FIIA Briefing Paper: Die EU in einem neuen imperialen Zeitalter

English

Von Niklas Helwig und Juha Jokela

Wie kaum ein zweiter politischer Akteur hat die EU die Grundsätze der liberalen „freien Welt“ sowohl verkörpert als auch von ihnen profitiert. Doch die globale Ordnung befindet sich schon seit einiger Zeit in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel von einem regelbasierten System zu einer Landschaft, die immer mehr von Machtpolitik, Ringen um transnationalen Einfluss und Wettbewerb um Ressourcen und Territorien geprägt ist. Die jüngste Wende in der US-Außenpolitik hat diesen Wandel noch weiter beschleunigt.

In einer geschichtsvergessenen Volte betrachtet Washington die EU und ihr liberales Modell nicht mehr als engen Verbündeten, sondern als Rivalen. Statt eines Partners mit gemeinsamen Werten sieht Trump in der EU ein Gebilde, das „die Vereinigten Staaten ausnutzt“, und anders als während seiner ersten Amtszeit ist er nun auch bereit und in der Lage, dieser Überzeugung Taten folgen zu lassen.

Stand der „Westen“ – trotz seiner vielen Ungereimtheiten – in der Vergangenheit meist geeint gegen autokratische Herausforderer, so zeigt sich heute ein fragmentiertes globales Umfeld, in dem die EU neue Partnerschaften schmieden und bestehende stärken muss, um die regelbasierte Ordnung zu verteidigen und sich gegen einen aufziehenden Imperialismus zu stemmen.

Neues FIIA Briefing Paper

Ein neues Briefing Paper für das Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) analysiert die Herausforderungen und Chancen der EU in einer Welt, die zunehmend von hierarchischen Machtstrukturen und Taktiken der Nötigung bestimmt wird – was wir als ein im Entstehen befindliches imperiales Zeitalter beschreiben. Das Papier konzentriert sich auf drei kritische Dimensionen: die interne Glaubwürdigkeit der EU als politisches Projekt, ihre Fähigkeit, ihren Prinzipien im Umgang mit globalen Partnern treu zu bleiben, und ihre Möglichkeiten, wirtschaftlichen Einfluss in einer Ära des machtgetriebenen Wettbewerbs auszuüben.

Die wichtigste Schlussfolgerung ist, dass die EU trotz der Zunahme von roher Machtpolitik und transaktionaler Diplomatie ihr liberales, regelbasiertes Kernmodell internationalen Engagements aufrechterhalten, weiterentwickeln und verteidigen muss. Ob die EU im Zeitalter der Imperien eine nicht-imperiale Alternative für die Weltpolitik bieten kann, hängt davon ab, ob sie die Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu Hause aufrechterhält und gleichberechtigte Partnerschaften im Ausland fördert. Außerdem kommt es darauf an, die fiskalische und politische Integration zu vertiefen, um die wirtschaftliche Stärke der EU zu erhalten und sich auf eine Verschärfung globaler Handelskonflikte vorzubereiten.

Das Briefing Paper „The EU in an age of empires: A liberal geopolitical force in the making?“ wurde von Niklas Helwig und Juha Jokela herausgegeben und umfasst Beiträge mehrerer Mitglieder des EU-Programms von FIIA.

Das vollständige Paper (in englischer Sprache) ist hier zu finden.

Übersetzung: Manuel Müller.
Bild: Deckblatt des FIIA Briefing Paper, basierend auf einem Foto von Dimitar Dilkoff, AFP / Lehtikuva.

FIIA Briefing Paper: The EU in an age of empires

Deutsch

By Niklas Helwig and Juha Jokela

The EU has both embodied and benefited from the principles of the liberal ‘free world’. Yet the global order has been undergoing a profound transformation for some time, shifting away from a rules-based international system towards a landscape increasingly shaped by power politics, transnational influence, and competition over resources and territories – a shift further accelerated by the recent turn in US foreign policy.

In an history-ignoring turn of events, the EU and its liberal model is no longer seen by Washington as a close ally but as a rival. Rather than a partner in shared values, Trump perceives the EU as an entity that “takes advantage of the United States”, and unlike during his first term, he is now both willing and able to act on this belief.

What was once a world where the “West” – despite its many inconsistencies – stood united against autocratic challengers has now fractured into a global environment where the EU must forge new partnerships and strengthen existing ones to defend the rules-based order and fend off imperialism.

New FIIA Briefing Paper

A new Briefing Paper for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) assesses the EU’s challenges and opportunities in a world increasingly defined by hierarchical power structures and coercive tactics – what we describe as an emerging age of empires. The Paper focuses on three critical dimensions: the EU’s internal credibility as a political project, its ability to uphold a principled approach with global partners, and its capacity to wield economic influence in an era of power-driven competition.

The key takeaway is that, despite the intensification of raw power politics and transactional diplomacy, the EU must continue to uphold, leverage, and defend its core liberal, rules-based model of international engagement. In an age of empires, the EU’s ability to offer a non-imperial alternative to global politics depends on maintaining the rule of law at home and fostering equitable partnerships abroad. Additionally, deeper fiscal and political integration will be crucial for sustaining the EU’s economic strength and preparing for the intensification of global trade conflicts.

The Briefing Paper “The EU in an age of empires: A liberal geopolitical force in the making?” has been edited by Niklas Helwig and Juha Jokela. Several members of FIIA’s EU programme have contributed to it.

The full paper is available here.

Picture: Cover of the FIIA Briefing Paper, based on a photo by Dimitar Dilkoff, AFP / Lehtikuva.

Der Europäische Rat: Nationale Staats- und Regierungschef:innen im EU-Gesetzgebungsprozess

English

Von Edoardo Bressanelli, Christel Koop, Francesca Minetto und Christine Reh

Der Europäische Rat soll Agendasetzer und Krisenmanager sein. Aber er greift auch regelmäßig in den Gesetzgebungsprozess ein.

Der Europäische Rat ist vor allem als strategischer Agendasetzer, als Krisenmanager und als Verfassungsautorität der EU bekannt. Darüber hinaus hat er aber auch eine bisher weitgehend unbekannte Seite: In diesem Artikel stellen wir einen Europäischen Rat vor, der immer wieder aktiv und selbstbewusst in die tägliche Entscheidungsfindung der EU eingreift.

Die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten, die Präsident:in der Europäischen Kommission und die Hohe Vertreter:in für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik treffen sich regelmäßig in Gipfeln. Der erste Gipfel des Europäischen Rates fand vor 50 Jahren, im März 1975, statt. Seit 2009 werden diese hochrangigen Treffen von einer ständigen Präsident:in des Europäischen Rates vorbereitet und geleitet. Gipfeltreffen können formell oder informell sein; nach formellen Gipfeltreffen werden sogenannte „Schlussfolgerungen“ veröffentlicht. Diese Schlussfolgerungen sind rechtlich nicht bindend, enthalten aber die vereinbarten Standpunkte der Staats- und Regierungschef:innen zu Fragen, die für die Union und ihre Bürger:innen von großer Bedeutung sind. Darüber hinaus werden in den Schlussfolgerungen regelmäßig bestimmte Gesetze und Gesetzesvorhaben erwähnt und die anderen EU-Institutionen und die Mitgliedstaaten damit „beauftragt“, zu diesen Rechtsvorschriften zu handeln.

Wie oft interveniert der Europäische Rat in die Gesetzgebung?

In unserem Forschungsprojekt haben wir mehr als 2.500 Gesetze und Gesetzesvorhaben im Zeitraum von 1999 bis 2024 analysiert, die im Rahmen des ordentlichen Gesetzgebungsverfahrens (oder Mitentscheidungsverfahrens) vorgeschlagen, abgeschlossen oder zurückgezogen wurden. Zudem haben wir 106 Schlussfolgerungen von Gipfeltreffen untersucht und Interviews mit Entscheidungsträger:innen auf nationaler und EU-Ebene geführt, die uns dabei halfen, die Vorbereitung von Schlussfolgerungen und ihre Weiterverfolgung im nachgelagerten Gesetzgebungsprozess besser zu verstehen.

Von den 2.585 analysierten Gesetzen erwähnt der Europäische Rat etwa 17% in seinen Schlussfolgerungen. Insgesamt erwähnen die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen 451 Gesetze zwischen einem und 13 Mal; 168 Gesetze werden einmal erwähnt, 53 Gesetze werden drei- bzw. fünfmal erwähnt, und 12 Gesetze werden mehr als zehnmal erwähnt.

Der Europäische Rat beauftragt EU-Institutionen und Mitgliedstaaten

Die nationalen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen erteilen dabei den anderen EU-Institutionen und den Mitgliedstaaten häufig Aufträge, die alle Phasen des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens betreffen.

Als Policy-Vorschläge verstehen wir Formulierungen, in denen die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen die Europäische Kommission zu neuen Rechtsvorschriften „auffordern“ oder „einladen“; seit 1999 haben sie der Kommission 216 derartige Aufträge erteilt.

Im Rahmen dessen, was wir Policy-Bekräftigung nennen, „ermutigen“ oder „begrüßen“ die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen Gesetzgebungsvorschläge oder „nehmen sie zur Kenntnis“; dies geschah 352 Mal seit 1999.

Bei Policy-Entscheidungen „drängt“ der Europäische Rat die Ko-Gesetzgeber (den Rat der EU und das Europäische Parlament), „erwartet die Verabschiedung“ oder fordert zur „Beschleunigung“ auf. Mit mehr als 850 Aufforderungen ist dies die Phase mit den meisten Aufträgen.

Die letzte Form des Auftrags schließlich betrifft die Policy-Implementierung, bei der die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen die nationale Umsetzung beschlossener EU-Gesetze fordern. Seit 1999 haben die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen die Europäische Kommission und die Mitgliedstaaten 186 Mal zur Implementierung von Recht aufgefordert.

Welche Art von Gesetzen erwähnt der Europäische Rat?

Basierend auf etablierten Ansätzen und unserer eigenen, bis 2024 aktualisierten Kodierung, unterscheiden wir vier Arten von Gesetzgebung. Umverteilungsgesetze dienen der Zuweisung von Finanzmitteln; Verteilungsgesetze weisen ebenfalls Finanzmittel zu, allerdings ohne Umverteilung; Regulierungsgesetze legen Beschränkungen fest und eröffnen Möglichkeiten, insbesondere für Akteure im Binnenmarkt; verfahrenskonstituierende Gesetze legen die Regeln für Politikgestaltung fest. Der Europäische Rat nimmt auf alle vier Arten von Gesetzen Bezug, erwähnt aber Umverteilungsgesetze am häufigsten. Mit diesen Gesetzen werden Gelder verteilt, die aus den Haushalten der Mitgliedstaaten stammen. Die nationalen Entscheidungsträger:innen, so argumentieren wir, wollen über diese Gesetze offenbar kontrollieren, wie ihre Mittel ausgegeben werden.

Darüber hinaus unterscheiden wir zwischen „expansiven“ und „nicht-expansiven“ Gesetzen. Expansive Rechtsvorschriften erhöhen das Niveau, den Umfang oder die Reichweite von EU-Gesetzen. Ein bekanntes Beispiel aus jüngster Zeit ist das Gesetz über kritische Rohstoffe aus dem Jahr 2023. Der Europäische Rat verweist häufig auf expansive Gesetze: Er erwähnt 27% der expansiven Gesetze, aber nur 10% der nicht-expansiven Gesetze. Auch die Kommission priorisiert expansive Gesetze bei der Festlegung ihrer eigenen Gesetzgebungsagenda.

Wenn Staats- und Regierungschef:innen als Verfechter:innen nationaler Interessen wahrgenommen werden, sollte uns die häufige Erwähnung expansiver Rechtsvorschriften stutzig machen. Wir schlagen zwei mögliche Erklärungen vor: Entweder versuchen der Europäische Rat und die Europäische Kommission gemeinsam, diese Gesetze „anzuschieben“ oder zu „fördern“, oder der Europäische Rat versucht, in festgefahrenen Situationen Blockaden zu überwinden.

Ist der Europäische Rat ein Krisenmanager?

Der Europäische Rat befasst sich öffentlich und gut sichtbar mit wirtschaftlichen, politischen, sicherheitspolitischen und gesellschaftlichen Krisen. Die Tagesordnungen der Gipfeltreffen sind oft krisenorientiert, und die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen erwähnen krisenbezogene Gesetze viel häufiger als „normale“ Rechtsakte. Tatsächlich werden in den Schlussfolgerungen der Gipfeltreffen 37% der krisenbezogenen Gesetze erwähnt, verglichen mit 14% der nicht-krisenbezogenen Gesetze. Die drei Krisen, die relativ gesehen am häufigsten genannt werden, sind Energie, Asyl und Migration sowie die russische Invasion der Ukraine.

Auf dieser Grundlage argumentieren wir, dass der Europäische Rat in Brüssel nicht nur sichtbar Krisenmanagement betreibt (oder zu betreiben versucht). Vielmehr kombinieren die nationalen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen regelmäßig hochrangige Krisenpolitik mit Interventionen in die alltägliche gesetzgeberische Krisenreaktion.

Gesetzgebungsprioritäten: Kooperation mit der Kommission?

Bei der Vorbereitung der Gipfeltreffen wird die Europäische Kommission zum Tagesordnungsentwurf und zum Entwurf der Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates konsultiert und erörtert diese mit der Präsident:in des Europäischen Rates und ihrem Kabinett. Während der Gipfeltreffen steht die Kommissionspräsident:in in direktem Kontakt mit den Staats- und Regierungschef:innen. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob die Gesetzgebungsprioritäten in den jährlichen Arbeitsprogrammen der Kommission und in den Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates eng aufeinander abgestimmt sind. Dies ist nicht der Fall.

Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass mehr als 60% der EU-Gesetze weder vom Europäischen Rat noch von der Kommission als vorrangig eingestuft werden. Weniger als 5% sind gemeinsame Prioritäten, mehr als 20% werden nur von der Kommission priorisiert, und weniger als 10% sind alleinige Prioritäten des Europäischen Rates.

Wir bieten zwei mögliche Erklärungen für diese Beobachtung an. Erstens könnte die Europäische Kommission ausdrücklich Aufträge des Europäischen Rates „anfordern“, um hochrangige Unterstützung zu signalisieren, wenn Gesetzesvorschläge feststecken. Zweitens scheint die Kommissionspräsident:in die Gipfeltreffen zu nutzen, um selbst mit den Staats- und Regierungschef:innen der Mitgliedstaaten Optionen zu erkunden. Insgesamt scheint die Kommission – im Gegensatz zum Europäischen Parlament – mit dem Selbstbewusstsein und der Interventionsfreude des Europäischen Rates recht gut zurechtzukommen.

Sind Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates rechtsverbindlich?

Die Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates, einschließlich ihres Geltungsbereichs und ihrer Rolle, wurden verschiedentlich vor dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH) angefochten. Eine Studie für das Europäische Parlament unterstreicht, wie schwierig es ist, den Europäischen Rat gerichtlich zur Verantwortung zu ziehen: Die Vertragsartikel über den Europäischen Rat sind relativ vage, die EU ist ein Mehrebenensystem, es gibt strenge Zulässigkeitsregeln, und die Entscheidungsfindung im Europäischen Rat erfolgt in der Regel im Konsens.

Dennoch hat der EuGH – ähnlich wie das Generalsekretariat des Rates – argumentiert, dass die Schlussfolgerungen des Gipfels nicht rechtsverbindlich sind, sondern die Akteure nur politisch verpflichten. In zwei Fällen – die von Polen angestrengte Rechtssache C-5/16 zur Marktstabilitätsreserve und die von der Slowakei und Ungarn angestrengten verbundenen Rechtssachen C-643/15 und C-647/15 zur Umsiedlung von Flüchtlingen – hat das Gericht die Befugnis des Europäischen Rates, Leitlinien für die Rechtsetzung der EU festzulegen, ausdrücklich eingeschränkt.

Konkret argumentierte das Gericht, dass die Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates die Mehrheitsregel im Rat der EU nicht ändern dürfen. Der EuGH versuchte damit, die Eingriffsmöglichkeiten der Staats- und Regierungschef:innen durch das interinstitutionelle Gleichgewicht des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens einzugrenzen. Diese Urteile haben den Europäischen Rat jedoch nicht davon abgehalten, den anderen EU-Institutionen und den Mitgliedstaaten weiterhin und häufig Aufträge im Gesetzgebungsprozess zu erteilen.

Fazit

Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen, dass der Europäische Rat am Prozess der alltäglichen Rechtsetzung beteiligt ist, und zwar mit Nachdruck. Die nationalen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen erwähnen in den Schlussfolgerungen ihrer Gipfel etwa 17% der EU-Gesetzgebung, und zwar insbesondere Gesetze, die Mittel umverteilen, EU-Kompetenzen erweitern und/oder krisenbezogen sind. Wenn der Europäische Rat Gesetze erwähnt, so agiert er mit großem Selbstbewusstsein und erteilt über alle Phasen des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens hinweg explizite Aufträge an die anderen EU-Institutionen, insbesondere an die Ko-Gesetzgebungsorgane.

Haben diese häufigen Eingriffe in den Gesetzgebungsprozess Auswirkungen auf das Machtgleichgewicht innerhalb der EU? Der Europäische Rat ist in der Tat ein besonders mächtiger und sichtbarer Akteur, der in Brüssel über weitreichende Befugnisse verfügt. Einige Beobachter:innen aus Wissenschaft und Politik argumentieren, dass die starke Führung durch die Staats- und Regierungschefs:innen notwendig sei, damit die EU effektiv funktionieren kann, insbesondere in Krisenzeiten.

Aus unserer Sicht hingegen verkompliziert das routinemäßige aktive und selbstbewusste Eingreifen der Staats- und Regierungschef:innen die klassische Rollenverteilung der gesetzgebende Akteure im EU-Mitentscheidungsverfahren. Um den Gesetzgebungsprozess vollständig zu verstehen, müssen wir daher vielleicht über das etablierte „institutionelle Dreieck“ hinaus ein neues „institutionelles Quadrat“ andenken.

Edoardo Bressanelli ist Associate Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa und Senior Visiting Research Fellow am King’s College London.

Christel Koop ist Professorin für Politökonomie am King’s College London.

Francesca Minetto ist Doktorandin an der Hertie School in Berlin, wo sie zu den Außenbeziehungen der EU und ihren Institutionen forscht.

Christine Reh ist Professorin für europäische Politik an der Hertie School in Berlin.

Dieser Artikel basiert auf einem CEPS Explainer, The European Council: Truly the law-maker-in-chief?, der im April 2025 in englischer Sprache auf der Website des Centre of European Policy Studies erschienen ist.

Übersetzung: Manuel Müller.
Bild: Europäischer Rat: European Union (European Council) [Lizenz], via European Council newsroom; Porträts Edoardo Bressanelli, Christel Koop, Francesca Minetto, Christine Reh: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

The European Council: National leaders in EU law-making

Deutsch

By Edoardo Bressanelli, Christel Koop, Francesca Minetto, and Christine Reh

The European Council is supposed to be an agenda-setter and crisis manager. But it also regularly intervenes in the legislative process.

The European Council is known primarily as a strategic agenda-setter, crisis-manager, and constitutional authority. However, it also has a largely unknown side: In this article, we introduce a European Council that routinely and assertively intervenes in the EU’s everyday decision-making.

National heads of state or government, the European Commission president, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy regularly meet in summits. The first European Council summit happened 50 years ago, in March 1975. Since 2009, these high-level meetings have been chaired and prepared by a permanent European Council president. Summits can be formal or informal; formal summits produce so-called ‘conclusions’. These conclusions are not legally binding but report national leaders’ agreed positions on issues of high relevance for the Union and its citizens. In addition, the conclusions regularly mention specific pieces of legislation and ‘mandate’ the EU’s other institutions and member states to act on these laws.

How often does the European Council intervene in legislation?

In a joint research project, we have looked at the 1999-2024 period and analysed more than 2,500 pieces of legislation – pending, concluded, or withdrawn under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP, or co-decision). We also drew on 106 summit conclusions and on interviews with national and EU-level decision-makers who helped us better understand the preparation of conclusions and their follow-up in ‘downstream’ legislation.

Out of the 2,585 laws analysed, the European Council mentions about 17% in its conclusions. In total numbers, the leaders mention 451 laws between one and 13 times; they refer to 168 laws once, mention 53 laws and 23 laws three and five times respectively, and refer to 12 laws more than 10 times.

The European Council mandates EU institutions and member states

The national leaders use mandates to the EU’s other institutions and the member states frequently and across all policy stages. Under ‘policy proposal’, leaders ‘call for’ or ‘invite’ new legislation from the European Commission; since 1999, they have mandated the Commission 216 times.

Under what we call ‘policy acknowledgement’, leaders ‘encourage’, ‘note’ or ‘welcome’ legislation; this happened 352 times. Under ‘policy decision’, the European Council ‘urges’, ‘expects adoption’, and asks the co-legislators – the Council of the EU and the European Parliament – to ‘speed up’. With more than 850 calls, this is the most mandated stage.

Finally, under ‘policy implementation’, leaders call for the national implementation of EU law. Since 1999, leaders have asked the European Commission and member states 186 times to ensure compliance.

What types of law does the European Council mention?

We draw on established approaches and our own coding, updated to 2024, to distinguish four types. Redistributive laws reallocate funds; distributive laws deal with funds but do not reallocate; regulatory laws impose constraints and opportunities, in particular on actors in the single market; procedural constituent laws set the rules for policymaking. Whilst the European Council refers to all four types, redistributive laws are most likely to be mentioned. Such laws reallocate money. Money comes from member state budgets, and national leaders, we argue, will want to control how their funds are being spent.

We also distinguish between ‘expansive’ and ‘non-expansive’ laws. Expansive legislation increases the level, the scope, or the inclusiveness of EU action. One well-known recent example is the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act. The European Council references expansive laws frequently: 27% of expansive laws are mentioned against only 10% of non-expansive laws. Similarly, the Commission prioritises expansive laws in its own legislative agenda-setting.

If heads of state or government are perceived as defenders of national interest, the frequent mention of expansive legislation should puzzle us. We propose two potential explanations: either the European Council and the European Commission jointly try to ‘push’ or ‘promote’ these laws, or the European Council aims to break an impasse if legislation seems gridlocked.

Is the European Council a crisis-manager?

The European Council publicly and visibly addresses economic, political, security, and societal crises. Summit agendas are often crisis-focused, and leaders are much more likely to mention crisis-related laws than ‘standard’ pieces of legislation. Indeed, 37% of crisis legislation features in the summit conclusions compared to 14% of non-crisis legislation. The three crises referred to most frequently in relative terms are energy, asylum and migration, and the Ukraine invasion.

On this basis, we argue that the European Council does not only (attempt to) visibly manage crises in Brussels. Instead, national leaders regularly combine high-level crisis politics with interventions into everyday legislative responses to crises.

Legislative priorities: Cooperation or competition with the Commission?

In the preparation of summits, the European Commission is consulted on, and discusses, the European Council’s draft agenda and draft conclusions with the European Council president and their cabinet. During summits, the Commission president directly interacts with the leaders. We therefore ask whether the legislative priorities expressed in the Commission’s annual work programmes and in the European Council’s summit conclusions are closely aligned. They are not.

Our findings show that more than 60% of EU legislation is not prioritised by either the European Council or the Commission. Less than 5% are shared priorities; more than 20% are prioritised by the Commission only; and less than 10% are European Council priorities.

We make two suggestions for why this is the case. First, the European Commission could explicitly ‘request’ mandates as high-level support when legislative proposals are ‘stuck’. Second, the Commission president seems to ‘use’ the summits themselves to explore options with national leaders. Overall, and in stark contrast to the European Parliament, the Commission seems to be more at ease with the European Council’s assertiveness and intervention.

Are summit conclusions legally binding or political commitments?

The European Council’s conclusions, including their scope and role, have been challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A study published for the European Parliament in 2024 explains that holding the European Council judicially accountable is challenging: The treaty articles on the European Council are relatively imprecise, the EU is a multi-level system, there are strict standing rules, and, usually, decision-making is consensual.

Nevertheless – and similar to an argument by the Council’s General Secretariat – the CJEU has stated that summit conclusions are not legally binding but commit actors politically. In two cases – on the market stability reserve (Case C-5/16) brought by Poland and on refugee relocation (joined cases C-643/15 and C-647/15) brought by Slovakia and Hungary –, it explicitly reined in the European Council’s power to set guidelines in EU law-making.

Indeed, the court argued that conclusions cannot de facto change the majority rule in the Council of the EU under co-decision. The CJEU did (try to) limit the leaders’ ability to interfere with the inter-institutional balance in the legislative process. Yet, these judgments have not deterred the European Council from providing direction via mandates to the other EU institutions and to the member states.

Conclusions

Our research shows a European Council that is involved in everyday law-making, and assertively so. National leaders mention about 17% of EU legislation in their summit conclusions; in particular, they mention laws that redistribute funds, expand EU competences, and are crisis-related. On the laws mentioned, the European Council acts assertively across all policy stages and explicitly mandates the EU’s other institutions – especially the co-legislators.

Do these frequent interventions across the policy process matter for the balance of power within the EU? The European Council is a singularly powerful and visible actor, with extensive authority in Brussels. Some observers, academic and political, argue that the leaders’ strong guidance is necessary for the EU to effectively function, especially during times of crisis. We propose instead that the leaders’ routine but active and assertive intervention in the everyday politics of co-decision complicates the ‘classic’ roles assigned to the EU’s legislative players. Indeed, to fully understand the legislative process, we may need to move from the well-established ‘institutional triangle’ to a new ‘institutional square’.

Edoardo Bressanelli is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa and Senior Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London.

Christel Koop is Professor of Political Economy at King’s College London.

Francesca Minetto is a PhD Researcher at the Hertie School in Berlin, where she researches the European Union’s external relations and its institutions.

Christine Reh is Professor of European Politics at the Hertie School in Berlin.

This article is based on a CEPS Explainer, The European Council: Truly the law-maker-in-chief?, published in April 2025 on the website of the Centre of European Policy Studies.

Picture: European Council roundtable: European Union (European Council) [license], via European Council newsroom; portraits Edoardo Bressanelli, Christel Koop, Francesca Minetto, Christine Reh: private [all rights reserved].

EU to go: Europas Wirtschaft und Deutschlands Beitrag

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Die Diagnose, die Enrico Letta und Mario Draghi in ihren Berichten zur wirtschaftlichen Lage der EU gestellt haben, trifft insbesondere auch auf Deutschland zu: Ein hoher Transformationsdruck, eine lähmende Bürokratie, unzureichende Verteidigungsfähigkeit und ein geringes Produktivitätswachstum. Nun hat der alte Deutsche Bundestag mit einer Mehrheit von Union, SPD und Grünen ein Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur beschlossen und die Schuldenbremse für Verteidigungsausgaben über ein Prozent des BIP ausgesetzt, um diese Herausforderungen angehen zu können.

Angesichts des geopolitischen Drucks und der veränderten Sicherheitslage eine Erleichterung für Deutschland – aber auch für Europa? Thu Nguyen bespricht gemeinsam mit Nils Redeker, stellvertretender Direktor des Jacques Delors Centre, und Philipp Jäger, Experte für Klima- und Wirtschaftspolitik, welchen Investitionsspielraum sich Deutschland geschaffen hat. Wie gut lassen sich die neuen Verteidigungsausgaben mit den EU-Fiskalregeln vereinbaren? Kann der geplante Bürokratieabbau, mit dem auch Friedrich Merz Wahlkampf machte, wirklich Investitionen beschleunigen – oder dient er nur als Deckmantel, um Klima- und Umweltstandards abzubauen? Und was genau bedeutet „Whatever it takes“ für das wirtschaftsstärkste Mitgliedsland der EU?

A new German EU policy: Merz’s intergovernmentalism or von der Leyen’s supranationalisation?

Deutsch

By Julian Plottka

The European policy positions of the CDU under Friedrich Merz are a far cry from Helmut Kohl’s federalism.

Expectations at home and abroad regarding the European policy of the potential new German federal government could hardly be further apart: After the traffic light coalition failed to take the initiative in European policy due to internal conflicts, Germany’s European partners have high expectations for the new German government. It shall finally take on a leading role in the EU and launch initiatives to enable the Union to master current political, most notably geopolitical challenges. Expectations range from a revitalisation of the Franco-German engine to a fundamental reform of asylum and migration policy, more support for Ukraine and a strengthening of European competitiveness.

Meanwhile in the 2025 federal election campaigns, the salience of European policy was very low. The pro-European parties’ positions on European policy are changing in a pattern that has been observed since the end of the 1990s: Traditionally, the conservative CDU (EPP) was home to federalist positions in the German party system. On the left side of the party system, the SPD (PES) and, since the 1980s, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (EGP) were more sceptical concerning liberalisation in the Common Market.

Changing party positions on EU policy

However, since the end of the permissive consensus in the early 1990s, parties on both sides changed their positions. The conservatives have put the principle of subsidiarity and de-bureaucratisation at the centre of their European policy agenda and support an increasingly intergovernmental approach to European integration. The 2025 demand for “[m]ore Europe only where Europe creates added value for all” is far away from the previously federalist CDU of Helmut Kohl.

Today, federalist positions have their home with Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the SPD. The former’s election manifesto calls for a federal European republic with a constitution, while the latter supports a new European convention for treaty reform. Being long-term supporters of European integration in the Common Market, the current position of the liberal FDP (ALDE) on the future of the EU is quite close to the social-democratic and Green visions for the Union.

Additionally, European policy has become much more polarised in Germany during the last three decades. The pro-European parties face increasingly vocal European-sceptic parties on the left and the right of the political spectrum, making it more difficult to launch pro-European policy initiatives. Their diverging views on intergovernmental or supranational approaches to European integration also complicate the chance of a CDU-led German government to take the initiative on the EU level.

Options for the new German government

The new German government has at least three options to meet its international partners’ expectations for German impetus to EU policies. First, the new government could return to Germany’s traditional “Leitbilder”-driven approach to European policy. Second, the new government could develop a new intergovernmental approach, which has never been spelled out so far. Third, German leadership could come from the Berlaymont, with German support by Manfred Weber (CSU/EPP) in the European Parliament and Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP) in the German Federal Chancellery.

First, the traditional German approach to supranational integration would be in line with the SPD’s party manifesto. The German government’s European policy has been characterised by Leitbilder (visions) such as the “United States of Europe”, which not only set goals but also legitimise policies. Since for Germany, the transfer of competences to the supranational level was always associated with regaining international actorness, the federal governments were prepared to make extensive concessions to the partner states in order to enable reforms and deepen European integration. A strong emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, limiting the transfer of national competences to the EU, contradicts this approach to European policy. It used to focus on strengthening the level of policy making which can pursue a certain policy most effectively.

A turn towards flexible intergovernmental coalitions?

Since the end of the 1990s, Germany’s European policy is increasingly led by national interests. In a famous speech at the College of Europe, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel outlined the so-called “Unionsmethode” as a new approach to German European policy. However, it has never been fully spelled out what it means and how it differs from intergovernmentalism. Such a new approach would be the second option for the new German government. 

In a paper for the ECFR, Timo Lochocki has shown what this might look like, detecting a generational change in the second row of the CDU that has resulted in a new approach to European policy. Elements of such a new approach are a stronger focus on Germany’s short-term advantages, which are achieved on the basis of flexible coalitions with partner states. This would be a departure from the model of supranational integration. Progress towards integration can only be expected as unintended side effects of such flexible coalitions. From the perspective of those conducting negotiations at EU level, such a bi- or minilateralisation of German European policy may be tempting, as there is no need to overcome resistance by other member states, it can simply be circumvented.

Putting von der Leyen centre stage?

A third option for a new German European policy puts the European Commission under its President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) centre stage. Supported by Manfred Weber as chair of the Group of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament and soon by a potential new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, she started her second term in office with the aim of following a more conservative agenda. The composition of the European Commission, the allocation of dossiers and von der Leyen’s political guidelines for her second term of office have a clear conservative profile with priorities such as competitiveness, defence and security as well as reducing bureaucracy. The idea of a “more feminine, greener, and more digital” Commission and the Conference on the Future of Europe, both key slogans of 2019, are a thing of the past.

A conservative German Chancellor could play a key role in the implementation of this programme. As the Commission takes a lead even in intergovernmental policy areas such as the Common Security and Defence Policy, it is unlikely that a single head of state or government will soon reclaim the agenda setting role from her.

Commission agenda-setting on defence policy

This was particularly evident in the EU’s most recent reaction to the turbulence in international relations following the failed meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his US counterpart Donald Trump. The EU’s first reaction was the announcement of an 800 billion euros investment plan in defence by the President of the European Commission. In a letter to the heads of state or government, she presented her further proposals for strengthening European defence policy.

For the most part, the conclusions of the European Council of 6 March 2025 read like a confirmation of the Commission President’s agenda. The heads of state or government hardly added any additional impetus of their own. Only the list of capability development priorities and the request to European NATO members to coordinate within the EU framework before the next NATO summit have no direct reference to the European Commission. All other decisions of the European Council are either based on Commission initiatives or are addressed to the Commission.

Published on 19 March 2025, the Joint Communication on defence not only proposes concrete measures to strengthen European defence, but announces the publication of an additional “European Armament Technology Roadmap” and a “Joint Communication on Military Mobility” as the next steps on how the Commission will shape the EU’s defence policy agenda. In its conclusions of 20 March 2025, the European Council again invites the legislatives bodies of the EU to take forward the recent Commission initiatives, while it does not propose any intergovernmental initiatives to strengthen European defence.

To be successful, Merz needs to break with his party manifesto

A new conservative German Chancellor is in a difficult position. He will only be able to meet international expectations for a revived German European policy when he breaks with the approach to European integration as presented in the conservative party manifesto. A more intergovernmental approach to European policy will only replicate deadlocks in European policy, which, for example, prevented a reform of the Common European Asylum System for nearly ten years.

Such approaches of using flexible coalitions are not new in international politics but have become en vogue in recent years. In the past, they have often been unsuccessful. Consider, for example, the British government’s failed attempt to divide the EU-27 member states during the Brexit negotiations. The EU was successful in the Brexit negotiations, because it rallied behind a common position.

In order to overcome deadlocks in European policy and effectively address current challenges, a new German European policy has to become again more supranational: either in a supportive role for the Commission agenda or with an own supranational agenda. The fragmentation of international negotiations or European policy is hardly suitable for tackling the tasks ahead.

Back to the roots of conservative German EU policy

Instead, German European policy needs an integrative approach that succeeds in winning over its partner states for European initiatives. Many EU member states seek guidance from the German government on European policy issues that are of secondary importance to them. While doing it alone on European policy has become fashionable for German governments in recent decades, the next one should reverse this trend and return to the roots of conservative German European policy. It must once again engage more closely with its European partners, take note of their interests and positions and, in the best-case scenario, integrate them into joint initiatives.

Based on the mutual acknowledgement of different interests, a comprehensive reform package, with defence at its core, would create considerably more room for negotiation and potential for compromise. In view of the current shift in the political centre of the EU towards the east and north, a revival of the Weimar Triangle – as proposed in the election manifestos of all pro-European parties – is an obvious basis for such initiatives. Proposals which are a compromise between Germany, France, and Poland have good chances of also finding support among other member states.

Julian Plottka is a Senior Scientific Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

This is a shortened and revised version of an article previously published in German on this blog.

Pictures: Merz: European People’s Party [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Julian Plottka: private [all rights reserved].

European Parliament seat projection (March 2025): Far right stronger than ever, EPP and Liberals suffer setbacks

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	188	80	86	27	29	–
Jan. 25 (B)	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
Mar. 25 (B)	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
Mar. 25 (D)	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 24 March 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 24 March 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)

The European Parliament seat projections, which have been published regularly on this blog for over a decade, document some interesting patterns in the European political mood. On the one hand, they show that, in the long term, there are indeed some common EU-wide trends and developments. For example, the rise of far-right parties since the euro crisis has affected almost all member states.

In the short term, on the other hand, election polls in different countries move largely independently of each other. Reactions to individual events – even those of pan-European significance, such as the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 or the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – can vary widely depending on the national party landscape. Similarly, the recent speech by US Vice President JD Vance (Rep./IDU) at the Munich Security Conference caused a big stir among all EU governments, but did not have a clear impact on the polls.

If the projection shows a rapid dynamic, it is usually due to sudden national swings in individual member states, for example as a result of national government crises or election campaigns. In any case, there have been several of these in the two months since the last seat projection at the end of January: In Germany, the final phase of the Bundestag election campaign in February brought surprising changes. In Romania and Poland, national presidential elections in May cast their shadows ahead. In Portugal, the parliament was dissolved and new elections will also be held in May.

New record high for the far right

In short, there was a lot of movement in the European election polls recently. The changes were not always in the same direction in all countries. For example, the German Left (EL) made strong gains just before and after the federal elections, whereas the Portuguese left-wing parties had a rather weak start to their national campaign. But there were some similarities as well: Almost in all member states where there have been significant shifts in recent weeks, far-right parties have made gains. In most cases, this was to the detriment of the center-right parties, i.e. the EPP and the Liberals.

If the European Parliament were to be re-elected now, each of the three far-right groups (ECR, PfE, and ESN) would do better than in the last election in 2024. Together, they would hold around 30% of the seats, making them stronger than ever before in history. Conversely, each of the four centrist groups (EPP, RE, S&D, and Greens/EFA) is currently in a worse position than in the 2024 elections, and they are also at an all-time low. The so-called “Venezuela alliance” of the EPP and the far-right groups would for the first time have more seats in the Parliament than the grand-coalition “platform” of the EPP, S&D and RE.

Big losses for the EPP

One of the biggest losses in the current seat projection is for the European People’s Party. The German CDU/CSU fell short of expectations in the Bundestag elections and has slipped even further in the first post-election polls. In other countries, EPP member parties have also fallen back; the Romanian UDMR and the Dutch BBB would not win any seats in the European Parliament now.

Only the French Républicains bucked the downward trend and made significant gains in a new French poll. Overall, the EPP group has 177 seats (–⁠8 compared to the January forecast), its weakest position in this electoral term.

S&D almost unchanged

However, the second-placed S&D group can hardly benefit from this. For the Social Democrats, the first months of the year once again brought mixed results: They slightly lost support in Germany, Poland, Greece and Bulgaria, while making slight gains in France, the Netherlands and Croatia, among others.

In all these cases, however, the shifts in voter preferences were only small. The most significant gains are likely those in France: Together with its smaller partner Place Publique (led by the popular MEP Raphaël Glucksmann, who has also been very prominent in the international media recently), the PS is closing in on the liberal governing party RE (RE). If this trend continues, the Socialists can hope that they, and not Emmanuel Macron’s ruling alliance, will be seen as the main democratic alternative to Marine Le Pen’s far-right RN (PfE) in the next national elections.

In the projection, the S&D group reaches an almost unchanged total of 131 seats (+⁠1). The gap to the EPP falls below 50 seats for the first time since the European elections, but is still higher than for most of the 2019-24 legislature.

Liberals plummet

The main loser in the last weeks has been the RE group. The Liberals have plummeted in France in particular, but have also suffered losses in Germany, Poland, Belgium and Slovenia. Gains in Romania and Portugal have only marginally offset this.

Overall, the RE group now stands at just 73 seats (–⁠8) – their worst seat projection for almost ten years. In addition, the Liberals once again falls behind the ECR group, leaving them as only the fifth largest force in the European Parliament (as they were at last June’s elections).

Gains for the Left

Also the European Greens have lost some ground in recent weeks. In Germany, they lost many voters to the left in the final phase of the German election campaign; and in Denmark, their race to catch up with the Social Democrats recently suffered some setbacks. Overall, the Greens/EFA group is now projected to have 41 seats (–⁠2).

The Left, on the other hand, is making strong gains. In particular, as mentioned above, it has massively improved its position in Germany, where it has more than doubled its support since the start of the Bundestag election campaign. In Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Cyprus, left-wing parties have also been on the rise. The French LFI, on the other hand, is falling back in the latest poll, and the two Portuguese left-wing parties, BE and CDU, would currently not win any seat in the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the Left group has made significant progress in the seat projection compared to January (52 seats/+⁠4).

Far-right groups increase strongly

But the main winners of the last two months have been the three far-right groups.

The ECR group is benefiting above all from the gains made by the Romanian AUR. It is now in first place in the national polls and can hope to attract more protest votes following the disqualification and criminal proceedings against the independent far-right presidential candidate Călin Georgescu. In Belgium, the N-VA, which recently became the leading party in the national government for the first time, made slight gains. Despite recent setbacks for the Polish PiS, the ECR group now stands at 79 seats (+⁠2) in the seat projection, its best result for almost a year.

The gains of the PfE group are even greater, with some significant increases in France, Poland, Belgium and Hungary, among others. In Czechia, the small motorists’ party Motoristé would also gain a seat now. The PfE group has suffered minor losses only in the Netherlands, where the PVV has been on a downward spiral since it entered government last summer and is now causing coalition crises on an almost monthly basis. Overall, however, the PfE group climbs to 99 seats (+6) in the forecast, just below its previous record high of last December.

Also the third far-right group, the ESN, is able to make further gains in the projection – mainly thanks to the federal election results of the German AfD, whose members make up almost two-thirds of the entire group. The ESN now has a total of 33 seats (+⁠4). In every single seat projection since the European elections last year, it has exceeded its previous figure.

Little change among non-attached and “other” parties

Among the non-attached parties, the left-wing nationalist PE from Greece made significant gains, whereas the left-wing conservative BSW from Germany and the far-right SOS from Romania suffered losses. On balance, the projected number of non-attached MEPs remains unchanged at 24 seats (±0).

There is also little movement among the “other” parties (i.e. parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament and do not belong to a European party, so that they cannot be clearly assigned to any political group), which now stand at 11 seats (+1). Unlike in January, the small Greek left-wing parties MéRA25 and KD would not win any seats now. New to the table are the Bulgarian far-right party MECh and the centre-right parties FD from Romania and Demokrati from Slovenia.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest. In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	188	80	86	27	29	–
Jan. 25 (B)	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
Mar. 25 (B)	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
Mar. 25 (D)	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	9 Linke 1 Tier	11 Grüne 3 Volt	14 SPD	3 FDP 3 FW	24 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			20 AfD	3 BSW 2 Partei 1 PdF
FR	7 LFI	4 EELV	12 PS	14 RE	11 LR		33 RN
IT	10 M5S 2 SI	3 EV	19 PD	3 IV/+E	7 FI 1 SVP	24 FdI	7 Lega
ES	2 Sumar 2 Pod 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	19 PSOE	1 PNV	22 PP	1 SALF	9 Vox		1 Junts
PL			3 Lewica	2 PL2050	19 KO 2 KP	17 PiS	5 Konf	5 Konf
RO			8 PSD	5 USR 1 PMP	4 PNL	10 AUR			2 SOS	2 POT 1 FD
NL	2 SP 1 PvdD	3 GL	4 PvdA	7 VVD 2 D66	4 CDA		8 PVV
BE	3 PTB	1 Groen	2 Vooruit 2 PS	2 MR 2 LE	1 CD&V 1 CSP	4 N-VA	4 VB
CZ		1 Piráti			3 STAN 1 TOP09 1 KDU-ČSL	2 ODS	8 ANO 1 AUTO	3 SPD	1 Stačilo
EL	2 Syriza		3 PASOK		6 ND	3 EL	1 FL		3 PE 2 KKE 1 NIKI
HU			1 DK		10 TISZA		9 Fidesz	1 MHM
PT			7 PS	2 IL	8 AD		4 Chega
SE	2 V	1 MP	8 S	1 C	4 M	5 SD
AT		2 Grüne	5 SPÖ	2 Neos	4 ÖVP		7 FPÖ
BG			1 BSP	2 PP 1 APS	5 GERB 1 DB	1 ITN		3 V	2 DPS-NN	1 MECh
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	2 V	2 LA 1 K	2 DD	1 DF
SK				4 PS	2 Slov 1 KDH	1 SaS		1 REP	4 Smer 2 Hlas
FI	1 Vas	1 Vihreät	4 SDP	2 Kesk	4 Kok	3 PS
IE	4 SF			5 FF	4 FG					1 SD
HR		1 Možemo	5 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT		2 DSVL	2 LSDP	1 LS 1 LP	2 TS-LKD	1 LVŽS				2 NA
LV		1 Prog	1 SDPS		1 JV	2 NA 1 LRA	1 LPV			1 ZZS 1 ST!
SI		1 Vesna	1 SD	2 GS	4 SDS					1 D
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 1 KE	3 Isamaa		1 EKRE
CY	2 AKEL		1 DIKO		2 DISY	1 ELAM
LU		1 Gréng	1 LSAP	1 DP	2 CSV	1 ADR
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.

An overview of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Republicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Czechia: TOP09 (1, 3, 5 etc.) and KDU-ČSL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: TD: PL2050 (1, 3, 5 etc.), KP (2, 4, 6 etc.). In Czechia, some polls combine ODS (ECR), TOP09 and KDU-ČSL (both EPP); in these cases, two thirds of the seats are allocated to the ODS and one third to the alliance of TOP09 and KDU-ČSL. For Poland, the projection assumes that the members of the Konfederacja are equally divided between the ESN and PfE groups. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead. For Slovenia, the seat projection assumes that MEP Vladimir Prebilič will run for the Vesna party as in 2024; if polls show values for a hypothetical party of Prebilič’s own, these are attributed to Vesna.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 20-24/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
France: national polls, 6/2/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Italy: national polls, 6-17/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Spain: national polls, 14-21/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Poland: national polls, 6-13/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Romania: national polls, 16/2/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Netherlands: national polls, 17-24/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, French community: polls for the national parliamentary election in Wallonia 11/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, Dutch community: polls for the national parliamentary election in Flanders, 11/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024.
Czechia: national polls, 5-16/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Greece: national polls, 6-19/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Hungary: national polls, 28/2-12/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Portugal: national polls, 6-10/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Sweden: national polls, 9-16/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Austria: national polls, 26/2-11/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Bulgaria: national polls, 16/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Denmark: national polls, 4-16/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovakia: national polls, 9-14/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Finland: national polls, 4-16/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Ireland: national polls, 19/2-1/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Croatia: national polls, 20/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Lithuania: national polls, 23-28/2/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Latvia: national polls, January 2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovenia: national polls, 6-12/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Estonia: national polls, 12-19/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Cyprus: national polls, 11/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Luxembourg: national polls, 30/9/2024, source: Wikipedia.
Malta: national polls, 12-13/2/2025, source: Wikipedia.

Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller.