20 November 2026

EU budget: How the consensus procedure undermines democratic legitimacy

By Manuel Müller
Parliamentary debates can be meaningful – but only if the parliamentary majority actually takes responsibility for the outcome.

The power of the purse is traditionally considered a core parliamentary prerogative. In all modern democracies, it is a fundamental principle that decisions on taxation and public spending should be made not by governments, but by elected representatives.

There are several good reasons for this: Firstly, budgetary authority enables parliaments to scrutinise the government and prevent abuses of power. Secondly, budgetary decisions have particularly far-reaching implications for a country’s overall political direction. They affect the balance between solidarity and personal responsibility within the community, the prioritisation of various political objectives and, ultimately, the question of the role that the state (or a particular level of government) should play in society.

Parliamentary debates serve to create meaning

In short, budget debates are about the big picture, which is precisely why they belong in parliament. No other forum is better suited to fostering public political debate, bringing proposals and counter-proposals to light and facilitating a transparent exchange of arguments.

In the end, the parliamentary majority will outvote the minority to pass its budget, but it must accept accountability for doing so before the electorate. It is through this visibility of alternatives and responsibilities that the budget acquires political meaning for the public. As a citizen and taxpayer, you can either welcome or reject it. Either way, however, you will understand what it is intended to achieve, and you will know who to reward or punish for it at the next election. In short, the budget becomes democratically legitimate.

The EU budget is primarily negotiated at intergovernmental level

The EU’s multiannual financial framework lacks such a creation of meaning through parliamentary processes. Instead, the EU treaties primarily rely on consensus procedures to legitimise the budget: In the MFF negotiations, each member state has a veto in the Council, which is exercised by the national governments.

In many member states, national parliaments are also involved to some extent. For example, many governments must obtain their parliament’s approval before supporting the MFF in the Council. However, national MPs do not sit at the negotiating table during the negotiations themselves. At best, they can influence their government’s position, but not the overall outcome. Consequently, when the EU budget is debated in national parliaments, the focus tends to be more on national interests and the need to reach compromises than on different ideas about what the EU as a whole should be and achieve with its budget.

The Parliament is only one of 28 veto players

The European Parliament is unable to remedy this under the current procedure. While its transnational political groups offer the diversity of perspectives necessary for meaningful budgetary debates, this can only happen if the parliamentary majority is also held politically responsible for the MFF in public. This is not currently the case.

The Parliament does have the right of veto; without its approval, the budget cannot be adopted. However, because of the unanimity rule in the Council, it is just one of 28 veto holders. At best, the Parliament can make minor adjustments to a compromise reached in the Council, but it cannot fundamentally overturn it. Compared with the protracted negotiations between the member states, the disputes between the political groups in the Parliament therefore play hardly any role in the public eye.

Ritualised conflicts of national interest

Instead, the focus of the process is on the Council, where the debate is characterised above all by ritualised conflicts of national interest. Every seven years, the Commission calls for an increase in the budget; the “frugal” net contributor states reject this increase; the governments of countries with a large agricultural sector campaign to maintain agricultural spending; and the economically disadvantaged countries defend the cohesion funds.

In this debate, the pros and cons of genuinely new priorities quickly come to play only a minor role. The end result is a compromise solution that everyone can somehow live with, but which nobody really wanted and for which, consequently, nobody is willing to take full public responsibility.

The veto-ridden procedure prevents genuine accountability

This makes it impossible for the budget to acquire an overarching political meaning that citizens can understand. The large number of actors with veto powers in the process prevents genuine accountability, incentivising governments to prioritise their respective national interests. Consequently, rather than focusing on different visions for coexistence within the EU, public debate primarily centres on national net positions, and the governments that demand the highest price for their Council veto are rewarded the most.

Thus, the budget debate is an example of how European consensus procedures undermine democratic legitimacy rather than create it. The attempt to strengthen national parliaments through national veto rights tends to shift the focus of public debate towards the conflicting national interests of member states, rather than their shared political objectives. At the same time, this approach diminishes the role of the European Parliament, preventing the exchanges between its political groups from becoming meaningful to the public debate.

It is hardly surprising, then, that many Europeans are ultimately left with the vague feeling that their taxes are funding an EU budget whose purpose nobody has clearly explained to them – and that they have no one to hold accountable and vote out of office if they disagree with it.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and the editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. His research focuses on supranational democracy and EU institutional reform.

A version of this article was originally published as a column in the Europe.Table newsletter and can also be found on the Table.Briefings website.


Pictures: European Parliament: European Union 2024 – Source: EP [CC BY 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved].

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