The new EU budget: Why Germany’s cost-cutting stance is weakening Europe

Deutsch

By Sophie Pornschlegel

The EU faces historic challenges, from competitiveness to security. Yet, at this critical moment, Germany wants to cut the already small EU budget.

The EU’s to-do list grows longer every year. It must strengthen the continent’s competitiveness to withstand pressure from the US and China. This requires large-scale investment in the single market, supply chains, energy infrastructure, and technological innovation. At the same time, the EU is asked to fund defence, security, and to continue its unwavering support for Ukraine. Not to mention all the other issues which it needs to deal with, such as energy, climate and agriculture.

But instead of providing the necessary resources, the next EU budget is likely to be cut in the negotiation process. In other words, the EU is expected to deliver results without incurring costs. This is the position adopted by the German government, alongside several other member states.

A drop in the ocean

Yet the EU budget is already rather small compared to the national budgets of its member states. The European Commission has proposed €1.7 trillion for the next seven-year financial framework (2028–2034). While this figure sounds substantial in absolute terms, it is a drop in the ocean in relative terms: The 27 member states allocate only around 1% of their gross national income to the EU. For comparison, Germany spends over 10% of its gross national income on its federal budget, with total public spending (including federal states, local authorities, and social security) reaching around 47%. In France, this figure is as high as 57%.

In addition, most EU money flows directly back to member states in the form of agricultural subsidies and cohesion funds, directly managed by the member states. Most of the EU budget is therefore not available to fund the EU’s new priorities.

Keeping pace with the challenges

To add to this already tight budgetary situation, there will be even less space to respond to the challenges in the coming years. A significant portion of the next budget is earmarked for repaying COVID-19 loans – around €23 billion annually. These repayments could consume up to 10% of the total EU budget. Adding to this is inflation: as it rises, the budget shrinks in real terms, leaving even less for the EU’s priorities. The next EU budget is likely to be similar in size as the current one, despite the growing challenges – and could even end up being smaller.

The EU thus faces an ever-growing list of tasks without the resources to address them. This sets the stage for a weakening of the EU. Since there is little public scrutiny of the EU budget negotiations, it becomes easy to blame the EU for failing to meet these challenges while portraying national governments as more effective – even though it is the national governments that do not give the EU the necessary (budgetary) tools to respond to the challenges effectively. It is no surprise that nationalist and far-right parties benefit from this situation.

Investing in the future must be doable

Compared to other international organisations, such as the United Nations, the EU still retains a much bigger “capacity to act”. The single market, trade policy, regulation in the tech sector, and consumer protection all make Europe stronger. Yet this capacity is now at risk – the less member states invest in the EU, the less the EU can do and the stronger the belief gets that individual nation states can better solve the problems.

But Germany cannot support Ukraine alone, nor does it have sufficient influence to assert its interests against the US or China. With an EU of 27 member states, the balance of power on the international stage shifts significantly.

So what should be done? Rather than advocating for cuts, Germany should support the European Parliament’s proposal to increase the EU budget by at least 10%. This increase is roughly equivalent to the amount earmarked for repaying COVID-19 loans – funds that cannot be actively used in the next EU budget.

New sources of revenue

Additionally, the German government should push for the EU to develop additional revenue sources, such as new taxes. Proposals under discussion include levies on emissions trading (EU ETS), the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), electronic waste, tobacco, new corporate levies for large companies with a net turnover of €100 million or more, as well as levies on online gambling and capital gains from cryptocurrencies. These measures would allow the EU to boost its budget without relying solely on member states.

The EU could also generate more revenue by rigorously enforcing existing regulations, particularly the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the AI Act. Companies that violate these regulations must face adequate sanctions. The billions generated could then be reinvested in Europe’s digital sovereignty. Yet, instead, member states – led by Germany – are pushing for deregulation. This is a strategic error that weakens the digital rights of EU citizens, reduces legal certainty, and eliminates an essential source of revenues.

Democratic infrastructure is non-negotiable

Should the German government remain committed to its spending cuts, it should at least ensure that programmes protecting the democratic foundations of our societies are not cut. The next EU budget allocates approximately 0.5% of its total – approximately €8.7 billion – to the AgoraEU programme, which aims to strengthen independent civil society, media, and culture.

By comparison, planned agricultural subsidies across the EU amount to €300 billion, around 35 times as much. The savings from cutting the AgoraEU programme would be marginal, but the damage would be immense. Resilient societies are less vulnerable to disinformation, hybrid attacks, and interference in elections and public discourse – a highly relevant issue, as demonstrated by Elon Musk’s interference in the 2025 German Bundestag elections.

The EU needs funding to deliver on its promises, and there are numerous options for where that funding can come from. Whether the EU can act effectively depends solely on the political will of its member states – and, to a large extent, the German federal government. Cutting the next EU budget would be a fatal mistake. Ultimately, Germany will decide whether the EU remains a global player or becomes a pawn of other major powers.

Sophie Pornschlegel is a Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre in Brussels and conducts research at Maastricht University on European sovereignty in defence and digital policy.

Images: Piggy bank: Braňo [Unsplash license], via Unsplash; portrait Sophie Pornschlegel: private [all rights reserved].

Der neue EU-Haushalt: Warum Deutschlands Sparkurs Europa schwächt

English

Von Sophie Pornschlegel

Die EU steht vor historischen Herausforderungen – von globalem Wettbewerb zu sicherheitspolitischen Krisen. Ausgerechnet jetzt setzt Deutschland auf kurzsichtige Sparsamkeit.

Die Aufgabenliste der EU wird von Jahr zu Jahr länger: Sie soll die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Kontinents stärken, um dem Druck der USA und Chinas standzuhalten. Dafür sind Investitionen in den Binnenmarkt, Lieferketten, Infrastruktur und technologische Innovation nötig. Gleichzeitig muss die EU in Verteidigung und Sicherheit investieren und sicherstellen, dass die Ukraine die notwendige Unterstützung bekommt.

Doch statt die notwendigen Mittel bereitzustellen, soll das nächste EU-Budget gekürzt werden: Die EU soll also liefern, aber bitte keine Kosten verursachen. Das ist die Position, die die deutsche Bundesregierung gemeinsam mit einigen anderen Mitgliedsländern derzeit in den EU-Budgetverhandlungen vertritt.

Ein Tropfen auf den heißen Stein

Dabei ist das Budget im Vergleich zu den nationalen Haushalten der Mitgliedsländer bereits absurd klein. Die EU-Kommission hat für den nächsten siebenjährigen Finanzrahmen (2028–2034) 1,7 Billionen Euro vorgeschlagen. Was in absoluten Zahlen nach viel Geld klingt, ist relativ betrachtet ein Tropfen auf den heißen Stein: Die 27 Mitgliedsländer geben nur etwa 1% ihres nationalen Bruttoeinkommens für die EU aus. Im Vergleich gibt Deutschland für den nationalen Bundeshaushalt über 10% des Bruttonationaleinkommens aus. Die gesamte Staatsquote (einschließlich Ländern, Kommunen und Sozialversicherungen) beläuft sich in Deutschland auf rund 47%, in Frankreich sind es sogar 57%.

Hinzu kommt, dass das meiste Geld aus dem EU-Budget in der Form von Landwirtschaftssubventionen und Kohäsionsfonds ohnehin direkt an die Mitgliedsländer zurückfließt – es sind sogar die Mitgliedsländer selbst, die die Gelder verwalten, und nicht die EU. Für die drängenden neuen EU-Prioritäten bleibt hingegen kaum Spielraum.

Das EU-Budget hält nicht mit den Herausforderungen mit

Dabei verschärft sich die Haushaltslage in den nächsten Jahren noch weiter: Ein großer Teil des nächsten Budgets ist für die Rückzahlung der Corona-Hilfskredite vorgesehen – etwa 23 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr. Diese Rückzahlungen könnten bis zu zehn Prozent des gesamten EU-Budgets verschlingen. Hinzu kommt die Inflation: Je höher sie ausfällt, desto kleiner wird das Budget in realen Werten, und umso weniger Geld gibt es für die EU-Prioritäten. Alles deutet darauf hin, dass das nächste EU-Budget höchstens so groß wie das aktuelle ausfallen wird – wenn nicht sogar kleiner.

Die EU erhält also eine immer längere Liste an Aufgaben, aber ohne die notwendigen Mittel, um diese zu bewältigen. Das setzt die Voraussetzungen für eine weitere Schwächung der EU. Da sich in der Öffentlichkeit nur wenige mit den EU-Budgetverhandlungen auseinandersetzen, ist anschließend einfach, der EU vorzuwerfen, dass sie den Herausforderungen nicht gerecht werde, und stattdessen die nationale Ebene als effektiver darzustellen. Dass davon nationalistische und rechtsextreme Parteien profitieren, erstaunt kaum – ihnen wurde der perfekte Steigbügel hingehalten.

Investionen in die Zukunft müssen möglich sein

Im Vergleich zu anderen internationalen Organisationen, die in Stagnation verfallen, hat die EU noch Handlungsmacht: Der Binnenmarkt, die Handelspolitik, die Regulierung von Tech und Verbraucherschutz – das sind alles Bereiche, die Europa stärker machen. Doch diese Handlungsfähigkeit steht nun auf dem Spiel. Zu glauben, dass die anstehenden Probleme von einzelnen Nationalstaaten gelöst werden können, ist nationalistisches Wunschdenken. Deutschland kann weder die Ukraine alleine unterstützen, noch hat es gegenüber den USA oder China ausreichend Macht, um seine Interessen durchzusetzen. Bei einer EU mit 27 Mitgliedsländern sieht die Macht auf der internationalen Bühne schon anders aus.

Statt sich für Kürzungen einzusetzen, sollte Deutschland deshalb dem Vorschlag des Europäischen Parlaments folgen, das das EU-Budget um mindestens 10 % aufstocken will. Dies entspricht in etwa der Summe, die für die Rückzahlung der Corona-Kredite vorgesehen ist – Gelder, die im nächsten EU-Budget nicht aktiv genutzt werden können.

Neue Einnahmequellen

Außerdem sollte sich die Bundesregierung für mehr eigene Einnahmequellen der EU einsetzen, etwa durch neue Steuern. Diskutiert werden verschiedene Vorschläge: Abgaben auf den Emissionshandel (EU-ETS), der CO₂-Grenzausgleichsmechanismus (CBAM), Abgaben auf Elektroschrott und Tabak, neue Unternehmensabgaben für Großunternehmen ab 100 Mio. Euro Nettoumsatz, sowie Abgaben auf Online-Glücksspiele und Kapitalgewinne aus Kryptowährungen. Damit könnte die EU ihr Budget aufstocken, ohne von den Mitgliedsländern abhängig zu sein.

Zusätzlich könnte die EU mehr Einnahmen erzielen, indem sie bestehende Regulierungen konsequent durchsetzt – insbesondere den Digital Services Act (DSA), den Digital Markets Act (DMA) und den AI Act. Unternehmen, die gegen diese Regulierungen verstoßen, müssen sanktioniert werden. Die daraus resultierenden Milliarden könnten in die digitale Souveränität Europas investiert werden. Doch stattdessen setzen die Mitgliedsländer –Deutschland an der Spitze – auf Deregulierung. Das ist ein schwerwiegender strategischer Fehler – nicht nur, weil damit die digitalen Rechte der EU-Bürger:innen geschwächt werden und die EU-Gesetzgebung weniger Rechtssicherheit liefert, sondern auch weil damit eine wichtige Einnahmequelle wegfällt.

Demokratische Infrastruktur ist nicht verhandelbar

Wenn die Bundesregierung partout nicht von ihrem Sparkurs für Europa abweichen will, dann sollte sie zumindest sicherstellen, dass relevante Programme, die die demokratischen Grundlagen unserer Gesellschaften schützen, nicht gekürzt werden. Das nächste EU-Budget sieht ca. 0,5% seiner Gesamtsumme – etwas 8,7 Milliarden – für das sogenannte AgoraEU-Programm vor, das eine unabhängige Zivilgesellschaft, Medien und Kultur stärken soll. Zum Vergleich: Die geplanten Agrarsubventionen in der gesamten EU belaufen sich auf 300 Milliarden Euro, also rund 35 Mal so viel.

Die Ersparnisse durch Kürzungen des AgoraEU-Programm wären marginal, der Schaden einer Kürzung jedoch enorm. Resiliente Gesellschaften sind weniger anfällig für Desinformation, hybride Angriffe und Einmischung in unsere Wahlkampagnen und Öffentlichkeit – ein hoch aktuelles Problem, wie nicht zuletzt die US-amerikanische Einmischung von Elon Musk in die deutschen Bundestsagswahlen 2025 gezeigt hat.

Die EU braucht Geld, wenn sie liefern soll. Und es gibt zahlreiche Optionen, woher das Geld kommen kann. Es hängt also einzig und allein am politischen Willen der Mitgliedsländer – und in erster Linie der deutschen Bundesregierung –, ob sie die EU handlungsfähig machen oder nicht. Eine Kürzung des nächstes EU-Budgets wäre ein fataler Fehler. Deutschland entscheidet letzlich, ob die EU in Zukunft global mitspielen kann oder zum Spielball anderer Großmächte wird.

Sophie Pornschlegel ist Senior Adviser beim European Policy Centre in Brüssel und forscht an der Universität Maastricht zu Fragen der europäischen Souveränität im Bereich der Verteidigung und der Digitalpolitik.

Bilder: Sparschwein: Braňo [Unsplash license], via Unsplash; Porträt Sophie Pornschlegel: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

EU Analytics – July 2026 review: Parliament’s self-defeat on “chat control”, and the ECR in limbo

By Nicolai von Ondarza

In this particular vote, the grey and blue parts of the diagram played a decisive role.

July was an eventful month for those looking into EU institutions: On “chat control”, the EPP used an institutional trick to bypass a majority of Parliament. But beware, on a closer look, in terms of substance the damage is smaller than made out in the online outcry. 

For the broader votes, this was another month where the far-right was decisive on quite a few votes, but several of them against rather than with the EPP.

Finally, in the Council, only one vote stood out, on the reform of air passenger rights.

Time to dive in:

Highlight of the month: EP majority failing to stop “chat control”

The most politically controversial, but also the most institutionally illuminating vote this month was a second-reading vote on a temporary derogation from the ePrivacy Directive, or, in political terms, against enabling “chat control”. The major twist here was that a majority in the EP voted against it, but not a majority of its members, so that the motion failed, and then the Council moved ahead regardless, all with the support of the EPP and the Parliament’s President Roberta Metsola. This deserves a bit of unpacking.

First, the political issue. I am looking at this from the institutional angle, not as an expert in online safety. My understanding is that, since 2021, a temporary derogation has disapplied parts of the EU’s ePrivacy Directive to allow providers of messaging and mail services to voluntarily scan for child sexual abuse and report it. This derogation was extended to April 2026. While the EPP in particular has called for a stricter regime, many opponents in the Parliament and beyond accused the EU of wanting to enable “chat control” and force providers to scan even encrypted material. Based on the objections, in March 2026 the EP’s plenary rejected the Commission’s proposals on this. In a normal procedure, this would have killed the process.

Using a procedural loophole

The second point is, however, that the Council and the EPP group in the European Parliament then used a procedural loophole. Rather than accepting the outcome, in early July the Council adopted its first-reading position and thus forced a second reading on a proposal the Parliament had just rejected. Crucially, within the ordinary legislative procedure, at second reading the Parliament needs a majority of its members, not just a normal majority, to overrule the Council.

Within the Parliament, the EPP group – with the support of “its” President Metsola – then used Rule 170 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure, the urgent procedure, to bring the file straight back to plenary. There, 360 MEPs (out of the current total of 719) would have been necessary to reject the Council’s position.

A legally correct trick to overrule the parliamentary majority

The vote then, thirdly, resulted in what amounts to a self-defeat of the European Parliament: Whereas 331 MEPs (51 per cent) voted in favour of the position against the Council and “chat control”, they fell short of the required threshold of an absolute majority of the House’s component members. The EPP (and, to a lesser extent, the S&D) thus both lost the vote and won the political fight, with huge damage to the EP as an institution.

Especially amongst the liberal, but also the far-right and far-left online communities, this was treated as proof of an undemocratic EU, which used procedural tricks to overcome a majority in Parliament. And although the trick was legally correct, in political terms it was exactly that: overruling the majority of Parliament.

Interestingly, as part of the procedure, two amendments were successful, one of which was in favour of a permanent carve-out exempting encrypted messages from scanning. And here, 362 MEPs voted in favour of the amendment, so the absolute majority of members was there; it just didn’t assemble for the final vote.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU.

Finally, the follow-up was also rather unusual. Instead of long Council deliberations, on 23 July 2026 the Council adopted the decision, though again on a temporary basis reinstating the derogation until 2028. It did so, however, by including the amendments adopted by the Parliament – including the carve-out for end-to-end encryption. After all the fighting, the majority in the EP did have the effect of limiting chat control and was not completely overruled by the Council. The new 2028 deadline also means that the final decisions on this dossier are again kicked down the road.

Institutionally, what remains is the question of whether this was a one-off institutional trick, or something we will see more often, especially on issues where the Parliament is fragmented. The Council, the Commission and the EPP have now learned that using the higher hurdles of the second reading is an option on very tight votes. I will certainly keep an eye on it.

Final votes in the European Parliament

In July 2026, the EP had one plenary session, from 6 to 9 July in Strasbourg. Overall, the plenary had 34 final votes recorded at HowTheyVote.EU. Key topics of the plenary included the contested adoption of the overhaul of air passenger rights, a debate on the June European Council, the starting debate on the 28th regime for the EU single market, a host of annual enlargement reports and the start of the Irish Council Presidency. Looking at the data from these votes, three interesting aspects emerge:

First, this was another plenary where the far right made its presence felt, as at least one far-right group was decisive for five of the 34 votes (roughly 15 per cent). As 23 of the 34 votes (67 per cent) were passed by broad consensus, this meant that the far right was decisive for almost half of the contested votes! However, there were different majorities behind it:

• Only one vote, an objection to land-use for renewable targets (e.g. via biofuels) was passed by the EPP with the three far-right groups, the by now traditional “Venezuela” majority.
• One very tight vote, passed by only 50 per cent, on the annual report of the European Investment Bank, was passed by a liberal, centre-right and conservative-right majority of Renew, EPP and ECR, plus a few rebels from the Patriots for Europe.
• Two further votes brought the anti-GM-maize majority back together, which consists of majorities of most groups except the EPP. (Personally, I have yet to figure out why the EP votes on genetically modified maize so often.)
• The fifth vote then was the vote analysed above, where the majority, with the help of the far right, voted against chat control and the EPP, but failed for procedural reasons.

This graph shows the number of times per plenary that far-right groups were decisive for votes. June was higher, but the level remains elevated. Data source: Own calculation based on HowTheyVote.EU.

The second observation is that, this month, the ECR looked more stranded in political no man’s land than usual. With only one “Venezuela” type vote, there was a strong overall voting overlap among the groups of the “von der Leyen” platform (EPP, S&D and Renew) and within the harder far right (PfE and ESN). Meanwhile, the ECR voted sometimes with the centre, sometimes with the far right, leaving it stranded between two blocs on this heatmap:

Heatmap of co-voting behaviour in the July plenary. Note the two green centres around the “von der Leyen” platform (plus the Greens) and the two further far-right groups, PfE and ESN. Data source: Own calculation based on HowTheyVote.EU.

The third observation concerns EU law-making. Although the treaties envisage a three-stage process in the ordinary legislative procedure, in practice almost all EU law is passed in so-called “first-reading agreements”. The change of the air passenger rights, however, has been so controversial that for the first time since 2024 Council and EP could not agree in the first or second reading, but had to go through a conciliation committee before finally reaching agreement at third reading.

This is only the second “third-reading agreement” in the current Parliament. The vote itself, though, was then very, very consensual, with 98 per cent approval and support by all party groups.

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always far fewer than the Parliament’s roll-call votes. For July 2026, summer was already approaching, with only five public votes. Of these, four were adopted by full unanimity – which means an 80 per cent consensus rate, though of course based on very few votes. A few interesting points stood out:

• The votes with full unanimity covered a broad range of topics: data protection, extending the access of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and OLAF to EU-wide value added tax (VAT) information, support amid rising fertiliser prices, and finally a special mechanism to allow a bilateral agreement between Austria and Switzerland.
• The one more controversial vote has a special history: It was a vote on air passenger rights protection, which was passed with two no votes (Spain, Latvia) and two abstentions (Austria, Finland). This was not an obvious blocking coalition, but in my view rather brought together sceptics with different motives. The reform itself was also controversial between the Council and the European Parliament and passed only in third reading after a conciliation committee, a very, very rare case (see above).

Voting result on the reform of EU air passenger rights, 13 July 2026. Data source: Council of the EU.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does additional institutional analysis.

Pictures: all graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

EU to go – Digital Omnibus: Vorfahrt für Big Tech?

In der neuen Folge von EU to go diskutiert Thu Nguyen mit Luise Quaritsch über den sogenannten Digitalen Omnibus und die Frage, ob Europa seine Digitalregeln sinnvoll vereinfacht oder den Interessen von Big Tech nachgibt.

Mit dem Digital Omnibus will die Europäische Kommission zentrale Vorschriften zu Datenschutz, Cybersicherheit und Künstlicher Intelligenz vereinfachen, um Unternehmen zu entlasten und Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu stärken. Doch das Gesetzespaket ist umstritten: Kritiker:innen warnen, dass die geplanten Änderungen weit über reinen Bürokratieabbau hinausgehen und den Schutz personenbezogener Daten und andere digitale Rechte schwächen könnten. Gleichzeitig steht der Vorwurf im Raum, dass insbesondere große US-Technologiekonzerne von der Deregulierung profitieren – und weniger europäische Unternehmen.

Wie weit darf die EU bei der Vereinfachung ihrer Digitalgesetze gehen? Droht der Datenschutz im Namen der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit ins Hintertreffen zu geraten? Und gelingt es Europa, Innovation zu fördern, ohne dabei digitale Grundrechte aufs Spiel zu setzen?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

EU Analytics – June 2026 review: The growing relevance of the far right

By Nicolai von Ondarza

No longer a marginal phenomenon: Far-right groups now quite regularly have a decisive impact on the outcome of votes in the European Parliament.

After last month looked more like the previous legislative period with the “pro-European” centre dominating, the June voting in both EP and Council underlined the fracturing European political landscape. In the EP, a centre-right-to-far-right majority pushed through major changes to EU migration policy in the shape of “return hubs”, delivering a major victory to far-right forces that pushed for such hardening of migration policy for a long time. But also outside of that there were several other votes where (parts of) the far right were decisive.

Over in the Council, there was another very close vote with six member states being outvoted on a regulation on farmers and food supply chains while the new Hungarian government voted (together with Vienna) against the rest of the EU for the first time.

Time to dive in:

Highlight of the month: EP vote on return hubs and home searches

In political terms, the most consequential vote this month was the EP vote approving a further hardening of EU migration policy, including setting the framework for speedier deportations of migrants with no legal right to remain in the EU, and setting up “return hubs” outside of the EU.

This was not only another example of the “Venezuela” majority of the EPP with the far right (ECR, PfE and ESN) that readers of this column will know well by now. It was an example where the centre-right together with the far right pushed through a major policy change throughout the whole policy process, from deliberation in the relevant committees, fending off amendments, adopting the EP position towards the Council and the Commission in the trilogue, and now finally adopting the legislation. An investigation by the German Press Agency dpa from March 2026 also shows that this was a case of clear coordination between the EPP and all three far-right groups, including the AfD-led ESN. When the final law was adopted, far-right MEPs chanted “send them back” in the EP plenary to celebrate their victory.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU.

The vote itself was, however, notably clear: 418 MEPs voted in favour (63%), and only 218 (33%) against. The majority was thus composed of the EPP together with all three far-right groups from the ECR to the Patriots for Europe to all ESN members, but also a majority of MEPs from Renew (37 to 21 with 20 abstentions/did not vote) as well as a few rebels from S&D (9) and the Greens/EFA (2). It was thus not only a repeat of previous “Venezuela” type votes, but also had a comparably strong support amongst Renew. As shown below, this is a recent trend, where we now have several votes of the centre-right-to-far-right majority supported by many in the “centrist” Renew.

This, then, was the clearest manifestation of the EPP moving to the right and the far right defining EU policy. “The era of deportations has begun,” claimed the Swedish negotiator for the ECR as a first group of EU countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Greece, are preparing to set up such return hubs.

Final votes in the European Parliament

In June 2026, the EP had one plenary session, from 15 to 18 June in Strasbourg. Overall, the plenary had 35 final votes recorded at HowTheyVote.EU. Key topics of the plenary included the EP positions on the various accession processes, competitiveness, the adoption of the final pieces implementing the EU-US Turnberry trade deal, migration policy as discussed above, and the adoption of the digital omnibus regarding AI. Looking at the data from these votes, three interesting aspects emerge:

First, not only on the return hubs, but also in other policy areas the far right made its influence felt. Of the 35 votes, there were seven (so 20 per cent!) in which at least one of the far-right groups was decisive for the vote. Whereas two of them concerned the return hubs, the five others were spread across different policy areas:

• In two separate votes a majority of EPP, ECR, PfE and some rebels from Renew voted in favour of new arrangements for excise duty applied to tobacco.
• A resolution on political repression and the humanitarian situation in Cuba was carried by the EPP with Renew and the ECR – so against both the further right and the centre-left to greens and far-left.
• A majority of EPP, ECR, PfE, ESN and parts of Renew formed a majority for implementing the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive.
• Finally, a majority against plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques comprised most of the von der Leyen platform, but due to many rebels needed the votes from the ECR to reach a rejection.

All told, these individual votes add to the complex picture of at least the ECR being needed more and more for majorities, also where the centre-left and centre-right groups are split.

Data source: Own calculation based on HowTheyVote.EU.

The second observation is closely related. This was a month where the “minority-type government” of the EPP really stood out in terms of winning the votes. Whereas the EPP was part of the majority in all but one of the votes – reaching a win rate of 97.1% - Renew was only at 94.3% and the S&D at 85.7%. This then is the first month I covered where the difference between the three parties of the “von der Leyen” platform was so large and so politically consequential.

Data source: Own calculation based on HowTheyVote.EU.

Finally, looking at all the votes and the co-voting behaviour, the strategic difference between the EPP and the far right still becomes clear. Despite the growing examples of a centre-right-to-far-right majority, on all of the 35 votes, the EPP still voted by 91% with Renew and by 83% with the S&D, compared to 71% with the ECR and, going further to the far right, only 43% with the “Patriots for Europe” and as low as 20% with the ESN, lower than even with The Left.

Data source: Own calculation based on HowTheyVote.EU.

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always fewer. For June 2026, a comparably high number of 11 votes were recorded. Of these, seven were adopted by unanimity, which is the highest share I have recorded since November last year (where nine out of ten were adopted by unanimity). But then there was also one vote with abstentions and one no vote each, as well as two with more no votes:

Voting result on a regulation on farmers and food supply chains, 29 June 2026.
(Source: Council of the EU. Click to enlarge.)

• The most controversial vote was on 29 June 2026 amending a regulation on farmers and food supply chains, with 3 member states voting against (Latvia, Netherlands, Sweden) and 3 abstaining (Germany, Denmark, Estonia). As amongst these were one big country (Germany) and three mid-sized (Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden), the overall vote was reasonably close, with “only” member states representing roughly 73 per cent of the EU population voting in favour. This was the regulation where the European Parliament wanted to include the infamous “veggie burger” ban, which was already taken out in trilogue. Still, the reasons it was controversial were questions of subsidiarity and restrictions on cultivated meat.
• This was the third month in a row where Germany abstained on one vote. In contrast to the aim of the Merz government to get rid of the “German vote”, Berlin is again abstaining quite regularly.
• Hungary, with the new Tisza government in power since 8 May, was outvoted for the first time. This was on a file on “circularity requirements for vehicle design”, where Budapest voted no together with Vienna.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does additional institutional analysis.

Pictures: all graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

Monitoring Europe: Warum Europas Rechte schwächelt und trotzdem gefährlich stark bleibt

Die Zahl des Monats lautet 211: So viele Sitze kämen derzeit im Basisszenario der EU-Sitzprojektion auf EKR, PfE und ESN zusammen. Das ist weniger als in früheren Projektionen, aber immer noch deutlich mehr als bei der Europawahl 2024. Auch wenn der europaweite Rückgang von Rechtsaußen kein bloßes statistisches Rauschen mehr ist, bleibt das Ausgangsniveau hoch. Vor allem Deutschland bildet mit dem weiteren Aufstieg der AfD einen Sonderfall.

In der neuen Ausgabe von „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ sprechen Christoph Siekermann und Manuel Müller darüber, was die vorläufige Trendwende bei den Rehtsaußenparteien ausgelöst haben könnte und warum diese noch nicht unbedingt bedeutet, dass Europa zur politischen Mitte zurückkehrt.

Ein Schwerpunkt der Folge liegt auf Ungarn, wo Péter Magyar und seine TISZA-Partei nach ihrem Wahlsieg weiter im Aufschwung liegen. Hat die EU hier einen neuen demokratischen Hoffnungsträger gewonnen, oder läuft sie Gefahr, Magyar zu schnell zu viel Vertrauen zu schenken? Außerdem geht es um neue Parteien in Bulgarien und Griechenland, um die Kategorie der „Sonstigen“ und um die Rolle der EVP bei der Mehrheitsbildung im Europäischen Parlament.

Die Podcastserie „Monitoring Europe – Wahlen und Zahlen“ ist eine Kooperation zwischen dem Europapodcast und dem Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“. Anhand von aktuellen Sitzprojektionen für das Europäische Parlament sprechen Christoph Siekermann, Manuel Knapp und Manuel Müller über die politische Stimmung in der EU.

„Monitoring Europe“ ist auch auf der Homepage des Europapodcast sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

EU to go – China-Schock 2.0: Wie sich die EU behaupten kann

In der neuen Folge von EU to go diskutiert Thu Nguyen mit Nils Redeker und Jannik Jansen über den sogenannten „China-Schock 2.0“ und die Frage, wie Europa auf Chinas wachsende industrielle Dominanz reagieren sollte.

Während der erste China-Schock vor allem einfache Konsumgüter betraf, steht heute der Kern der europäischen Industrie auf dem Spiel, und das in zweierlei Hinsicht: Traditionelle Schlüsselbranchen wie Automobil und Maschinenbau geraten unter Druck, während europäische Hersteller bei Zukunftstechnologien wie Batterien oder Solarmodulen längst weit hinterherhängen. Chinesische Unternehmen dominieren nicht nur auf dem heimischen Markt, sondern gewinnen zunehmend auch in Europa und auf Drittmärkten Marktanteile – unterstützt durch eine langfristige Industriestrategie, umfangreiche Subventionen und enorme Produktionskapazitäten.

Wie groß ist die Herausforderung für Europas Wirtschaft tatsächlich? Welche Rolle spielen Chinas Exportüberschüsse für die aktuelle Krise der deutschen Industrie? Und wie sollte die EU reagieren – mit Zöllen, neuen Schutzinstrumenten oder strengeren Regeln für chinesische Investitionen in Europa?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.