16 November 2026

More than redistribution: The EU budget’s cohesion funds are investments in the productivity of the single market

By Luigi Capoani and Alessandro Sbalzer
A modern double-decker train traveling on tracks through a rural landscape in Italy
Infrastructure projects financed by the Cohesion Funds are also European public goods, albeit ones with a specific geographical location.

In the ongoing negotiations on the next long-term EU budget, few items are under as much pressure as the cohesion funds. The charge against them is that they deliver no European added value: They redistribute money between member states instead of financing European public goods. On this blog, Friedrich Heinemann has argued that the next budget will be decided by priorities rather than by volume. Instead of redistribution, the scarce resources should go to European public goods such as defence, decarbonisation and cross-border networks.

The diagnosis about scarce resources is reasonable. The conclusion is less so. Cohesion funds do not only even out differences in income. They address a structural problem of the single market: Europe’s regions do not take part in it from the same positions. A company close to customers, suppliers and infrastructure has different opportunities from one located far from the major economic centres.

Cutting the cohesion funds therefore does not only cut a transfer. It cuts an investment in the Union’s productive capacity. A look at the economic geography of the single market shows why.

The Blue Banana as Europe’s economic heart

GDP per capita in NUTS 2 EU regions
The Blue Banana – here in green – is clearly visible in the per capita GDP of European regions. (Source: EU Commission 2024.)

The Blue Banana describes the belt of high urban and industrial density that, in the classic depiction, links England through the Benelux countries, western Germany and Switzerland to northern Italy. Its value lies in making visible the continuity of markets, infrastructure and skills across national borders. Although the Blue Banana is neither a political entity nor an administrative region, its constituent regions are closely linked economically and benefit from one another.

The Blue Banana is therefore a good example of how proximity between large concentrations of production can generate cumulative advantages. Economic Europe of course contains further dynamic centres, and the map of prosperity is not fixed. But as statistical data on regional competitiveness show, the belt has kept its spatial primacy even after new centres emerged in central and eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean.

What the gravity model explains

One instrument for interpreting these relationships is the so-called gravity model. In its intuitive form it says that trade flows grow with the economic size of regions and fall as the barriers between them rise.

What matters for a company is the demand it can reach at bearable cost. Proximity to many significant markets can shorten delivery times, ease procurement and widen commercial options. Alongside purely geographical distances, transport, logistics, digital accessibility and institutional barriers also play an important part. In a gravity analysis of Europe, centrality therefore refers not only to the kilometres on the map but above all to the position a region holds in various networks.

Why firms choose the centres

A central location makes it possible to serve several markets from a single plant or distribution centre. When many firms cluster in one region, that also attracts specialised suppliers, skilled labour and high-value services, which further strengthens the location’s appeal.

These advantages have limits. Rising congestion, more expensive property and higher wages can turn into a disadvantage. Firms also follow different sectoral logics. Peripheral regions can try to offer tax advantages to particular companies and so gain in appeal. On its own, however, that often fails to offset higher logistics costs or difficulties in finding skilled staff. The choice of location depends on the whole production system, not only on the tax rate.

Regions in relative peripheral positions

Parts of the Iberian peninsula, southern Italy and Greece, along with the central-eastern and north-eastern European member states, lie relatively far from the largest concentrations of continental demand. Together with institutional, infrastructural and historical factors, this can contribute to the difficulties of some productive activities in these regions.

Peripherality depends on the network under consideration, however. A Mediterranean port can be entirely central in international maritime connections and still hold a peripheral position within the European single market. It would also be wrong to claim that these countries always grow more slowly. Spain and Portugal, for example, recorded real growth above the European average between 2022 and 2024, and many central-eastern European countries have gone through considerable catch-up processes since joining the EU in 2004. Structural disadvantages, income levels and cyclical developments need to be distinguished.

What the gravity analysis does make clear is that not all countries take part in the European single market in the same way. Removing trade borders has lowered barriers, but it does not abolish geography, and with it the differences between central and peripheral regions.

Attracting residents is not attracting production

Some of the peripheral countries therefore rely on tax breaks to attract new residents, skilled professionals or wealthy individuals. According to a 2024 OECD survey, at least 24 member states offered programmes for selected groups of migrants or returning nationals.

The net economic benefit of such measures is limited. They can support consumption and bring in skills. Yet moving a tax residence does not move plants, research centres or skilled jobs. A region can therefore gain taxpayers without gaining productive capacity.

Investing in the accessibility of the peripheries

A more effective policy lever starts with accessibility: rail and port connections, reliable energy networks, digital infrastructure, research and training. Such factors can reduce the weight of geographical distance and make it worthwhile for firms to produce far from the large centres as well.

Building infrastructure alone, however, secures no local development either. A better connection can also make market entry easier for already dominant firms, without raising innovative capacity. What is needed alongside it is entrepreneurial capability, functioning public services and links between universities and value chains. The aim should be to widen the viable activities of regions and to avoid isolated projects whose usefulness ends with the public funding.

The next EU budget puts cohesion in question

This is where the EU’s long-term budget comes in. On 16 July 2025 the Commission proposed a multiannual financial framework for 2028 to 2034 of almost 2,000 billion euro, equivalent to 1.26 per cent of the Union’s average gross national income.

Within that sum, around 450 billion is earmarked for cohesion, rural development and fishing communities, an amount the Commission describes as broadly equivalent to the present one. The critical point, however, is not the total but how much of it stays tied to geography. The guaranteed minimum allocation for the less developed regions is only 218 billion. The rest depends on the national and regional partnership plans that the Commission is to negotiate with the member states.

According to estimates by the think tank Bruegel, cohesion commitments would fall from 0.30 per cent of gross national income in the 2021 to 2027 period to somewhere between 0.14 and 0.29 per cent, depending on how the national plans are designed.

Cohesion spending is an investment in the EU’s productive capacity

This brings us back to the starting point. The objection to cohesion funds is that they finance redistribution rather than European public goods. Yet energy networks, rail connections and digital infrastructure are European public goods, too – just ones with a specific geographical location. Building them where production density is already high brings immediate returns. Building them where accessibility is low changes the structure of the single market and makes it possible to activate peripheral regions whose productive capacity has so far been lower. The choice between thematic priorities and territorial attention is therefore less clear-cut than it appears.

Our point is this. The Cohesion Fund and other geographically tied spending in the EU budget are not mere redistributive concessions. They are an investment in the Union’s productive capacity.

Around a third of European regions had not regained their 2008 level of GDP per head by 2021. The Ninth Cohesion Report, published by the European Commission in 2024, also finds that remaining in a development trap goes together empirically with rising political discontent. Keeping those regions outside the potential of the single market costs more than can be saved by shifting the money elsewhere.

A European responsibility

Concentration can generate efficiency, but leaving territorial weaknesses unresolved carries collective risks. Persistent unemployment, out-migration and the erosion of public services can weaken demand, confidence and ultimately political support for European integration.

The Greek crisis from 2008 onwards showed how far the difficulties of one euro-area country can reach across the whole monetary union. It was not a simple consequence of peripheral position. It arose from a combination of financial imbalances, institutional problems and policy mistakes. Its lesson concerns interdependence: in an integrated market, the costs of crises can cross regional and national borders quickly.

The Greek case separates two outcomes that policy tends to confuse. Returning to earlier levels of activity is not the same as changing the structure of production. For Europe’s peripheries, what counted after the great financial crisis was not only the speed of economic recovery but above all the capacity to reorient through better integration into the single market.

Investing in cohesion ultimately strengthens the centre too

The development of the peripheries should therefore be a shared responsibility. A durable European investment capacity under democratic control could carry projects with cross-border benefits and strengthen the less well-equipped regional administrations.

The Ninth Cohesion Report documents considerable progress in convergence, but also persistent development traps. European policy has to take both findings seriously. Making the peripheries more accessible and more productive means widening the potential of the single market and reducing its vulnerability. Ultimately, the prosperity of the centres also gains in stability when more regions are able to contribute to it.



Luigi Capoani is an Adjunct Professor of International Economics at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice and the founder and president of the European Youth Think Tank (EYTT).

Alessandro Sbalzer is a policy analyst and research assistant at the European Youth Think Tank (EYTT).

Pictures: Double-decker train: Edoardo Bortoli [Unsplash license], via Unsplash; map EU regions: European Commission, Ninth Cohesion Report, 2024, p. 28; portraits Luigi Capoani, Alessandro Sbalzer: private [all rights reserved].

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