Europe’s climate crossroads: Why Germany must reclaim its role in the European energy transition

Deutsch

By Claudia Kemfert

The decisive question is not whether Europe can afford to accelerate decarbonisation, but how much economic and geopolitical vulnerability it is willing to accept by delaying it.

Ten years after the Paris Agreement entered into force, European climate policy faces a fundamental contradiction: The European Union has strengthened its long-term climate commitments, yet national governments increasingly question the instruments required to meet them. Germany exemplifies this tension. While maintaining ambitious emissions targets, it risks prolonging fossil fuel dependence through additional gas infrastructure, uncertainty over renewable energy support and insufficient progress in transport and buildings. Such inconsistencies undermine investment certainty, increase long-term economic costs and weaken Europe’s geopolitical position.

The central economic challenge is not the availability of clean technologies but the coordination of infrastructure, investment and regulation. Renewable energy, electrification, storage and digitalised networks can reduce import dependence while strengthening industrial competitiveness. However, their benefits depend on coherent policy frameworks and European market integration. In view of the COP31 conference, Germany should therefore promote an EU strategy that connects credible emissions reductions with energy security, industrial transformation and social resilience.

Ten years after Paris

The Paris Agreement fundamentally changed expectations about the future of the global energy system. Since its entry into force in November 2016, renewable energy technologies have become economically competitive, investments in clean energy have expanded and climate neutrality has become an established objective of European economic policy.

Nevertheless, current global emission pathways remain far from consistent with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals. A temporary exceedance of 1.5°C is increasingly difficult to avoid, making rapid emission reductions all the more urgent to limit the extent and duration of overshoot.

Geopolitical conflicts, inflationary pressures and concerns about industrial competitiveness have reinforced political demands to slow down the transformation. Yet delaying decarbonisation does not eliminate its costs; it redistributes and increases them. Continued investment in fossil fuel infrastructure creates financial risks when utilisation declines, while postponing electrification prolongs exposure to international fuel price volatility. Climate-related damages, meanwhile, place growing pressure on public budgets, infrastructure and economic productivity.

The costs of climate policy inconsistency

This contradiction is particularly evident in Europe. The EU has adopted a legally binding objective of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by 90 percent by 2040 compared with 1990 levels, complementing its target of at least 55 percent by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050. However, achieving these targets requires substantial additional investment in electricity grids, renewable generation, industrial processes, heating and mobility.

Weakening the regulatory conditions for such investments while maintaining the targets creates uncertainty rather than flexibility. The economic consequences extend beyond emissions: Firms postpone investment decisions, financing costs increase, and infrastructure development becomes misaligned with future demand. Climate policy credibility therefore depends not merely on legislative ambition but on the consistency of the instruments used to deliver it.

Germany: Tension between climate commitments and energy policy

Germany illustrates the growing tension between long-term climate commitments and short-term energy policy. Under Germany’s Federal Climate Change Act, greenhouse gas emissions must decline by at least 65 percent by 2030 compared with 1990 levels, with net greenhouse gas neutrality to be achieved by 2045 (§3 Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz). These nationally binding targets operate within the broader framework of the Paris Agreement and EU climate legislation. 

According to the German Environment Agency’s 2026 projections, however, existing measures would deliver a reduction of only 62.6 percent by 2030, leaving a gap of approximately 30 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalents. Transport and buildings remain major sources of emissions, while investment uncertainty threatens progress in both sectors. The challenge is not a lack of viable alternatives: Heat pumps, electric vehicles, renewable electricity and efficiency technologies are commercially available. Rather, policy incentives, infrastructure provision and long-term investment requirements remain insufficiently aligned.

Managing dependencies instead of reducing them

German energy policy also risks drawing the wrong conclusions from recent geopolitical crises. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the economic and political consequences of dependence on imported fossil fuels. The subsequent diversification of gas supplies improved short-term security, but did not resolve the structural vulnerability. Liquefied natural gas remains internationally traded, price-sensitive and exposed to geopolitical disruptions. Replacing dependence on one supplier with dependence on multiple suppliers may reduce concentration risks, but it does not eliminate fossil fuel price risks.

Additional investments in gas infrastructure therefore require careful scrutiny of future demand, utilisation and compatibility with climate targets. Otherwise, consumers and taxpayers risk financing assets whose economic usefulness declines as electrification progresses.

A political, not a technological problem

The same problem arises in the electricity sector. An excessive focus on expanding gas-fired generation risks underestimating the contribution of batteries, demand-side flexibility, interconnections and decentralised renewable generation. Dispatchable capacity remains necessary, but its volume and technological composition should be determined by system-wide flexibility requirements rather than assumptions based on conventional electricity markets.

Germany’s priority should be to modernise and digitalise electricity networks, accelerate smart meter deployment, enable flexible consumption and remove regulatory barriers to storage and vehicle-to-grid applications. Without these changes, even inexpensive renewable electricity cannot realise its full economic value.

The underlying problem is therefore one of political and institutional coordination. Germany’s energy transition does not primarily suffer from a technology deficit. It suffers from inconsistent incentives, inadequate infrastructure planning and insufficient integration between electricity, heating, transport and industrial policy.

Energy sovereignty and industrial competitiveness are connected

Fossil fuel import dependence is not only a climate problem but also an economic vulnerability. Oil and gas prices transmit geopolitical disruptions directly to European households and companies, affecting production costs, purchasing power and inflation. A strategy based primarily on securing additional fossil fuel supplies leaves this transmission mechanism largely intact. 

By contrast, domestic renewable electricity and electrification reduce exposure to globally traded fuels. Heat pumps use energy substantially more efficiently than fossil fuel boilers, while electric vehicles require considerably less final energy than combustion-engine vehicles. These efficiency gains translate into lower structural energy demand and, over time, reduced import requirements.

Integrating the European electricity market

However, European energy sovereignty cannot be achieved through national self-sufficiency. Electricity markets benefit from cross-border interconnections, geographical diversity in renewable generation and shared flexibility resources. The economic value of renewable energy depends on the ability to transport electricity, shift consumption and integrate storage across regions. 

European electricity market integration is therefore not merely a question of efficiency but an instrument of strategic resilience. Coordinated grid expansion, digital infrastructure and common standards for flexibility can reduce system costs while limiting the need for additional fossil fuel backup capacity.

Weakening climate policy puts Europe’s industrial base at risk

Industrial competitiveness must be considered within this framework. The global shift towards low-carbon technologies is already reshaping investment patterns and industrial competition. According to the International Energy Agency, global clean energy investment is expected to reach approximately USD 2.2 trillion in 2026, nearly twice the investment in fossil fuels. For European industry, delaying electrification and clean technology deployment therefore risks losing competitiveness in rapidly expanding markets.

European companies require affordable electricity, reliable infrastructure and predictable regulatory conditions to invest in electrified industrial processes. Repeatedly questioning climate targets or weakening implementation instruments risks discouraging precisely those investments needed to preserve Europe’s industrial base.

The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal provides a framework for connecting industrial development and decarbonisation, but its effectiveness depends on concrete financing mechanisms, infrastructure investment and consistent implementation.

Public support should be targeted and avoid misincentives

Targeted public support can help overcome high initial investment costs, particularly in energy-intensive industries. However, support should be conditional on credible transformation pathways and should avoid perpetuating inefficient fossil fuel structures.

Renewable hydrogen, for example, should primarily be directed towards applications where direct electrification is difficult, including selected industrial processes. Similarly, carbon capture should focus on genuinely hard-to-abate residual emissions rather than legitimising continued fossil fuel use where economically viable alternatives exist. Strategic prioritisation is necessary because public financial resources, renewable electricity and infrastructure capacity are limited.

The political economy of a just transition

The economic benefits of decarbonisation do not automatically translate into political support. Households face different investment capacities, housing conditions and mobility constraints. Higher fossil fuel prices can therefore impose disproportionate burdens on people who lack affordable alternatives. The political challenge is to address these distributional effects without weakening the incentives needed for structural change.

General fuel subsidies and price caps are particularly problematic because their benefits increase with consumption and frequently favour higher-income households. Moreover, they encourage continued dependence on fossil fuels and place additional pressure on public budgets.

The Social Climate Fund

More effective instruments include targeted direct payments, investment support for efficient heating systems, affordable public transport and incentives for building renovation. Carbon pricing can contribute to efficient emissions reductions, provided revenues are redistributed fairly and viable alternatives become accessible.

The EU’s Social Climate Fund represents an opportunity to link emissions reductions with targeted social support. Its effectiveness will depend on whether national implementation prioritises structural improvements rather than temporary compensation alone. In Germany, this requires integrating housing, transport and energy policy more consistently. Social acceptance depends less on weakening climate objectives than on ensuring that households can participate in and benefit from the transition.

COP31: Five priorities for German and European climate leadership

The COP31 conference in Antalya takes place at a moment when the credibility of European climate policy depends increasingly on implementation. The EU’s international negotiating position will be weakened if ambitious targets coexist with policies that delay domestic transformation. Germany should therefore use the conference as an opportunity to promote a coherent European agenda rather than merely reaffirm existing commitments:

• First, safeguard the credibility of European climate legislation. The EU’s 2040 target requires predictable intermediate pathways, effective monitoring and credible national implementation. International carbon credits must not substitute for substantial emissions reductions within Europe. Germany should align sectoral policies and infrastructure planning with its own 2045 climate neutrality objective and support the implementation of existing EU legislation.
• Second, establish energy system flexibility as a European infrastructure priority. Grid modernisation, digitalisation, storage, demand response and cross-border interconnections should receive greater strategic attention. European coordination can lower system costs, improve security of supply and accelerate renewable integration. Regulatory frameworks must allow decentralised producers, consumers and storage operators to participate effectively in electricity markets.
• Third, reduce fossil fuel dependence through electrification rather than new long-term import commitments. Energy security policy should distinguish clearly between necessary short-term precautions and investments that risk creating fossil fuel lock-in. Gas infrastructure planning should reflect declining demand under credible climate pathways, while investment incentives should accelerate clean heating, electric mobility and industrial electrification.
• Fourth, mobilise targeted European investment for industrial decarbonization. The EU should strengthen the Innovation Fund and InvestEU and operationalise the proposed Industrial Decarbonisation Bank to accelerate industrial electrification, clean production technologies and energy efficiency. Public support should be conditional on credible emissions reduction pathways and complemented by investment in electricity grids and infrastructure. The objective must be to leverage private capital for structural transformation rather than subsidise continued fossil fuel dependence.
• Fifth, reinforce international climate cooperation through credible finance and partnerships. Europe’s responsibility extends beyond domestic emissions reductions. Cooperation with emerging and developing economies should support renewable energy deployment, technology transfer, adaptation and climate-resilient infrastructure. Financial commitments must be transparent and additional, with particular attention to countries facing high climate vulnerability and restricted access to investment capital.

The economic risk lies in delaying transformation

European climate policy is increasingly evaluated through the lenses of competitiveness, affordability and security. This is justified, but the resulting political conclusions are often misguided. Fossil fuel dependence exposes Europe to recurring price shocks, geopolitical risks and the prospect of stranded investments. Delaying de-carbonisation does not protect industrial competitiveness; it increases uncertainty and risks locking capital into technologies with declining economic prospects.

Germany’s principal challenge is to restore coherence between its climate objectives and its economic policy. The necessary technologies are available, but their successful deployment depends on coordinated investment in infrastructure, reliable regulation and socially balanced incentives. At the European level, integrated electricity markets, common infrastructure priorities and credible industrial transformation policies can generate benefits that fragmented national strategies cannot achieve.

COP31 should therefore mark a shift from debating climate ambition towards implementing an economically consistent transition strategy. The decisive question is no longer whether Europe can afford to accelerate decarbonisation, but how much economic and geopolitical vulnerability it is willing to accept by delaying it. Europe’s energy transition is not a trade-off between climate protection and prosperity. Properly designed, it is a prerequisite for long-term economic resilience and strategic sovereignty.

Claudia Kemfert heads the Department of Energy, Transport and the Environment at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) and is a professor of energy economics and energy policy at Leuphana University Lüneburg.

This article was first published in the Berlin Perspectives series of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) and has been slightly edited for publication on the blog.

The Berlin Perspectives series presents analyses of Germany’s European policy to an English-speaking audience. The authors analyse German positions on current topics and debates and provide policy recommendations based on their findings.

Pictures: Smoke stacks: Janusz Walczak [Unsplash license], via Unsplash; portrait Claudia Kemfert: DIW Berlin/Photothek [all rights reserved] (cropped).

Europas Klimapolitik am Scheideweg: Warum Deutschland seine Rolle in der europäischen Energiewende wieder stärken muss

English

Von Claudia Kemfert

Die entscheidende Frage lautet nicht, ob Europa sich eine beschleunigte Dekarbonisierung leisten kann, sondern wie viel wirtschaftliche und geopolitische Verwundbarkeit es durch weitere Verzögerungen in Kauf nehmen will.

Zehn Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des Pariser Klimaabkommens steht die europäische Klimapolitik vor einem grundlegenden Widerspruch. Die Europäische Union hat ihre langfristigen Klimaziele verschärft, während nationale Regierungen zunehmend die Instrumente infrage stellen, die zur Erreichung dieser Ziele notwendig sind.

Deutschland ist ein besonders deutliches Beispiel für diesen Widerspruch: Obwohl es an ambitionierten Emissionsminderungszielen festhält, droht es durch zusätzliche Gasinfrastruktur, Unsicherheiten bei der Förderung erneuerbarer Energien und unzureichende Fortschritte im Verkehrs- und Gebäudesektor seine Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energien zu verlängern. Diese Widersprüche gefährden die Investitionssicherheit, erhöhen langfristig die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten und schwächen Europas geopolitische Position.

Die zentrale wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderung liegt nicht in der Verfügbarkeit klimafreundlicher Technologien, sondern in der Abstimmung von Infrastruktur, Investitionen und Regulierung. Erneuerbare Energien, Elektrifizierung, Speicher und digitalisierte Netze können Importabhängigkeiten verringern und zugleich die industrielle Wettbewerbsfähigkeit stärken. Voraussetzung dafür sind jedoch verlässliche politische Rahmenbedingungen und ein integrierter europäischer Energiemarkt. Angesichts der 31. Weltklimakonferenz (COP31) sollte Deutschland deshalb eine europäische Strategie vorantreiben, die glaubwürdige Emissionsminderungen mit Energiesicherheit, industrieller Transformation und gesellschaftlicher Widerstandsfähigkeit verbindet.

Zehn Jahre nach Paris

Das Pariser Klimaabkommen hat die Erwartungen an die Zukunft des globalen Energiesystems grundlegend verändert. Seit seinem Inkrafttreten im November 2016 sind erneuerbare Energietechnologien wirtschaftlich wettbewerbsfähig geworden, die Investitionen in saubere Energien haben deutlich zugenommen, und Klimaneutralität ist zu einem festen Ziel europäischer Wirtschaftspolitik geworden.

Dennoch sind die gegenwärtigen globalen Emissionspfade weiterhin weit davon entfernt, mit den Temperaturzielen des Pariser Abkommens vereinbar zu sein. Eine vorübergehende Überschreitung der 1,5-Grad-Grenze lässt sich zunehmend schwer vermeiden. Umso dringlicher sind schnelle Emissionsminderungen, um Ausmaß und Dauer einer solchen Überschreitung möglichst gering zu halten.

Geopolitische Konflikte, Inflationsdruck und Sorgen um die industrielle Wettbewerbsfähigkeit haben politische Forderungen verstärkt, die Transformation zu verlangsamen. Doch eine verzögerte Dekarbonisierung beseitigt die damit verbundenen Kosten nicht, sondern verteilt sie um und erhöht sie. Weitere Investitionen in fossile Infrastruktur schaffen finanzielle Risiken, wenn deren Auslastung künftig sinkt. Gleichzeitig verlängert eine verzögerte Elektrifizierung die Abhängigkeit von schwankenden internationalen Preisen für fossile Energieträger. Hinzu kommen die wachsenden wirtschaftlichen Schäden des Klimawandels, die öffentliche Haushalte, Infrastruktur und wirtschaftliche Produktivität zunehmend belasten.

Die Kosten einer widersprüchlichen Klimapolitik

Besonders deutlich wird dieser Widerspruch in Europa. Die EU hat sich rechtlich verbindlich verpflichtet, ihre Netto-Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2040 um 90 Prozent gegenüber 1990 zu reduzieren. Dieses Ziel ergänzt die angestrebte Emissionsminderung um mindestens 55 Prozent bis 2030 und die Klimaneutralität bis 2050. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, sind allerdings erhebliche zusätzliche Investitionen in Stromnetze, erneuerbare Energien, industrielle Produktionsverfahren, Wärmeversorgung und Mobilität notwendig.

Werden die regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen für solche Investitionen geschwächt, während die Klimaziele unverändert bestehen bleiben, entsteht nicht mehr Flexibilität, sondern zusätzliche Unsicherheit. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen gehen weit über die Emissionsentwicklung hinaus: Unternehmen verschieben Investitionsentscheidungen, Finanzierungskosten steigen, und der Infrastrukturausbau orientiert sich nicht ausreichend am künftigen Bedarf. Die Glaubwürdigkeit der Klimapolitik hängt deshalb nicht allein von ehrgeizigen gesetzlichen Zielen ab, sondern vor allem davon, ob die eingesetzten Instrumente konsequent auf deren Erreichung ausgerichtet sind.

Deutschland: Klimapflichten und Energiepolitik im Widerspruch

Deutschland verdeutlicht den wachsenden Widerspruch zwischen langfristigen Klimaverpflichtungen und kurzfristiger Energiepolitik. Nach § 3 Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz müssen die Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2030 um mindestens 65 Prozent gegenüber 1990 sinken. Bis 2045 soll Netto-Treibhausgasneutralität erreicht werden. Diese national verbindlichen Ziele stehen im übergeordneten Rahmen des Pariser Klimaabkommens und des europäischen Klimarechts. 

Nach den Projektionen des Umweltbundesamtes aus dem Jahr 2026 würden die bisherigen Maßnahmen bis 2030 jedoch lediglich eine Emissionsminderung von 62,6 Prozent erreichen. Damit verbleibt eine Lücke von rund 30 Millionen Tonnen CO₂-Äquivalenten. Insbesondere der Verkehrs- und Gebäudesektor verursachen weiterhin erhebliche Emissionen, während Investitionsunsicherheit die notwendigen Fortschritte zusätzlich gefährdet. Dabei mangelt es keineswegs an geeigneten technischen Lösungen: Wärmepumpen, Elektrofahrzeuge, erneuerbarer Strom und Effizienztechnologien sind längst am Markt verfügbar. Das eigentliche Problem besteht darin, dass politische Anreize, Infrastrukturentwicklung und langfristige Investitionserfordernisse nicht ausreichend aufeinander abgestimmt sind.

Abhängigkeiten werden verwaltet, statt sie abzubauen

Zudem droht die deutsche Energiepolitik aus den jüngsten geopolitischen Krisen die falschen Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen. Der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine hat die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Folgen der Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energieimporten deutlich gemacht. Die anschließende Diversifizierung der Gaslieferungen hat zwar kurzfristig die Versorgungssicherheit verbessert, die grundlegende Verwundbarkeit jedoch nicht beseitigt.

Flüssigerdgas wird weiterhin auf internationalen Märkten gehandelt, unterliegt erheblichen Preisschwankungen und ist geopolitischen Störungen ausgesetzt. Die Abhängigkeit von einem einzelnen Lieferanten durch die Abhängigkeit von mehreren Lieferanten zu ersetzen, verringert zwar Konzentrationsrisiken, beseitigt jedoch nicht das Preisrisiko fossiler Energieträger.

Zusätzliche Investitionen in Gasinfrastruktur müssen deshalb sorgfältig im Hinblick auf den künftigen Bedarf, ihre Auslastung und ihre Vereinbarkeit mit den Klimazielen geprüft werden. Andernfalls drohen Verbraucher:innen und Steuerzahler:innen Anlagen zu finanzieren, deren wirtschaftlicher Nutzen im Zuge der Elektrifizierung immer weiter sinkt.

Ein politisches, kein technologisches Problem

Ein ähnliches Problem besteht im Stromsektor. Eine zu starke Konzentration auf den Ausbau der Stromerzeugung aus Erdgas droht die Möglichkeiten von Batteriespeichern, flexibler Stromnachfrage, europäischen Stromverbindungen und dezentralen erneuerbaren Energien zu unterschätzen. Auch künftig werden steuerbare Kapazitäten benötigt. Ihr Umfang und ihre technologische Zusammensetzung sollten sich jedoch am tatsächlichen Flexibilitätsbedarf des gesamten Energiesystems orientieren und nicht an überholten Annahmen konventioneller Strommärkte.

Vorrangig sollte Deutschland deshalb seine Stromnetze modernisieren und digitalisieren, den Einbau intelligenter Stromzähler beschleunigen, einen flexiblen Stromverbrauch ermöglichen und regulatorische Hindernisse für Speicher sowie für die Rückspeisung von Strom aus Elektrofahrzeugen ins Netz (Vehicle-to-Grid) beseitigen. Ohne diese Veränderungen kann selbst kostengünstiger erneuerbarer Strom seinen wirtschaftlichen Nutzen nicht vollständig entfalten.

Im Kern handelt es sich somit um ein politisches und institutionelles Koordinationsproblem. Die deutsche Energiewende leidet nicht in erster Linie unter einem Technologiedefizit, sondern unter widersprüchlichen Anreizen, unzureichender Infrastrukturplanung und einer mangelnden Abstimmung zwischen Strom-, Wärme-, Verkehrs- und Industriepolitik.

Energiesouveränität und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gehören zusammen

Die Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energieimporten ist nicht nur ein klimapolitisches Problem, sondern auch eine wirtschaftliche Schwachstelle. Schwankende Öl- und Gaspreise übertragen geopolitische Krisen unmittelbar auf europäische Haushalte und Unternehmen. Sie beeinflussen Produktionskosten, Kaufkraft und Inflation. Eine Strategie, die vor allem auf die Sicherung zusätzlicher fossiler Energielieferungen setzt, verändert diesen grundlegenden Zusammenhang kaum. 

Heimisch erzeugter erneuerbarer Strom und eine stärkere Elektrifizierung verringern dagegen die Abhängigkeit von global gehandelten Energieträgern. Wärmepumpen nutzen Energie deutlich effizienter als fossile Heizkessel, während Elektrofahrzeuge erheblich weniger Endenergie benötigen als vergleichbare Fahrzeuge mit Verbrennungsmotor. Diese Effizienzgewinne senken den strukturellen Energiebedarf und damit langfristig auch die notwendigen Energieimporte.

Integration der europäischen Strommärkte

Europäische Energiesouveränität lässt sich allerdings nicht durch nationale Selbstversorgung erreichen. Strommärkte profitieren von grenzüberschreitenden Verbindungen, der geografischen Vielfalt erneuerbarer Stromerzeugung und gemeinsam nutzbaren Flexibilitätsoptionen. Der wirtschaftliche Wert erneuerbarer Energien hängt wesentlich davon ab, ob Strom über größere Entfernungen transportiert, Verbrauch zeitlich verlagert und Speicher überregional integriert werden können. 

Die Integration der europäischen Strommärkte ist deshalb nicht nur eine Frage der Wirtschaftlichkeit, sondern auch ein Instrument strategischer Widerstandsfähigkeit. Ein koordinierter Netzausbau, digitale Infrastruktur und gemeinsame Standards für Flexibilität können die Kosten des Energiesystems senken und zugleich den Bedarf an zusätzlicher fossiler Reserveleistung begrenzen.

Die Schwächung der Klimapolitik gefährt Europas Industriebasis

Auch die industrielle Wettbewerbsfähigkeit muss in diesem Zusammenhang betrachtet werden. Der globale Wandel hin zu klimafreundlichen Technologien verändert bereits heute Investitionsströme und industrielle Wettbewerbsbedingungen. Nach Angaben der Internationalen Energieagentur werden die weltweiten Investitionen in saubere Energien im Jahr 2026 voraussichtlich rund 2,2 Billionen US-Dollar erreichen und damit nahezu doppelt so hoch ausfallen wie die Investitionen in fossile Energien. Für die europäische Industrie bedeutet dies, dass eine verzögerte Elektrifizierung und ein zu langsamer Einsatz klimafreundlicher Technologien mit dem Risiko verbunden sind, auf schnell wachsenden Märkten an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu verlieren.

Europäische Unternehmen benötigen bezahlbaren Strom, eine leistungsfähige Infrastruktur und verlässliche regulatorische Rahmenbedingungen, um in elektrifizierte industrielle Produktionsprozesse zu investieren. Werden Klimaziele immer wieder infrage gestellt oder die Instrumente zu ihrer Umsetzung geschwächt, drohen ausgerechnet jene Investitionen auszufallen, die notwendig wären, um die industrielle Basis Europas langfristig zu sichern.

Der Clean Industrial Deal der EU bietet einen Rahmen, um industrielle Entwicklung und Dekarbonisierung miteinander zu verbinden. Entscheidend sind jedoch konkrete Finanzierungsinstrumente, Investitionen in Infrastruktur und eine konsequente Umsetzung.

Fehlanreize bei staatlicher Unterstützung vermeiden

Gezielte staatliche Unterstützung kann helfen, hohe anfängliche Investitionskosten zu überwinden, insbesondere in energieintensiven Industrien. Diese Förderung sollte allerdings an glaubwürdige Transformationspfade geknüpft sein und vermeiden, ineffiziente fossile Strukturen dauerhaft zu erhalten.

Erneuerbarer Wasserstoff sollte beispielsweise vorrangig dort eingesetzt werden, wo eine direkte Elektrifizierung schwierig ist, etwa bei bestimmten industriellen Prozessen. Ebenso sollte sich die Abscheidung und Speicherung von CO₂ auf tatsächlich schwer vermeidbare Restemissionen konzentrieren, anstatt den fortgesetzten Einsatz fossiler Energieträger zu rechtfertigen, wenn wirtschaftlich tragfähige Alternativen verfügbar sind. Eine klare Prioritätensetzung ist notwendig, weil öffentliche Finanzmittel, erneuerbarer Strom und Infrastrukturkapazitäten begrenzt sind.

Die politische Ökonomie einer sozial gerechten Transformation

Die wirtschaftlichen Vorteile der Dekarbonisierung führen nicht automatisch zu gesellschaftlicher Zustimmung. Haushalte verfügen über unterschiedliche finanzielle Möglichkeiten, leben unter verschiedenen Wohnbedingungen und haben ungleichen Zugang zu Mobilitätsalternativen. Steigende Preise für fossile Energieträger können deshalb gerade diejenigen besonders stark belasten, denen bezahlbare Alternativen fehlen. Die politische Herausforderung besteht darin, diese Verteilungswirkungen auszugleichen, ohne die notwendigen Anreize für den strukturellen Wandel zu schwächen.

Allgemeine Kraftstoffsubventionen und Preisdeckel sind dabei besonders problematisch, weil ihre Vorteile mit dem Verbrauch steigen und häufig Haushalte mit höheren Einkommen überproportional begünstigen. Zugleich fördern sie die fortgesetzte Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energieträgern und belasten die öffentlichen Haushalte zusätzlich.

Der Klima-Sozialfonds

Wirksamere Instrumente sind gezielte direkte Transferzahlungen, Investitionsförderung für effiziente Heizsysteme, bezahlbarer öffentlicher Verkehr und Anreize zur energetischen Gebäudesanierung. Eine CO₂-Bepreisung kann zu einer wirtschaftlich effizienten Emissionsminderung beitragen, wenn die Einnahmen sozial ausgewogen zurückverteilt werden und gleichzeitig bezahlbare Alternativen zur Verfügung stehen.

Der europäische Klima-Sozialfonds bietet die Möglichkeit, Emissionsminderungen mit gezielter sozialer Unterstützung zu verbinden. Ob er erfolgreich ist, wird davon abhängen, ob die nationale Umsetzung strukturelle Verbesserungen in den Vordergrund stellt, anstatt sich auf vorübergehende Ausgleichszahlungen zu beschränken. In Deutschland erfordert dies insbesondere eine stärkere Verzahnung von Wohnungs-, Verkehrs- und Energiepolitik. Gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz entsteht weniger dadurch, dass Klimaziele abgeschwächt werden, sondern vielmehr dadurch, dass Haushalte die Möglichkeit erhalten, sich an der Transformation zu beteiligen und von ihr zu profitieren.

COP31: Fünf Prioritäten für Deutschland und Europa

Die 31. Weltklimakonferenz in Antalya findet zu einem Zeitpunkt statt, an dem sich die Glaubwürdigkeit europäischer Klimapolitik zunehmend an ihrer tatsächlichen Umsetzung entscheidet. Die internationale Verhandlungsposition der EU wird geschwächt, wenn ambitionierte Klimaziele mit politischen Maßnahmen einhergehen, die die Transformation im eigenen Wirtschaftsraum verzögern. Deutschland sollte die Konferenz deshalb nutzen, um eine kohärente europäische Agenda voranzutreiben, statt lediglich bestehende Verpflichtungen erneut zu bekräftigen:

• Erstens: Die Glaubwürdigkeit der europäischen Klimagesetzgebung sichern. Das EU-Klimaziel für 2040 erfordert verlässliche Zwischenziele, eine wirksame Überprüfung der Fortschritte und eine glaubwürdige Umsetzung auf nationaler Ebene. Internationale CO₂-Gutschriften dürfen substanzielle Emissionsminderungen innerhalb Europas nicht ersetzen. Deutschland sollte seine sektoralen Maßnahmen und seine Infrastrukturplanung konsequent am Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis 2045 ausrichten und die Umsetzung der bestehenden europäischen Klimagesetzgebung unterstützen.
• Zweitens: Die Flexibilität des Energiesystems zu einer europäischen Infrastrukturpriorität machen. Netzausbau, Digitalisierung, Energiespeicher, flexible Stromnachfrage und grenzüberschreitende Stromverbindungen müssen strategisch stärker berücksichtigt werden. Eine europäische Koordinierung kann die Systemkosten senken, die Versorgungssicherheit verbessern und die Integration erneuerbarer Energien beschleunigen. Die regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen müssen es dezentralen Erzeugern, Verbraucherinnen und Verbrauchern sowie Speicherbetreibern ermöglichen, aktiv und wirtschaftlich sinnvoll an den Strommärkten teilzunehmen.
• Drittens: Die Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energieträgern durch Elektrifizierung verringern, statt neue langfristige Importverpflichtungen einzugehen. Die Energieversorgungspolitik muss klar zwischen notwendigen kurzfristigen Vorsorgemaßnahmen und Investitionen unterscheiden, die langfristige fossile Abhängigkeiten schaffen. Die Planung der Gasinfrastruktur muss den sinkenden Bedarf berücksichtigen, der sich aus glaubwürdigen Klimaschutzpfaden ergibt. Gleichzeitig sollten Investitionsanreize den Umstieg auf klimafreundliche Wärmeversorgung, Elektromobilität und die Elektrifizierung industrieller Prozesse beschleunigen.
• Viertens: Gezielte europäische Investitionen für die industrielle Dekarbonisierung mobilisieren. Die EU sollte den Innovationsfonds und InvestEU stärken sowie die geplante europäische Dekarbonisierungsbank für die Industrie auf den Weg bringen. Diese Instrumente sollen die Elektrifizierung industrieller Prozesse, klimafreundliche Produktionstechnologien und Energieeffizienz beschleunigen. Öffentliche Förderung muss an glaubwürdige Emissionsminderungspfade geknüpft und durch Investitionen in Stromnetze und weitere Infrastruktur ergänzt werden. Ziel muss es sein, privates Kapital für den strukturellen Wandel zu mobilisieren, anstatt die fortgesetzte Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energieträgern zu subventionieren.
• Fünftens: Die internationale Klimazusammenarbeit durch verlässliche Finanzierung und Partnerschaften stärken. Europas Verantwortung geht über die Minderung der eigenen Emissionen hinaus. Die Zusammenarbeit mit Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern sollte den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien, den Technologietransfer, die Anpassung an den Klimawandel und den Aufbau klimaresilienter Infrastruktur unterstützen. Finanzielle Zusagen müssen transparent und zusätzlich zu bestehenden Verpflichtungen erfolgen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen Länder, die stark vom Klimawandel betroffen sind und zugleich nur eingeschränkten Zugang zu Investitionskapital haben.

Das wirtschaftliche Risiko liegt in der Verzögerung der Transformation

Die europäische Klimapolitik wird zunehmend unter den Gesichtspunkten Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Bezahlbarkeit und Sicherheit bewertet. Das ist grundsätzlich richtig, doch die daraus gezogenen politischen Schlussfolgerungen gehen häufig in die falsche Richtung. Die Abhängigkeit von fossilen Energieträgern setzt Europa wiederkehrenden Preisschocks, geopolitischen Risiken und der Gefahr von Fehlinvestitionen in langfristig nicht mehr wirtschaftlich nutzbare Anlagen aus. Eine verzögerte Dekarbonisierung schützt die industrielle Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht, sondern erhöht die Unsicherheit und birgt die Gefahr, Kapital dauerhaft in Technologien zu binden, deren wirtschaftliche Perspektiven schwinden.

Deutschlands wichtigste Aufgabe besteht darin, seine Klimaziele wieder mit einer kohärenten Wirtschaftspolitik zu verbinden. Die erforderlichen Technologien sind vorhanden. Ihr erfolgreicher Einsatz hängt jedoch von koordinierten Infrastrukturinvestitionen, verlässlichen regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen und sozial ausgewogenen Anreizen ab. Auf europäischer Ebene können integrierte Strommärkte, gemeinsame Infrastrukturprioritäten und glaubwürdige industriepolitische Transformationsstrategien wirtschaftliche Vorteile schaffen, die durch fragmentierte nationale Alleingänge nicht erreichbar wären.

Die COP31 sollte deshalb einen Übergang markieren: weg von der immer neuen Debatte über die Ambition von Klimazielen, hin zur Umsetzung einer wirtschaftlich schlüssigen Transformationsstrategie. Die entscheidende Frage lautet nicht mehr, ob Europa sich eine beschleunigte Dekarbonisierung leisten kann, sondern wie viel wirtschaftliche und geopolitische Verwundbarkeit es bereit ist, durch weitere Verzögerungen in Kauf zu nehmen. Die europäische Energiewende ist kein Zielkonflikt zwischen Klimaschutz und Wohlstand. Richtig gestaltet ist sie eine Voraussetzung für langfristige wirtschaftliche Widerstandsfähigkeit und strategische Souveränität.

Claudia Kemfert leitet die Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) und ist Professorin für Energiewirtschaft und Energiepolitik an der Leuphana Universität in Lüneburg.

Dieser Artikel erschien zuerst auf Englisch in der Reihe Berlin Perspectives des Instituts für Europäische Politik (IEP). Er wurde für die Veröffentlichung auf diesem Blog übersetzt und geringfügig bearbeitet.

Die Reihe Berlin Perspectives bietet Analysen zur deutschen Europapolitik in englischer Sprache. Deutsche Positionen zu aktuellen Themen und Debatten werden erörtert und darauf aufbauend politische Handlungsempfehlungen formuliert.

Bilder: Schornsteine: Janusz Walczak [Unsplash license], via Unsplash; Porträt Claudia Kemfert: DIW Berlin/Photothek [alle Rechte vorbehalten] (cropped).

How to make a “spring of enlargement” a success

By Julian Plottka and Funda Tekin

In Germany, Euroscepticism has not undermined the government’s support for enlargement. But the window of opportunity opened in 2022 might be closing soon.

In September 2026, Marta Kos announced the “autumn of enlargement”. Still, as we have learned yet again, enlargement is anything but an easy sell.

The publication of the pre-enlargement policy reviews (6 October 2026), the European Council meeting (15 October 2026), the enlargement package (4 November 2026) and the EU Enlargement Forum (15/16 November 2026) mark important milestones in the EU’s enlargement policy. However, as it now stands, none of these events will move EU accession a substantive step forward. The major challenge for enlargement policy is once again the lack of political will among national governments.

Four challenges of EU enlargement …

The EU needs to find an answer to four challenges to achieve progress in the enlargement process:

• First, the challenge of speed relates to the geopolitical and modernisation logic that drive this policy. While containment of Russian expansionism and the protection of European values require fast accession, the modernisation logic’s merit-based approach is a lengthy procedure as it allows progress only when candidate countries reform.
• The second challenge results from the enlargement policy’s credibility. During their 20 years at the EU’s doorstep, citizens in the Western Balkans have lost trust in the credibility of their accession perspective. Both bilateral conflicts with member states and concerns that Moldova’s and Ukraine’s accession to the EU might get fast-tracked have amplified this perception.
• The EU’s absorption capacity is the third challenge. The Union’s last reform was drafted more than 23 years ago in a fundamentally different world. In spite of numerous reform proposals such as the report of the Franco-German Expert Group, appetite for reforming the EU is low among EU member states.
• Finally, there is the fourth challenge of a fading political momentum for enlargement as the EU is facing a series of major national elections in 2027. As war fatigue grows and radically Eurosceptic extremist parties gain influence in the EU, the window of opportunity for enlargement that opened widely in 2022 might be closing soon.

… and their proposed solutions

This summer, a series of non-papers and other contributions have proposed solutions to address these four challenges:

• Gradual integration is a means of speeding up integration of candidate countries and making the EU’s enlargement pledge trustworthy again by offering tangible benefits in the short-term perspective.
• Reversibility allows reconciling the geopolitical with the modernisation logic and addresses national concerns with regard to candidate countries’ reform reliability.
• Institutional safeguard clauses are a substitute for the lack of reforms aimed at strengthening the EU’s capacity to act.
• Transitory provisions accommodate member states’ opposition to enlargement in certain policy areas.

Germany’s position

In Germany, Euroscepticism has not undermined the government’s support for enlargement, even though extremist parties on the right (AfD/ESN), and less so on the post-communist left (BSW/–), are shaking up the German party system. The former recommends all candidate countries refrain from joining “the Brussels Dictatorship” and the latter calls for a moratorium on enlargement.

The democratic political parties and the German government support enlargement. The idea of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for “associate membership” for Ukraine and “substantial steps on their way to membership” for other candidate countries clearly bolsters gradual integration. So too does the Franco-German non-paper, written on the German side by the Federal Foreign Office. This is also reflected at the party level in the CDU (EPP), the SPD (PES) and the Grüne (EGP). Only the Linke (EL) criticises a “privileged partnership” or “two-speed Europe” and calls for full membership.

Reversibility is key

For the government, the principle of reversibility is a key element. The Chancellor’s letter to the heads of EU institutions proposes a “snap-back mechanism (alternatively a sunset-clause)”. The Franco-German non-paper considers all steps of gradual integration to be reversable. Another non-paper of five member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) proposes sectoral safeguards, transitional provisions and institutional safeguards for future accession treaties.

The need to establish the principle of reversibility enjoys wide consensus in the German debate. The Social Democratic and Green political groups in the Bundestag both recently tabled papers with concrete proposals on how the principle of reversibility could be implemented. The SPD proposed a reform of the Article 7 procedure, while the Grüne underlined the less-for-less principle and proposed different safeguard clauses. The Linke is even more critical than the other parties, assuming the EU is aiming for enlargement progress for geopolitical and economic reasons and ready to dilute social, rule of law and democratic standards.

Absorption capacity and the need for EU reform

For the German government, the EU’s absorption capacity is a prerequisite for enlargement. Thus, the accession processes and the “internal consolidation and reform of the EU” should happen in parallel. Specifically, it proposed observers in EU institutions before accession, a temporary reform of the Article 7 procedure and limiting the voting rights of new member states. Beyond these ideas, the German government only called upon the Commission to make reform proposals.

Despite following different ideological reasonings, all democratic parties in Germany agree in principle on the necessity of reforming the EU and making decision-making more efficient. In general, however, there is little appetite to take on the practical efforts involved in that. Where reforms within the treaties are not sufficient, the idea of using accession treaties for limited reforms is supported.

Support for a Montenegro mini-accession

Concerning concrete steps forward in the enlargement process, Chancellor Merz was frank in saying that “[i]t is time for [Montenegro’s] accession to the European Union” after praising the country’s reform progress in June 2026. In the run up to the European Council in October 2026, he also took the initiative together with French President Emmanuel Macron in pushing for the country’s accession. His second journey to Montenegro this year for the summit of the Berlin Process on 22 October, where he reiterated his assessment of June, might be a signal that the German government is starting to invest more in building support for a mini-accession to come soon.

Meanwhile, the Chancellor is also still waiting for a substantial response to his idea of “associate membership” from the Ukrainian government – aside from the rejection of the terminology.

For the German public, enlargement is a topic of low salience. Montenegro is the only candidate country whose membership enjoys support within the German public, albeit by a slim margin (46 percent in favour compared to 45 percent against). All other candidate countries face a plurality of Germans opposing their membership.

Recommendations: the short-term perspective

Against this background, the challenges for Germany’s position regarding the EU’s enlargement policy are twofold in the short-term perspective:

There is the need to build political momentum among national governments in the EU to support rapid progress in enlargement policy while the window of opportunity is open. Additionally, the German government has to prepare for winning the support of German citizens and countering the anti-EU campaigns of political extremists to secure ratification in Germany.

Mini-enlargement

The Irish Presidency should close the remaining chapters in the negotiations with Montenegro, and the European Commission should finalise the accession treaty seeking signature as early as possible. Such a mini-enlargement would send a clear geopolitical signal and strengthen the credibility of the EU enlargement pledge, especially in the countries of the Western Balkans. The provisional application of parts of the treaty, e.g. giving Montenegro observer status in the EU institutions, would show immediately that EU enlargement works in practice.

To achieve such a mini-enlargement, German EU policy should be energised and use minilateral formats to organise support for enlargement. Building a coalition with the “Friends of the Western Balkans” and additional supportive member states would be a suitable approach to convincing reluctant national governments to support Montenegro’s accession. The German Chancellor’s close relationship with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni could be used to establish the coalition, at least before the upcoming elections in Italy.

Making use of package deals

German EU policy should use package deals to facilitate EU enlargement policy. This way, Germany would receive a double return on its investment by using policies, which are anyway in its own interest, as a lever in enlargement policy: The ongoing negotiations for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) offer considerable leverage to win over reluctant countries from South-Western Europe, which support a larger EU budget. Most notably, this could be a way of overcoming French reluctance, which remains a key obstacle to the EU’s enlargement.

Furthermore, German defence policy and its clear support for Ukraine can be a lever for advancing support for Montenegro’s accession in North-Eastern Europe, where the Western Balkans are of low salience.

Gathering pro-European stakeholders

German EU policy should also start to build an enlargement coalition in Germany by gathering pro-enlargement stakeholders. Such a coalition of interest groups, pro-European civil society, diaspora groups and democratic political parties should be empowered to develop campaigns in support of enlargement.

These campaigns need to develop a positive narrative with target-group-specific arguments to bring the candidate countries closer to the German public. They also need to debunk fake news about EU enlargement and the candidate countries and prepare for countering anti-EU campaigns by extremists and malign foreign actors.

Recommendations: the medium-term perspective

In the medium-term perspective, the major challenge for Germany’s positioning on the EU’s enlargement policy is the fading momentum and the potentially less favourable political context within the EU following the upcoming elections throughout Europe. German European policy should already prepare for this situation now.

In the framework of Germany’s clear commitment to Ukraine, the German government should overcome any terminological difficulties and constructively work with the Ukrainian government on a concrete proposal for Ukraine’s interim closer association with the EU. Considering the ongoing war in the country, the gradual integration path for Ukraine is most likely fundamentally different from that of the other candidate countries. Still, there is a need for a different term – avoid calling it “associate membership”.

Maintaining the momentum

Building on its non-papers, the German government should table a proposal for a comprehensive governance framework for gradual integration, including safeguards to ensure the principle of reversibility. This way, the government could give additional impetus to the Council assessment of the Commission’s pre-enlargement policy reviews, which is necessary to speed up the process. To this end, the German government should work closely with the upcoming Lithuanian Council presidency.

Assuming that the enlargement round after the mini-enlargement of Montenegro might encompass a group of candidate countries with a greater effect on the EU’s capacity to act, the German government should consider proposing institutional reforms via the accession treaties.

In parallel to this set of limited reforms of the primary law, the German government should work on a second set of reforms, which can be reached by using provisions within the EU Treaties, such as extending the use of QMV. This second set should be adopted together with the signature of the second next enlargement treaty.

Julian Plottka is a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Funda Tekin is the Director of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin and a honorary professor at the University of Tübingen.

This article was first published in the Berlin Perspectives series of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) and has been slightly edited for publication on the blog.

The Berlin Perspectives series presents analyses of Germany’s European policy to an English-speaking audience. The authors analyse German positions on current topics and debates and provide policy recommendations based on their findings.

Pictures: Clear glass jar: Олег Мороз [Unsplash+ license], via Unsplash [edited]; portrait Julian Plottka, Funda Tekin: private [all rights reserved].

EU Analytics – October 2026 review: A vote on EU-China lays bare shifting divisions, and the EPP reaffirms its central role

By Nicolai von Ondarza

On EU-China policy, the right united. And the left split.

In October 2026, a vote in the European Parliament showed how the political map of Europe is changing. When MEPs voted on a recommendation on EU-China relations, the right was remarkably united, with only the AfD-led ESN opposed, while about half of the centre-left S&D abstained. This is one of three key takeaways from my look at October’s votes in the European Parliament and the Council.

Across all EP votes, the EPP once again confirmed how firmly it sits in the driving seat: On most votes, it continued its cooperation with the centre-left and liberals, but formed majorities with the far right on eight votes, including on softening parts of the Green Deal and on a resolution on countering Islamic entryism and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the Council, in the shadow of difficult budget negotiations, consensus was the rule. In only two of 16 public votes did a member state vote no, and in both cases it was a large country being outvoted: Germany and Spain, respectively.

Highlight of the month: EP recommendation on EU-China relations

This month, a recommendation on EU-China policy, adopted on 7 October 2026, stood out to me as being interesting to highlight. The vote itself was on a recommendation proposed by Rapporteur Hilde Vautmans (Renew, Belgium) and called for a hardening of EU policy towards China. Passed by a majority of 454 against 86 with 110 abstentions, MEPs called for a robust economic approach by the EU to China and for pressure on Beijing to use its influence on Russia to help end the war in Ukraine.

It thus fit right into the growing EU discussion on how to deal with the “China shock 2.0”. This was both a topic at the European Council in October and the subject of a Franco-German input paper also calling for much harder EU trade defence instruments. The basis for this was, in particular, a policy shift in Berlin, which used to oppose tough trade measures against China. In 2024, for instance, the previous German government voted against protective tariffs against Chinese EVs in the Council.

A united right, a split centre-left

Four aspects of the vote were particularly noteworthy to me. First, it showed how much the EPP has swung behind a tough trade line vis-à-vis China. In the past, EPP parliamentarians from the German CDU or Central/Eastern Europe would likely have objected to a tough trade policy towards China, but after the changes in Berlin, the EPP has firmly swung behind the hard approach.

As a second point, this vote showed once again that the far right is split on foreign policy: Whereas the ECR and the “Patriots for Europe” overwhelmingly voted for the recommendation, the ESN, led by the China-friendly AfD, overwhelmingly voted against. This, however, is also a shift for me. In the past, quite a few member parties of the PfE like the Italian Lega would have voted against. Even the Hungarian Fidesz – under Orbán very pro-China – abstained:

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU.

The counter development then was, thirdly, that roughly one half of the S&D group abstained – mostly socialist parliamentarians from Southern Europe, in particular Spain and Italy, but also Portugal, Romania and Greece. In my view, this was another case of Spain becoming an outsider in the EU under Pedro Sánchez, who opened up to China while most of the rest of Europe is hardening. The PSOE said it abstained because the text was lacking “balance” in its view. A similar logic was followed by the Italian PD.

Finally, this also played into the geographic distribution of the vote. Due to the Partido Popular and Vox votes, Spain was not such an outlier here. More notable was Greece – without a single vote in favour –, as well as Romania and Slovakia. Hungary was also an interesting case: Not only did Fidesz abstain, but all MEPs from the new government party Tisza (EPP) chose not to vote. In contrast to the overall distribution of the votes, only the lone Hungarian S&D MEP voted in favour:

Support of MEPs for the recommendation on EU-China relations, per member state.

Overall, the vote highlighted to me how the changes in the EU’s positioning towards China led to more unity on the right (with only the ESN fully opposed) while creating new frictions within the centre-left.

Final votes in the European Parliament

In October 2026, the EP had two plenary sessions, one from 5 to 8 October in Strasbourg and one from 19 to 22 October in Brussels. Overall, the two plenaries had 53 final votes recorded on HowTheyVote.eu. Key topics of the plenary sessions in Strasbourg and Brussels were the debates ahead of and after the October European Council, quite a few votes on adopting various omnibus regulations for simplification/deregulation (depending on your political views), as well as the EP adopting its position for the 2027 budget and foreign policy issues such as the EU-China recommendation highlighted above:

Overall, the two plenaries showed the different majorities at play in the European Parliament: About 75 per cent of the votes were passed in broad consensus from (almost) all parts of the political spectrum, with the “von der Leyen platform” of EPP, S&D and Renew at its core. However, only four votes (7.5 per cent) were based on the von der Leyen platform alone. Taken together, the three pro-European centre groups EPP, S&D and Renew still form the basis of the majority for most votes in the EU Parliament. At the same time, the small number of “thin” majorities based on these three groups alone suggests to me that the centre is reluctant to push through narrow votes on its own.

This graph shows the different majorities in this legislative period. Note the relatively low share of votes this month where the “von der Leyen” majority was decisive on its own.

The second observation is that, this month, the EPP has been back to being the most successful group, being part of the majority in 98.1 per cent of the votes. This is also reflected in the fact that eight votes (~15 per cent) were based on a majority formed by the EPP with several of the far-right groups, and in some cases also including Renew.

In particular, there were two politically controversial votes on the methane regulation, where the EPP softened another part of the Green Deal in cooperation with the far right. Another controversial vote was a resolution on the “need for an EU strategy to counter Islamic entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood”, which was celebrated by the far right as a triumph in its fight against (radical) Islam. The resolution itself was tabled by the EPP, and adopted together with the ECR, PfE, ESN and also Renew, in a “classic” left-right division against the S&D, Greens and Left.

Co-voting matrix

The co-voting matrix confirms this complex picture: There is a definitive cluster around the “von der Leyen platform” of EPP, S&D and Renew. However, the distance between the S&D and the EPP is also clearly visible; the overlap between EPP and S&D in one direction (83 per cent), and EPP and ECR in the other direction (79 per cent), is almost equally high.

Finally, the ESN remains in full opposition mode, with strong distances to everyone but the PfE. Interestingly, a small sign of the “horseshoe” theory is also visible: The overlap of the ESN with the Left is just a touch higher than with the Greens, S&D or Renew – precisely because of votes like the one on China highlighted above.

Heatmap of co-voting behaviour in the October plenary. Note the strong centre around the “von der Leyen platform”, but also the distance between S&D and EPP.

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always far fewer than the Parliament’s roll-call votes. October is usually a busy month for the Council, so there were 16 public votes in the various Council formations (after just four in September). Among these, 12 were adopted by unanimity and two more had only abstentions, which means an 87.5 per cent consensus rate.

The remaining two votes had one no vote each, so this was a month without highly controversial votes in the Council. Still, a few interesting points stood out:

• Belgium abstained twice, highlighting the increasing frictions within its coalition government, which then collapsed in early November.
• The only two countries which voted no were Germany and Spain. This fits the argument by Manuel Müller that it is actually small countries which increasingly benefit from QMV, as it allows them to outvote larger countries at times.
• Spain voted against the return regulation allowing return hubs. This is both another expression of the minority position Spain finds itself in on migration – at least until the Spanish elections at the end of November – and one of the few cases I could find where a national government voted against a proposal in the Council because it rejected a compromise achieved in the EP on the basis of a centre-right-to-far-right majority.

Result of the vote on the return regulation. Data source: EU Council.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack.

Pictures: all graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

Podcast Monitoring Europe – Rechtsruck im Europäischen Parlament: Was die Sitzprojektion zeigt

Die europäische Sitzprojektion zeigt kurzfristig wenig Bewegung, im längerfristigen Vergleich jedoch einen deutlichen Rechtsruck.

In der jüngsten Ausgabe des Podcasts „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ sprechen Christoph Siekermann und Manuel Müller über das Wachstum der Rechtsaußenfraktionen, die Schlüsselrolle der Europäischen Volkspartei und die zunehmend durchlässige Brandmauer im Europaparlament. Außerdem geht es um die Bedeutung europäischer Parteienfamilien und darum, wie nationale Wahlen die Mehrheitsverhältnisse in der EU verändern können.

Die aktuelle Sitzprojektion für das Europäische Parlament gibt es hier.

Die Podcastserie „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ ist eine Kooperation zwischen dem Europapodcast und dem Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“. Anhand von aktuellen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament sprechen Christoph Siekermann, Manuel Knapp und Manuel Müller über die politische Stimmung in der EU.

„Monitoring Europe“ ist auch auf der Homepage des Europapodcast sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Back to basics is a misleading narrative for the UN’s future

By Ronny Patz

The United Nations has never been only about preventing wars.

There is a new catchphrase that dominates debates about the future of the United Nations: “back to basics”. I want to question both the logic of “back” and the logic of “basics”. I argue for a forward-looking approach instead of invoking a past that never existed.

Proponents of the idea of “back to basics”, a slogan prominently used by the US administration, among others, claim that there was an ideal past of the UN in which the organization did nothing more but to prevent conflicts and wars – and successfully so. In this imagined past, there was unity among member states, and the UN system was not as fragmented, not as complex to manage and not as expensive as today.

But a resolution adopted during the fourth session of the UN General Assembly in 1949 already then highlighted the “problem of the proliferation and overlapping of the programmes of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.”

Proliferation and overlap were already present in 1949

The “back to basics” narrative argues, implicitly and explicitly, that the UN was created in 1945 out of the ashes of World War II, built on the ruins of the failed League of Nations that had been unable to prevent this war.

However, academic research has shown, again and again, that the United Nations system with its many agencies and related organizations has deep organizational and ideological roots in the League of Nations. The League was never just about preventing wars but also had ambitions related to global health, refugee policy, intellectual cooperation, economic stabilization, and workers’ rights.

When the UN was created in 1945, these and other ambitions were maintained alongside the goal of preventing another global war. Massive humanitarian operations were ongoing under the UN’s roofs in the first years after the war to support the large populations displaced by the war. The Bretton Woods financial organizations assisted with post-war reconstruction. Early on, projects for international development and technical assistance were organized through the UN and its newly formed Specialized Agencies such as the World Health Organization, which succeeded the League of Nations Health Organization.

The UN Charter defines a broad programme

Not surprisingly, the UN’s purposes and principles set out in Article 1 UN Charter define a broad programme around four interrelated goals to “maintain international peace and security”; “develop friendly relations among nations”; “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”; and to “be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends”. That’s a broad, idealistic programme, not just some basics.

The UN’s so-called “basics” in the field of collective security were so idealistic to even include the possibility that the UN Security Council would one day command armed forces made available by member states. And still, establishing the first major peacekeeping missions around the Suez crisis and in Congo were an innovation, not something that existed from day one. Those missions had to be established and financed against the resistance of veto powers like France or the Soviet Union, both unwilling to pay for those missions.

Today, even “basic” peace missions are being discontinued

This revolt against what today are considered by some to be the basics of the UN’s work led to the first major financial crisis of the UN in the 1960s, which at the time was largely contained by the USA who bought a large share of the debt bonds the UN issued.

Today, many UN peace missions are being discontinued, not because they are no longer needed but because veto powers including the USA are unwilling or unable to agree on them anymore. Instead, they prefer to engage in unilateral wars and invasions, voice threats to neighbouring countries, and sustain decades-old conflicts. It is almost ridiculous to hear the same countries speak about going back to basics.

The world of today is different from 1945

1945 was an important moment for global governance in the wake of a massive war. However, a lot of the progress that the UN helped shape, including in decolonization, had not yet been achieved. When the Charter was signed, the first atomic bomb had not yet been dropped on Hiroshima, so the nuclear threat to human survival was not even considered at the time. Humanity had not gone to space, was not able to manipulate genes, had not developed artificial intelligence, and had not realized that industrial-scale progress would mean the destruction of our planet’s ecosystems and lead to massive climate change.

We cannot go back to basics, imagined or not, when the world of today is totally different from 1945, even if many of the original challenges still exist. So let’s rather work on rethinking what the ambitions of the Charter mean, how we can “achieve international co-operation” and use the UN as “a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations”.

Instead of going back to imagined basics, we need to find new ways

Maybe placing some countries above others in the Security Council does not help? Maybe giving micro-states and the world’s population giants the same one vote each in the General Assembly is not very democratic? Maybe expecting two countries – China and the USA – to shoulder more than 40 percent of the UN’s budget is increasing the risk of financial failure instead of producing global justice? And maybe some of the cost-cutting reforms of the past two years are just ways to avoid talking about how we can build humanity-oriented, fair, and realistic backbone structures of global cooperation for the 21^st century?

Instead of going back to imagined basics, we need to find new ways of cooperating as humanity. Some bold ideas have been around for a long time and may still be relevant, if not more so in times of today’s transactional multilateralism.

Let’s be bolder as citizens of the world

Organizations like Democracy Without Borders might highlight that the UK Secretary of State, back in 1945, proposed a discussion on setting up a directly elected world assembly, to name just one example. Others like the Article 109 coalition remind us that going back to basics could also mean to go back to the drawing board and rethink what we expect from global cooperation.

In any case, let’s try to not just tighten some of the screws in an aging machinery and not to reduce the UN to ideas and practices that it was never limited to. Let’s be bolder as citizens of the world and ask for a UN that looks beyond the basics, that modernizes the machine instead of just oiling its most visible parts.

Ronny Patz is a researcher in the UN team at IDOS, the German Institute of Development and Sustainability based in Bonn.

This article was first published on the blog of Democracy Without Borders.

Pictures: UN Flag Parade in Geneva: EGilham [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons (cropped); portrait Ronny Patz: Thomas Roese [all rights reserved].