EU to go: Europa unboxed – ein Gespräch mit Markus Preiß

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Warum wirkt Brüssel für viele wie eine Blackbox – und wie lässt sich die EU verständlich erklären?

In dieser Folge von EU to go spricht Thu Nguyen mit Markus Preiß (ARD-Hauptstadtstudio) über die Kunst, Europa sichtbar zu machen. Sie diskutieren, warum politische Kommunikation in Brüssel andere Herausforderungen hat als in Berlin, und sprechen über Preiß’ aktuelles Buch „Angezählt – Warum ein schwaches Deutschland Europa schadet“.

Eine Folge über politische Kommunikation, Deutschlands Rolle in Europa – und die Grenzen des Machbaren in einer EU im Krisenmodus.

After Zeitenwende: Germany and the future of Europe’s security

Deutsch

By Oleksiy Kandyuk

Can Germany step up to lead a renewed and more resilient European security order?

In 2025, Europe finds itself at a historical crossroads. Russia’s continued war against Ukraine, the erosion of US security guarantees under the second Trump presidency, and the increasingly volatile global security landscape have exposed deep vulnerabilities in the European security architecture. As these trends converge, the call for stronger European defence capabilities and more autonomous leadership grows louder. At the heart of this moment lies a critical question: Can Germany, Europe’s largest economy and most influential political power, step up to lead a renewed and more resilient European security order?

Zeitenwende

Until recently, Germany has hesitated to assume such a role. Anchored in its post-1945 identity as a “Zivilmacht” (civilian power), Berlin traditionally avoided assertive military strategies, relying instead on diplomacy, trade, and multilateral institutions. This strategic culture – rooted in the logic of “Wandel durch Handel” (change through trade) – was supported by the implicit assumption that the United States would continue to underwrite Europe’s security indefinitely. That assumption no longer holds.

The current context demands a fundamental rethink of Germany’s defence posture and foreign policy doctrine. The Zeitenwende – first announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022 – marked a rhetorical turning point, recognizing the need for significant defence investment and a more assertive role within NATO and EU structures. However, the implementation of Zeitenwende has so far been constrained by budgetary politics, institutional inertia, and public hesitancy.

Ambiguities with consequences

This ambiguity has had tangible consequences. Without a more consistent approach from Germany, Europe’s response to mounting security challenges has often been fragmented and reactive.

Germany’s refusal to supply Taurus long-range missiles to Ukraine in 2023/24, despite sustained allied pressure, reinforced divisions within NATO and the EU over military aid. Delays in implementing the €100 billion special defence fund and hesitation over procuring F-35 fighter jets further stalled progress toward enhancing Europe’s collective defence posture. Germany’s eventual move to acquire the F-35 represents not just alignment with the US, but a necessary step to maintain interoperability and operational credibility.

In the realm energy security, Germany’s initial reluctance to endorse a comprehensive embargo on Russian gas imports significantly complicated and delayed the EU’s collective response to the war. While several member states, notably Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary, also expressed reservations rooted in their structural energy dependencies, Germany’s position carried disproportionate weight due to its central role in shaping EU policy and its longstanding entanglement with Russian energy infrastructure, notably through Nord Stream I and II.

Germany’s hesitation compelled other member states to adopt fragmented national energy strategies. This disjointed response undermined the EU’s credibility as a coherent geopolitical actor and exposed the structural asymmetries in its energy architecture. While Berlin has since recalibrated its stance – accelerating LNG infrastructure, reducing import dependencies, and promoting joint gas purchasing mechanisms – its initial ambivalence revealed the enduring tensions between national economic calculations and the imperatives of collective strategic autonomy. Moving forward, Germany’s ability to lead on energy security will depend on its willingness to internalise and act upon the geopolitical consequences of past policy choices.

Germany’s strategic reassessment

Under the emerging leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz and the new CDU-led coalition, Germany is signalling a sharper strategic shift. Merz has openly called for a “radical overhaul” of the country’s security apparatus. In a moment of candour, he acknowledged the uncomfortable reality: “The absolute priority must now be to strengthen Europe quickly so that we can step by step become independent of the United States”.

This sentiment, unthinkable in mainstream German politics a decade ago, reflects the gravity of current threats and the diminishing reliability of transatlantic guarantees. It also speaks to a deeper recognition: that Germany’s traditional low-profile approach is no longer sufficient. Already, tangible changes are underway. In early 2025, Germany passed a historic constitutional amendment removing debt limits on defence spending. This move expands and deepens the Zeitenwende, pushing Germany beyond the limits of its civilian-power legacy.

Seeking a more assertive role

Germany is actively seeking a more assertive role in European security initiatives, especially in response to uncertainties surrounding US commitments under the Trump administration. While initiatives like the proposed EU-led “Coalition of Willing” for Ukraine are primarily driven by the UK and France, Germany is making significant contributions to bolster its position within multilateral defence frameworks.

For example, in December 2024, Friedrich Merz proposed the creation of a new European contact group comprising Germany, France, Poland, and the UK. This group aims to coordinate arms deliveries to Ukraine independently of the US-led “Rammstein format”. Germany is also initiating dialogues with France and the UK regarding shared nuclear deterrence as a complement to the existing US nuclear umbrella. In October 2024, Germany and the UK signed the Trinity House Agreement, aiming to deepen bilateral defence cooperation across all domains. Germany additionally leads the European Sky Shield Initiative, launched in October 2022, which involves joint procurement of air defence systems among 15 European nations.

From Zeitenwende to Epochenbruch

However, obstacles remain. Despite growing support for increased defence spending (66% of population as of March 2025), Berlin’s strategic culture has not fully caught up. Public debate is still shaped by ambivalence about the use of force, and bureaucratic sluggishness continues to delay military procurement and deployment.

Additionally, Germany’s cautious stance on supplying advanced offensive weapons to Ukraine – such as persisting refusal to deliver Taurus long-range missile systems (despite increasingly positive signals from Merz) – highlights the limits of its current strategic shift. In many ways, Germany is still in transition: rhetorically committed to change, structurally struggling to deliver.

To meet the challenge of this new geopolitical era – what the new chancellor has called an Epochenbruch (historic turning point) – Germany must transform its current trajectory into a sustainable strategy of European leadership. The following steps are critical:

1. Institutionalise strategic culture change

Germany must embed the principles of Zeitenwende into its institutional frameworks. This means streamlining military procurement, creating clear operational mandates for Bundeswehr deployments etc. A permanent National Security Council – integrating foreign, defence, and economic policy – would help coordinate strategy and accelerate implementation.

Friedrich Merz has already expressed strong support for such an initiative, presenting it as a key component of his broader vision for a more agile and coherent national security architecture. The chancellor has emphasised that “the world will not wait for us” , highlighting the urgency of moving from ad hoc responses to structural readiness.

2. Lead, don’t follow, in European defence

Germany should take the initiative to establish a permanent EU defence coordination body – an institutional mechanism designed to significantly enhance Europe’s ability to respond swiftly to crises. Such a body, situated within or closely affiliated with the European External Action Service (EEAS), would go beyond the current mandates of the EU Military Staff or ad hoc coalitions by providing a standing platform for operational planning, intelligence coordination, and rapid decision-making among coalitions of willing member states.

Unlike existing structures that operate on the basis of consensus and are often limited in flexibility, this new mechanism could function on a modular and mandate-based model, allowing for deeper integration while remaining anchored in the EU’s institutional architecture. It would not duplicate NATO but rather complement it, filling a coordination gap at the EU level in situations where the Alliance is politically constrained or not institutionally engaged. Moreover, such a body could serve as a driver for consolidating multiple ongoing initiatives – such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the Strategic Compass – into a more coherent and operationally effective framework.

3. Work within and beyond EU institutions

The European Commission has taken on a more visible role in security and defence policy – through existing and new initiatives such as the European Defence Fund, PESCO, Military Mobility Action Plan and White Paper for European Defence. These mechanisms have helped streamline joint capability development, enhance cross-border troop movement, and incentivize collaborative R&D among member states. However, despite these ambitions, the Commission’s institutional mandate remains limited. It lacks the legal authority to direct member state defence policies or to lead joint military operations.

Therefore, Germany’s effort to lead in European security must include active cooperation with pan-European initiatives that operate both within and outside formal EU structures. This means avoiding a selective or nationally fragmented approach and instead implementing a strategy that reflects a truly European logic of defence integration.

4. Align with France and Poland on strategic frameworks

The Weimar Triangle – long dormant as a formal vehicle of strategic coordination – possesses significant untapped potential to serve as a cornerstone of European defence and security architecture. France’s longstanding advocacy for European strategic autonomy, Poland’s assertive security orientation towards the Eastern flank, and Germany’s pivotal economic and logistical role form a natural division of labour. In light of mounting geopolitical pressures and a fragmenting transatlantic consensus, reactivating this trilateral format could address critical gaps in Europe’s capacity to act collectively on defence, procurement, and crisis response.

However, the viability of the Weimar Triangle is contingent upon political alignment among its members. The re-election of President Donald Tusk has temporarily brought Poland’s European policy back into closer alignment with the EU’s strategic direction. But this is not guaranteed to endure beyond the current legislature and the Triangle’s long-term coherence will hinge on anchoring Poland’s participation in a broader, societally embedded consensus on European integration and strategic autonomy. As such, the Triangle’s revitalization must be seen not as a fait accompli, but as a time-sensitive opportunity demanding institutional entrenchment, public legitimacy, and clear deliverables now.

There have been encouraging initial steps: The planned Weimar Triangle military exercises in 2025 – hosted by Poland and centred on hybrid threats and interoperability – could become a foundational template for broader EU joint force planning. France’s accession to the German-Polish-Dutch military mobility pact strengthens operational logistics for rapid deployments and offers a practical layer of integration. Moreover, the alignment of defence ministers on Ukraine-related support – including harmonised equipment transfers and political backing for Kyiv’s EU/NATO trajectory – demonstrates an emerging consensus on core strategic priorities. Merz’s decision to prioritise Paris and Warsaw on his inaugural foreign visits, alongside the establishment of a Franco-German Defence and Security Council and a symbolic Franco-Polish treaty, underscore a deliberate effort to restore trilateral credibility. Nevertheless, further institutionalisation is essential – potentially through a standing secretariat, regularised high-level summits, and formalised mechanisms for joint capability development.

5. Embrace political responsibility

Above all, Germany must shed its reluctance to lead. As the EU’s largest member state, Germany has both the capacity and the responsibility to act decisively. This means not only contributing financially, but setting the political agenda, rallying consensus, and defending European interests in an increasingly hostile world.

Germany’s transformation from a civilian power into a strategic actor is far from complete. But if pursued with clarity and commitment, it could mark the beginning of a more autonomous, coherent, and secure Europe. In a world where the rules are being rewritten, United Europe cannot afford a hesitant Germany. It needs a Germany that leads.

Oleksiy Kandyuk is the current Walter Benjamin Professor at the University of Konstanz.

This article was first published in the Berlin Perspectives series of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP).

Pictures: Chess knight: Arthur A (americanaez225) [Unsplash License], via Unsplash; portrait Oleksiy Kandyuk: private [all rights reserved].

Nach der Zeitenwende: Deutschland und die Zukunft der Sicherheit in Europa

English

Von Oleksiy Kandyuk

Kann Deutschland die Führung für eine erneuerte und widerstandsfähigere europäische Sicherheitsordnung übernehmen?

Im Jahr 2025 steht Europa an einem historischen Scheideweg. Der andauernde Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine, die Aushöhlung der US-Sicherheitsgarantien unter der zweiten Amtszeit von Donald Trump und die zunehmend volatile globale Sicherheitslage haben tiefgreifende Schwachstellen in der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur offenbart. Angesichts dieser Entwicklungen wird der Ruf nach stärkeren europäischen Verteidigungskapazitäten und einer autonomeren Führungsrolle immer lauter. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei eine entscheidende Frage: Kann Deutschland, Europas größte Volkswirtschaft und einflussreichste politische Macht, die Führung übernehmen, um eine erneuerte und widerstandsfähigere europäische Sicherheitsordnung zu ermöglichen?

Zeitenwende

Bis vor Kurzem zögerte Deutschland, eine solche Rolle zu übernehmen. Geprägt von seiner nach 1945 entwickelten Identität als „Zivilmacht“, vermied Berlin traditionell militärisch orientierte Strategien und setzte stattdessen auf Diplomatie, Handel und multilaterale Institutionen. Diese strategische Kultur – verwurzelt in der Logik des „Wandels durch Handel“ – basierte auf der impliziten Annahme, die Vereinigten Staaten würden Europas Sicherheit auf unbestimmte Zeit immer weiter gewährleisten. Diese Annahme gilt nicht mehr.

Der aktuelle Kontext erfordert ein grundsätzliches Umdenken in der deutschen Verteidigungspolitik und außenpolitischen Doktrin. Die „Zeitenwende“ – erstmals 2022 von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz angekündigt – markierte einen rhetorischen Wendepunkt und erkannte an, dass Deutschland erheblicher Investitionen in die Verteidigung leisten und eine selbstbewusstere Rolle innerhalb der NATO- und EU-Strukturen übernehmen musste. Doch die Umsetzung dieser Zeitenwende wurde bisher durch Haushaltspolitik, institutionelle Trägheit und öffentliche Zögerlichkeit behindert.

Unklarheit mit Folgen

Diese Unklarheit hatte spürbare Folgen. In Abwesenheit eines konsistenten Ansatzes von Deutschland blieb auch Europas Antwort auf die wachsenden Sicherheitsherausforderungen oft fragmentiert und rein reaktiv.

Dass Deutschland sich 2023/24 trotz anhaltenden Drucks der Verbündeten weigerte, der Ukraine Taurus-Langstreckenraketen zu liefern, verschärfte die Meinungsverschiedenheiten innerhalb der NATO und der EU über Militärhilfe. Verzögerungen bei der Umsetzung des 100 Milliarden Euro schweren Sonderverteidigungsfonds und die Unentschlossenheit bei der Beschaffung von F-35-Kampfflugzeugen bremsten zusätzlich den Fortschritt bei der Stärkung der europäischen kollektiven Verteidigungsfähigkeit. Dass Deutschland sich letztendlich zur Anschaffung der F-35 entschied, stellt nicht nur eine Annäherung an die USA dar, sondern ist auch ein notwendiger Schritt zur Wahrung von Interoperabilität und operativer Glaubwürdigkeit.

Im Bereich der Energiesicherheit erschwerte und verzögerte Deutschlands anfänglicher Unwille gegenüber einem umfassenden Embargo auf russische Gasimporte die gemeinsame Reaktion der EU auf den Krieg erheblich. Zwar äußerten auch mehrere andere Mitgliedstaaten, insbesondere die Slowakei, Österreich und Ungarn, aufgrund ihrer strukturellen Energieabhängigkeit Vorbehalte. Doch Deutschlands Position fiel dabei aufgrund seiner zentralen Rolle für die EU-Politik und seiner langjährigen Verflechtung mit der russischen Energieinfrastruktur, insbesondere durch Nord Stream I und II, weitaus schwerer ins Gewicht.

Deutschlands Zögern zwang andere Mitgliedstaaten zur Verabschiedung fragmentierter nationaler Energiestrategien. Diese unkoordinierte Reaktion schadete der Glaubwürdigkeit der EU als kohärenter geopolitischer Akteur und legte die strukturellen Asymmetrien in ihrer Energiearchitektur offen. Zwar hat Berlin seine Haltung inzwischen neu ausgerichtet – durch den Ausbau der LNG-Infrastruktur, die Verringerung der Importabhängigkeit und die Förderung gemeinsamer Gasbeschaffungsmechanismen –, doch seine anfängliche Ambivalenz offenbarte die anhaltenden Spannungen zwischen nationalen Wirtschaftskalkülen und den Erfordernissen kollektiver strategischer Autonomie. Deutschlands Fähigkeit, in Zukunft eine führende Rolle in der Energiesicherheit zu übernehmen, wird von seiner Bereitschaft abhängen, die geopolitischen Konsequenzen früherer politischer Entscheidungen zu verinnerlichen und entsprechend zu handeln.

Deutschlands strategische Neuausrichtung

Unter Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz und der neuen CDU-geführten Koalition signalisiert Deutschland einen deutlicheren strategischen Wandel. Merz forderte offen eine „radikale Überholung“ des deutschen Sicherheitsapparats. In einem Moment der Offenheit räumte er die unbequeme Realität ein: „Die absolute Priorität muss jetzt darin bestehen, Europa schnell zu stärken, damit wir Schritt für Schritt von den Vereinigten Staaten unabhängig werden können.“

Diese Sichtweise, die vor einem Jahrzehnt in der etablierten deutschen Politik undenkbar gewesen wäre, spiegelt die Schwere der aktuellen Bedrohungen und die schwindende Verlässlichkeit transatlantischer Garantien wider. Sie zeugt auch von einer tieferen Erkenntnis: Deutschlands traditionell zurückhaltender Ansatz reicht nicht mehr aus. Bereits jetzt zeichnen sich spürbare Veränderungen ab. Anfang 2025 verabschiedete Deutschland eine historische Verfassungsänderung, die die Schuldenbremse für Verteidigungsausgaben aufhebt. Dieser Schritt erweitert und vertieft die Zeitenwende und bringt Deutschland in neues Terrain jenseits seiner Zivilmacht-Tradition.

Auf der Suche nach einer selbstbewussteren Rolle

Deutschland strebt aktiv eine selbstbewusstere Rolle in europäischen Sicherheitsinitiativen an, insbesondere als Reaktion auf die Ungewissheit des Engagements der USA unter der Trump-Regierung. Während Initiativen wie die EU-geführte „Koalition der Willigen“ für die Ukraine vor allem von Großbritannien und Frankreich vorangetrieben werden, leistet Deutschland bedeutende Beiträge zur Stärkung seiner Position in multilateralen Verteidigungsrahmen.

So schlug Friedrich Merz im Dezember 2024 die Einrichtung einer neuen europäischen Kontaktgruppe aus Deutschland, Frankreich, Polen und Großbritannien vor. Ziel dieser Gruppe ist es, Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine unabhängig vom US-geführten „Rammstein-Format“ zu koordinieren. Deutschland leitet zudem Gespräche mit Frankreich und Großbritannien über eine gemeinsame nukleare Abschreckung als Ergänzung zum bestehenden US-Atomschirm ein. Im Oktober 2024 unterzeichneten Deutschland und Großbritannien die Trinity-House-Vereinbarung, deren Ziel eine Vertiefung der bilateralen Verteidigungskooperation in allen Bereichen ist. Deutschland leitet zudem die im Oktober 2022 gestartete European Sky Shield Initiative, die die gemeinsame Beschaffung von Luftabwehrsystemen durch 15 europäische Länder vorsieht.

Von der Zeitenwende zum Epochenbruch

Doch es gibt weiterhin Hindernisse. Trotz der wachsenden Zustimmung zu höheren Verteidigungsausgaben (im März 2025 waren es 66 Prozent der Bevölkerung) hält Berlins strategische Kultur noch nicht vollständig Schritt. Die öffentliche Debatte ist nach wie vor von Ambivalenz gegenüber dem Einsatz von Gewalt geprägt, und bürokratische Trägheit verzögert weiterhin die mmilitärische Beschaffung und Stationierung.

Darüber hinaus verdeutlicht Deutschlands zurückhaltende Haltung bei der Lieferung moderner Offensivwaffen an die Ukraine – wie etwa die (trotz zunehmend positiver Signale von Merz) fortdauernde Weigerung, Taurus-Langstreckenraketensysteme zu liefern – die Grenzen des aktuellen strategischen Wandels. Deutschland befindet sich in vielerlei Hinsicht noch immer im Umbruch: Rhetorisch ist es zum Wandel bereit, strukturell tut es sich schwer, seinen Versprechen gerecht zu werden.

Um die Herausforderungen dieser neuen geopolitischen Ära – die der neue Bundeskanzler als „Epochenbruch“ bezeichnet hat – zu meistern, muss Deutschland seinen derzeitigen Kurs in eine nachhaltige Strategie europäischer Führung umwandeln. Folgende Schritte sind entscheidend:

1. Den strategischen Kulturwandel instiutionalisieren

Deutschland muss die Prinzipien der Zeitenwende in seinen institutionellen Rahmen integrieren. Dies bedeutet eine Straffung der militärischen Beschaffung, die Schaffung klarer operativer Mandate für Bundeswehreinsätze usw. Ein ständiger Nationaler Sicherheitsrat, der Außen-, Verteidigungs- und Wirtschaftspolitik integriert, würde helfen, um Strategien zu koordinieren und schneller umzusetzen.

Friedrich Merz hat bereits seine starke Unterstützung für eine solche Initiative zum Ausdruck gebracht und sie als Schlüsselelement seiner umfassenderen Vision einer agileren und kohärenteren nationalen Sicherheitsarchitektur dargestellt. Der Bundeskanzler betonte, dass „die Welt nicht auf uns warten wird“, und hob die Dringlichkeit hervor, von Ad-hoc-Reaktionen zu struktureller Bereitschaft überzugehen.

2. In der europäischen Verteidigungspolitik führen, nicht folgen

Deutschland sollte die Initiative ergreifen, ein ständiges EU-Gremium zur verteidigungspolitischen Koordinierung einzurichten – einen institutionellen Mechanismus, um Europas Krisenreaktionsfähigkeit deutlich zu verbessern. Ein solches Gremium, das im Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) angesiedelt oder eng mit ihm verbunden sein sollte, würde eine ständige Plattform für operative Planung, nachrichtendienstliche Koordinierung und schnelle Entscheidungsfindung zwischen Koalitionen williger Mitgliedstaaten bieten und damit über das herausgehen, was derzeit durch den EU-Militärstab oder durch Ad-hoc-Koalitionen geleistet wird.

Während die bestehenden Strukturen auf Konsens basieren und oft wenig flexibel sind, könnte dieser neue Mechanismus nach einem modularen, mandatsbasierten Modell funktionieren. Dies würde eine tiefere Integration ermöglichen und gleichzeitig in der institutionellen Architektur der EU verankert bleiben. Er würde NATO-Strukturen nicht duplizieren, sondern ergänzen, indem er auf EU-Ebene eine Koordinierungslücke schließt, die in Situationen auftritt, in denen die NATO politisch handlungsunfähig oder institutionell nicht aktiv ist. Darüber hinaus könnte das neue EU-Gremium mehrere laufende Initiativen wie die Ständige Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit (PESCO), den Europäischen Verteidigungsfonds (EVF) und den Strategischen Kompass in einem kohärenteren und operativ wirksameren Rahmen zusammenführen.

3. Innerhalb und außerhalb der EU-Institutionen arbeiten

Die Europäische Kommission hat durch bestehende und neue Initiativen wie den Europäischen Verteidigungsfonds, die PESCO, den Aktionsplan zur militärischen Mobilität und das Weißbuch für die europäische Verteidigung eine stärkere Rolle in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik übernommen. Diese Mechanismen haben dazu beigetragen, die gemeinsame Entwicklung von Fähigkeiten zu rationalisieren, grenzüberschreitende Truppenbewegungen zu verbessern und die Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedstaaten in Forschung und Entwicklung zu fördern. Doch trotz dieser Ambitionen bleibt das institutionelle Mandat der Kommission begrenzt. Ihr fehlt die rechtliche Befugnis, die Verteidigungspolitik der Mitgliedstaaten zu steuern oder gemeinsame Militäroperationen zu leiten.

Deutschlands Bemühungen um eine sicherheitspolitische Führungsrolle müssen deshalb eine aktive Zusammenarbeit mit gesamteuropäischen Initiativen sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb der EU-Strukturen beinhalten. Deutschland muss also einen selektiven oder national fragmentierten Ansatz vermeiden und stattdessen eine Strategie umsetzen, die eine echte europäische Logik der Verteidigungsintegration widerspiegelt.

4. Strategische Rahmen mit Frankreich und Polen abstimmen

Das Weimarer Dreieck lag lange Zeit als formelles Instrument strategischer Koordinierung brach und birgt erhebliche ungenutzte Potenziale, um als ein Eckpfeiler der europäischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsarchitektur zu dienen. Frankreichs langjähriges Eintreten für europäische strategische Autonomie, Polens selbstbewusste Sicherheitsorientierung an der Ostflanke und Deutschlands zentrale wirtschaftliche und logistische Rolle spiegeln eine natürliche Arbeitsteilung wider. Angesichts des zunehmenden geopolitischen Drucks und eines zerbrechenden transatlantischen Konsenses könnte die Reaktivierung dieses trilateralen Formats kritische Lücken der europäischen kollektiven Handlungsfähigkeit in den Bereichen Verteidigung, Beschaffung und Krisenreaktion schließen.

Ob das Weimarer Dreieck funktioniert, hängt jedoch von der politischen Ausrichtung seiner Mitglieder ab. Die Wiederwahl von Ministerpräsident Donald Tusk hat Polens Europapolitik vorübergehend wieder stärker auf Linie mit der strategischen Ausrichtung der EU gebracht. Es ist jedoch unsicher, ob dies über die laufende Legislaturperiode hinaus Bestand haben wird. Die langfristige Kohärenz des Dreiecks hängt davon ab, ob es gelingt, Polens Teilnahme in einem breiteren gesellschaftlichen Konsens über europäische Integration und strategische Autonomie zu verankern. Die Wiederbelebung des Dreiecks darf deshalb nicht als vollendete Tatsache angesehen werden, sondern als ein zeitkritisches Gelegenheitsfenster, das jetzt eine institutionelle Verfestigung, öffentliche Legitimität und klare Ergebnisse verlangt.

Erste ermutigende Schritte gab es bereits: Die für 2025 geplanten Militärübungen des Weimarer Dreiecks – ausgerichtet von Polen und mit Schwerpunkt auf hybriden Bedrohungen und Interoperabilität – könnten zu einem grundlegenden Muster für eine umfassendere gemeinsame Streitkräfteplanung der EU werden. Der Beitritt Frankreichs zum deutsch-polnisch-niederländischen Militärmobilitätspakt stärkt die operative Logistik für schnelle Einsätze und bietet eine Ebene praktischer Integration. Zudem zeigt die Einigkeit der Verteidigungsminister:innen über die Unterstützung der Ukraine – einschließlich harmonisierter Ausrüstungstransfers und politischer Hilfestellung für Kyjiws EU-/NATO-Kurs – einen sich abzeichnenden Konsens über zentrale strategische Prioritäten. Merz’ Entscheidung, seine ersten Auslandsbesuche nach Paris und Warschau zu machen, die Einrichtung eines deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats sowie ein symbolträchtiger französisch-polnischer Vertrag unterstreichen die bewussten Bemühungen um die Wiederherstellung trilateraler Glaubwürdigkeit. Dennoch bleiben weitere Institutionalisierungsschritte unerlässlich – möglicherweise durch ein ständiges Sekretariat, regelmäßige hochrangige Gipfeltreffen sowie formalisierte Mechanismen für die gemeinsame Entwicklung militärischer Fähigkeiten.

5. Politische Verantwortung annehmen

Vor allem aber muss Deutschland seine Zurückhaltung bei der Übernahme einer Führungsrolle abschütteln. Als größter Mitgliedstaat der EU hat Deutschland sowohl die Fähigkeit als auch die Verantwortung, entschlossen zu handeln. Das bedeutet, nicht nur einen finanziellen Beitrag zu leisten, sondern auch die politische Agenda zu setzen, Konsens zu schaffen und die europäischen Interessen in einer zunehmend feindseligen Welt zu verteidigen.

Deutschlands Wandel von einer zivilen Macht zu einem strategischen Akteur ist noch lange nicht abgeschlossen. Aber wenn er mit Klarheit und Entschlossenheit vorangetrieben wird, könnte er den Beginn eines autonomeren, kohärenteren und sichereren Europas markieren. In einer Welt, in der die Regeln neu geschrieben werden, kann sich das vereinte Europa kein zögerliches Deutschland leisten. Es braucht ein Deutschland, das führt.

Oleksiy Kandyuk ist der aktuelle Walter-Benjamin-Professor an der Universität Konstanz.

Dieser Artikel erschien zuerst auf Englisch in der Reihe Berlin Perspectives des Instituts für Europäische Politik (IEP).

Übersetzung: Manuel Müller.
Bilder: Schachfigur: Arthur A (americanaez225) [Unsplash License], via Unsplash; Porträt Oleksiy Kandyuk: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

“A fight for our future”: Ursula von der Leyen’s 2025 State of the European Union address

Edited by Manuel Müller

with contributions from Minna Ålander, Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek, Saila Heinikoski, Manuel Müller, Katariina Mustasilta, Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel, Federica Prandin, Antti Rauhala, Sanna Salo, and Timo R. Stewart

Once again, geopolitics was the main topic in Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the European Union address. But there were also many other things that she mentioned, and some that she omitted.

Three and a half years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war in Europe was at the heart of the State of the European Union address in 2025 as much as it was in 2022. As she does every September, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) appeared before the European Parliament today to take stock and announce her most important plans for the coming months. She set the tone right from the start of her speech: “Europe is in a fight,” she claimed, in an “unforgiving” world of “imperial ambitions and imperial wars”. People can “feel the ground shift beneath them,” and “we simply cannot wait for this storm to pass.” Fortunately, she also had a solution at hand: a European “independence moment”, brought about by “unity” among member states, EU institutions and the “pro-European democratic forces” in the European Parliament.

The most impressive moment of the speech also came very early on, when von der Leyen told the story of a Ukrainian teenager (present in the Parliament as a guest) who was kidnapped by Russian soldiers and only freed thanks to the courageous efforts of his grandmother. In general, the threat posed by Russia, which von der Leyen addressed in no uncertain terms, was a key theme of the speech. The fact that Russian drones had entered Polish airspace the night before lent her warnings a very acute urgency. The key phrase “Europe stands in full solidarity with Poland”, while clearly well-intentioned, sounded a little off – after all, Poland is part of Europe, and solidarity is usually shown to others, not oneself. Overall, however, the message was clear: Ursula von der Leyen, the woman that coined the catchphrase of the “geopolitical Commission”, believes that Europe is in danger and is ready to take action.

Of course, Russia and Ukraine were not the only topics covered in this State of the European Union address. Other geopolitical hotspots, such as Gaza and the US, were also addressed, as were economic and social policy, climate and energy, migration policy, and the rule of law. This article provides a collection of short analyses on some key issues of the SOTEU, written by experts from several universities and think tanks. Further information on the speech can be found on the Commission’s website, along with the original multilingual text and an English translation.

Defence: The challenge of “independence”

In this year’s SOTEU speech, almost everything was somehow relevant for the wider question of Europe’s ability to defend itself. The challenges Europe is faced with are not limited to the number of tanks or fighter jets (or drones) European armies have at their disposal, but encompasses everything from digital sovereignty to trade. In many of these areas, Europe’s dependence on the United States (or China) has proven dangerous, if not even fatal. And Ursula von der Leyen set the bar high: she did not speak of “strategic autonomy” anymore, but of Europe’s “independence” moment.

Of the many interesting things von der Leyen said regarding European security and defence, the sentence “Europe will defend every inch of its territory” was perhaps the most remarkable one – because it copies NATO’s 2022 pledge to “defend every inch of Allied territory”. Europe alone, and especially the EU as an institution, has no structures in place today to actually provide collective defence outside of NATO. But that may well be the future. For what it’s worth, the challenge that nobody in Europe has been willing to say out loud is now out there.

Ukraine keeps featuring high up on Europe’s security agenda. The SOTEU speech took place in a dramatic context, with an unprecedented Russian violation of Polish airspace with drones. That Poland and NATO allies shot down some of the drones using highly sophisticated and expensive fighter jets, further underlines the urgency of the announced new initiatives to boost Europe’s catchup with drone technology – such as the Eastern Flank Watch including a drone wall, the Qualitative Military Edge, and the drone alliance with Ukraine.

Minna Ålander • link

Israel: Harsher than previously, but still avoiding direct blame

Von der Leyen reiterated long-standing EU support for a two-state solution, meaning an independent Palestine alongside an independent Israel, and highlighted the efforts of France and Saudi Arabia to further this goal in their upcoming New York Conference. Although the speech was full of passive voice and agentless constructions to avoid placing direct blame on Israel, the tone was harsher than previously. While von der Leyen was careful to mention her long-standing friendship with the people of Israel, underline there would be no place for Hamas and recall the plight of the Israeli hostages, she also mentioned man-made famine in Gaza and “a clear attempt to undermine the two-state solution”.

The speech called for more EU action, while acknowledging the difficulties of achieving unanimity or even majorities. The proposed measures included traditional approaches of dealing with the symptoms of ongoing Israeli occupation, such as setting up a Palestine Donor Group to help repair the massive damage Israel has purposefully created in Gaza. Other measures aimed at creating political pressure. Von der Leyen announced that she would put the Commission’s relatively minor bilateral support to Israel on hold. She also expressed support for a partial suspension of the Association Agreement on trade-related matters and sanctions on what she called “extremist ministers”.

While this has been a path followed by some EU member states, singling out individual ministers makes a disingenuous distinction between them and the Israeli government in whole. After all, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s government is entirely committed to the goal of preventing a Palestinian state and asserting Israeli sovereignty over all the areas it illegally occupies. Netanyahu himself is wanted in the Hague on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including using the war crime of starving the civilian population of Gaza. 

Avoiding direct mentions of Israel and Israeli policies directly undermines any attempt to create political pressure on Israel. This in turn undermines von der Leyen’s stated aim of pursuing “the only realistic peace plan”, which she says is “based on two states”.

Timo Stewart • link

US: “Europe’s independence moment” – but independent from whom?

Von der Leyen spent only about three minutes directly naming the United States. But between the lines, the entire speech referred tangentially to the Trump administration’s impact on Europe and the ways that the EU can respond. The reference, within the first few minutes, to “Europe’s independence moment” was striking. The question is “independence from whom?”, and the answer seemed to be: the United States. But this was contradicted by von der Leyen’s insistence on the importance of the transatlantic relationship. What came throughout the speech – on defense and security, competitiveness, technology and energy, society and democracy, partnerships and alliances, determination of destiny – were tacit references to the evolving relationship between the US and EU.

In real terms, von der Leyen defended her tariff deal with the United States, arguing that it protected trade and goods and Europe jobs and was preferable to a trade war with one of the EU’s closest allies. There were important contradictions and omissions, though, and von der Leyen received plenty of pushback from the parliamentary group leaders after her speech. Iratxe García (PSOE/PES) mentioned digital taxes and the need to use the EU’s anti-coercion instrument – things to which Trump, in defending US big tech, has been vehemently opposed. Another issue was picked up by Green leader Bas Eickhout (GL/EGP): The terms of the US-EU trade deal require the EU to buy $750 billion of US energy by 2028. Recently, US Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, noted that an EU shift to buy US LNG over Russian gas would help the US to back tougher sanctions on Russia, which is fundamentally at odds with EU climate goals. All other party responses also mentioned the US; most bemoaned the EU’s weakness.

It was telling that von der Leyen quickly followed up on her defense of the US trade deal with a focus on the need to expand to new partnerships, including a coalition of like-minded countries to focus on rules-based trading – included a shout-out to the CPTPP. It was also notable that she segued from the US section directly into naming new initiatives on research security, with the Choose Europe Package, health, with a new Global Health Resilience Initiative, rule of law, with the European Democracy Shield, protecting against disinformation, with a new European Centre for Democratic Resilience, and independent journalism protection, with a new Media Resilience Programme. All of these – research, health, rule of law, disinformation, and independent journalism – are areas where the United States is backsliding at the moment.

Von der Leyen’s message was clear: the EU must present an alternative vision for itself and for the world, and that vision is independence. Now, it only needs to be operationalized.

Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek • link

Global relations: Enter like-minded partners, exit development cooperation

The EU’s global relations featured unsurprisingly narrowly in this year’s SOTEU, with the speech reflecting the on-going major shift from a Global Europe focused on multilateralism and development cooperation towards a doubling down on trade, investments, and bilateral as well as minilateral international partnerships with like-minded actors. Global partnerships were mainly addressed under the headlines of competitiveness and energy transition as well as a geopolitical need to diversify partners. In the realm of foreign and security policy, Ukraine and Gaza dominated the agenda, with no other conflicts or crises mentioned – not even as a cause of irregular migration.

Beyond the security priorities, the Global Gateway – the EU’s response to China’s Belt and Road initiative and what looks like its new blueprint for international development – was addressed in connection to supporting European clean technology, with von der Leyen stating that the partners invested in through Global Gateway are strongly incentivized to “buy European”. This captures the heavy emphasis in the Global Gateway framework on securing the EU’s, the member states’, and European companies’ interests. However, such incentives can easily backfire on the EU, as many countries in the so-called Global South prefer issue-based and versatile international partnerships and do not like to feel pressured to choose sides in the geopolitical competition.

In terms of the more traditional international development agenda, only global health was explicitly mentioned. In the context of the dismantling of USAID and the huge aid cuts by the United States hitting global health governance, von der Leyen’s announced Global Health Resilience Initiative is certainly welcomed. At the same time, it reflects the changing landscape of international development, including in peacebuilding and fragile contexts, with shrinking aid budgets and a focus on humanitarian aid dominating the agenda.

In a nutshell, the broader global relations in the SOTEU can be summed up as follows: Today’s world is unforgiving, turbulent, and insecure, yet the democratic EU remains open to old and new allies – as long as they buy European!

Katariina Mustasilta • link

Enlargement: Back to the future of 2021

Von der Leyen’s treatment of the enlargement issue showed how fast the policy wheel in Brussels can turn. In her State of the Union speech two years ago, there was need for a “vision for a successful enlargement”, which is a “catalyst for progress.” This year, there were fewer lines dedicated to the topic than there are countries holding candidate status.

Von der Leyen’s call “Let’s make the next reunification of Europe happen”, because “[a] larger and stronger Union is a security guarantee for all of us”, are really nice words. But how should this happen? All the Commission president mentioned was “integrating [the countries] into the Single Market” and following a “merits-based process”. With other words: welcome back in 2021, where there are lukewarm words of welcome, but accession is ultimately treated as a business of the candidate countries.

Any problems with enlargement policy? Maybe in Georgia? No, von der Leyen did not mention Georgia at all. At least, Turkey will now no longer have to feel alone in the group of unrealistic candidates.

Julian Plottka • link

Democracy and the rule of law: Brushing aside internal differences

Von der Leyen said that our “most important task is to protect our democracy”. Judging by her speech, that task today primarily consists of tackling external threats, framed as a precondition for safeguarding Europe’s freedom, independence and, by extension, democracy. Regarding foreign interference and disinformation, in addition to her Commission’s flagship initiative, the European Democracy Shield, von der Leyen proposed a new European Center for Democratic Resilience.

Secondly, referring more to the EU’s internal challenges, von der Leyen emphasized protecting the rule of law. In addition to strengthening the conditionality mechanisms related to the use of EU funds, she proposed a new Rule of Law Cycle, an attempt at centrally monitoring the rule of law in Member States. Third, von der Leyen underlined the significance of independent media and proposed a Media Resilience Program to that end.

Overall, besides citing an aspiration to strengthen the Parliament’s “pro-European majority”, the EU’s internal differences were largely brushed aside. Yet, for her “pitch for unity” of Europe to succeed, navigating the major internal differences not only regarding policy, but also regarding the values of and goals for the Union itself, will be a foremost task in the remainder of her tenure.

Sanna Salo • link

Economic policy: No big solutions for Europe’s growth puzzle

The competitiveness agenda was not at the centre of this year’s State of the Union. In a dark-toned speech, Ursula von der Leyen framed it as one element of Europe’s “Independence Moment,” an instrument of sovereignty rather than a centrepiece of the European policy agenda. Instead of sweeping trillion-euro recovery funds like those mobilised during the pandemic or the European Green Deal, this Commission’s approach has been marked by more modest means if not lesser ambition: focused on the priority ofclean and digital technologies and reducing the bureaucratic cost of regulations for European businesses.

Von der Leyen underlined the need to expand electricity grids for the green transition, build European cloud and AI infrastructure, and support sectors such as the car industry under pressure from global competition. To back these goals, she promised a mix of deeper Single Market integration, new funds to help firms scale, and streamlined rules to cut red tape.

The speech contained no big ticket item to reinvigorate the stagnant European economy but offered a smorgasbord of targeted actions. The Single Market Roadmap, Industrial Accelerator Roadmap, continued work on the Omnibus, European Innovation Act ticked many boxes for those watching the speech with bingo cards in hand for mentions of the Draghi and Letta policy priorities that animated European economic policy debates for the past year. Yet, the scale of the funding announced, only up to ten billion euros at most for initiatives like Scaleup Europe Fund, looks small compared to the transformative ambition the agenda implies and the EU’s past big spending packages.

Von der Leyen’s sharpest diagnosis concerned Europe’s chronic weakness: the lack of growth capital for scaling companies. “We want the best of Europe to stay in Europe,” she declared, warning that financing gaps drive promising firms abroad or leave them outpaced by rivals. But beyond the passing mention of a Savings and Investment Union, there was no real detail on timelines or operationalisation of fully integrated European capitals markets.

The same applied to internal Single Market barriers. The speech promised a Single Market Roadmap to 2028 – but without more concrete steps to dismantle internal barriers or to advance capital markets integration, it risks being remembered more for its accurate diagnosis than for setting the scene for successful structural reforms needed to make the European economy globally competitive.

Antti Rauhala • link

Social policy: Or rather industrial policy?

Social policy played a major role in the political guidelines that Ursula von der Leyen presented in her 2024 re-election bid in the European Parliament (for which she needed the support of the centre-left S&D Group). At that time, she declared the “European social model” to be an essential component of the “European way of life” and proclaimed a “Union of equality” as a goal.

Just over a year later, social policy still featured prominently in the SOTEU. Von der Leyen emphasised that times were tough for many families, declared this a matter of “basic social justice”, and promised that an “ambitious European Anti-Poverty Strategy”, to be drawn up shortly, would help to make it possible to “eradicate poverty by 2050”.

However, she only announced concrete measures relating to “affordability and the cost of living”, which she illustrated using four examples: energy, housing, cars and food. In these areas, her proposed solutions included increasing electricity production and improving grid infrastructure, speeding up building approval procedures and providing more state subsidies for housing construction, launching an investment initiative for “small affordable cars”, and deregulating, subsidizing and protecting the agricultural sector.

All of this sounds more like industrial policy than actual social policy, which is certainly no coincidence. The Commission only needs a qualified majority in the Council to regulate and deregulate markets, whereas redistribution measures in favour of the socially disadvantaged would require unanimous agreement among the member states and are therefore much more difficult to enact. In other words, von der Leyen is doing what she can – and labeling it as a matter of “social justice” to keep the centre-left happy.

Manuel Müller • link

Migration: Nothing new on the migration front

On migration, the SOTEU speech offered no major innovations likely to make headlines. The most notable announcement was the Commission’s plan to treble funding for migration and border management in the next budget. Ursula von der Leyen urged co-legislators to swiftly adopt the EU’s common returns system, referring to the Return Regulation proposed in March, which also includes a framework for establishing return hubs outside the EU. She further stressed the need to implement the Pact on Migration by summer 2026, reminding member states of their obligation to contribute (whether through relocations or financial support) despite some governments already signalling resistance to mandatory solidarity.

The Commission president noted that migrant arrivals to Europe are declining but placed blame for irregular entry squarely on smugglers and traffickers. She pledged that the EU would continue to honour its international obligations, as she said the EU has done in the past. Beyond legislation, she also called for cooperation with online platforms and airlines to curb irregular arrivals, citing flights to Belarus, a point directed particularly at a Polish audience.

Overall, the migration section of the speech was cautious and offered little that was new. It omitted the politically prioritised “migration partnerships” and other “innovative” initiatives related to the external dimension of migration previously promised to be explored, including the related proposal on safe third country regulation currently under discussion in the Council and Parliament. Positioning migration at the very end of the address, while highlighting only increased funding, seems to have been a deliberate choice to keep the issue out of the SOTEU-related headlines. For now, member states remain in the driver’s seat of EU migration policy and at least the Commission president is doing her best not to irritate any political sides on this politicised topic.

Saila Heinikoski • link

Climate and energy: Prioritising economic growth and independence

Ursula von der Leyen framed climate and energy policy within the broader European competitiveness and economic security discourse, portraying the Green Deal not as a standalone environmental imperative but as a tool for reducing dependencies – particularly on Russian fossil fuels – and securing future markets. She reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to 2030 climate targets, citing scientific, economic, and security imperatives, while positioning the bloc as a low-carbon leader.

This geopolitical lens mirrors the discursive shift in EU climate narratives from 2019 onwards, evolving from environmental priorities to geopolitical and security lenses post-Ukraine invasion. Von der Leyen addressed industry and hesitant member states by acknowledging 2040 target fears, promising investments, just transitions, and protections against “unfair competition”. Key measures announced include a single market roadmap by 2028 covering energy, €1.8 billion in equity for battery production, “Made in Europe” requirements for clean tech demand, accelerating the Circular Economy Act, and a new initiative to address eight energy bottlenecks for affordable, homegrown clean energy. She also proposed subsidies for affordable European electric cars and a long-term trade instrument to replace expiring steel safeguards.

These steps align with the Clean Industrial Deal’s ambitions but risk adding regulatory complexity, potentially exacerbating the “Valley of Death” for clean tech commercialization without clearer timelines or mechanisms. Notably omitted were broader environmental priorities beyond climate, such as biodiversity, resource efficiency (outside circularity), or chemicals regulation, signalling a narrowing of the original Green Deal’s scope to favour industrial competitiveness over holistic sustainability. Overall, the speech advanced a pragmatic vision, prioritising economic growth and independence over urgent climate action.

Federica Prandin • link

Multiannual Financial Framework: Many plans requiring funding

Ursula von der Leyen delivered her speech today in a strikingly urgent and alarmist tone. She declared, “Europe is in a fight – for a continent that is whole and at peace, for a free and independent Europe, for our values and our democracies, for our liberty and our ability to determine our destiny, for our future.” She acknowledged the difficult and “unforgiving” geopolitical climate and urged EU member states to move past deadlock and paralysis, stressing the urgency for collective, decisive action.

The EU budget featured only briefly in her address: once in the context of food and agriculture, and once regarding democracy and the rule of law. Von der Leyen noted that agricultural income support for farmers has been ring-fenced in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – a concession sought by major agricultural lobbies and one that risks limiting meaningful progress toward a green transition in the food sector.

She also emphasised that the Commission’s MFF proposal, published in mid-July, seeks to strengthen the link between EU funding and respect for the rule of law, making it clear that “respecting the rule of law is a must for EU funds.” To fulfill this, the Commission must take a firmer stance than it did in December 2023, when it released funds to Hungary in exchange for Viktor Orbán dropping his veto against a Ukraine support package, despite Hungary’s clear and continuous breach of EU Treaties. The Commission must avoid repeating such concessions.

Overall, many of the proposed measures in her speech, especially in defence and competitiveness, will require adequate funding in the coming years. With EU budget negotiations set to begin soon and the Danish Council Presidency preparing the negotiation toolkit for December, von der Leyen’s most important message was political: a call for member states to overcome paralysis and reach compromise. Europe’s future depends on it.

Sophie Pornschlegel • link

Institutions: “New Europe” needed, but major reform still off the agenda

Starting her speech with a call for a “new Europe”, Ursula von der Leyen only managed to address “real reforms” in the last 180 seconds of her State of the Union speech. A comparison of the few sentences dedicated to institutional reforms at the beginning and at the end of her speech shows considerable inconsistencies in the Commission President’s view on what is needed for a “new Europe”. Initially, she suggested that anything could be achieved if only the member states and EU institutions were united, citing the EU’s response to the pandemic and its support for Ukraine as examples. Later, she admitted that the EU legislators need to act faster.

Her outline of Commission proposals for the EU’s response to the war in Gaza already made clear that Europe is paralysed on this topic. In his response to the speech, the EPP chairperson, Manfred Weber, further emphasised that the real threat to the EU’s ability to act are populist and anti-democratic governments: “We cannot allow Orbán and crazy Fico that they turn the European Union into a foolish organisation.”

Von der Leyen’s concrete proposals how to achieve this are limited: She only referred to the renewed framework agreement between the European Commission and the European Parliament, voiced support for a right of initiative of the European Parliament, and called for more qualified majority voting. Her previous praising of the EU’s crisis management, however, implied that the European Parliament is not at the centre of her idea of institutional reforms. Both during the pandemic and with regard to the EU’s ongoing support for Ukraine, the Parliament has been sidelined and the Commission has worked closely only with the member states. 

Such a strengthened intergovernmentalism may serve the short-term institutional interest of the European Commission, but it has also important pitfalls. This governance approach might make crisis decision-making more efficient, but it grants every government a veto. Avoiding political paralyses by means of increased differentiation might be an opportune option but undermines democracy in the long-term.

The SOTEU 2025 shows that institutional reforms remain off the table. The European Parliament’s work on the own initiative report “on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations” is therefore likely to have the same fate as the Conference on the Future of Europe: in a few months, only the members of the AFCO Committee will remember it, even though the debate on institutional reforms is actually urgently needed in order to prepare for enlargement.

Julian Plottka • link

Minna Ålander is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House.

Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and a Clarendon Scholar and doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford.

Saila Heinikoski is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki.

Manuel Müller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Katariina Mustasilta is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki.

Julian Plottka is a research associate at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics at the University of Passau and a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophie Pornschlegel is a Brussels-based political analyst, with a focus on EU politics and institutions, democracy and the rule of law.

Federica Prandin is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki.

Antti Rauhala is an independent policy consultant who has worked on economic development and energy transition issues at the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD.

Sanna Salo is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki.

Timo R. Stewart is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

Pictures: Ursula von der Leyen during the SOTEU: European Union 2025 – European Parlament [licence], via EP; portraits Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek, Saila Heinikoski, Manuel Müller, Katariina Mustasilta, Federica Prandin, Sanna Salo, Timo Stewart: FIIA [all rights reserved]; Minna Ålander, Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel, Antti Rauhala: private [all rights reserved].