	21	24
26-02-23	54	37	124	64	175	83	104	37	24	18
26-01-07	53	37	122	71	177	80	104	38	27	11
25-11-10	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
25-09-01	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
25-07-01	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
25-05-19	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
26-08-17	56	40	119	70	175	84	103	45	28	–
26-06-15	52	40	124	74	181	80	101	39	29	–
26-04-20	53	39	126	72	173	84	106	36	31	–
26-02-23	55	37	126	65	176	90	104	37	30	–
26-01-07	54	37	123	73	177	86	106	38	26	–
25-11-10	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–
25-09-01	56	40	125	68	177	89	107	37	21	–
25-07-01	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
25-05-19	49	40	132	78	179	82	101	36	23	–
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7); Slovenia: Levica (1) and Vesna (2). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.) and RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). Occasionally, members of a single national party split into several political groups after the election; in such cases, a plausibility assumption (usually based on the status quo) is made about their distribution after the next European election. This currently applies to PRO from the Netherlands and KE from Estonia. In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 2-10/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Italy: national polls, 23/7-5/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Spain: national polls, 4-7/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Poland: national polls, 2-12/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Romania: national polls, 24/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Netherlands: national polls, 1/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemish polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/6/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024;
Czechia: national polls, 31/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Greece: national polls, 20-23/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Hungary: national polls, 11/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Portugal: national polls, 14-27/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Sweden: national polls, 10/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Austria: national polls, 7-17/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Bulgaria: national polls, 23/7-4/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Denmark: national polls, 9-12/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovakia: national polls, 10/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Finland: national polls, 3/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Ireland: national polls, 31/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Croatia: national polls, 31/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Lithuania: national polls, 28/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Latvia: national polls, 15/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovenia: national polls, 6/8/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Estonia: national polls, 13/7/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Cyprus: results of the national parliamentary election, 24/5/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Luxembourg: national polls, 24/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Malta: results of the national parliamentary election, 30/5/2026, source: Wikipedia.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].