06 Februar 2025

FIIA Briefing Paper: Germany’s “perfect storm”

By Manuel Müller
Cover des FIIA Briefing Paper: Germany’s ‘perfect storm’: A structural crisis for the EU’s engine?

Ahead of the federal elections on 23 February, Germany faces numerous and profound structural challenges. In foreign and economic policy, growing geopolitical tensions – the loss of Russian energy supplies, the uncertainties surrounding the economic partnership with China and the prospect of an unfriendly US administration under Donald Trump – have undermined the country’s model based on global interdependence and open trade.

Domestically, Berlin is struggling with the consequences of long-term underinvestment in public infrastructure, limited innovation capacity and sluggish productivity growth. Despite the country’s reliance on labour migration, public opinion has become increasingly hostile to immigrants. At the same time, the rise of the far-right AfD (ESN) has severely limited post-election coalition options and led to conflicts between centrist parties over the future of the cordon sanitaire.

Setbacks in EU policy

All of this has not been without an impact on Gemany’s role in the European Union. The “traffic light” coalition entered the 2021-25 legislature with high ambitions for EU policy. Since then, however, both Germany’s leading role in the EU and its long-standing partnership with France have suffered severe setbacks. Not least Germany’s reactions to the wars in Ukraine and in Gaza have sparked criticism and dented the country’s credibility.

At the same time, no credible alternatives have emerged to replace the role of the Franco-German tandem. On the contrary: Many other EU member states are struggling with similar problems as Germany. Even if recent developments have affected Germany’s status in the EU, the Union will hardly be able to overcome its internal and international crises without Germany’s contribution and leadership. Still, solving the many structural problems will not be easy: Even if the next German government is more stable than the recent one, it will still be subject to the same economic constraints and domestic political pressures.

In a new Briefing Paper for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), my colleagues and I take a look at the German situation ahead of the federal elections. The full Briefing Paper is available here.

FIIA is also organising a discussion on the federal elections next Wednesday, 13 February, at the Finnish Parliament in Helsinki. As a guest speaker, we will welcome Nicolai von Ondarza, Head of the EU/Europe Research Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). More information on the event here.


Picture: Cover of the FIIA Briefing Paper, based on a photo by Kay Nietfeld, DPA / Lehtikuva.

FIIA Briefing Paper: Deutschland vor der Bundestagswahl

Von Manuel Müller
Cover des FIIA Briefing Paper: Germany’s ‘perfect storm’: A structural crisis for the EU’s engine?

Vor der Bundestagswahl am 23. Februar steht Deutschland vor einer Vielzahl von strukturellen Herausforderungen. Außen- und wirtschaftspolitisch stellen die wachsenden geopolitischen Spannungen – das Ende der russischen Energieimporte, die Unsicherheiten um die Wirtschaftspartnerschaft mit China und die Aussicht auf eine unfreundliche US-Regierung unter Donald Trump – das bisherige deutsche Erfolgsmodell in Frage.

Innenpolitisch kämpft Berlin mit den Folgen anhaltender Unterinvestitionen in die öffentliche Infrastruktur, einer eingeschränkten Innovationsfähigkeit und einem schwachen Produktivitätswachstum. Obwohl das Land auf die Einwanderung von Arbeitskräften angewiesen ist, ist die öffentliche Stimmung zunehmend migrationsfeindlich geworden. Zugleich schränkt der Aufstieg der rechtsextremen AfD (ESN) auch die Koalitionsoptionen nach der Wahl erheblich ein und führt zu Konflikten zwischen den Parteien der Mitte über die Zukunft der „Brandmauer“.

Europapolitische Rückschläge

Das alles hat sich auch auf Deutschlands Rolle in der Europäischen Union ausgewirkt. Die Ampel-Koalition startete 2021 mit hohen europapolitischen Ambitionen in die Legislaturperiode. Doch seitdem haben sowohl die deutsche Führungsrolle in der EU als auch die langjährige Partnerschaft mit Frankreich Rückschläge erlitten. Nicht zuletzt Deutschlands Reaktionen auf die Kriege in der Ukraine und im Gazastreifen haben Kritik ausgelöst und die Glaubwürdigkeit des Landes beschädigt.

Gleichzeitig haben sich keine glaubwürdigen Alternativen herauskristallisiert, die die führende Rolle des deutsch-französischen Tandems ersetzen könnten. Im Gegenteil: Viele andere EU-Mitgliedstaaten haben mit ähnlichen Problemen zu kämpfen wie Deutschland. Auch wenn die jüngsten Entwicklungen Deutschlands Status in der EU beeinträchtigt haben, wird die Union ihre internen und internationalen Krisen kaum ohne Deutschlands Beitrag und Führungsrolle bewältigen können. Doch eine Lösung für die zahlreichen strukturellen Probleme wird nicht einfach zu finden sein: Selbst wenn die nächste deutsche Bundesregierung stabiler ist, als es die Ampel zuletzt war, bleibt sie denselben wirtschaftlichen Zwängen und demselben innenpolitischem Druck ausgesetzt.

In einem neuen Briefing Paper für das Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) werfen meine Kolleg:innen und ich einen Blick auf die Lage in Deutschland vor der Bundestagswahl. Das vollständige Briefing Paper (auf Englisch) ist hier zu finden.

Außerdem organisiert FIIA am kommenden Mittwoch, 13. Februar, eine Diskussionsveranstaltung zur Bundestagswahl im Auditorium des finnischen Parlaments in Helsinki. Als Gastredner begrüßen wir Nicolai von Ondarza, Leiter der Forschungsgruppe EU/Europa der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Mehr Informationen zu der Veranstaltung gibt es hier.


Bild: Cover des FIIA Briefing Paper, basierend auf einem Foto von Kay Nietfeld, DPA / Lehtikuva.

04 Februar 2025

Der EUROMAT zur Bundestagswahl 2025

Von Manuel Müller

In weniger als drei Wochen steht die Wahl des neuen Deutschen Bundestags an – und damit auch eine Richtungsentscheidung für die Europäische Union. Die neue Bundesregierung, die aus dieser Wahl hervorgeht, wird im Rat der EU an der europäischen Gesetzgebung beteiligt sein, sie wird ein Vetorecht in der gemeinsamen Außen-, Sozial- und Haushaltspolitik besitzen, sie wird eine tonangebende Rolle spielen, wenn es um institutionelle Reformen oder die Erweiterung der EU geht. Und auch Parteien, die im Bundestag in der Opposition sind, können für Europa wichtig sein, indem sie zum Beispiel mit Parteien aus anderen Ländern zusammenarbeiten und in der öffentlichen Debatte den Ton setzen.

Mit ihrem Stimmzettel werden die deutschen Wähler:innen deshalb großen Einfluss auf die Ausrichtung der EU in den kommenden vier Jahren nehmen. Aber wofür stehen die Bundestagsparteien in der Europapolitik eigentlich genau? Irgendwie „für Europa“ zu sein, nehmen fast alle von ihnen in Anspruch, doch will man es genauer wissen, muss man sich meist tief in die Details der Wahlprogramme einlesen. Oder man nutzt den EUROMAT.

Mit dem europapolitischen Wahlkompass EUROMAT können Sie Ihre Standpunkte zu 25 europapolitischen Thesen mit denen der Parteien im Deutschen Bundestag – SPD (SPE), CDU/CSU (EVP), Grüne (EGP), FDP (ALDE), AfD (ESN), Linke (EL) und BSW (–) – vergleichen. Er funktioniert ähnlich wie der bekannte Wahl-O-Mat, konzentriert sich aber auf Fragen mit europapolitischer Bedeutung.

25 Thesen, sieben Parteien, ein Thema: Europa

Der EUROMAT zur Bundestagswahl 2025 ist ein gemeinsames Informationsangebot der Bürgerbewegung Pulse of Europe, der Jungen Europäischen Föderalist:innen Deutschland, des Graswurzel-Thinktanks Polis 180 und des Blogs Der (europäische) Föderalist. Er schließt an frühere EUROMAT-Ausgaben zu den deutschen Bundestagswahlen 2017 und 2021 und zur Europawahl 2024 an und baut auf deren Erfahrungen auf. Vor allem in zwei Bereichen gibt es wichtige Neuerungen:

  • Erstens haben wir die Thesen im EUROMAT nicht den Parteien selbst vorgelegt, sondern ihre Positionen aus den Wahl- und Parteiprogrammen abgeleitet. Das hat zum einen praktische Gründe, da Parteien in der Vergangenheit oft nicht, nicht vollständig oder erst sehr spät auf unsere Anfragen geantwortet haben. Zum anderen hat es aber auch den Vorteil, dass wir im EUROMAT keine von den Parteien auf uns maßgeschneiderten Antworten präsentieren, sondern eben jene Standpunkte, die sie auch in ihren wichtigsten programmatischen Texten vertreten.
  • Zweitens gibt es zu jeder These im EUROMAT jetzt einen kurzen Text, der in wenigen Sätzen zusammenfasst, worum es bei dem Vorschlag geht und welche die wichtigsten Argumente dafür und dagegen sind. Dieser Ansatz geht auf Feedback von Nutzer:innen früherer EUROMAT-Ausgaben zurück, denen es teils schwer gefallen war, eigene Positionen zu den Thesen zu beziehen – auch weil sie mangels einer breiten öffentlichen Debatte zur Europapolitik zu wenig Informationen dazu hatten. Die kurzen Erklärtexte sollen dem abhelfen und zugleich dazu einladen, sich eigenständig weiter mit den Hintergründen der Thesen zu beschäftigen.

Ansonsten funktioniert der EUROMAT genau wie immer: Als Nutzer:in bewerten Sie 25 Thesen mit „Stimme zu“, „Stimme nicht zu“ oder „Neutral“ – von der europäischen Außenpolitik über Wirtschaft, Asyl und Klima bis zu institutionellen Grundsatzfragen. Sie können einzelne Thesen überspringen sowie Thesen, die Ihnen besonders wichtig sind, im Nachhinein doppelt gewichten. Anschließend berechnet das Programm, wie weit Ihre Antworten mit denen der Parteien übereinstimmen. Zum Abschluss können Sie einzelne Parteien anklicken und nachlesen, wie diese ihre Standpunkte im Wahl- oder Parteiprogramm begründet haben.

Mehr zum Entstehen des EUROMAT finden Sie hier. Auf diesem Blog ist der EUROMAT über die Website euromat.info eingebunden. Personenbezogene Daten fallen bei seiner Nutzung kaum an; insbesondere werden die von Nutzer:innen eingegebenen Standpunkte nicht gespeichert. Die dazugehörige Datenschutzerklärung gibt es hier.

The EUROMAT for the 2025 German Bundestag election

By Manuel Müller

The election of the new German Bundestag is less than three weeks away – and, as always, it will also be a decision on the future of the European Union. The new German government that emerges from these elections will be involved in European legislation in the EU Council; it will have a veto in common foreign, defence, social, tax, and budgetary policy; it will play a leading role in matters of EU enlargement and institutional reform. And even parties in opposition in the Bundestag can be important for Europe, for example by cooperating with parties from other countries and setting the tone in public debate.

With their ballot papers, German voters will therefore have a major influence on the direction of the EU over the next four years. But what exactly do the parties in the Bundestag stand for when it comes to European policy? Almost all of them claim to be “pro-European” in some way, but if you want to find out more, you usually have to dig deep into the details of their election manifestos. Or you can use the EUROMAT.

The EUROMAT is an election tool that allows you to compare your views on 25 European policy statements with those of the parties in the German Bundestag – SPD (PES), CDU/CSU (EPP), Greens (EGP), FDP (ALDE), AfD (ESN), Left (EL) and BSW (–). It works similarly to the well-known Wahl-O-Mat or other voting advice apps, but focuses on questions of importance for EU policy.

25 statements, seven parties, one topic: EU policy

Der EUROMAT zur Bundestagswahl 2025 ist ein gemeinsames Informationsangebot der Bürgerbewegung Pulse of Europe, der Jungen Europäischen Föderalist:innen Deutschland, des Graswurzel-Thinktanks Polis 180 und des Blogs Der (europäische) Föderalist. It follows previous EUROMAT editions for the German Bundestag elections in 2017 and 2021 and for the 2024 European elections, and builds on their experience. There have been two major changes in two areas in particular:

  • Firstly, we did not ask the parties themselves for their views on the EUROMAT statements, but inferred their positions from their manifestos and party programmes. This is partly for practical reasons, as in the past the parties have often not responded to our requests or have responded very late. At the same time, it has the advantage that the EUROMAT does not present tailor-made answers that the parties have written only for us, but rather the positions they take in the main programmatic texts that they also use as their policy guidelines themselves.
  • Secondly, each statement in the EUROMAT is now accompanied by a short text summarising its context and the main arguments for and against it. This is based on feedback from users of previous EUROMAT editions, some of whom found it difficult to form their own opinions on the statements – partly because they had too little information about them due to the lack of a broad public debate on EU policy. The short explanatory texts aim to address this problem, while inviting users to further explore the background to the issues themselves. 

Otherwise, the EUROMAT works in the same way as always: as a user, you rate 25 statements – covering a wide range of issues such as European foreign policy, the economy, migration, climate action, as well as fundamental institutional issues – with “agree”, “disagree” or “neutral”. You can skip individual statements or give double weighting to statements that are particularly important to you. The EUROMAT then calculates how closely your positions match those of each party. Finally, you can click on individual parties and read how they justify their positions in their manifesto or party programme.

You can read more about the background of the EUROMAT here. The EUROMAT is embedded into this blog via the euromat.info website. Hardly any personal data is collected during its use; in particular, the answers entered by users are not stored. The privacy policy of the EUROMAT can be found here.

30 Januar 2025

European Parliament seat projection (January 2025): “Patriots” lose ground, Left and Greens make gains

By Manuel Müller


Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
EP2024 46531367718878842533
EP today 46531367518880862531
Dec. 24 (B) 434113183186731002724
12
Jan. 25 (B) 48431308118577932924
10
Jan. 25 (D) 49431328218580962924
Baseline scenario,
as of 27 January 2025.
(Click to enlarge.
)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 2 December 2024.
(Click to enlarge.)

In the US, Donald Trump (Rep./IDU) has been re-inaugurated as president; in Germany, the CDU (EPP) is cracking up the firewall that has so far kept the AfD (ESN) out of political influence and polarising the campaign for the federal election of 23 February: Political events have become quite turbulent in recent weeks, and it has often been parties on the far right end of the political spectrum that have benefited.

If we look at the European election polls, however, the recent results of the far-right parties have been mixed at best. Compared to the last projection in early December 2024, the largest far-right group, Patriots for Europe (PfE), has lost many seats, while the ECR and ESN have made slight gains. In contrast, the most significant progress has been made by the Left group, and also the Greens are in a slightly better position than two months ago. The three “platform” groups – the centre-right EPP, the centre-left S&D and the liberal RE – have all suffered slight losses.

EPP weakening in Germany

In the case of the European People’s Party, these losses are mainly due to Germany, where the CDU/CSU is clearly leading in the federal election campaign but has been gradually losing support since early December. (Most of the polls included in this projection were conducted before the recent asylum policy initiative by chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz). The Austrian ÖVP has also lost significant support following the announcement of coalition talks with the FPÖ (PfE). In Poland and Latvia, the governing EPP parties are similarly polling slightly worse than before.

In other countries, however, the EPP has made gains in recent weeks. In Hungary, there was a much-commented poll putting the EPP’s Tisza party well ahead of the governing Fidesz (PfE) – although it remains to be seen whether they will be able to consolidate this lead. The Portuguese AD and the Dutch CDA have also improved slightly. Estonia’s Isamaa, which has dominated national polls since the end of 2023, would now narrowly win a third seat in the European Parliament. Overall, the EPP group would still have 185 seats (–⁠1 compared to the December 2024 projection).

Slow decline of the S&D

The situation for the European Socialists is similarly mixed. They have made some gains in Germany and Bulgaria (where they are part of the newly formed coalition government); in Sweden they are consolidating their position at the top of the national party landscape.

By contrast, the slow decline of the Socialists continues in Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Lithuania. All in all, this brings the group to 130 seats – just one less than in December, but the S&D’s worst figure in the projection since October 2022.

RE expels member party

The RE group also suffered losses (81 seats/–⁠2). The polls themselves are mixed for the Liberals. They have made slight gains in the Netherlands and slowed down their long slide in Slovenia, but they are slipping further in Portugal and would only just make it into the European Parliament in Italy.

However, there is something that has a greater impact on the seat projection than these fluctuations: Following the split of the Bulgarian RE member party DPS in the summer of 2024, the group decided to expel the larger successor party DPS-NN, led by media tycoon Deljan Peevski, who is suspected of corruption. Only the smaller successor party (known as APS or “DPS-Dogan”) will remain in the group.

Left and Greens gain ground

Meanwhile, the biggest gains in recent weeks have been made by the Left, which has improved to 48 seats (+5). The German Linke, the Spanish Podemos, the Portuguese CDU and the Greek Syriza have all made some progress after a long slump; the Dutch animal rights party PvdD would now narrowly re-enter the Parliament. All these gains are based on relatively small fluctuations in the polls, and it remains to be seen whether they will stabilise in the coming weeks. But for the time being, the Left Party has achieved its best result in the projection since spring 2023.

The Greens also slightly increased their number of seats. In both Germany and Austria, they benefited from the end of unpopular coalitions with the FDP (RE) and ÖVP (EPP). In total, the Greens/EFA group now stands at 43 seats in the projection (+2).

ECR with new arrival from Spain

On the right of the parliamentary spectrum, the ECR also made gains in the projection (77 seats/+4). In Latvia, the NA has strengthened its position as the largest national party, in Sweden the SD has once again replaced the Moderaterna (EPP) as the strongest force in the right-wing bloc, and in Poland the PiS has again pulled ahead of the PO (EPP) in several polls.

Moreover, the ECR Group is benefiting from the arrival of the Spanish right-wing populist party SALF. SALF won three MEPs in the European elections, two of whom were now admitted to the group. Only party leader Alvise Pérez himself, who is facing several charges in Spain for illegal campaign financing, remains non-attached for the time being.

The small far-right group ESN has also grown stronger in the polls since December (29 seats/+2). This is mainly due to the German AfD, which made gains in the federal election campaign.

Setbacks for the PfE

The picture looks very different for the largest far-right parliamentary group, the PfE. With a loss of seven seats, it is the biggest loser of the last eight weeks (93 seats/–⁠7).

These losses are particularly pronounced in the Netherlands, where the PVV has only been part of the government for six months, but has already caused the first serious coalition crisis in November with its incendiary anti-Muslim rhetoric. Hungary’s Fidesz and Czechia’s ANO have also recently suffered setbacks. Moreover, the alliance between the Czech Přísaha and Motoristé parties recently collapsed, leaving each party too weak to win seats in the European Parliament.

Non-attached and “others”

There has been little change among the non-attached parties. While Germany’s BSW and Slovakia’s Hlas-SD fell slightly, the Czech Stačilo (an electoral alliance around the post-communist KSČM) would now win a seat in the European Parliament again. All three parties represent left-conservative and Eurosceptic positions. With the entry of the Bulgarian DPS-NN and the departure of the Spanish SALF, the overall number of non-attached parties remains unchanged at 24 seats (±⁠0).

The “other” parties – i.e. parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament and do not belong to a European party, so that cannot be clearly assigned to a political group – suffered slight losses (10 seats/–⁠2).

New to the tableau is the left-wing MéRA25 from Greece – the national offshoot of the Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25) that was founded in 2016 by former Greek finance minister Yánis Varoufákis with the aim to democratise the EU by 2025. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian far-right party MECh and the Hungarian satirical party MKKP would not win seats in the Parliament any more.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest. In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.



Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
EP2024 46531367718878842533
EP today 46531367518880862531
Dec. 24 (B) 434113183186731002724
12
Jan. 25 (B) 48431308118577932924
10
Jan. 25 (D) 49431328218580962924

Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
DE 4 Linke
1 Tier
12 Grüne
3 Volt
15 SPD 4 FDP
3 FW
27 Union
1 Familie
1 ÖDP


18 AfD 4 BSW
2 Partei
1 PdF

FR 8 LFI
4 EELV 11 PS 19 RE 9 LR
30 RN


IT 9 M5S
2 SI
3 EV 19 PD 3 IV/+E 8 FI
1 SVP
24 FdI 7 Lega


ES 2 Sumar
3 Pod
1 Bildu
2 Sumar
1 ERC

18 PSOE 1 PNV
22 PP 1 SALF 9 Vox
1 Junts

PL

4 Lewica 3 PL2050
18 KO
2 KP
19 PiS 3 Konf 4 Konf

RO

9 PSD
4 USR
1 PMP
5 PNL
2 UDMR
7 AUR

3 SOS 2 POT
NL 1 SP
1 PvdD
3 GL
3 PvdA 6 VVD
3 D66
4 CDA
1 BBB

9 PVV


BE 2 PTB 1 Groen
2 Vooruit
2 PS
1 O-VLD
3 MR
2 LE
2 CD&V
1 CSP
3 N-VA 3 VB


CZ
1 Piráti


3 STAN
1 TOP09
1 KDU-ČSL
3 ODS 9 ANO
2 SPD 1 Stačilo

EL 2 Syriza
4 PASOK
6 ND 2 EL 1 FL
2 KKE
1 PE
1 NIKI
1 MéRA
1 KD
HU

1 DK

11 TISZA

8 Fidesz
1 MHM

PT 1 BE
1 CDU

6 PS 1 IL 8 AD
4 Chega


SE 2 V 1 MP 8 S 1 C
4 M
5 SD



AT
2 Grüne 4 SPÖ 2 Neos 4 ÖVP
8 FPÖ


BG

2 BSP 2 PP
1 APS
5 GERB
1 DB
1 ITN

3 V 2 DPS-NN

DK 1 Enhl. 3 SF 4 S 2 V
2 LA
1 K
2 DD



SK


4 PS 2 Slov
1 KDH
1 SaS

1 REP 4 Smer
2 Hlas

FI 1 Vas 1 Vihreät 4 SDP 2 Kesk
4 Kok
3 PS



IE 4 SF


5 FF
4 FG



1 SD
HR
2 Možemo 4 SDP
5 HDZ



1 Most
LT
2 DSVL 2 LSDP 2 LS
2 TS-LKD 1 LVŽS



2 NA

LV
1 Prog 1 SDPS
1 JV
2 NA
1 LRA
1 LPV


1 ZZS
1 ST!
SI 1 Levica

1 SD 3 GS 4 SDS





EE

1 SDE 1 RE
1 KE
3 Isamaa
1 EKRE


CY 1 AKEL
1 DIKO

3 DISY 1 ELAM



LU
1 Gréng 1 LSAP 1 DP 2 CSV 1 ADR



MT

3 PL
3 PN





Timeline (baseline scenario)


Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
25-01-27 48 43 130 81 185 77 93 29 24 10
24-12-02 43 41 131 83 186 73 100 27 24 12
24-10-07 44 41 136 79 186 74 96 26 29 9
24-08-12 44 45 137 77 191 73 88 25 31 9
EP 2024 46 53 136 77 188 78 84 25 33

Timeline (dynamic scenario)


Left G/EFA S&D RE EPP ECR PfE ESN NI other
25-01-27 49 43 132 82 185 80 96 29 24
24-12-02 43 42 133 82 186 77 104 27 26
24-10-07 46 41 137 79 187 77 97 26 30
24-08-12 45 46 138 78 191 76 89 25 32
EP 2024 46 53 136 77 188 78 84 25 33

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.

An overview of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).


Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Republicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Czechia: TOP09 (1, 3, 5 etc.) and KDU-ČSL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: TD: PL2050 (1, 3, 5 etc.), KP (2, 4, 6 etc.). In Czechia, some polls combine ODS (ECR), TOP09 and KDU-ČSL (both EPP); in these cases, two thirds of the seats are allocated to the ODS and one third to the alliance of TOP09 and KDU-ČSL. For Poland, the projection assumes that the members of the Konfederacja are equally divided between the ESN and PfE groups. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 21-27/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
France: results of the first round of the national parliamentary election, 30/6/2024, source: Wikipedia,
Italy: national polls, 8-13/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Spain: national polls, 11-24/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Poland: national polls, 11-24/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Romania: Ergebnisse der nationalen Parlamentswahl, 1/12/2024, source: Wikipedia,
Netherlands: national polls, 20-25/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Belgium, Dutch community: polls for the national parliamentary election, 24/11/2024, source: HLN,
Belgium, French community: polls for the national parliamentary election, 24/11/2024, source: HLN,
Belgium, German community: results of the European election, 9/6/2024,
Czechia: national polls, 13-21/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Greece: national polls, 10-21/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Hungary: national polls, 10/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Portugal: national polls, 5/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Sweden: national polls, 6-12/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Austria: national polls, 15-21/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Bulgaria: national polls, 12-20/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Denmark: national polls, 19-22/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Slovakia: national polls, 13-17/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Finland: national polls, 7-17/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Ireland: national polls, 11-22/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Croatia: national polls, 10-25/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Lithuania: national polls, 20/12/2024, source: Wikipedia,
Latvia: national polls, December 2024, source: Wikipedia,
Slovenia: national polls, 15-23/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Estonia: national polls, 19-21/1/2025, source: Wikipedia,
Cyprus: national polls, October 2024, source: Europe Elects,
Luxembourg: results of the European election, 9/6/2024,
Malta: national polls, 17/11/2024, source: Wikipedia.

Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller.