The 2026 global election campaign is underway: Who will be the next UN Secretary-General?

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

António Guterres is nearing the end of his term as UN Secretary-General. Who will succeed him?

Times are not easy for the United Nations. The concept of fostering peace, human rights, and economic development through international law and global cooperation remains as sound as ever. Yet the key players in global politics have recently moved further and further away from these ideals: Three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia, China, and the US – are openly pursuing imperial strategies aimed solely at expanding their own spheres of influence. Even within the EU, which is more committed than any other major power to defending the liberal world order, some believe that power is more important than law in global politics.

At the same time, democracy is in crisis worldwide. In the United States, an authoritarian far-right party has controlled the government since 2025. In France and the United Kingdom – the other two permanent members of the Security Council – similar developments loom in the 2027 and 2029 national elections. Meanwhile, climate change is accelerating; global development aid is facing drastic cuts; the scale of global forced migration is at a record high; the UN itself is facing an existential financial crisis because wealthy member states are not paying their dues; and in 2030, the Sustainable Development Goals will expire and need to be replaced by a new global development policy framework.

So this is just the right moment to fill the “most impossible job on this earth”: In autumn, the United Nations will elect a new Secretary-General.

Personality is key

The top position of the world organisation’s executive is the highest-ranking office the international community has to offer. But while the Secretary-General does wield considerable influence, they have little formal power. Their success therefore depends heavily on other actors, particularly the governments of the major member states. At the same time, the personality of the office-holder also plays a key role. While some former Secretaries-General, such as Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden, independent, 1953–61) or Kofi Annan (Ghana, independent, 1997–2006), initiated significant changes in global politics, others remained unremarkable like Ban Ki-moon (South Korea, independent, 2007–16), or saw their ambitions thwarted by the reluctance of member states like Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt, NDP/SI, 1992–96).

The current Secretary-General, António Guterres (Portugal, PS/SI-PA, since 2017), was the first former national head of government to hold this position. During his tenure, he spearheaded several key reforms to the UN system, most notably the UN80 initiative adopted in 2025. In light of global challenges, he initially sought to build consensus through “quiet diplomacy”, a strategy that drew criticism from some human rights organisations. Only quite late in the day, in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s ruthless military operations in Gaza, he began to speak out more clearly in public.

Overall, Guterres was unable to truly prevent the global political situation from escalating or stop the United Nations from becoming increasingly marginalised. But it is, of course, difficult to say just how much worse things might have become without him. Can his successor be more successful? And how does one even find someone who is suited to the job?

The selection procedure

For a long time, the selection process for the UN Secretary-General was largely unregulated. Article 97 of the UN Charter merely stipulates that the Secretary-General is “appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”. In practice, the final say has always rested with the Security Council, where a majority of 9 out of 15 members is required. For this, the ten non-permanent members (currently Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Pakistan, Bahrain, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Liberia, Colombia, and Panama) each have only a single vote, whereas the five permanent members each have the power of veto. Thus, the key issue is whether the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France can agree on a common candidate.

To narrow down the field of candidates, the Security Council traditionally begins by conducting so-called straw polls. These are anonymous (and officially closed to the public, although the results are always leaked in practice) and are repeated until a sufficient consensus emerges around a particular candidate. Only then does an open vote take place. To prevent an institutional deadlock, the General Assembly then traditionally limits itself to merely rubberstamping the compromise candidate selected in this manner.

The reform initiative of 2016

With its consensualism, its secrecy, its exclusivity and its proclivity for protracted blockades, this procedure has often been compared to the conclave used to elect a pope. Ahead of the 2016 Secretary-General election, there was therefore an initiative to reform the process. While the election of the UN Secretary-General could not be as democratic as the lead candidate system introduced two years earlier for electing the EU Commission President, it should at least be made somewhat more transparent and inclusive.

The main driving force behind this initiative (which was also discussed several times on this blog at the time) was the 1for7billion campaign, which brought together organisations such as the World Federalist Movement and the United Nations Association UK. Support for the initiative was also evident within the UN General Assembly itself, particularly from the reform-oriented ACT Group and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Bringing debates into the public arena

The campaign’s main objective was to encourage member states to nominate candidates for the position of Secretary-General in advance and to have these candidates present their ideas and goals at public hearings. This was intended to take the discussion about the most suitable candidate out of diplomatic backrooms and into the public sphere – and thereby indirectly pressure Security Council members not to settle for the lowest common denominator.

The campaign also called for more far-reaching changes: For example, it proposed that the Security Council should nominate several candidates, rather than just one, so that the General Assembly would make the final decision between them. In order to make the Secretary-General more independent of member states, the campaign further proposed extending the term of office from five to seven years and eliminating the possibility of re-election.

Can the standard achieved in 2016 be sustained?

In practice, only the first part of these demands – the preliminary nomination of candidates and a kind of public campaign between them – was implemented in 2016. Hopes for a broad and meaningful debate in the General Assembly went unfulfilled. The decisive moment remained the anonymous straw polls in the UN Security Council. Still, the process that led to António Guterres’ appointment in 2016 was more structured and transparent than ever before.

Guterres was re-elected in 2021 without facing any official challengers and thus with virtually no public attention. However, the upcoming election is once again an open race and will therefore be a new test for the reformed process. Given the state of the world, hardly anyone is expecting significant further progress towards greater transparency and inclusivity. Nevertheless, there is hope that at least the standard achieved in 2016 can be maintained and become the new norm.

The 2026 procedure

The UN General Assembly, which has the strongest institutional interest in this, has already taken the lead. In its Resolution 79/327 (para. 42), adopted in September 2025, the Assembly presented a detailed procedural proposal:

• The proceedings were officially opened in November 2025 with a joint letter from the President of the General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock (Germany, Greens/GG), and the President of the Security Council, Imran Kanu (Sierra Leone, independent).
• In the second stage, all UN member states can now nominate candidates. Each government may submit one candidate, who does not necessarily have to be a citizen of the nominating country. It is also possible for several countries to nominate a joint candidate. Throughout the entire process, governments may withdraw their nomination at any time. This results in the automatic elimination of the candidate, unless, of course, the candidate still has the support of another government.
• When nominated, candidates must provide a résumé, a vision statement, and an overview of their funding sources, all of which are published on the UN website.
• Starting in April 2026, the General Assembly will hold “informal hearings” with candidates who have been nominated by that time. Representatives of civil society organisations will also be included in these hearings. For the candidates, participation is voluntary.
• From July onwards, the UN Security Council will begin its straw polls. As it is not legally bound by the General Assembly’s procedure, it could, in theory, even put forward a completely new name. In practice, however, this is only likely to happen if all of the candidates who have presented themselves to the General Assembly are consistently vetoed by one of the permanent members.
• Provided there are no major deadlocks, the process is expected to conclude in autumn 2026 with a candidate’s official nomination by the Security Council and appointment by the General Assembly. The new Secretary-General will then take up their post on 1 January 2027.

Wanted: a Latin American woman with UN experience

What would the ideal Secretary-General look like? While there are no formal requirements for candidacy, various stakeholders have voiced their hopes and expectations regarding the profile of the next Secretary-General.

International experience is, of course, essential. Past Secretaries-General have typically been former top-level national diplomats, often serving as foreign ministers. Kofi Annan was a long-standing UN official, António Guterres was the first former head of government to be appointed. His successor should possess comparable political influence. At the same time, they should not have permanently alienated any of the UN’s veto powers during their previous career.

Another important criterion is regional origin. According to informal practice, the top UN post rotates among the continents. However, there are no specific rules governing this. As Eastern Europe is the only UN regional group that has never provided a Secretary-General, many candidates that stood in 2016 were from this region. Ultimately, however, the Western European António Guterres was chosen. Following Africa (Annan), Asia (Ban), and Europe (Guterres), it is expected that it will once again be Latin America’s turn in 2026. The region last provided a UN Secretary-General from 1982 to 1991, when Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru, independent) held the post.

Finally, gender also plays a role: After nine male Secretaries-General, many now believe that the time has come for the first woman to hold the office. For example, a female Secretary-General is a key demand of 1for8billion, the successor of the reform campaign of 2016. Annalena Baerbock, as President of the General Assembly, has also clearly expressed her support for nominating female candidates. This is supported by many governments, too, including EU member states, Brazil, Mexico, the ACT Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. In contrast, the Russian government has explicitly opposed making the Secretary-General’s gender a “decisive criterion”.

The candidates

So who will it be? The 1for8billion website provides a continuously updated overview of the candidates that have been nominated by a member state, as well as other potential contenders. So far, the following are officially in the running:

Michelle Bachelet (b. 1951, Chile, PS/SI-PA) carries the most political weight among the candidates so far, having served as President of Chile (2006–10, 2014–18), first Executive Director of UN Women (2010–13), and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018–22). She also enjoys the support of three member states: in addition to her home country of Chile, she was nominated by Brazil and Mexico. However, her profile may be too progressive for the Security Council’s veto powers – in recent years, she has voiced open criticism of all of Russia, China, and US President Donald Trump (Rep./IDU).	Michelle Bachelet.
Rebeca Grynspan (b. 1955, Costa Rica, PLN/SI) has served as Vice President of Costa Rica (1994–98) and subsequently has held leadership positions in various international organisations, most recently as Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since 2021. In 2022, she played a key role in negotiating the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, which enabled the export of Ukrainian agricultural products to prevent a global food crisis. Grynspan was nominated by her home country, Costa Rica.	Rebeca Grynspan.
Rafael Grossi (b. 1961, Argentina, independent) is an Argentine diplomat who has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2019. Given that nuclear issues have played a role in many major contemporary political conflicts, this position has already given him several opportunities to act as a mediator at the global scale. Grossi was nominated by the government of his home country, Argentina.	Rafael Grossi.
Virginia Gamba (b. 1954, Argentina, independent) has had a long career as a UN official, most recently serving as the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict (2017–25). She was nominated by the Maldives, making her the only candidate to have the backing of a government from another continent.	Virginia Gamba.
Macky Sall (b. 1961, Senegal, APR/LI) has served as his country’s Prime Minister (2004–07) and President (2012–24). As a male candidate from outside Latin America with mostly national-level political experience, his chances of success are rather slim. Sall was nominated by Burundi, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the African Union (AU). However, the AU has not officially endorsed his candidacy.	Macky Sall.

In addition to these already nominated candidates, other prominent names are often mentioned as potential contenders. These include, for example:

Jacinda Ardern (b. 1980, New Zealand, NZLP/PA) has served as her country’s prime minister from 2017 to 2023. The world’s youngest head of government at the time, she was regarded as a kind of global progressive icon. When she stepped down in 2023, many already speculated that a career at the UN might be her next move. However, her reputation as “the world’s anti-Trump” during her time in office is unlikely to help her in the UN Security Council.	Jacinda Ardern.
Amina Mohammed (b. 1961, Nigeria/UK, independent) has served as Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations since 2017. As an experienced figure within the UN system, she commands widespread respect. However, she too might face opposition in the Security Council, given, for example, her recent explicit condemnations of US violations of international law (“Yesterday it was Venezuela; tomorrow it may be Greenland”).	Amina Mohammed.
Vuk Jeremić (b. 1975, Serbia, Narodna/–) has served as Serbia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007–12), President of the UN General Assembly (2012–13), and leader of the small Serbian party Narodna (2017–23). He has already been a candidate in the 2016 Secretary-General election, receiving the second-highest number of support votes in the straw polls after António Guterres. At the time, his main strength was that he was considered a candidate who could be acceptable to both the West and Russia. Later, however, Jeremić increasingly adopted right-wing populist and Eurosceptic positions, explicitly opposing sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, it is doubtful that France or the UK would consider him a viable compromise candidate anymore.	Vuk Jeremić.
Kristalina Georgieva (b. 1953, Bulgaria, close to GERB/IDU) has served as a Member of the European Commission (2010–16), CEO of the World Bank (2017–19), and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (since 2019). Although she was considered a potential candidate in the 2016 UN Secretary-General election, she was only nominated by the Bulgarian government shortly before the final straw poll, by which time a consensus in favour of Guterres was already emerging. In her current role, she has expressed support for Ukraine and criticised the Trump administration, albeit from an economic-technocratic rather than a political perspective.	Kristalina Georgieva.

An opportunity to debate the future of the UN

Over the coming months, we will find out which of these candidates, or perhaps someone entirely different, will ultimately become the next Secretary-General. First, however, they will be invited to present their ideas for the United Nations during the hearings in April.

These hearings also provide an important opportunity for a broader public debate about the future of the UN. In light of the challenges currently facing the world, we should not let it pass us by.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Pictures: António Guterres: Xuthoria [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons; Michelle Bachelet: Lula Oficial [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Rebeca Grynspan: UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Rafael Grossi: IAEA Imagebank [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Virginia Gamba: Gov.pl [CC BY 3.0 PL], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Macky Sall: Prime Minister’s Office (GODL-India) [GODL-India], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Jacinta Ardern: Adam Chitayat [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Amina Mohammed: U.S. Department of State [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Vuk Jeremić: Južne vesti [CC BY 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Kristalina Georgieva: Xuthoria [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

Der globale Wahlkampf hat begonnen: Wer wird 2026 UN-Generalsekretär:in?

English

Von Manuel Müller

António Guterres blickt dem Ende seiner Amtszeit als UN-Generalsekretär entgegen. Wer wird ihm nachfolgen?

Es sind keine einfachen Zeiten für die Vereinten Nationen. Die Idee, durch Völkerrecht und globale Zusammenarbeit Frieden, Menschenrechte und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung zu fördern, ist zwar so gut wie eh und je. Doch die zentralen weltpolitischen Akteure haben sich zuletzt immer weiter von diesen Idealen entfernt: Drei der fünf ständigen Mitglieder des UN-Sicherheitsrats – Russland, China und die USA – verfolgen offen imperiale Strategien, deren Ziel nur die Ausweitung der eigenen Machtsphäre ist. Selbst in der EU, der mehr als jeder anderen Großmacht an der Verteidigung der liberalen Weltordnung liegt, halten manche in globalen Fragen Stärke für wichtiger als Recht.

Zugleich befindet sich die Demokratie weltweit in der Krise. In den USA kontrolliert seit 2025 eine autoritäre Rechtsaußen-Partei die Regierung, in Frankreich und Großbritannien – den beiden anderen ständigen Mitgliedern des Sicherheitsrats – droht bei den nationalen Wahlen 2027 bzw. 2029 Ähnliches. Derweil beschleunigt sich der Klimawandel; die weltweite Entwicklungshilfe erfährt drastische Kürzungen; das Ausmaß an Zwangsmigration befindet sich auf einem globalen Rekordhoch; die Vereinten Nationen selbst durchleben eine existenzielle Finanzkrise, weil reiche Mitgliedstaaten ihre Beiträge nicht bezahlen. Und 2030 laufen auch noch die Sustainable Development Goals aus und müssen durch einen neuen entwicklungspolitischen Handlungsrahmen ersetzt werden.

Genau der richtige Moment also, um den „unmöglichsten Job der Welt“ neu zu besetzen: Im Herbst 2026 wählen die Vereinten Nationen eine neue Generalsekretär:in.

Die Persönlichkeit spielt eine wichtige Rolle

Der Chefposten der globalen Exekutive ist das höchstrangige Amt, das die Weltgemeinschaft zu vergeben hat. Doch die Generalsekretär:in hat zwar großen Einfluss, aber nur wenig formale Macht. Ihr Erfolg ist deshalb stark von anderen Akteur:innen, speziell den Regierungen der großen Mitgliedstaaten, abhängig. Zugleich spielt auch die Persönlichkeit der Amtsträger:in selbst eine wichtige Rolle. Während einige frühere Generalsekretäre wie Dag Hammarskjöld (Schweden, parteilos, 1953-61) oder Kofi Annan (Ghana, parteilos, 1997-2006) wichtige weltpolitische Veränderungen anstießen, blieben andere farblos wie Ban Ki-moon (Südkorea, parteilos, 2007-16) oder scheiterten mit ihren Ambitionen am Unwillen der Mitgliedstaaten wie Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Ägypten, NDP/SI, 1992-96).

Der derzeitige Generalsekretär António Guterres (Portugal, PS/SI-PA, seit 2017) war der erste ehemalige nationale Regierungschef auf dieser Position. Während seiner Amtszeit setzte er einige wichtige Impulse für Reformen des UN-Systems, insbesondere die 2025 verabschiedete UN80-Initiative. Angesichts der globalen Herausforderungen bemühte er sich zunächst, durch „stille Diplomatie“ Konsens zu bilden, was ihm Kritik von Menschenrechtsorganisationen einbrachte. Erst angesichts des russischen Überfalls auf die Ukraine und der israelischen Kriegführung in Gaza fand er auch in der Öffentlichkeit deutlichere Worte.

Wirklich verhindern konnte Guterres die Eskalation der weltpolitischen Lage und die zunehmende Marginalisierung der Vereinten Nationen nicht. Aber natürlich ist es schwer zu sagen, um wie viel schlimmer es ohne ihn noch hätte kommen können. Kann seine Nachfolger:in erfolgreicher sein? Und wie findet man überhaupt eine Person, die dafür geeignet ist?

Das Wahlverfahren

Das Wahlverfahren für die UN-Generalsekretär:in war lange Zeit kaum geregelt. Art. 97 UN-Charta legt lediglich fest, dass sie „auf Empfehlung des Sicherheitsrats von der Generalversammlung ernannt“ wird. In der Praxis lag die eigentliche Auswahl dabei stets beim Sicherheitsrat, in dem eine Mehrheit von 9 der 15 Mitglieder nötig ist. Die zehn nicht-ständigen Mitglieder (derzeit Dänemark, Griechenland, Lettland, Pakistan, Bahrain, die Demokratische Republik Kongo, Somalia, Liberia, Kolumbien und Panama) haben dabei nur eine einfache Stimme, die fünf ständigen Mitglieder hingegen ein Vetorecht. Entscheidend ist deshalb vor allem, ob sich die USA, China, Russland, Großbritannien und Frankreich auf einen gemeinsamen Namen einigen können.

Um das Bewerberfeld auszudünnen, führt der Sicherheitsrat traditionell zunächst Probeabstimmungen durch. Diese straw polls sind anonym (und offiziell nicht-öffentlich, wobei die Ergebnisse in der Praxis stets geleakt werden) und werden so lange wiederholt, bis sich ein ausreichender Konsens für einen Namen abzeichnet. Erst dann findet eine offene Abstimmung statt. Die Generalversammlung nickt die auf diese Weise gefundene Kompromisskandidat:in dann traditionell nur noch ab – schon um eine institutionelle Blockade zu verhindern.

Die Reforminitiative von 2016

Mit ihrer Konsensorientierung, ihrer Geheimniskrämerei, ihrer Exklusivität und ihrer Neigung zu langwierigen Blockaden ist diese Prozedur immer wieder mit dem Konklave zur Papstwahl verglichen worden. Vor der Generalsekretärswahl 2016 gab es deshalb eine Initiative, um das Verfahren zu reformieren. Wenn schon nicht so demokratisch wie das zwei Jahre zuvor eingeführte Spitzenkandidatensystem zur Wahl der EU-Kommissionspräsident:in, so sollte die Wahl der UN-Generalsekretär:in doch wenigstens etwas transparenter und inklusiver werden.

Der wichtigste Träger jener Initiative – die damals auch auf diesem Blog mehrfach Thema war – war die Kampagne 1for7billion, die unter anderem das World Federalist Movement und die United Nations Association UK vereinigte. Unterstützung erfuhr sie auch in der UN-Generalversammlung selbst, insbesondere von der reformorientierten ACT-Gruppe sowie den Blockfreien Staaten.

Debatten in die Öffentlichkeit ziehen

Zentrales Ziel der Kampagne war, dass die Mitgliedstaaten Kandidat:innen für den Generalsekretärsposten bereits vorab nominieren sollten. In öffentlichen Anhörungen sollten diese dann ihre Ideen und Ziele vorstellen. Das sollte die Diskussion über die geeignetste Kandidat:in aus den diplomatischen Hinterzimmern in die Öffentlichkeit ziehen – und indirekt Druck auf die Sicherheitsratsmitglieder ausüben, sich nicht nur auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner zu einigen.

Als noch weitergehende Vorschläge forderte die Kampagne zudem, dass der Sicherheitsrat nicht nur eine, sondern mehrere Kandidat:innen vorschlagen sollte, sodass die eigentliche Entscheidung zwischen ihnen erst in der Generalversammlung fallen würde. Um die Generalsekretär:in von den Mitgliedstaaten unabhängiger zu machen, sollte außerdem die Amtszeit von fünf auf sieben Jahre verlängert werden und die Möglichkeit einer Wiederwahl entfallen.

Lässt sich der 2016 erreichte Standard verstetigen?

In der Praxis wurde 2016 nur der erste Teil dieser Forderungen – die Vorabnominierung von Kandidat:innen und eine Art öffentlicher Wahlkampf zwischen ihnen – umgesetzt. Die Hoffnungen auf eine breite Debatte in der Generalversammlung blieben hingegen unerfüllt. Die entscheidende Rolle spielten weiterhin die straw polls im UN-Sicherheitsrat. Immerhin aber war das Verfahren, das 2016 zur Ernennung von António Guterres führte, jedenfalls strukturierter und transparenter als je zuvor.

Guterres’ Wiederwahl 2021 erfolgte ohne offizielle Gegenkandidat:innen und damit nahezu ohne öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit. Die jetzt anstehende Wahl ist hingegen wieder ein offenes Rennen – und damit ein neuer Testlauf für das reformierte Verfahren. Hoffnungen, dass es große weitere Fortschritte zu mehr Transparenz und Inklusivität gibt, macht sich angesichts der Weltlage wohl kaum jemand. Immerhin aber gibt es Hoffnung, den 2016 erreichten Standard zu verstetigen und damit zur neuen Norm zu machen.

Das Verfahren 2026

Das stärkste institutionelle Interesse daran hat die UN-Generalversammlung, die auch tatsächlich bereits das Heft des Handelns an sich gezogen hat. In ihrer im September 2025 verabschiedeten Resolution 79/327 (Nr. 42) legte sie einen detaillierten Verfahrensvorschlag vor:

• Offiziell eröffnet wurde das Verfahren im November 2025 durch ein gemeinsames Schreiben der Präsident:innen der UN-Generalversammlung, Annalena Baerbock (Deutschland, Grüne/GG), und des UN-Sicherheitsrats, Imran Kanu (Sierra Leone, parteilos).
• Im zweiten Schritt können nun alle UN-Mitgliedstaaten Kandidat:innen nominieren. Jede Regierung kann dabei maximal eine Kandidat:in ins Rennen schicken, wobei es sich nicht notwendigerweise um eine Staatsbürger:in des eigenen Landes handeln muss. Es ist auch möglich, dass mehrere Länder eine gemeinsame Kandidat:in nominieren. Während des gesamten Verfahrens können Regierungen ihre Nominierung jederzeit wieder zurückziehen. Die Kandidat:in scheidet dadurch automatisch aus – außer natürlich, sie hat noch die Unterstützung eines anderen Landes.
• Bei der Nominierung müssen die Kandidat:innen einen Lebenslauf, ein vision statement sowie eine Übersicht ihrer Finanzierungsquellen einreichen, die auf der UN-Website veröffentlicht werden.
• Ab April 2026 wird die Generalversammlung „informelle Anhörungen“ der bis dahin nominierten Kandidat:innen durchführen, bei denen voraussichtlich auch zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen werden Fragen stellen können. Die Teilnahme der Kandidat:innen ist freiwillig.
• Ab Juli wird dann der UN-Sicherheitsrat mit seinen straw polls beginnen. Er ist dabei rechtlich nicht an das Verfahren der Generalversammlung gebunden – theoretisch könnte er auch einen vollkommen neuen Namen ins Spiel bringen. Praktisch dürfte das aber allenfalls dann passieren, wenn sämtliche Kandidat:innen, die sich in der Generalversammlung vorgestellt haben, dauerhaft am Veto eines der ständigen Mitglieder scheitern.
• Gibt es keine größeren Blockaden, wird das Verfahren wohl im Herbst 2026 mit dem offiziellen Vorschlag des Sicherheitsrats und der Wahl in der Generalversammlung abgeschlossen. Die Amtszeit der neuen Generalsekretär:in beginnt dann am 1. Januar 2027.

Gesucht: eine lateinamerikanische Frau mit UN-Erfahrung

Wie sähe die ideale Generalsekretär:in aus? Formale Anforderungen an eine Kandidatur gibt es zwar nicht, doch von verschiedenen Seiten werden Wünsche und Forderungen an das Profil der nächsten Amtsträger:in geäußert.

Unverzichtbar ist natürlich internationale Erfahrung. Die bisherigen Generalsekretäre waren in der Regel ehemalige nationale Spitzendiplomaten, häufig Außenminister. Kofi Annan war langjähriger UN-Beamter, António Guterres war der erste ehemalige nationale Regierungschef. Auch sein:e Nachfolger:in sollte vergleichbares politisches Gewicht besitzen. Gleichzeitig darf sie aber natürlich in ihrer früheren Karriere keine der UN-Vetomächte dauerhaft verärgert haben.

Ein wichtiges Kriterium ist zudem die regionale Herkunft. Nach den informellen Gepflogenheiten rotiert der UN-Spitzenposten zwischen den Kontinenten; genaue Regeln gibt es dafür aber nicht. Da Osteuropa als einzige regionale Gruppe der UN noch niemals eine Generalsekretär:in gestellt hat, gab es 2016 besonders viele osteuropäische Kandidat:innen – letztlich einigte man sich aber auf den Westeuropäer Guterres. Für 2026 wird nun erwartet, dass nach Afrika (Annan), Asien (Ban) und Europa (Guterres) wieder Lateinamerika an der Reihe ist, das zuletzt 1982-91 mit Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru, parteilos) einen UN-Generalsekretär gestellt hat.

Und schließlich spielt auch das Geschlecht eine Rolle: Nach neun männlichen Generalsekretären ist für viele nun endlich die Zeit für die erste Frau im Amt gekommen. Eine weibliche Generalsekretärin ist etwa eine zentrale Forderung der Kampagne 1for8billion, der Nachfolgerin der Reforminitiative von 2016. Auch Annalena Baerbock als Präsidentin der Generalversammlung hat sich deutlich für die Nominierung weiblicher Kandidatinnen ausgesprochen. Und auch viele Regierungen unterstützen diese Forderung – neben den EU-Ländern beispielsweise auch Brasilien, Mexiko, Namibia, die Mitglieder der ACT-Gruppe sowie die Blockfreien Staaten. Hingegen hat sich allerdings die russische Regierung explizit dagegen ausgesprochen, das Geschlecht der Generalsekretär:in zu einem „entscheidenden Kriterium“ zu machen.

Die Kandidat:innen

Und wer wird es nun? Die Website von 1for8billion bietet eine laufend aktualisierte Übersicht über die bereits offiziell nominierten Kandidat:innen und andere mögliche Bewerber:innen. Formell im Rennen sind bislang:

Michelle Bachelet (*1951, Chile, PS/SI-PA) hat als frühere chilenische Staatspräsidentin (2006-10, 2014-18), Gründungsdirektorin von UN Women (2010-13) und UN-Hochkommissarin für Menschenrechte (2018-22) das größte politische Gewicht unter den bisherigen Kandidat:innen. Zudem genießt sie die Unterstützung von gleich drei Mitgliedstaaten: Außer von ihrem Herkunftsland Chile wurde sie auch von Brasilien und Mexiko nominiert. Womöglich ist ihr Profil allerdings zu progressiv für die Vetomächte im Sicherheitsrat – immerhin hat sie in den letzten Jahren offene Kritik an Russland, China und US-Präsident Donald Trump (Rep./IDU) geübt.	Michelle Bachelet.
Rebeca Grynspan (*1955, Costa Rica, PLN/SI) war Vizepräsidentin von Costa Rica (1994-98) und hatte danach Leitungspositionen in verschiedenen internationalen Organisationen, zuletzt seit 2021 als Generalsekretärin der UN-Handels- und Entwicklungsorganisation UNCTAD. Unter anderem spielte sie 2022 eine wichtige Rolle bei der Aushandlung des russisch-ukrainischen Getreideabkommens, die den Export ukrainischer Agrarprodukte ermöglichte, um eine globale Nahrungsmittelkrise zu verhindern. Nominiert wurde sie von ihrem Herkunftsland Costa Rica.	Rebeca Grynspan.
Rafael Grossi (*1961, Argentinien, parteilos) ist argentinischer Diplomat und seit 2019 Generaldirektor der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde IAEA – eine Rolle, in der er sich bei den großen politischen Konflikten der Gegenwart schon jetzt immer wieder um eine Vermittlungsrolle bemüht. Er wurde von der Regierung seines Herkunftslands Argentinien nominiert.	Rafael Grossi.
Virginia Gamba (*1954, Argentinien, parteilos) blickt auf eine lange Karriere als UN-Beamtin zurück, zuletzt als UN-Sonderbeauftragte für Kinder und bewaffnete Konflikte (2017-25). Nominiert wurde sie von den Malediven; damit hat sie als einzige Kandidatin die Unterstützung einer Regierung von einem anderen Kontinent.	Virginia Gamba.
Macky Sall (*1961, Senegal, APR/LI) war senegalesischer Premierminister (2004-07) und Präsident (2012-24), dürfte als Mann aus einem nicht-lateinamerikanischen aber ein Außenseiter-Kandidat sein. Nominiert wurde er von Burundi, das aktuell den Vorsitz in der Afrikanischen Union (AU) innehat. Offiziell unterstützt wird Sall von der AU jedoch nicht.	Macky Sall.

Neben diesen bereits nominierten Kandidat:innen werden immer wieder noch weitere prominente Namen gehandelt. Dazu zählen zum Beispiel:

Jacinda Ardern (*1980, Neuseeland, NZLP/PA) war 2017-23 Premierministerin ihres Landes. Als seinerzeit jüngste Regierungschefin der Welt galt sie als eine Art globale progressive Ikone, und schon bei ihrem Rücktritt 2023 spekulierten viele mit einer UN-Karriere als nächstem Schritt. Dass sie während ihrer Regierungszeit auch als „anti-Trump“ bekannt war, dürfte ihr im UN-Sicherheitsrat allerdings kaum helfen.	Jacinda Ardern.
Amina Mohammed (*1961, Nigeria/Großbritannien, parteilos) ist seit 2017 stellvertretende UN-Generalsekretärin und genießt als eine erfahrene Akteur:in im UN-System breite Anerkennung. Allerdings kritisierte sie zuletzt ausdrücklich die US-Völkerrechtsverletzungen („Gestern war es Venezuela, morgen könnte es Grönland sein“).	Amina Mohammed.
Vuk Jeremić (*1975, Serbien, Narodna/–) war nationaler Außenminister (2007-12), Präsident der UN-Generalversammlung (2012-13) sowie Chef der serbischen Kleinpartei Narodna (2017-23). Jeremić war bereits Kandidat bei der Generalsekretärswahl 2016 und erzielte in den straw polls die zweithöchsten Werte hinter Guterres. Insbesondere galt er damals als Kandidat, der sowohl für den Westen als auch für Russland akzeptabel sein könnte. Später vertrat Jeremić allerdings zunehmend rechtspopulistische und EU-skeptische Positionen; nach dem russischen Überfalls auf die die Ukraine lehnte er Sanktionen explizit ab. Ob er für Frankreich oder Großbritannien damit immer noch als mögliche Kompromisslösung in Frage käme, ist fraglich.	Vuk Jeremić.
Kristalina Georgieva (*1953, Bulgarien, GERB/IDU-nah) war Mitglied der EU-Kommission (2010-16), Präsidentin der Weltbank (2017-19) sowie Direktorin des Internationalen Währungsfonds (seit 2019). Schon bei der UN-Generalsekretärswahl 2016 galt sie als mögliche Kandidatin, wurde von der bulgarischen Regierung allerdings erst kurz vor dem letzten straw poll nachnominiert, als sich bereits ein Konsens für Guterres abzeichnete. In ihrer aktuellen Funktion hat sie Sympathien für die Ukraine gezeigt und die Trump-Regierung kritisiert – allerdings jeweils eher aus einer ökonomisch-technokratischen als einer politischen Warte.	Kristalina Georgieva.

Eine Chance für die Debatte über die Zukunft der UN

Wer von diesen Kandidat:innen – oder ob vielleicht doch jemand ganz anderes – am Ende wirklich UN-Generalsekretär:in wird, werden die nächsten Monate zeigen. Erst einmal aber werden im April die Anhörungen beginnen, bei denen sie ihre Ideen für die Vereinten Nationen darlegen können.

Diese Anhörungen sind auch eine Chance für die breitere öffentliche Debatte über die Zukunft der UN. Gerade angesichts der Herausforderungen, vor denen die Welt gerade steht, sollten wir sie uns nicht entgehen lassen.

Manuel Müller ist Europawissenschaftler und Herausgeber des Blogs „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Bilder: António Guterres: Xuthoria [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons; Michelle Bachelet: Lula Oficial [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Rebeca Grynspan: UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Rafael Grossi: IAEA Imagebank [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Virginia Gamba: Gov.pl [CC BY 3.0 PL], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Macky Sall: Prime Minister's Office (GODL-India) [GODL-India], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Jacinta Ardern: Adam Chitayat [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Amina Mohammed: U.S. Department of State [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Vuk Jeremić: Južne vesti [CC BY 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Kristalina Georgieva: Xuthoria [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); Porträt Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

Freedom vs tyranny? On the European reactions to the US war of aggression against Iran

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

Pedro Sánchez was the only European head of government to clearly call out the US attack on Iran as a violation of international law.

Less than two months after the US, in violation of international law, invaded Venezuela in order to kidnap President Nicolás Maduro (PSUV/–), it has now, again in violation of international law, launched a war of aggression against Iran together with Israel. In both cases, the reaction of the EU was conspicuously restrained: It voiced “concern”, called for de-escalation, and demanded the protection of the protection of civilians. However, it did not explicitly condemn the US attacks in either case.

The individual member states reacted in similar ways. The German federal government under Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP), for example, explicitly addressed international law in both cases – but only to emphasize its alleged “complexity” and avoid making a “final assessment”. The only exception was Spain, whose head of government, Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/PES), left no doubt about his rejection of the American-Israeli attack – whereupon US President Donald Trump (Rep./IDU) threatened Spain with a trade embargo.

Hesitating to confront the USA

The fact that, besides Malta and Slovenia, Spain is the only EU member state with a centre-left government, and that the conservative opposition leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo (PP/EPP) promptly criticized Sánchez’s stance, suggests that there is also a party-political dimension to Spain’s special role.

But why is it so difficult for most EU countries to find a clear response to the US actions in Venezuela and Iran? One obvious reason is that Europe remains heavily dependent on the US for security. Even though the Trump administration is very open about its hostility towards the EU, European countries feel too weak to openly criticise their former NATO ally on global political issues.

International law, but not for everyone?

Beyond this evasive attitude, however, there is also a significant section of the European public that clearly sympathises with American actions. After all, wasn’t Maduro an authoritarian ruler who only managed to stay in power by rigging elections? And doesn’t the Iranian regime have a decades-long history of human rights violations, culminating in the recent massacre of tens of thousands of its own citizens? Shouldn’t we show solidarity with the Iranians who after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took to the streets in celebration?

In the words of German right-wing commentator Jan Fleischhauer, international law would become a “joke” if it protected “blood-suckers” like Khamenei. The far more moderate Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen (Kok./EPP) called the Iranian dictatorship “a shackle on its own citizens” and Khamenei’s death “a window for long-awaited change”. In the German Bundestag, CSU/EPP politician Alexander Hoffmann declared that international law could be “of the utmost importance to us, but it must not become a terror clause for terrorist regimes”. And Alberto Núñez Feijóo summed up the Iran question in one simple choice: “For freedom or for the tyrants.”

Dilemma between democracy and the ban on aggression?

At its core, this argument revisits an old debate about the relative importance of democracy and human rights on the one hand, and principles such as state sovereignty and the prohibition of wars of aggression on the other.

Established international law provides a clear, albeit unsatisfactory, answer to this question. On the one hand, democracy and human rights are enshrined in international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as numerous regional agreements. On the other hand, it offers little scope for direct action if governments fail to comply.

“Responsibility to protect” – but only with a UN mandate

True: The concept of the “responsibility to protect”, developed by the United Nations in the early 2000s, relativised the absolute sovereignty of states, behind which authoritarian regimes had long been able to hide. It permits external armed intervention in extreme situations, such as genocide or crimes against humanity – a threshold that Iran may have crossed.

In any case, however, such interventions require a mandate from the UN Security Council, a body that regularly includes authoritarian regimes with no interest at all in protecting human rights. Russia and China even have permanent seats with veto power. Therefore all Iran had to do to prevent Security Council action was to secure Russia’s support, which it did, among other things, by supplying combat drones for Russia’s own war of aggression against Ukraine.

The “liberal interventionism” of the 1990s

Thus, discussions about whether armed action might be legitimate without a UN mandate have been ongoing in Western democracies since the 1990s. The prime example of such a constellation is the Kosovo War of 1999, which was justified as the prevention of a genocide against the Kosovo-Albanian population.

This “liberal interventionism” was also fuelled by the belief that, following the end of the Cold War, democracy would soon become the dominant form of government worldwide. Although serious human rights violations continued to occur, they appeared to stem only from individual authoritarian leaders. It therefore seemed reasonable to hope that these violations could be gradually eliminated, either peacefully or through armed intervention, in order to ultimately achieve lasting democratic peace.

Democracy on the defensive

In practice, liberal interventionism was quickly discredited by the neoconservative foreign policy of the US administration under George W. Bush (Rep./IDU), which used the spread of democracy as an excuse to disregard international law and the United Nations also in pursuit of other foreign policy interests. The numerous falsehoods used to justify the 2003 Iraq War, in particular, led to a massive loss of credibility that even subsequent Democratic US administrations under Barack Obama and Joe Biden (both Dem./PA) were unable to fully compensate for.

In addition, democracy has come under increasing pressure worldwide, both internally due to the rise of right-wing extremist parties and externally due to the strengthening of authoritarian great powers. Rather than on liberal interventions, the debate in recent years has centred on how to safeguard the liberal order against the imperial ambitions of states such as Russia and China.

Paradoxical lessons from the Russian aggression of 2022

In this context, a key shock moment for the EU was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It led the European public to learn two somewhat paradoxical lessons: On the one hand, Europeans rediscovered the importance of national sovereignty under international law as a protective mechanism against authoritarian expansionism and attempts to exert influence. The fact that the Russian invasion had violated the ban on wars of aggression was the West’s main argument when seeking support for Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly.

On the other hand, growing global competition between democratic and authoritarian regimes also led to an increasing willingness among Europeans to openly confront systemic conflicts, if necessary even by military means. As early as 2019, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) had called on Europe to learn the “language of power”. Ukraine’s experience in 2022 then demonstrated to all EU countries that the survival of a democracy can sometimes depend on the strength of its weapons.

International law as an obstacle in a global systemic conflict?

This perspective, however, has an inherent tendency to blur boundaries: If an armed global systemic conflict is deemed to be inevitable, the question immediately arises as to whether it should also be proactively waged and, if necessary, escalated. The various armed disputes of the present then no longer appear as individual conflicts, but rather as a kind of global civil war between democratic and authoritarian actors. In that vein, numerous European politicians recently pointed to Iran’s drone deliveries to Russia as an argument to justify the military strikes of the US.

From this perspective, international law, which is designed to contain conflicts, can easily become “annoying” – as the newly elected Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten (D66/ALDE) put it – if it acts as an obstacle to democracies and thereby gives an advantage to authoritarian regimes. Even if they do not openly approve, many Europeans seem to respect and secretly admire the American and Israeli governments’ demonstrations of power. After all, as Friedrich Merz said regarding the 2025 Israeli attack on Iran, they are “doing the dirty work for us”.

But does this ambivalence toward international law really correspond to Europe’s values and interests? In my view, there are four main points that argue against it.

Violence is always violence

Firstly, violence always remains violence. It is no coincidence that the UN Charter begins with the desire “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which […] has brought untold sorrow to mankind”. While some in Iran rejoiced at the dictator’s death, others mourned the more than 160 civilian casualties killed in the bombing of a primary school – probably a mistake in target selection, but mistakes of this kind are a common occurrence in armed attacks.

The victims of war cannot be ignored any more than the victims of dictatorship. While military strikes may sometimes be necessary to prevent serious human rights violations, there are good reasons why international law restricts their use. And granted, the UN Security Council is dysfunctional, particularly with regard to the veto power of the five permanent members. But a world in which each state decides for itself whether and when a war of aggression is justified would hardly be a safer place.

Military interventions rarely truly lead to democracy

Secondly, the track record of liberal interventionism is poor. The major military interventions by Western states since the turn of the millennium – in addition to Iraq in 2003, this includes, for example, Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011 – have usually not resulted in the establishment of stable democracies, but rather in years of civil war.

Democratization processes take time and require intensive and sustained civil support. The US under Donald Trump has obviously no interest in providing this: By closing the national development aid agency USAID, the Trump administration has destroyed its most important instrument for promoting democracy abroad. In Venezuela, the US has come to terms with Maduro’s successor, Delcy Rodríguez (PSUV/–), whose regime is just as authoritarian as her predecessor’s. And in Iran, Trump recently announced that he wants to choose the next leader himself.

The Trump administration is not fighting for democracy

Thirdly, this also makes it obvious that the simple good-versus-evil paradigm used by Alberto Núñez Feijóo and others is not helpful in today’s world. For many Europeans, particularly within the conservative camp, the threat posed by Russia stirs up memories of the Cold War, when the transatlantic alliance was considered vital to the survival of the democratic West.

But Western democracy today is under threat not only from outside forces, but also from within. Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud/IDU), in particular, clearly harbour authoritarian ambitions in their domestic policies. And the threats against Canada and Greenland should have been the last wake-up call for everyone in Europe to realise that also Trump’s foreign policy follows a neo-imperial pattern that is not aimed at spreading democracy, but at US dominance over other states.

Of course, the US is not yet a stable dictatorship like the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, this war is not about “freedom versus tyranny”, but rather the aggression of one authoritarian actor against another.

The EU’s credibility is at stake

And this, fourthly, also puts the EU’s own global credibility as a pro-democratic actor at stake. In view of the global systemic conflict, it has often been argued that the EU must strengthen its relations with democratic states in the Global South – countries such as Brazil, which share Europe’s fundamental political values while also offering significant potential for economic cooperation.

From bitter experience, many of these countries place great importance on the ban of aggressive warfare in international law, while also being extremely wary of imperial ambitions by Western states. In addition, they are often sceptical of the traditional “liberal world order”, which has entrenched significant economic, social and political inequalities on a global scale.

While they almost unanimously rejected Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the conflict is more distant for them and therefore does not carry the same existential significance as it does for Europe. In particular, they do not see it as a reason to disregard legal boundaries and turn a blind eye to American or Israeli violations of international law simply because they were committed “for us”.

Do not encourage global nihilism

For the EU to be able to stand up for its values on a global level, it is essential that it remains credible among these democratic partners. The fact that most European countries (again with the exception of Spain) have cut back on their development aid in recent years is already a serious problem.

It would be even more disastrous if European governments were now to give the impression that they are also applying double standards to fundamental norms of international law, such as the ban on wars of aggression. What is at stake here is not only Europe’s influence in global politics and the willingness of the Global South to continue supporting Ukraine. If EU states undermine international law, they encourage a global nihilism that skilled authoritarian regimes such as China will exploit to their advantage. Ultimately, this will jeopardise the cause of democracy itself.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Pictures: Pedro Sánchez: Finnish Government [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].