15 Mai 2026

Eine schlafende Mittelmacht: Deutschlands EU-Politik ein Jahr nach Amtsantritt der Merz-Regierung

Von Julian Plottka
Ursula von der Leyen and Friedrich Merz at the 2025 EPP Congress in Valencia.
Eine Vision für die Zukunft Europas, die als Leitlinie für ihre EU-Politik dienen könnte, hat die Regierung Merz bis jetzt nicht entwickelt.

Als Friedrich Merz am 6. Mai 2025 sein Amt als deutscher Bundeskanzler antrat, hofften viele Partnerländer auf eine stärkere deutsche Führungsrolle in der EU. Merz selbst versprach eine effizientere Koordination der deutschen Europapolitik.

Zu diesem Zweck wurde die Rolle des Bundeskanzleramts in der Europakoordinierung ausgeweitet. Der frühere Ständige Vertreter Michael Clauß leitet jetzt die Europaabteilung des Kanzleramts und Kanzleramtschef Thorsten Frey ist zuständig, um bei EU-bezogenen Konflikten zwischen Bundesministerien zu vermitteln. Dank des persönlichen Einsatzes der Schlüsselakteure soll sich die Koordinierung im Vergleich zur Vorgängerregierung deutlich verbessert haben.

Allerdings ist die regierungsinterne Koordinierung nur eine notwendige, keine hinreichende Bedingung für eine effektive deutsche Führung in der EU. Im Jahr 2025 habe ich dazu drei mögliche Optionen diskutiert, wie Deutschland eine Führungsrolle in der EU übernehmen könnte: Die erste Option war eine Rückkehr zu Deutschlands traditionellem, von Leitbildern geprägten Ansatz in der Europapolitik. Die zweite war eine deutsche Führung aus dem Berlaymont, unterstützt durch Manfred Weber im Europäischen Parlament, Friedrich Merz im Europäischen Rat und deutsche Minister:innen im Rat der EU. Die dritte war ein neuer intergouvernementaler Ansatz auf Grundlage von gegenseitigen Vereinbarungen mit EU-Partnerländern. Ein Jahr nach dem Amtsantritt der aktuellen deutschen Regierung zieht dieser Artikel Bilanz über die deutsche Führungsrolle in der EU.

1. Ein Ende des Westens und der Leitbilder-geprägten EU-Politik?

Anfang 2026 ist klar, dass es keine Rückkehr zum traditionellen, von einem föderalistischen Leitbild der europäischen Integration geprägten deutschen Ansatz in der EU-Politik gegeben hat. Dieser Ansatz hat wohl dauerhaft mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon geendet. Dafür gibt es vier Gründe:

  • Erstens haben sich die CDU (EVP) in gewissem und die CSU (EVP) in noch viel stärkerem Maße in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten zunehmend kritisch gegenüber der europäischen Integration gezeigt. „Mehr Europa nur dort, wo Europa einen Mehrwert für alle schafft“, der Abbau von Bürokratie und die Förderung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips waren Schlüsselkonzepte im Europa-Kapitel des gemeinsamen Wahlprogramms der konservativen Parteien.
  • Zweitens ist, seitdem das Ende des permissiven Konsens auch Deutschland erreicht hat, das Thema Europapolitik in der Öffentlichkeit sehr viel sichtbarer und polarisierter geworden.
  • Drittens setzt sich die Regierung zwar für eine „innere Konsolidierung und Reform der EU“ vor der nächsten EU-Erweiterungsrunde ein und ist bereit, die in den Verträgen vorgesehene Flexibilität zu nutzen, um die Handlungsfähigkeit der EU zu stärken. Doch im Rest der EU gibt es nur wenig Appetit auf die notwendigen Reformen. Selbst im Europäischen Parlament, das in der vergangenen Wahlperiode der lautstärkste Befürworter einer Vertragsreform war, ist die Debatte zu diesem Thema verhalten.
  • Viertens war der Leitbild-orientierte Ansatz in der EU-Politik stets Bestandteil des übergeordneten Projekts der deutschen Westintegration. Dieses normative Projekt des Westens scheint seit Beginn der zweiten Amtszeit von Donald Trump zu Ende gegangen zu sein. Schon jetzt wird Merz von manchen als erster „postatlantischer Kanzler“ bezeichnet.

Doch auch wenn klar ist, dass das traditionelle Leitbild eines föderalen Europas in den konservativen Parteien, in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit und bei den Regierungen der anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten kaum Unterstützung findet, hat die derzeitige Regierung keine alternative Vision für die Zukunft Europas entwickelt, die der deutschen EU-Politik in einem neuen Zeitalter der Geopolitik und Geoökonomie zur Orientierung dienen könnte.

2. Deutsche Führung in Brüssel und Straßburg?

In ihrer Rede zur Lage der Union 2025 widmete Ursula von der Leyen den größten Teil ihrer Redezeit den Themen Sicherheit, Verteidigung und Außenbeziehungen. Die Befugnisse der Kommission in diesen Bereichen sind jedoch stark begrenzt, mit Ausnahme der Handelspolitik, wo sie erhebliche Fortschritte beim Abschluss von Handelsabkommen mit zahlreichen Partnerländern erzielt hat. Die deutsche Regierung unterstützt die EU bei der weltweiten Förderung des Freihandels durch bi- oder multilaterale Abkommen. Es war jedoch die italienische Ministerpräsidentin Giorgia Meloni, die eine Verlängerung der Frist für die Annahme des Abkommens mit den Mercosur-Ländern durch den Rat erreichte.

Mit der Ernennung eines EU-Kommissars für Verteidigung, der Veröffentlichung des Weißbuchs zur europäischen Verteidigung und der Initiative zur Vollendung des Verteidigungsbinnenmarktes versucht die Kommission, die Agenda für die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zu bestimmen. Ihre Handlungsspielräume werden allerdings bald an ihre Grenzen stoßen. Für weitere Fortschritte müsste die deutsche Regierung die Initiative ergreifen. Doch abgesehen von Merz’ Vorschlag, eingefrorene russische Vermögenswerte für das jüngste Darlehen an die Ukraine zu nutzen – der letztlich im Europäischen Rat scheiterte –, kamen aus Berlin kaum Impulse.

Parteipolitische Prioritätensetzung

„Eine wettbewerbsfähige und prosperierende Union“ – die zweite Priorität, die von der Leyen in ihrer letzten Rede zur Lage der Union skizzierte – genießt die volle Unterstützung des deutschen Bundeskanzlers. Gemeinsam mit 18 weiteren Staats- und Regierungschef:innen schlug Merz das sogenannte „Leaders Retreat“ des Europäischen Rates im Februar 2026 vor, für das sich die deutsche und die italienische Regierung auf ein Non-Paper geeinigt hatten. Dieses Non-Paper forderte Deregulierung, Digitalisierung und eine ehrgeizigere Handelspolitik.

Der Draghi-Bericht und der Letta-Bericht werden zwar häufig zitiert, doch nehmen die darin genannten Prioritäten Dekarbonisierung, ökologischer Wandel, Erweiterung und Infrastrukturinvestitionen auf der politischen Agenda einen weniger prominenten Platz ein als die Empfehlungen zur Deregulierung und zur Vollendung des Binnenmarktes. Die Wettbewerbsagenda der deutschen Regierung steht im Einklang mit der Haltung der Mehrheit der konservativen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen und spiegelt eine parteipolitische Prioritätensetzung wider.

Allianzen mit Rechtsaußen

Das Gleiche lässt sich in der Europäischen Kommission und vor allem im Europäischen Parlament beobachten, wo der Fraktionsvorsitzende der Europäischen Volkspartei (EVP), Manfred Weber, die traditionelle Große Koalition nach und nach durch eine rechte Mehrheit ersetzt. Eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EVP und den Rechtsaußen-Parteien im Europäischen Parlament gab es bereits in der vergangenen Legislaturperiode. Seit den Wahlen 2024 scheint die Fraktion jedoch einer klaren Strategie zu folgen, den Einfluss der linken Parteien einzuschränken und dafür extremistischen Parteien die Mitgestaltung der EU-Politik zu ermöglichen. Das jüngste Beispiel ist die Mehrheit aus EVP, Europäischen Konservativen und Reformern (EKR), Patrioten für Europa (PfE) sowie Europa der Souveränen Nationen (ESN) für einen gemeinsamen Änderungsantrag zur Verordnung zur Einrichtung eines gemeinsamen Systems für die Rückkehr von illegal in der Union aufhältigen Drittstaatsangehörigen.

Die deutsche Führung durch von der Leyen und Weber verändert den Kurs der europäischen Politik in Richtung von Deregulierung und weiterer Einschränkung der Migration, sie verändert aber auch die Funktionsweise des politischen Systems der EU. Während das Europäische Parlament in der Vergangenheit von der Tradition großer Kompromisse geprägt war, stärkt Weber derzeit den parteipolitischen Wettbewerb. Grundsätzlich könnte eine Parlamentarisierung der EU-Governance, bei der eine parlamentarische Mehrheit die Kommission gegen eine Opposition stützt, ein Schritt zur Stärkung der europäischen Demokratie sein. Anti-europäischen Extremist:innen Einfluss auf die EU-Entscheidungsfindung zu gewähren, ist jedoch kein demokratischer Fortschritt. Die Zusammenarbeit der EVP mit diesen Fraktionen ist so eng, dass selbst die Vorsitzenden von CDU, Merz, und CSU, Markus Söder, sie deutlich missbilligten.

3. Ein transaktionalistischer Ansatz in der Europapolitik?

Die dritte Option, nämlich ein neuer intergouvernementaler oder gar transaktionalistischer Ansatz in der Europapolitik auf der Grundlage von gegenseitigen Vereinbarungen mit den EU-Partnerländern, war die größte Hoffnung auf eine Führungsrolle der deutschen Regierung. Traditionell gilt das deutsch-französische Tandem als Kernstück eines solchen Ansatzes. Nach den angespannten Beziehungen zwischen dem französischen Präsidenten Emmanuel Macron und dem ehemaligen deutschen Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz wurde unter Bundeskanzler Merz ein Neustart des deutsch-französischen Motors erwartet.

Gute persönliche Beziehungen zwischen dem französischen Präsidenten und dem deutschen Bundeskanzler sind jedoch noch keine Garantie für gemeinsamen politischen Erfolg. Stattdessen tun sich beide Regierungen schwer mit der Zusammenarbeit. Das Future Combat Air System (FCAS), einst als die europäische Zukunft bezeichnet, wird wahrscheinlich eingestellt, nachdem der letzte Vermittlungsversuch gescheitert ist. Während Deutschland das Handelsabkommen mit den Mercosur-Staaten nachdrücklich unterstützte, stimmte Frankreich dagegen. Noch irritierender war, dass der deutsche Bundeskanzler nach dem Europäischen Rat im Oktober 2025 einseitig die einstimmige Unterstützung aller Mitgliedstaaten für das Abkommen verkündete, während sich weder Ratspräsident António Costa noch der französische Präsident an eine Debatte zu diesem Thema erinnern konnten.

Der französische Präsident teilt zwar die Priorität der deutschen Regierung in Sachen Deregulierung, vertritt aber eine andere Industriestrategie. Macron, der seit seiner Wahl 2017 für eine autonomere Europäische Union eintritt, fordert mehr Investitionen in Europa. Von drei aufeinanderfolgenden deutschen Regierungen hat er hierfür jedoch kaum Unterstützung erhalten. Traditionell gelten unterschiedliche Ansichten innerhalb des deutsch-französischen Duos als Voraussetzung dafür, dass gemeinsame Initiativen bei den anderen Mitgliedstaaten breite Unterstützung finden. Doch derzeit scheint es eher so, als ob die deutsche Regierung den französischen Präsidenten vor der Wahl im nächsten Jahr schon jetzt als lame duck betrachtet.

Ein Muster eigenmächtigen Handelns

Die zweite bilaterale Beziehung, auf die sich Merz in seiner Europapolitik stützen wollte, war die deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit, mit dem Ziel einer Wiederbelebung des deutsch-französisch-polnischen Weimarer Dreiecks. Dass 2023 Donald Tusk an die Regierung zurückkehrte, bot positive Aussichten für eine fruchtbare deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit. Am 7. Mai 2025 erteilte der deutsche Bundesinnenminister Alexander Dobrindt jedoch die Anweisung, Asylsuchenden, die aus sicheren Staaten ankommen, die Einreise zu verweigern.

Diese Anweisung, die gegen europäisches Recht verstößt, setzte die regierende Platforma Obywatelska (PO/EVP) unter erheblichen Druck, da sie Rechtsextremist:innen zu Protesten an der deutschen Grenze mobilisierte und dem damaligen Kandidaten der Oppositionspartei Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS/EKR) und heutigen polnischen Präsidenten Karol Nawrocki ein Thema für seinen Wahlkampf lieferte.

Das Verhalten der deutschen Regierung folgte einem bereits bekannten Muster eigenmächtigen Handelns ohne vorheriger Konsultation der europäischen Partner. Zuvor war dieses Muster bereits beim deutschen Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie, bei der Entscheidung zur Aussetzung von Rückführungen von Asylsuchenden in EU-Mitgliedstaaten sowie beim Bau der Nord-Stream-2-Pipeline zu beobachten. Der jüngste Alleingang hat der Wiederbelebung des Weimarer Dreiecks nun vorerst ein Ende gesetzt.

Unerwartet enge Zusammenarbeit mit Giorgia Meloni

Eine unerwartete Perspektive bilateraler Zusammenarbeit bilden Merz’ enge Beziehungen zur postfaschistischen italienischen Ministerpräsidentin Giorgia Meloni (FdI/EKR). Merz heizte die Debatte um ein neues „power couple“ an, als er bei seinem ersten Besuch erklärte, es gebe „zu praktisch allen europapolitischen Fragen eine sehr weitgehende Übereinstimmung zwischen unseren beiden Ländern“.

Tatsächlich ist dies jedoch nicht der Fall. So unterstützte die italienische Regierung nicht Merz’ Plan, eingefrorene russische Vermögenswerte für den jüngsten Ukraine-Kredit zu nutzen, sie forderte vor der Zustimmung zum Mercosur-Abkommen zusätzliche Schutzmaßnahmen für Landwirt:innen, und sie verfolgt traditionell einen anderen fiskalpolitischen Ansatz als Deutschland. Unklar ist, wie sich Melonis anfänglicher Appeasement-Kurs gegenüber Trump entwickeln wird, nachdem sie dessen Einmischung in Grönland und im Nahen Osten sowie seine Angriffe auf den Papst kritisiert hat. Ob sich die deutsch-italienische Beziehung zu einer dauerhaften Grundlage für Deutschlands Europapolitik entwickeln wird, bleibt abzuwarten.

Fazit: Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik?

Nach einem Jahr im Amt sind von der deutschen Führung in der Kommission und im Europäischen Parlament Impulse für einen Wandel ausgegangen. Der deutsche Bundeskanzler und seine Partei unterstützen diese Agenda der Deregulierung, während der sozialdemokratische Koalitionspartner sie ablehnt. Dass die EVP-Fraktion im Europäischen Parlament Rechtsextremen Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der EU-Politik gewährt, birgt erhebliche Risiken für die Zukunft der EU, da sich die Einbindung extremistischer Parteien als Strategie zu ihrer Eindämmung nicht bewährt hat. Manfred Weber sollte deshalb aufhören, auf EU-Ebene Fehler zu wiederholen, die bereits in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten begangen wurden.

Die derzeitige Bundesregierung unterstützt die Wettbewerbsfähigkeits-Agenda der EU und hat sich der Forderung nach einem souveränen Europa angeschlossen. Sie hat jedoch keine Vision für die Zukunft Europas entwickelt, die als Leitlinie für ihre EU-Politik dienen könnte. Insbesondere in den bevorstehenden Verhandlungen über den mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen für die Jahre 2028-2034 wird es notwendig sein, eine klare Perspektive für die EU-Politik jenseits von Deregulierung zu entwickeln, wenn der nächste MFR die geopolitische Handlungsfähigkeit der EU stärken soll.

Deutschland muss seine Partner wieder besser einbeziehen

Alleingänge, die die Auswirkungen auf die Partner nicht berücksichtigen, sind zu einem zentralen Element in der EU-Politik mehrerer deutscher Regierungen geworden. Merz hat eine neue Variante davon geschaffen, den deklaratorischen Alleingang, bei dem der deutsche Bundeskanzler europäische politische Ziele oder sogar Erfolge verkündet, ohne über die notwendige Unterstützung zu verfügen. Liana Fix hat kürzlich davor gewarnt, dass die Aufrüstung auf dem besten Weg ist, Deutschlands nächster Alleingang zu werden, und Alptraumszenarien beschrieben, wie dies zu einer Rückkehr zur Machtpolitik in Europa führen könnte.

Um diesen und weitere Alleingänge zu vermeiden, sollte die deutsche Regierung zu der seit langem etablierten, in letzter Zeit jedoch vernachlässigten Tradition zurückkehren, alle Mitgliedstaaten mithilfe von Konsultationen einzubeziehen. Die Standpunkte der Partner zu berücksichtigen, ist der erste Schritt zum Aufbau von Koalitionen zur Unterstützung deutscher Initiativen. Die Investition in den langfristigen Aufbau von Vertrauen bei den europäischen Partnern lohnt sich und ist entscheidend für die Führungsrolle Deutschlands in der EU.

Dieser Artikel erschien zuerst auf Englisch in der Reihe Berlin Perspectives des Instituts für Europäische Politik (IEP).


Übersetzung aus dem Englischen: Manuel Müller.
Bilder: Ursula von der Leyen und Friedrich Merz: European People's Party [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons; Porträt Julian Plottka: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

A sleeping middle power: Germany’s EU policy one year into the Merz government

By Julian Plottka
Ursula von der Leyen and Friedrich Merz at the 2025 EPP Congress in Valencia.
So far, the Merz government has not developed a vision for the future of Europe that could guide its EU policy.

When Friedrich Merz took office as German chancellor on 6 May 2025, many international partners hoped for greater German leadership. Merz himself promised a more efficient coordination of German EU policy.

To this end, the Federal Chancellery’s role in European policy coordination has been increased further. Former Permanent Representative Michael Clauß is now leading the Directorate-General for European Policy in the Federal Chancellery, while the head of the Federal Chancellery, Thorsten Frey, is in charge of mediating EU-related conflicts between federal ministries. Individual engagement of the key actors is said to have much improved coordination compared to the previous government.

Coordination within the government is, however, only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for effective German leadership in the EU. In 2025, I discussed three possible options for Germany to fulfil a leadership role in the EU: The first option was a return to Germany’s traditional “Leitbilder”-driven approach to European policy. The second was German leadership from the Berlaymont supported by Manfred Weber in the European Parliament, Friedrich Merz in the European Council and German ministers in the Council of the EU. The third was a new intergovernmental approach to European policy based on mutual agreements with EU partner countries. One year after the inauguration of the current German government, this article takes stock of German leadership in the EU.

1. An end of the West and Germany’s “Leitbilder” driven EU policy?

In early 2026, it is clear that there has been no return to the traditional German approach to EU policy, driven by a federalist “Leitbild” of European integration, which most likely ended with the Treaty of Lisbon. There are four reasons for this:

  • First, the CDU (EPP) to a certain and the CSU (EPP) to a much stronger degree have become increasingly critical of European integration in the last three decades. “More Europe only where Europe creates added value for everyone”, cutting red tape, and promoting subsidiarity were keywords in the Europe section of the conservative parties’ joint electoral platform.
  • Second, the topic of European policy is much more salient and polarised in the public as the end of the permissive consensus has also reached Germany.
  • Third, while the government is committed to a “consolidation and reform of the EU” before the next EU enlargement round and it is ready to use flexibility within the treaties to strengthen the EU’s actorness, there is little appetite in the EU for the necessary reform. Even in the European Parliament, the most vocal supporter of a treaty reform during the previous electoral period, debate on this subject is muted.
  • Fourth, the “Leitbild”-driven approach to EU policy has always been one element of the larger project of Germany’s integration into the West. Since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term, the normative project of the West seems to have come to an end, with some dubbing Merz already the first “post-Atlantic chancellor”.

While it is clear that the traditional “Leitbild” of a federal Europe has little support within the conservative parties, the German public, and among member state governments, the current government has developed no alternative vision for the future of Europe that could guide German EU policy in a new age of geopolitics and geoeconomics.

2. German leadership in Brussels and Strasbourg?

During her 2025 State of the Union speech, Ursula von der Leyen dedicated most of her speaking time to security, defence and external relations. However, the Commission’s powers in these areas are more than limited, except for trade policy, where it has made considerable progress in concluding negotiations on trade agreements with multiple partner countries. The German government supports the EU’s global promotion of free trade by means of bi- or multilateral trade agreements. However, it was the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni who achieved an extension of the deadline for the Council to adopt the agreement with the Mercosur countries.

With the election of a European Commissioner for Defence, the publication of the White Paper for European Defence, and the initiative to complete the internal market for defence, the Commission is trying to set the agenda for security and defence policy, but it is about to reach its limit of initiative soon. For further progress, the German government would need to take the initiative. But apart from Merz’s proposal to use Russian frozen assets for the most recent loan to Ukraine, which finally failed in the European Council, little impetus has come from Berlin.

Party-political priorities

“A competitive and prosperous Union”, the second priority that von der Leyen outlined in her last State of the Union Speech, enjoys the full support of the German chancellor. Together with 18 other heads of state or government, Merz proposed the so-called leaders retreat of the European Council in February 2026, for which the German and Italian governments agreed on a non-paper. This non-paper called for deregulation, digitalisation, and a more ambitious trade policy.

While the Draghi Report and the Letta Report are frequently quoted, the priorities of decarbonisation, green transition, enlargement and infrastructure investments feature less prominently on the political agenda than the recommendations for deregulation and completion of the common market. The German government’s competitiveness agenda is in line with the majority of conservative heads of state or government and reflects a party-political prioritisation.

Seeking alliances with the far right

The same can be found in the European Commission and more importantly in the European Parliament, where the chairperson of the European People’s Party’s (EPP) political group, Manfred Weber, is gradually replacing the traditional grand coalition with a right-wing majority. Cooperation between the EPP and the right-wing extremist parties in the European Parliament had already occurred during the previous legislative term. However, since the 2024 election, the political group seems to be following a clear strategy of limiting the left parties’ influence and allowing extremist parties to shape EU policies. The most recent example is the majority of the EPP, European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE) and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) for the joint amendment of the Regulation establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally.

German leadership by von der Leyen and Weber is changing the course of European policy towards deregulation and further reducing migration, but it is also altering the functioning of the EU’s political system. While the European Parliament has in the past been governed by the tradition of large compromises, Weber is currently strengthening party-political competition. In principle, a parliamentarisation of EU governance, where a parliamentary majority supports the Commission against an opposition could have been a step towards enhancing European democracy. However, offering anti-European extremists access to EU decision-making is no democratic progress. The EPP’s engagement with these political groups is so close that even the chairpersons of the CDU, Merz, and the CSU, Markus Söder, clearly disproved of it.

3. A transactionalist approach to European policy?

The third option of a new intergovernmental or even transactionalist approach to European policy based on mutual agreements with EU partner countries was the biggest hope for leadership by the German government. Traditionally, the Franco-German couple is considered the centre piece to such an approach. Following strained relations between French President Emanuel Macron and former German chancellor Olaf Scholz, a restart of the Franco-German engine was expected under Chancellor Merz.

However, good personal relations between the French president and the German chancellor do not guarantee joint political success. Instead, both governments are struggling to cooperate. Once dubbed the future of Europe, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) is likely to be terminated as the last mediation attempt has failed. While Germany strongly supported the trade agreement with the Mercosur countries, France voted against it. Even more irritating was that the German chancellor unilaterally announced unanimous support of all member states for the agreement following the European Council in October 2025, when neither its President António Costa nor the French president could remember a debate on the topic.

The French president shares the German government’s priority on deregulation but supports a different industrial strategy. Macron calls for more investments in Europe as he has called for a more autonomous European Union since he was elected in 2017, but he has received little support for this from three consecutive German governments. Traditionally, diverging views within the Franco-German couple are seen as a precondition for receiving wide support for joint initiatives among other member states, but currently the German government seems to consider the French president already a lame duck before next year’s election.

A pattern of going it alone

German-Polish cooperation was the second bilateral relationship Merz wanted to rely on in his European policy, with the aim of reviving the Weimar triangle of Franco-German-Polish cooperation. The return of Donald Tusk to government in 2023 provided a positive outlook for productive German-Polish cooperation. However, on 7 May 2025, the German Federal Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt issued instructions to refuse entry to asylum seekers arriving from safe states. This directive, which contravenes European law, put the governing Platforma Obywatelska (PO/EPP) under considerable pressure as it mobilised far-right extremists to protest at the German border and provided the then candidate backed by the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS/ECR) opposition party and now President of Poland Karol Nawrocki with a topic for his electoral campaign.

The German government’s behaviour repeated an established pattern of going it alone without the consultation of European partners, which could previously be observed in the cases of Germany’s exit from nuclear energy, the decision to stop the readmission of asylum seekers to EU member states, and the building of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The latest Alleingang has so far put an end to the revival of the Weimar triangle.

Unexpected close cooperation with Giorgia Meloni

An unexpected prospect for bilateral cooperation is Merz’ close relations with the post-fascist Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (FdI/ECR). Merz nurtured the debate on a “new power couple” when he stated during his first visit that “[t]here is a very broad consensus between our two countries on virtually all issues relating to European policy”.

This is, however, not the case, as the Italian government did not support Merz’ plan to use Russian frozen assets for the latest Ukraine loan, demanded additional safeguards for farmers to support the Mercosur agreement, and has traditionally a different approach to fiscal policy than Germany. In addition, it is unclear how Meloni’s initially appeasing approach to Trump will evolve since she criticised his interference in Greenland and the Middle East as well as his attacks on the pope. Whether this relationship will turn into a permanent basis for Germany’s European policy remains to be seen.

Conclusion: A new German European policy?

After one year in office, transformative impulses have come from German leadership in the Commission and the European Parliament. The German chancellor and his party support this agenda of deregulation, while the social-democratic coalition partner disapproves of it. That the EPP group in the European Parliament is offering right-wing extremists access to shaping EU policy bears considerable risks for the EU’s future, as the integration of extremist parties has failed as a strategy for containing them. Therefore, Manfred Weber should stop repeating mistakes at the EU level that have already been committed in several member states.

Despite the support for the EU’s competitiveness agenda and the call for a more sovereign Europe, the current German government has not developed a vision for the future of Europe that could guide its EU policy. Especially during the upcoming negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2028 to 2034, it will be necessary to develop a clear perspective for EU policy beyond deregulation if the next MFF is to strengthen the EU’s geopolitical actorness.

Germany needs less “Alleingänge” and more inclusiveness

Alleingänge, unilateral decisions that do not consider effects on partners, have become a key element of the EU policy of multiple German governments. Merz has created a new variant of it, the declaratory Alleingang, where the German chancellor announces European policy objectives or even achievements without having the necessary support. Liana Fix has recently warned that rearmament is on course to become Germany’s next Alleingang describing nightmare scenarios of a return to balance of power politics in Europe, which could result from it.

To avoid this and further Alleingänge, the German government should return to the long established, but recently neglected tradition of inclusive consultations with all EU member states. Considering their views is the first step to building support coalitions for German initiatives. The investment in long-term trust building with European partners is worth the investment and key to German leadership in the EU.

This article was first published in the Berlin Perspectives series of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP).


Pictures: Ursula von der Leyen and Friedrich Merz: European People's Party [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Julian Plottka: private [all rights reserved].

06 Mai 2026

EU Analytics – April 2026 review: EP presents itself fragmented for the multi-year EU budget fight

By Nicolai von Ondarza
AI-generated image of the European Parliament. A man in a suit is walking on a tightrope. In one hand he holds a book titled “MFF,” and in the other, a European flag. In the Parliament’s plenary chamber, members of Parliament are pulling on ropes. The members on the left are holding signs reading “EPP,” “S&D,” “Renew,” and “Greens,” while those on the right hold signs reading “ECR,” “PfE,” and “ESN.” In the background, other people in suits, identified by a sign reading “The Council,” are holding up national flags. The MEPs on the left appear cheerful, while those on the right and the representatives in the Council look agitated or angry.
The budgetary tightrope, as illustrated by ChatGPT.

Despite further geopolitical turmoil, April was another month in which the EU institutional machine rumbled on. The highlighted vote this month is on the EU’s multiannual budget, the MFF, which showed that for the fundamental decisions, the “von der Leyen” platform from the centre-right and centre-left is still required, and still working.

The other votes in the EP also point in this direction: At least for now, the majorities with the far-right remain the exception and the votes around the centre the norm. In the Council, we had only four public votes, but two of them were quite controversial – and in both cases Germany, among others, was outvoted.

Time to dive in:

Highlight of the month: EP vote on its position regarding the MFF

For this month’s highlight, I choose a closer look at the EP’s vote regarding the EU’s long-term budget, in EU speak the “multiannual financial framework” or, in short, MFF. The MFF sets the overall EU budget for a seven-year timeframe, with the next one covering 2028-2034. The negotiations on the MFF are usually among the most difficult in the EU: Although the EU budget covers only just above 1% of EU GDP (the EP is calling for 1.27% this time), as it stretches over seven years it sounds like an enormous amount of money, and it is of course highly relevant for all discussion of how much member states “pay into” the EU or “get out” of it.

The main action of these negotiations takes place in the European Council between the member states. In the past, there was usually at least one summit where negotiations broke down, including lots of hard bargaining between net payers and recipients, friends of cohesion, supporters of other policy areas, advocates of the EU showing it can also do austerity, and more. In 2020, of course, the negotiations were overshadowed by the Covid-19 pandemic, which eventually enabled the adoption of the “Recovery and Resilience Facility” on top of the usual MFF.

Pushing for changes in the MFF proposal

Currently, the aim of António Costa is to get an agreement in the European Council by the end of this year so as not to run into the 2027 French presidential election, though I am personally quite sceptical that this will be achieved. What is important for this analysis is that, after an agreement in the European Council, the European Parliament also has to vote in favour of the MFF.

In the past, this has allowed the EP to push for some marginal changes. Usually in the process, the EP asks for more money than the Commission or member states are willing to provide, and then the EP accepts the European Council result with some adaptations. The vote this month points in a similar direction: In its interim report, the EP is calling for a higher EU budget than the Commission proposed (while many net payers such as Germany want to set it lower). While the EP politically calls for defence and competitiveness as priorities, most of the additions it suggests are in agriculture and cohesion.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Politically, two aspects of the vote are worth highlighting: First, on this fundamental issue for the functioning of the EU, it is still the “von der Leyen” platform of centre-right and centre-left parties that matter. With a few rebels, the EPP, S&D and Renew voted in favour, plus the Greens. The number of rebels shows that depending on the final decision, this time it could become a close call: Overall, only 56% of the EP voted in favour. On the other side, all of the “Patriots for Europe” (PfE) voted against, all of the AfD-led “Europe of Sovereign Nations” (ESN) voted against and most of the ECR abstained. This includes the Italian ECR deputies from Meloni’s party FdI, who all abstained. Together, this shows that if the “von der Leyen” platform ever really breaks down, it will be hard for the EPP to get a majority for the EU budget with the far-right.

Secondly, the vote also creates an interesting map showing which national MEPs are reluctant to support the MFF in the form proposed by the EP. The report did not gain a majority amongst MEPs from France, Italy (due to FdI’s abstentions), from frugals such as the Netherlands, Austria or Denmark, from Central Europe (Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia) or from Malta. The reasons are different, but just like the negotiations within the European Council could be even more difficult this time, the vote suggests the MFF will not have smooth sailing in the EP either.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Final votes in the European Parliament

In April 2026, the EP had one plenary session, from 28-30 April in Strasbourg. In terms of the votes, there were a total of 51 votes recorded at HowTheyVote.EU. The comparably high number of votes for one plenary session is due to a series of budget/discharge votes on all the different EU institutions.

Looking at the data from these votes, the picture now familiar to readers of EU Analytics emerges:

On the one hand, the “von der Leyen” platform of centre-right EPP, liberal Renew and centre-left S&D remains the dominant majority. This month, Renew returned to its old centre position by being part of the majority in every single vote, though partially with the far-right. This meant that the S&D and EPP followed behind. But even the Greens were part of the majority in over 85% of the cases, not only in the budgetary vote analysed above but also in the many discharge votes. On the other side of the plenary, the ECR dropped below the Left, while the PfE (47.1%) and the ESN (27.5%) slipped back into a more oppositional role.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

The high degree of institutionalised votes was also visible in the co-voting behaviour. Here too, April 2026 was a month of more “traditional” pro-European votes, with EPP, S&D and Renew having the highest overlap, and the Greens not far behind. In contrast, the ECR was torn between worlds, neither having a strong overlap with the more far-right PfE nor, this month, with the centre-right EPP.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Notably, in my “far-right watch” category, there were two votes for which (parts) of the far-right were decisive for the majority. However, they looked more like weird majorities than like the “Venezuela” majority cases of previous months, where the EPP together with the ECR, PfE and ESN brought whole dossiers through the EP in a semi-coordinated fashion.

The first case was a vote on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank Group, which the S&D, Greens, the Left and also the ESN rejected, so the EPP and Renew got a majority with the ECR and PfE. The second was a rejection of a report on the Protection of the EU’s financial interests (combating fraud – annual report 2024), where only the EPP and (parts of the) ECR voted in favour, so S&D, Renew, Greens, Left, PfE and ESN together formed the rejecting majority. Both look more like accidental majorities to me, but I would need to dig deeper into the individual cases to be sure.

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always fewer. For April 2026, only four public votes were recorded, among the lowest number I have seen while doing this series. Of these, two were adopted by unanimity, but the other two had a notably high number of “no votes”:

  • The first contested vote was on a regulation on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques, thus falling in the often contested area of how to deal with GMO food in the EU. Here, six countries voted against (Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and three abstained (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany). That meant that it was both one of the closest votes I ever recorded – with only 66.5% of the represented population voting in favour – and showed that the largest EU country, Germany, can still be outvoted even when eight other governments also vote against or abstain:
Public vote on the regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques and their products. Source: Council of the EU.

  • The second contested vote regarded the production and marketing of forest reproductive material and had three no votes (Austria, Germany, Slovakia) plus Slovenia abstaining. Again, Germany was outvoted, this time with a full no vote.
  • Since Hungary had its important election in April, I will be curious how its voting behaviour changes over the course of the coming months. For now, the Orbán government is still technically in power. Nevertheless, the lifting of the veto on the €90bn loan for Ukraine (which was not a public vote) was already an important shift in policy.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.


Pictures: all graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

04 Mai 2026

EU to go – EU Inc.: Gamechanger für Europas Startups?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Wer als junges Unternehmen in Europa heute über nationale Grenzen hinaus wachsen will, stößt schnell auf einen Flickenteppich aus unterschiedlichen Unternehmensrechten, bürokratischen Hürden und hohen Kosten. Das bremst Expansion, schreckt internationale Investor:innen ab und trägt dazu bei, dass Risikokapital meist im nationalen Rahmen bleibt.

Genau darauf zielt EU Inc. ab: mit einer digitalen Gründung in 48 Stunden, europaweit einheitlichen Regeln und als ein sogenanntes 28. Regime – also eine freiwillige, EU-weite Rechtsform. Doch hält der Vorschlag, was er verspricht? Wo liegen seine Stärken und Schwächen, etwa bei den Mitbestimmungsrechten für Angestellte oder dem Rückgriff auf nationales Recht? Und wie fügt sich EU Inc. in die größeren Bemühungen ein, Europas Startup- und Scaleup-Ökosystem zu stärken, etwa durch den neuen Scaleup Europe Fund?

In der neuen Folge von EU to go diskutiert Thu Nguyen mit Marlene Schörner, Policy Fellow für EU-Finanzmärkte am Jacques Delors Centre, über den Vorschlag der EU-Kommission.

29 April 2026

Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen: Ein neuer Podcast zur politischen Stimmung in der EU

Die Podcastserie „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ ist eine Kooperation zwischen dem Europapodcast und dem Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“. Anhand von aktuellen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament sprechen Christoph Siekermann, Manuel Knapp und Manuel Müller über die politische Stimmung in der EU.

Monitoring Europe“ ist auch auf der Homepage des Europapodcast sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Seit 2014 erscheinen auf diesem Blog alle acht Wochen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament und Analysen, wie sich die Parteienlandschaft in der Europäischen Union entwickelt. Künftig gibt es dazu auch eine Audio-Erweiterung: In der neuen Sendung „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ spreche ich mit den Hosts des Europapodcasts, Manuel Knapp und Christoph Siekermann, über die Ergebnisse der letzten Projektion, die jüngsten Wahlen in EU-Mitgliedstaaten und andere Ereignisse, die sich auf die politische Stimmung in Europa niederschlagen.

Die Sendung verbindet fundierte Datenanalyse mit politischer Einordnung. Sie macht sichtbar, welche Dynamiken sich in den Mitgliedstaaten abzeichnen, welche Lager im Europäischen Parlament zulegen oder verlieren und welche Folgen das für zentrale europäische Debatten haben kann. Dabei greifen wir die Artikel auf dem Blog auf, tauchen darüber hinaus aber auch noch tiefer in einzelne Aspekte ein. Die einzelnen Folgen der Sendung sollen im Zweimonatsrhythmus immer in der Woche nach der Sitzprojektion erscheinen.

In der ersten Folge sprechen wir darüber, wie und warum die Sitzprojektion überhaupt entsteht, und nehmen dann die Ausgabe von letzter Woche in den Blick.

23 April 2026

European Parliament seat projection (April 2026): Has the far-right wave in Europe broken?

By Manuel Müller


Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
EP2024 46531367718878842533
EP today 46531357718581852731
Feb. 26 (B) 54371246417583104372418
April 26 (B) 52391247017378103362124
April 26 (D) 533912672173841063631
Baseline scenario,
as of 20 April 2026.
(Click to enlarge.
)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 20 April 2026.
(Click to enlarge.)

After 16 years in power, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz (PfE) suffered a crushing defeat in Hungary’s national parliamentary election two weeks ago, bringing a sigh of relief to democratic politicians far beyond Hungary’s borders. Speaking at the Global Progressive Mobilisation, a global social democratic network meeting held in Barcelona last weekend, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/S&D) was confident: “The time for the reactionary ultra-right is over!” 

Orbán’s defeat also received widespread media coverage far beyond national borders. Newspapers across Europe and around the world raised the question whether the downfall of the Hungarian prime minister, one of the most prominent leaders of the international New Right, means that the recent rise of the far right will also begin to recede elsewhere.

European trend reversal?

The answer to this question is complex, as demonstrated by two other political developments in EU member states over the past few days: In Bulgaria’s national parliamentary election last weekend, former president Rumen Radev’s newly founded PB (–) party won an absolute majority with a combination of economically left-wing, socially right-wing and geopolitically Eurosceptic-Russophile positions. Meanwhile, in Slovenia, liberal Prime Minister Robert Golob (GS/RE) has failed to form a governing coalition following his narrow parliamentary election victory in March. This could pave the way for either new elections or a return to power for Janez Janša (SDS/EPP), the right-wing authoritarian but reliably pro-Ukrainian former head of government.

There is no clear pattern emerging from this chain of events: While transnational figureheads such as Viktor Orbán certainly play an important role, the national party-political developments in the individual EU member states are intricate and sometimes contradictory. Whether the far-right wave has broken or not will not become evident from individual national elections, but rather from how the poll numbers for far-right parties are developing across Europe as a whole – in short: from the trajectory of the European Parliament seat projections reflecting the European political mood.

The rise ended in autumn 2025

In fact, the projection data has given centrist parties reasons to be cautiously optimistic, not only following Orbán’s defeat, but already since the beginning of the year. After the combined number of seats held by the three far-right groups in the European Parliament (ECR, PfE, and ESN) had grown almost continuously for several years, this trend halted in late autumn 2025.

It is difficult to determine whether there was a single cause for this. The most plausible explanation may be that the erratic behaviour of US President Donald Trump (R/IDU), the world’s most visible far-right leader, had such a deterrent effect on European voters that it also affected his ideological allies here.

Since then, the slight downward trend among Europe’s far-right bloc has continued. The current projection shows that the three groups combined will lose another seven seats compared to the last edition in late February. These losses are not due to a significant decline in one country, but are spread across several member states. This is consistent with the idea of a Europe-wide trend reversal: Almost everywhere in the EU, far-right parties are currently struggling a bit more than they were six months ago.

The losses are still small

It should also be noted, however, that these losses for the far-right bloc have so far been quite modest. Currently, the three groups together hold 217 seats. This is only ten fewer than at their peak in September 2025, and still thirty more than in the 2024 European election – in which, in turn, they performed better than in any previous election. Thus, by historical standards, the political mood in Europe still remains very far to the right. If there has been a trend reversal, it is, at best, in its very early stages.

In this situation, Viktor Orbán’s removal from power could well have a catalytic effect. The ousting of this prominent figure signals that the far right is not invincible, which can encourage and mobilise centrist and left-wing supporters in other member states. But whether the European far-right wave has been broken for good or whether Orbán’s defeat will soon be overshadowed by new developments in other countries, remains to be seen.

EPP weaker, S&D unchanged

A more detailed look at the current seat projection shows that, in addition to the three far-right parties, the centre-right European People’s Party has also suffered losses in recent weeks. Centre-right parties have recently seen a slight decline in Germany, Spain, Belgium and Latvia, among other countries, and Bulgaria’s GERB fell well short of expectations in the national parliamentary election.

In Poland, Greece, and Lithuania, however, EPP member parties were able to further consolidate their position as the strongest national force; and in Hungary, Péter Magyar’s Tisza party won the election by a wider margin than predicted by the polls. Overall, the EPP still reaches 173 seats (–⁠2 compared to February) in the baseline scenario of the projection: its worst result since the 2024 European elections, but still in line with the long-term average of the past five years.

For the centre-left S&D group, in turn, slight gains in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Belgium are offset by slight losses in Germany and Romania, among other countries. Overall, the group’s seat total remains unchanged at 124 (±⁠0), stuck on a historically low level since last summer.

Liberals make up for losses

The biggest winner of the last weeks has been the liberal RE group. In the February projection, it had fallen to a 12-year low, although this was primarily due to rather small poll fluctuations across several member states, all of which happened to point downwards.

Now, the Liberals can make up for some of these setbacks and are also seeing gains in a few other countries, such as Romania and Slovenia. This is only partly offset by new losses in the Netherlands, where D66 is slipping back in the polls following its unexpected national parliamentary election victory in autumn 2025. Overall, the RE group now stands at 70 seats (+⁠6) in the projection, which is a significant improvement on February’s figures, but remains one of the group’s weakest positions in recent years.

Greens are gaining ground

The Greens/EFA group is also projected to make significant gains. They are receiving a strong boost particularly in Germany, where their success in the Baden-Württemberg state election in March provided a morale boost and where they are also benefiting from the erratic course of the governing coalition of the CDU/CSU (EPP) and SPD (S&D) during the current oil crisis. Green/EFA member parties are also projected to make slight gains in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, while they are expected to lose ground in Lithuania and Latvia. Overall, the group is now projected to hold 39 seats (+2), its best result since fall 2025.

The Greens/EFA group is also gaining ground. They are increasing their support in Germany in particular, where their success in the Baden-Württemberg regional election in March boosted morale, and where they are also benefiting from the haphazard handling of the current oil crisis by the governing CDU/CSU (EPP) and SPD (S&D) coalition. Greens/EFA member parties are also making slight gains in the Netherlands and Czechia, while they are falling behind in Lithuania and Latvia. Overall, the group has increased to 39 seats (+⁠2), their best result since autumn 2025.

The Left, on the other hand, is performing slightly worse than in February, though this is due to very minor and, in some cases, likely random fluctuations in the polls in a few member states. Overall, it now stands at 52 seats (–⁠2), roughly in line with its long-term average.

Clear losses for ECR, slight decline for PfE and ESN

Within the far-right camp, the ECR group suffers the most significant losses due to slightly weaker poll numbers for its member parties in Greece, Lithuania, and Latvia, among other countries. Overall, the ECR group drops to 78 seats (–⁠5), its lowest level in over a year.

In the PfE group, in addition to Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, the member parties from Spain (Vox) and Portugal (Chega) are also experiencing a slight decline. Both parties had previously enjoyed several months of growth, but this now appears to be coming to an end. However, the opposite is true in Denmark, where the PfE member party DF made significant inroads in the national parliamentary election in March and has continued to perform well in subsequent polls. Overall, the PfE group has therefore decreased only slightly (103 seats/–⁠1).

Finally, the extremist ESN group is also suffering slight losses. While its largest member party, Germany’s AfD, recently achieved record-high results at the national level, the other parties in the group have been less successful. For instance, following its poor performance in the national parliamentary election, Bulgaria’s Vǎzraždane would now fail to win any seats at the European level. Overall, the ESN group now holds 36 seats (–⁠1), making it once again the smallest group in the European Parliament, behind the Greens/EFA.

Compared to their respective high-water marks (September 2025 for ECR and PfE, November 2025 for ESN), the ECR group has thus lost seven seats, while PfE and ESN have each lost two.

“Others” considerably stronger

Also down is the number of seats held by non-attached parties (21 seats/–⁠3). In Bulgaria, the liberal-populist DPS performed even worse than expected in the national parliamentary election. In Greece, the high-flying left-nationalist PE, which was still the strongest opposition party in the polls just a few months ago, seems to have reached the end of its run. Furthermore, the small German party PdF joined the RE group in March and therefore no longer appears among the non-attached.

By contrast, the “other” parties, which are not currently represented in the European Parliament and cannot be clearly assigned to any political group, have made considerable gains once again (24 seats/+6). By far the largest single party in this diverse group is Rumen Radev’s PB. If it were to replicate its performance in last weekend’s Bulgarian election in the upcoming European Parliament election, it could secure no fewer than ten seats. However, it is difficult to say whether any political group might welcome it. For what it’s worth, its arguably closest policy counterparts, the Slovak governing party Smer and the German BSW, both remain non-attached.

Another party that has gained ground is the Dutch far-right JA21, which was previously part of the ECR group and could return there if it wins seats in the European Parliament again. In addition, there are several small parties from Latvia that are new to the lineup:

  • ZZS is a heterogeneous electoral alliance that primarily advocates agrarian-conservative and moderate Eurosceptic positions. It previously held a seat in the European Parliament from 2014 to 2019, first as part of a Eurosceptic group and then with the Liberals.
  • SV is a right-wing Christian conservative Russian minority party. At the European level, it is a member of the European Christian Political Party (ECPP), whose members are divided between the ECR and EPP groups. However, it is unlikely that either of these groups would accept the very pro-Russian SV. It seems more plausible that they would join the PfE group or remain unaffiliated.
  • MMN is a centrist-populist party that advocates more direct democracy and wants non-partisan members of parliament and ministers. Given its opposition to party-based democracy, it would likely remain unaffiliated if elected to the European Parliament.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest, and also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. As a result, the ECR group and the group of non-attached parties are currently slightly stronger in the dynamic than in the baseline scenario. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.



Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
EP2024 46531367718878842533
EP today 46531357718581852731
Feb. 26 (B) 54371246417583104372418
April 26 (B) 52391247017378103362124
April 26 (D) 533912672173841063631

Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
DE 9 Linke
1 Tier
12 Grüne
3 Volt
12 SPD 3 FDP
3 FW
1 PdF
22 Union
1 Familie
1 ÖDP


23 AfD 3 BSW
2 Partei

FR 8 LFI

13 PS 14 RE 12 LR
34 RN


IT 11 M5S
2 SI
4 EV 20 PD
7 FI
1 SVP
25 FdI 6 Lega


ES 2 Pod
2 Sumar
1 Bildu
2 Sumar
1 ERC

18 PSOE 1 PNV
21 PP
12 Vox
1 SALF

PL

3 Lewica
19 KO
14 PiS 6 Konf 6 Konf 5 KKP
RO

7 PSD
4 USR
1 PMP
6 PNL
15 AUR



NL
3 GL
3 PvdA 5 D66
5 VVD
4 CDA

4 PVV 3 FvD
4 JA21

BE 2 PTB 1 Groen
2 Vooruit
3 PS
2 MR
2 LE
1 CD&V
1 CSP
4 N-VA 4 VB


CZ
2 Piráti


4 STAN
1 TOP09
4 ODS 9 ANO
1 SPD

EL 1 Syriza
4 PASOK
8 ND 2 EL 1 FL
2 PE
2 KKE
1 MéRA

HU



12 TISZA

8 Fidesz 1 MHM

PT
1 Livre
7 PS 2 IL 6 AD
5 Chega


SE 2 V 1 MP 7 S 1 C
4 M
1 KD
5 SD



AT
2 Grüne 4 SPÖ 1 Neos 4 ÖVP
9 FPÖ


BG


2 PP
3 GERB
1 DB



1 DPS
10 PB

DK 1 Enhl. 2 SF 4 S 1 V
1 RV
1 M
1 LA
1 K
1 DD 2 DF



SK


4 PS 2 Slov
1 KDH
1 D
1 SaS

2 REP 3 Smer
1 Hlas

FI 2 Vas 1 Vihreät 4 SDP 3 Kesk
3 Kok
2 PS



IE 5 SF


3 FF
1 II
3 FG



2 SD
HR
2 Možemo 4 SDP
5 HDZ



1 Most
LT
1 DSVL 2 LSDP 2 LS
3 TS-LKD 1 LVŽS



2 NA
LV
1 Prog

1 JV
1 NA
1 LRA
2 LPV


1 ZZS
1 SV
1 MMN
SI 1 Levica

1 SD 3 GS 3 SDS
1 N.Si





EE

1 SDE 1 RE
1 KE
2 Isamaa 1 KE 1 EKRE


CY 2 AKEL
1 DIKO

1 DISY 1 ELAM


1 ALMA
LU

1 LSAP 2 DP 2 CSV


1 ADR
MT

3 PL
3 PN





Timeline (baseline scenario)


Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
26-04-20 52 39 124 70 173 78 103 36 21 24
26-02-23 54 37 124 64 175 83 104 37 24 18
26-01-07 53 37 122 71 177 80 104 38 27 11
25-11-10 51 37 124 71 175 81 105 39 24 13
25-09-01 55 40 123 66 176 85 105 37 21 12
25-07-01 51 44 124 73 181 80 99 36 20 12
25-05-19 49 40 130 76 179 79 100 35 23 9
25-03-24 52 41 131 73 177 79 99 33 24 11
25-01-27 48 43 130 81 185 77 93 29 24 10
24-12-02 43 41 131 83 186 73 100 27 24 12
24-10-07 44 41 136 79 186 74 96 26 29 9
24-08-12 44 45 137 77 191 73 88 25 31 9
EP 2024 46 53 136 77 188 78 84 25 33

Timeline (dynamic scenario)


Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
26-04-20 53 39 126 72 173 84 106 36 31
26-02-23 55 37 126 65 176 90 104 37 30
26-01-07 54 37 123 73 177 86 106 38 26
25-11-10 52 37 126 73 175 86 109 39 23
25-09-01 56 40 125 68 177 89 107 37 21
25-07-01 52 44 126 75 181 84 101 37 20
25-05-19 49 40 132 78 179 82 101 36 23
25-03-24 52 41 132 74 179 82 103 33 24
25-01-27 49 43 132 82 185 80 96 29 24
24-12-02 43 42 133 82 186 77 104 27 26
24-10-07 46 41 137 79 187 77 97 26 30
24-08-12 45 46 138 78 191 76 89 25 32
EP 2024 46 53 136 77 188 78 84 25 33

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.) and RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). Occasionally, members of a single national party split into several political groups after the election; in such cases, a plausibility assumption (usually based on the status quo) is made about their distribution after the next European election. This currently applies to KE from Estonia. In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 7-17/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Italy: national polls, 3-16/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Spain: national polls, 8-18/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Poland: national polls, 3-15/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Romania: national polls, 4-10/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Netherlands: national polls, 13-18/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemis polls for the national parliamentary election, 9/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024;
Greece: national polls, 31/3-4/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Hungary: national parliamentary election results, 12/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Portugal: national polls, 14-15/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Sweden: national polls, 24/3-5/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Austria: national polls, 14-16/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Bulgaria: national parliamentary election results, 19/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Denmark: national polls, 19/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovakia: national polls, 13/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Finland: national polls, 7/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Ireland: national polls, 25/3-3/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Croatia: national polls, 26/3-5/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Lithuania: national polls, 28-30/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Latvia: national polls, 7/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Slovenia: national polls, 9-10/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Estonia: national polls, 5-8/4/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Cyprus: national polls, 26/3/2026, source: Wikipedia;
Luxembourg: national polls, 29/9/2025, source: Wikipedia;
Malta: national polls, 16/4/2026, source: Wikipedia.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

Correction note, 29/4/2026: In an earlier version of this article, the Lithuanian party NA was assigned to the ECR group in the dynamic scenario. In fact, it is likely to join the PfE group.
Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].