Memory Politics and Historical Grievances: Nawrocki’s Presidency Win Portends Gridlock and Animosity Ahead

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By Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek

“Poland First”: Karel Nawrocki aims to emulate Donald Trump’s MAGA movement.

It was a narrow victory. The turnout was the highest ever in any Polish presidential election since the collapse of communism. Karol Nawrocki, a relative outsider to Polish politics, won Poland’s presidential election with 50.89% of the votes to the 49.11% for Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw.

Nawrocki was hand-picked by Lech Kaczyński, the leader of the Euroskeptic PiS party (ECR), which has been eroding the rule of law in Poland through the previous PiS government-presidential alliance from 2015 to 2023. Since 2023, outgoing President Andrzej Duda (PiS/ECR) has regularly blocked legislation and policy initiatives of the current government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk (KO/EPP): PiS was looking for its new stand-in to serve the same position. The Polish president has some authority, including representation of Polish foreign policy, acting as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and vetoing legislation. He can also dissolve the houses of parliament in certain cases.

The result of Nawrocki’s victory may be contained to insurmountable gridlock, but it has the potential to trigger early parliamentary elections and to throw Poland back into a reign of rightwing politics. It also consolidates the winning electoral strategy in Poland of capitalizing on national sovereignty with exaggerated claims, instrumentalizing historical grievances, and inserting a solid dose of populism—an approach that ultimately sows the seeds of political polarization. The electoral outcome also carries heavy implications for Poland’s international relationships, notably with the EU, the US, Germany, and Ukraine.

How we got here

A few lines about Nawrocki: He is a historian, from Gdańsk, with a penchant for amateur boxing. Indeed, he cultivated this macho bravado image throughout his campaign through posts in the boxing ring and shooting range. He worked at the World War II Museum and the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, or IPN), which has the task of investigating and bringing justice to the crimes committed by Nazi Germany and by Communist authorities in Poland. Memory politics are important in Poland, and Nawrocki’s election shows that they—and the national grievances channeled through them—are here to stay.

Nawrocki leveraged the discontent among rural Poles and appealed strategically to the countryside. He was also able to distance himself from PiS’s missteps—casting himself as an outsider, one of the people, and his opponent as a member of the urban elite, disconnected from frustrations and needs of real, salt-of-the-earth Poles. It was a right-wing populist playbook that has worked well in many other elections worldwide—the 2024 US presidential election comes to mind. Time and time again, the strategy has proved itself. And it worked well here, too.

Vying for the far-right vote

After the first round, both candidates tried to vie for the votes of the other party candidates, in particular Sławomir Mentzen (Konfederacja/ESN), who represented a party even further to the right than PiS, and had received around 3 million votes (15%) in the first round of voting. Trzaskowski appealed to the business instincts of the Mentzen voters, with promises of cutting regulatory red tape. Nawrocki parroted Mentzen’s nationalist rhetoric against Ukraine and doubled down on his edge on memory politics and his support for traditional family values and guns. He also looked to bring onboard supporters of the extremely controversial radical right candidate Grzegorz Braun (KKP/–).

It was do-or-die for Nawrocki who, similar to US President Donald Trump in the 2024 US election, would have been facing legal troubles due to allegations of fraud had he lost. Also like Trump, Nawrocki was able to successfully spin these accusations to his benefit and sow doubt in the minds of Polish voters that the claims were exaggerated and politically motivated; PiS accused the KO government and “liberal media” of fabricating the scandals to try to derail Nawrocki’s bid. Now that he has won, the follow-through on any allegations has been thrown into question.

A fragile centrist government coalition

The stakes were high for Trzaskowski, too, who had already narrowly lost to Duda in 2020. For Trzaszkowski personally, it is unlikely KO will back his candidacy for a third time. For politics, it also spells disaster. After the KO-led coalition managed to secure a victory in the 2023 Polish parliamentary election, the hope was that a centrist president—Trzaskowski—could finally enable the coalition to deliver outcomes to Polish voters. So far, outgoing Polish President Duda has been able to block or veto most of the initiatives of the coalition.

Tusk’s troubles go beyond the PiS control of the presidency. The government has focused on being centrist, but this has translated as indecisiveness: no one is sure what exactly the government stands for or is trying to accomplish. The coalition is fragile, fraught with divisions and disagreements, and held together only by the parties’ joint dislike for PiS rather than any unified vision for Poland. The battle cry “we tried to get stuff done but President Duda stopped us” lacks the ring of conviction. Instead, Polish voters see eighteen months and little progress.

Nawrocki is primed to prevent any forward momentum

With this untenable situation, Prime Minister Tusk’s position is beginning to falter. Previously unable to put a foot wrong, there are hints he is becoming a political liability, and even his campaigning for Trzaskowski might be seen in hindsight as a strategic error. In a bid to reassert control, Tusk has called a confidence vote, which will take place this Wednesday. But even if he emerges victorious for now, there is an expiration date on how long the coalition can hold. If it remains unable to deliver on promises and bring real outcomes, Polish voters will lose patience. The risk of early parliamentary elections is high, and a second term in 2027 becomes implausible. Though one thing maybe giving some of the coalition partners a pause is that in new elections they might struggle to clear the 5% threshold to make it to the parliament. This means it might be better a better strategy to wait and buy time.

Nawrocki’s win is a resounding victory for the right-wing PiS and a sore defeat for the coalition of Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Indeed, the three right wing candidates, Nawrocki, Mentzen and Braun (an antisemitic extremist) together received 51% of the vote in the first round. Nawrocki touted the presidential election as a referendum of Tusk’s government. Certainly, Nawrocki will feel empowered to prevent any forward momentum of the KO government and will derail any initiatives. Any hopes of meaningful judicial reform, an overturn of the abortion ban, or advancing LGBTQ+ rights are squashed: Nawrocki can simply veto any of them or pass them over to the PiS-established conservative Constitutional Court.

Foreign policy implications

The election result has implications for Poland’s bi-lateral relationships and its position within the European Union. Duda followed the PiS party line on many things, but not all things. Nawrocki is a departure from this: he has shown himself to be ready and willing to serve as the executive conduit for PiS’s policy. His comments on the campaign trail suggest he is significantly more anti-EU and, in particular, anti-Ukraine than previous presidents, including President Duda. Nawrocki is focused on Poland’s sovereignty against external actors, including the EU, and he wants to project Poland’s strength.

For onlookers, one of the biggest impacts is on the perceptions and expectations of Poland: with a Trzaskowski victory, Poland would have firmly turned a page after the PiS period. But now, it feels like a swing back to the right, and one that might be even more significant.

The EU: Rejecting “ever-closer union”

PiS is proudly Euroskeptic, and Nawrocki is no exception. While Tusk’s government has worked to smooth over relations with the European Union, especially as Poland is just finishing its EU Council Presidency, Nawrocki is likely to walk back most of those efforts.

Indeed, Poland is now at risk of losing the Covid recovery funding: the EU unlocked funds earmarked for Poland after Tusk government put reforms in process, such as discontinuing the disciplinary measures on judges and starting proceedings to reinstate judges who were unlawfully removed by the PiS government. Nawrocki has indicated that he will put breaks on these and continue Duda’s veto, which means that the EU could potentially decide to freeze further disbursements if it deems that Poland is not carrying out the reforms to restore the rule of law.

Nawrocki will be able to make key appointments, including judges. He will also appoint a successor to the President of the National Bank of Poland, Adam Glapiński, whose mandate ends in 2028. Any appointment requires the approval of the Sejm, but given the current trajectory of Polish politics, it is likely Nawrocki would have a compliant chamber to rubber-stamp any nominee. This would ensure that the Euroskeptic line of the Polish central bank is prolonged by at least another six years. Indeed, that was among Nawrocki’s campaign slogans—that vote for him is a vote for the złoty; again, an emphasis on monetary sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the European Commission finds itself in a difficult position now with the Art. 7 procedure that it had opened against Poland in 2019 because of the rule of law violations of the previous PiS government. In 2024, the Commission dropped these proceedings after KO won and formed a government, even though there had been no substantive improvements in the Polish justice system. With Nawrocki able to veto any reform, such improvements are now also unlikely to pass in the future. But as there has been no further change, triggering a new Art. 7 procedure would be politically and procedurally suspect.

Only weeks ago, the Economist ran an article on Poland’s economic might—one of the best performing in Europe. The irony is that much of Poland’s growth is based in EU fund support and its most reliable trading partner—Germany—both of which Nawrocki is prepared to antagonize.

The US: A blueprint to emulate

Despite issues over domestic governance and the relationship with the EU, one of the defining aspects of Polish foreign policy over the years has been surprising consistency between the two opposing parties on some major foreign policy issues, like military buildup and a strong Transatlantic relationship. During the Trump administration, given Trump’s antagonistic stance towards the EU on tariffs and military spending, it can feel as though Poland’s relationship with the US or EU is mutually exclusive. It is clear which one Nawrocki is going to prioritize. To a degree, this is understandable. Poland faces an existential threat from Russia. In the short term, meaningful territorial defense is most possible partnered with the US and through continued US support in NATO. For now, the EU—even the coalition of the willing—does not seem to have the strength to defend Poland in hypothetical kinetic conflict. It has been a point of pride for Poland that the Trump administration and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has held Poland up as a paragon of defense spending excellence when compared to other European NATO members.

Nawrocki is cozy with the United States of Donald Trump. The two men met at the White House in May 2025, when Nawrocki was visiting for the National Day of Prayer. Trump gave Nawrocki a sign of support and urged him on, reportingly saying “you will win”. Nawrocki also aims to emulate the MAGA movement: while “MPGA” doesn’t quite have the same ring as “MAGA”, Nawrocki was more than happy to adopt Trump’s “America First” to make “Poland First” and “Poles first”—“Po pierwsze Polska; po pierwsze Polacy”.

Just a week before the second round of the Polish elections, the Conservative Political Action Committee (CPAC) hosted their convention in Poland—for the first time ever, and complementing the one hosted in Hungary. It was at CPAC, in Rzeszow, close to the Ukrainian border, where Nawrocki met with Kristi Noem, Trump’s Secretary of Homeland Security, who also advocated for Poles to vote for Nawrocki.

Nawrocki’s emulation of Trump flies counter to Polish public opinion, though. Polling from March 2025 showed that 46% of Polish respondents believed that Trump’s actions were bad for Poland; 29% saw his actions as a positive thing.

Germany: Reparations and strife

Next to the United States, Germany is one of Poland’s most important foreign policy partners. Germany is Poland’s most significant trading partner, and it runs a significant surplus. In 2024, Germany accounted for approximately 19.5% of Poland’s total imports—valued at approximately $74 billion. In the same year, Polish exports to Germany totaled approximately $102.93 billion, accounting for about 27.3% of Poland’s total exports for the year. (For Germany, Poland is its fourth most important partner both for exports and imports.)

Yet, Poland, and PiS in particular, has a complicated relationship with Germany, grounded in historical memory and grievances. The official PiS platform has bashed Germany and tried to discredit “pro-German” or “German-owned” media in Poland. Even non-PiS politicians find it hard to strike a delicate balance between avoiding political liabilities while facing the reality of the importance of the relationship. Prime Minister Tusk has consistently tried to downplay his friendly relationship with the government in Berlin—PiS leader Kaczyński has repeatedly dubbed Tusk a “German agent” in an attempt to discredit him.

In that sense, Nawrocki stuck to the PiS party line on remaining antagonistic towards Germany, grounded in part with his work on historical memory and pursuing reparations. Nawrocki has publicly demanded that Germany pay Poland 6.2 trillion złoty (approximately €1.3 trillion) in reparations for the destruction and atrocities committed during World War II. This figure is based on the 2022 “Report on Losses Incurred by Poland as a Result of German Aggression and Occupation 1939–1945,” prepared by PiS lawmaker Arkadiusz Mularczyk. He also implied that he would go head-to-head with the German government over various issues. With the transatlantic alliance already in tumult, such internal confrontations between EU and European NATO members are worrisome.

Ukraine: Antagonism over historic grievances

Nawrocki’s anti-Ukraine stance is the most notable. In the leadup to the election, PiS accused Ukraine of interfering in Polish elections, something that Nawrocki did not counter. Nawrocki has raised historical crimes in Volyn and linked the crimes to disputing both Ukraine’s membership to the European Union and to NATO saying that the country has no place in either organization until the history is answered for. He also signed Mentzen’s list of eight demands, which included that he would not sign any law to ratify Ukraine’s NATO membership and he responded to Braun’s request to squash the “Ukrainization” of Poland.

Such an anti-Ukraine stance is new for a Polish mainstream politician, especially one from PiS. Previously, the PiS party supported fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO. This started to shift ahead of the 2023 parliamentary elections: facing pressure from Konfederacja on the right flank, PiS started pandering more to the Ukraine-critical narratives and implementing policy, such as the agricultural import restrictions from Ukraine, to reach rural Poles. Nevertheless, Nawrocki’s stance is a step further, and more in line with the government in Hungary. Still, unlike his other far-right European counterparts like Slovakia’s Robert Fico (SMER/–) or Hungary’s Viktor Orbán (Fidesz/P), Nawrocki does support continued military assistance to help Ukraine.

There is falling support for Ukrainians among Poles, who are frustrated with the influx of migrants, luxury SUVs with Ukrainian plates clogging up traffic and speeding through their streets, and agricultural issues. Nawrocki successfully tapped into that frustration, especially among rural Poles, and took notes from the far-right playbook, which stoked fears amid growing Polish concerns over migration and cost of living.

What does the future hold?

The upshot is that despite all this, at least on foreign policy, Nawrocki will face challenges to implement any radical foreign policy agenda: in the same way that Nawrocki will try to block the government, the government will try everything possible to reduce the impact of the president and keep relations normal through their legislative capacity. Nawrocki might also tone down his language and demands, now that he is no longer campaigning. But the rhetoric still matters.

The domestic side might spell certain doom: President Nawrocki is in office until at least 2030. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2027, but snap elections are increasingly likely. A resurrected PiS and the strength of the far-right Konfederacja loom in the distance and could bring further trouble if it emboldens ever-more radical voices. Poles want to see change, but the tradeoff between the weak messaging of a seemingly ineffective left, ground to a halt, and a revanchist right, which is proud to block and stymie, rather than lead, could put Poland into another rule-of-law tailspin.

There was a sense that Poles were not voting for what they wanted but rather against what they did not want. As someone pointed out to me over dinner in Warsaw on Saturday night before the election, when voter turnout is about hate and rejection, the far right always capitalizes. For a brief moment on Sunday night, I thought they might be wrong. But Monday morning brought other news.

Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and a Clarendon Scholar and doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford.

Pictures: Karel Nawrocki: Aawiosnaa [CC BY 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].