Coalitions of the willing within the EU: Opportunities and risks of differentiated integration

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

Even if smaller states retain the right to participate in all EU policies, they may no longer be at the table when those policies are shaped and decided.

Differentiated integration – the idea that EU member states do not always have to proceed in unison, and that some may be more integrated than others – is likely to gain traction in the coming years. Differentiation is not a new phenomenon. It has existed for several decades, with the eurozone and the Schengen area being the most prominent examples. Nevertheless, key political actors have so far treated it as a last resort, generally preferring to move forward as the full EU27, even if this has meant more protracted negotiations.

Sidestepping internal resistance

In recent years, however, the EU’s existing procedures have repeatedly proved inadequate for its increased geopolitical role. In an era of fast-moving emergencies – from the asylum crisis to the pandemic to the war in Ukraine – the Union has often been slow to respond to changing circumstances. Unanimity requirements in particular have resulted in gridlocks and even attempts at political blackmail by individual member states. The prospect of EU enlargement further exacerbates these challenges. And while the European Parliament has proposed far-reaching treaty changes to improve the EU’s ability to act, these proposals have themselves stalled in the European Council due to the member states’ inability to reach agreement.

With treaty reform looking ever more unlikely, the European Commission has recently argued in a communication that internal differentiation should be “part of the equation” for enabling EU enlargement. This idea will resonate with France, which has long been open to more differentiated integration, and also with the new conservative-led German government, which is likely to be driven less by traditional federalist principles than by a desire to see its policy goals implemented. Instead of trying to overcome resistance from other member states, Germany and France could simply sidestep it by forming flexible coalitions of the willing.

Risks for European democracy – and for small member states

Such a normalisation of differentiated integration – be it in foreign, economic, migration, or other policies – could help resolve EU gridlocks. But it also entails significant risks. An uneven application of new EU rules could jeopardise existing integration achievements, such as the single market. Moreover, a proliferation of national policy opt-outs would hamper the emergence of a common European identity among citizens, and thus the goal of supranational democracy. For this reason, the European Parliament has always been the least enthusiastic of the EU institutions when it comes to differentiated integration.

Finally, normalising intra-European differentiation also poses a threat to the interests of smaller member states. In the EU27, small states are guaranteed a voice and play a role in the formation of majorities, which allows them to influence the common European position, even in areas where they lack a veto. Conversely, in a system of flexible coalitions, larger states can much more easily bypass smaller ones that they consider unnecessary for achieving a particular goal. Even if smaller states retain the right to participate in all EU policies, they may no longer be at the table when those policies are shaped and decided.

Models matter: “À la carte” or “concentric circles”?

To minimise these risks, the form that differentiated integration takes is crucial. The increased use of flexible coalitions corresponds to a model traditionally referred to as “à la carte” differentiation, in which the in- and out-groups vary according to the policy area. By contrast, the “concentric circles” model implies the creation of several tiers of member states: a highly supranationalised “core”, whose members would be deeply integrated across all policy areas, and a looser “outer circle”, whose members could more easily opt out but would also be more easily left out of certain policies.

Compared to the status quo, a concentric circles model could dynamize the EU and help resolve existing gridlocks. At the same time, in- and out-group membership would be more stable than under an à la carte model. As such, a concentric circles model would better safeguard the interests of smaller member states, at least of those within the core.

However, such a model would need a certain legal structure, with a new treaty defining the rights and obligations associated with the different tiers and possibly creating some specific institutions for the core. This, in turn, would require the sort of comprehensive institutional debate that EU member states have recently been shying away from. There is therefore a strong risk that, rather than achieving differentiation through concentric circles, the EU will just stumble towards a model of flexible coalitions for the sake of short-term convenience.

The EU is bound to change. The time to shape that change is now

This issue is particularly important for Finland. As a small member state on the EU’s geographical periphery, Finland has long seen it in its national interest to be at the table whenever decisions are taken, and has criticised instances where Franco-German bilateral agenda-setting has bypassed the views of smaller countries. While Finland would stand to benefit from a more dynamic EU capable of overcoming gridlocks, a normalisation of the flexible coalitions of the willing model can hardly be in its interest.

However, Finland has also been among the member states dragging their feet on EU institutional reform in recent years, unwilling to expend political capital on seemingly esoteric debates when more immediate issues were pressing. This neglect may come back to haunt Finnish policymakers in the future. With the EU’s geopolitical responsibilities rapidly increasing and enlargement knocking on the door, Europe’s institutional functioning is bound to change – for better or worse. The best time to actively shape that change is now.

This article was first published as a FIIA Comment by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Pictures: Chairs and table: Possessed Photography [Unsplash license], via Unsplash.