The European Policy Quartet: With the Hungarian election behind us and the French one ahead – what is the state of play in the EU’s struggle against democratic backsliding?

Deutsch

With:

• Manuel Müller, Der (europäische) Föderalist, Helsinki
• Julian Plottka, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
• Sophie Pornschlegel, University of Maastricht

This conversation was conducted as a written online chat in German. The text below has been edited and translated.

Viktor Orbán is gone. But the threat to the EU from the far right is far from over.

Manuel
When Viktor Orbán lost the Hungarian election in April, there was a great sense of relief in Brussels. More than anyone else, Orbán embodied the rise of far right across Europe and the erosion of national democracy in the EU member states where they have come to power. Now he is gone – but the threat that the far right poses to the EU is far from over.

In today’s European Policy Quartet, we’ll take a look at the current state of the struggle for democracy and the rule of law within EU member states. Was Orbán’s political downfall just a stroke of luck, or is it a sign that the EU’s rule-of-law instruments are having an effect? Has the far-right wave in Europe reached its peak? And what will the super election year of 2027 – with elections in France, Italy, Spain and Poland, among others – have in store for us?

But let’s take another look at Hungary first. Ultimately, of course, elections are always decided by the national electorate themselves. Yet it was quite clear that the EU institutions also played a role here. Rhetorically, the Commission kept a low profile, probably to give Orbán as little ammunition as possible during the election campaign. At the same time, however, the EU had frozen about 20 billion euros for Hungary under various rule-of-law instruments, which severely restricted Orbán’s financial leeway, for example in terms of pre-election fiscal handouts. So did they get it all right?

Sophie
Good morning! Great to be back here.

In general, it is certainly encouraging that there has been a change of government in Hungary, especially since the elections weren't fair and free any more – so Péter Magyar’s success was by no means a foregone conclusion. As for the EU, I wouldn’t be sure that it really played such a significant role. Yes, some funds were frozen, but the main reason why Orbán lost the election was endemic corruption and the poor economic situation. For that, he had only himself to blame.

Overall, in my view, the EU has been rather weak in recent years when it comes to the rule of law. And what will happen next in Hungary remains to be seen.

Julian
Whatever the EU has done to support the rule of law in Hungary has certainly come far too late. The Commission should have made consistent use of all the means at its disposal even before the penultimate parliamentary election in Hungary in 2022. Especially the delayed application of the conditionality mechanism, despite the European Parliament’s first legal action against the Commission in October 2021, was a clear act of appeasement towards Orbán. The Commission failed to take a firm political stance on this issue, it really had to be pushed into action.

Sophie
And one more point to add to Julian’s argument: The Commission has allowed itself to be blackmailed by Orbán, for example when funds were released to Hungary in December 2023 in exchange for him lifting his veto on the Ukraine aid package. The European Parliament has also taken legal action against this. What we see here is that the Commission has politicised the rule of law and turned it into something negotiable – just as Orbán wanted.

What more could the EU have done?

Manuel
OK, the Commission had to be pushed into action. But in the end it did take action, didn’t it? In any case, it seems to me that a lot of people in the EU policy debate think that Orbán’s defeat has vindicated the approach of rule-of-law conditionality – that is, that it’s best to target authoritarian leaders in the member states primarily through financial means.

The main alternative – namely the Article 7 procedure, with the possibility of suspending voting rights in the Council – regularly fails politically due to the requirement for unanimity. So what else could or should the EU have done?

(Just asking for a friend. Actually, I completely agree with your criticism of the Commission’s hesitant approach!)

Sophie
There is a lot the EU could have done. First and foremost, it could have made proper use of the instruments already available. For example, the Article 7 procedure was not taken seriously enough. Yes, it is a limited instrument, but the issue could at least have been put on the Council’s agenda. But none of the member states that have held the Council presidency in recent years wanted to do so.

Also, it would have been possible to apply the rule of law conditionality mechanism not just to three structural funds, but to all of them – and to do so without instrumentalising it for political ends.

The Commission has also been extremely hesitant when it comes to infringement proceedings. In this regard, the European Court of Justice has actually done more to uphold the rule of law than any other institution (the Parliament has tried, but it simply doesn’t have much power in this area). And when lots of legal experts say that the Treaties are being breached, but the Commission, as the “guardian of the Treaties”, does nothing, that’s actually a sign that the Commission has not done its job properly.

Why did the Commission hesitate so long?

Julian
What I find particularly fascinating about the Commission’s behaviour is the question of why: Why did the Commission remain inactive and hesitant for so long?

I can think of three arguments:

1. The German economy, and German car manufacturers in particular, would have lost a great deal of money if the Commission had intervened earlier.
2. From a tactical standpoint, making concessions has often made negotiations in the European Council easier in the short term – or at least that is what the heads of state and government believed.
3. Conservatives had a kind of nostalgic feeling for Orbán, especially in Germany. I’m sure I’m not the only one who has often heard people say that, deep down, Orbán is actually “a good guy”!

What do you think was the reason for the Commission’s lack of commitment? Are there any other explanations?

Manuel
I think point 2 is structurally the most important aspect, although the others have certainly played a part as well. But the many areas where unanimity is required in the Council have given Orbán enormous leverage. This applies in particular to foreign policy, which is especially prominent given the current geopolitical situation, but also to the EU budget, without which the EU would be paralysed. Orbán has been really skilful at exploiting this – and maybe as importantly, he has shown potential imitators how it’s done.

What next for Hungary?

Sophie
Absolutely. The prevailing attitude in the Council is to seek compromise, even with people like Orbán.

I also see the danger that the Commission will now celebrate Magyar’s election as a political victory and open up towards Hungary too quickly, rather than considering strategically how the EU can be a partner to Hungary in the process of redemocratisation. EU funds shouldn’t be released for political reasons, but according to the criterion of whether or not a member state adheres to the principles of the rule of law. And objectively speaking, Hungary is not currently doing so, because the judiciary and the media, for example, are not sufficiently independent. After all, the country has not become a democracy again overnight. To achieve that, it will first have to “undo” 16 years of democratic backsliding.

Julian
I see that risk too, especially as the EPP regards Magyar as one of their own – an EPP-dominated Commission, the large EPP group in Parliament and a predominantly EPP European Council will surely be only too happy to let all oversight slide.

What the Commission should be doing now is sitting down with the new Hungarian government to agree on a clear roadmap for dismantling the autocratic system. Funds should only be released once previously agreed benchmarks for re-democratisation have been met.

Sophie
Especially since Magyar was himself a member of Fidesz until 2024, meaning he supported the move towards autocracy for years. His then-wife, Judit Varga, was even minister of justice under Orbán and responsible for the confrontational stance towards Brussels. He later became the leader of the opposition, but he’s still a right-wing conservative. One can therefore only hope that he keeps his election promises and rebuilds democratic structures in Hungary. Anyway, his first staffing decisions for the new government are looking promising so far.

Julian
True! We should also not forget that Magyar owes his overwhelming majority solely to the absurd Hungarian electoral system. Orbán’s Fidesz still received over 38 per cent of the vote.

Given that the consequences of dismantling the autocratic system are unlikely to please all voters, and given that the Hungarian party system has all but ceased to exist, Hungary’s long-term stability is by no means clear. The temptation is therefore strong to perhaps not pursue the restoration of democracy quite so rigorously – on the grounds that “it’s better to play it safe so that Fidesz doesn’t return”.

Even without Orbán, the far right remains strong in Europe

Sophie
I agree. From a PR perspective, this is all very nice for the EU and its member states: Orbán is gone, so we’ve solved the problem. But nothing has actually been solved – Hungary hasn’t suddenly become democratic again overnight. I very much hope that the EU does not repeat the same mistake it made with Poland by prematurely discontinuing the Article 7 procedure before any real progress had been made. The EU is perfectly capable of pursuing a two-pronged approach: politically demonstrating that it is now dealing with Hungary differently, while also remaining consistent in its use of the rule of law instruments.

And let’s perhaps have a brief look at the situation in the other EU member states. Orbán has played the role of Europe’s “black sheep” in recent years. For many, this was a rather convenient situation, as it diverted attention from other problematic developments – for example, the fact that far-right parties are also in power in several other EU member states: Italy, Slovakia, Czechia, also Sweden and Finland.

Not to mention the fact that, in certain areas, far-right ideology is already being promoted by democratic parties. One need only look at the EU’s migration policy and the latest return regulation, which is truly worrying from a human rights perspective.

Julian
In a way, it is quite an ironic twist that Orbán has been voted out of office just as his migration policy has finally entered the political mainstream and is being implemented.

How will the rise of the far right be stopped?

After years on the rise, support for far-right parties in the EU has declined slightly in recent months.

Manuel
So let’s move on from the past to the present: As Sophie said, numerous EU member states have far-right parties in government, even if not all of them are as openly anti-democratic as Hungary’s Fidesz. Judging by the polls, the political mood in Europe is more right-wing than it has ever been since the Second World War.

At the same time, however, my latest European Parliament seat projections have shown that the Europe-wide rise of the far right has levelled off and has even begun to decline slightly since last autumn.

Of course, there are exceptions at national level, such as Germany, where the AfD continues to surge from one record high to the next. But rather than standing frozen like a rabbit in the headlights, it is still a good occasion to ask: When and how might the rise of the far right in Europe actually come to a halt?

Sophie
The “when” is a good question – you’d need a crystal ball to answer that! But there is a clear answer to the “how”: The centrist parties must finally stop adopting the right-wing agenda. Many academic studies have now proven that voters always prefer the original to the copy, and the more right-wing ideas move into the mainstream, the easier it becomes for far-right parties to come to power. A prime example of this is the UK’s migration policy under Keir Starmer. Labour has really shot itself in the foot with that.

Julian
Let’s hope it’s just the foot and not the head. 🙈

Why has the far right recently stagnated in EU opinion polls?

Manuel
Sophie, I see things exactly the same way, and I’m also familiar with the studies you mention – like this one by Werner Krause et al. Also, it doesn’t ultimately make much difference to us citizens whether far-right policies are implemented by far-right parties or by parties traditionally considered to be centrist. After all, it’s not the name that matters, but the political substance.

Nevertheless, I suspect that Orbán’s defeat will be seen as a vindication by those who believe that adopting right-wing positions is a winning strategy. As you said earlier, Magyar is hardly a left-winger. And across Europe, the recent slowdown in the rise of the right has coincided with a period in which many centrist parties are adopting right-wing positions. (Although centrist parties have so far gained little from this in the polls: In the latest seat projections, it is mainly newcomer parties and independents that have made gains, such as the populist PB, which won Bulgaria’s parliamentary election in April.)

Julian
We would have to take a closer look at voter migration numbers for that. In general terms, I can think of three reasons for the decline of the far right:

1. The extremists may have exhausted their voter potential in many member states; after all, there are also staunch democrats who would never vote for them. This would be a very worrying development, however, because it would mean that the enemies of democracy have become permanently entrenched at their current level.
2. As you just said, in some member states voters are switching their support to new and fringe parties. This would be a better development, insofar as it would show that these voters are not convinced by far-right policies on their merits. However, if we end up with a merry-go-round of protest votes instead, that would still pose a structural problem for democracy, as electoral results and parliamentary majorities would become more volatile.
3. It could also be that right-wing extremism is no longer in vogue and has passed its peak. If so, an interesting question would be: Where do we go from here? Will Markus Söder be hugging trees again in three years’ time and linking his political future to the end of nuclear power? Or will the current deregulation agenda at EU level strengthen left-wing parties?

Sophie
Markus Söder entered the chat. 😆

Manuel
Good points, Julian! As a fourth reason (or an addition to your third): Donald Trump is also likely to play a part in this. His erratic behaviour and decisions have caused the Republican Party’s poll ratings in the US to plummet and seem to be so off-putting also to European voters that they have damaged the image of the far-right camp across the Atlantic.

But your first two points are certainly valid as well. We also have to keep in mind that, for now, the seat projections merely indicate a temporary halt to the multi-year rise of far-right parties, not a big trend reversal. Currently, the far-right camp is still significantly stronger than it was at the last European election in 2024. It could therefore well be that we are simply witnessing the far-right consolidating at a high level, and that the problems of recent years have become endemic.

Sophie
Yes. As long as we fail to tackle the fundamental problems facing our society, economy and politics – such as the issue of inequality – the far right will continue to solidify its position.

Will the rule of law drop off the EU’s agenda without Orbán?

Julian
I see yet another risk: Now that the poster boy for dictatorship has stepped down, I fear that the issue of the rule of law in the EU will soon cease to interest anyone. Viktor Orbán was perfectly suited to the role of the personification of evil, which allowed the issue to be brought to the attention of the wider public. This will not work quite as well with any of the other heads of state and government who are currently displaying authoritarian tendencies. Either people will turn a blind eye to their evil ways for opportunistic reasons, as with Giorgia Meloni, or they are simply not well known enough, as in the case of Czechia.

Manuel
Yes, I see that risk too. Even in Orbán’s case, the EPP stood by him until he began to explicitly attack European policy-makers such as Manfred Weber. Of course, other authoritarian politicians will learn from this: As long as they keep a low profile in Brussels and support the key objectives on the agenda of the major member states, they will have considerable scope to erode national democracy at home.

The key player that might stand in the way of this is the European Court of Justice, for which considerations of political expediency do not play as significant a role as they do for the Council, the Commission or even the European Parliament. But the ECJ’s scope for action is limited – in particular, it can only respond to specific cases that are brought before it.

Sophie
That’s true. I’d also like to briefly draw attention here to the ECJ’s latest ruling against Hungary: This has been the first time the Court has cited Art. 2 TEU as an independent legal basis in its judgments. The definition of “European society”, which was used for the first time, is also interesting. These are interesting developments that demonstrate the need for the EU to be more vocal about the fundamental values it defends. But yes, the ECJ is not the guardian of the Treaties. And the European Commission should take its role much more seriously here and make use of its legal scope for action. Overall, I am rather under the impression that the Commission is acting very timidly, with “anticipatory obedience” towards the Council.

Regarding Julian’s point: I find it fascinating how the stance on Ukraine often takes precedence over all other positions within the EU. For example, Merz has no qualms about working with Meloni to push through a deregulation agenda in Brussels, even though she is a neo-fascist. The narrative here is that, because she supports Ukraine, she is an acceptable partner.

Is being “pro-Ukraine” the only relevant criterion?

Julian
I agree with you on this point and I am also alarmed by how uncritically people in Germany have been speculating about the potential new “power couple” Merz-Meloni. But on the issue of Ukraine, it should be noted that the Italian fascists have been loyal to NATO since the end of the Second World War. So this is a well-established foreign policy stance, not an expression of short-term politics. Still, it should not be used as an argument to normalise fascism.

Manuel
I’m also not sure whether the term “neo-fascism” adequately describes Meloni’s politics. In any event, she is not a Mussolini nostalgist, but above all a power-oriented politician whose policies are broadly in line with those of other far-right parties in Europe – somewhat more pragmatic, somewhat more skilful than many others, and perhaps all the more dangerous for it.

As for your general point, Sophie, I do agree. Ahead of the 2024 European election, Manfred Weber declared that the EPP would only cooperate with parties that were “pro-European, pro-rule of law and pro-Ukraine”. But if you look at who they form governing coalitions with at national level, “pro-Ukraine” seems to be the only criterion that really matters. And when it comes to forming majorities in the European Parliament, it seems the EPP is now happy to work with any partner anyway.

Julian
The extent to which the erosion of democracy has become mainstream would be a topic worthy of its own European Policy Quartet. I also find it worrying, for example, how the EPP is attempting to silence critical voices and extra-parliamentary opposition. Consider, for instance, the NGO working group in the European Parliament, where the EPP is collaborating with the far right.

What if Bardella wins the election in France?

Manuel
Let’s instead return to the point that the EU might lose interest in the rule of law issue following Orbán’s defeat, as there is no longer a prominent, polarising figurehead for the European far-right camp. That could change as early as 2027: National elections are due to be held in no fewer than eight EU member states that year – including the presidential election in France, where the likely far-right candidate, Jordan Bardella (RN/Patriots), is currently well ahead in the polls for the first round.

Is the EU prepared for the possibility that France could shift to the right in a year’s time?

Sophie
To put it simply: No, the EU isn’t in the least bit prepared for this.

And this is particularly serious when one considers the implications – for the EU budget or for decision-making in the Council, for example. Unfortunately, neither Brussels nor the capitals of the member states are taking a forward-looking approach. The strategy being pursued is simply to sit back and hope for the best.

Julian
I don’t think Bardella will be able to step into the role that Orbán has played any time soon. Even if he wins the election and then sets about dismantling French democracy very efficiently, it is doubtful that he will line his own pockets and act as an autocrat in the same way as Orbán. To be fair, it also took Orbán years to establish his reputation.

In France, I think there is a greater risk that actors would gravitate towards Bardella, regardless of his policies – simply because the country is so large. He’d essentially be treated as a second Meloni, even though his views on European policy are even further from the mainstream than hers.

Manuel
I also think that many European politicians have a mixture of (a) the hope that Bardella would ultimately behave like Meloni – that is, that he would be reasonably cooperative at European level and would push ahead with the erosion of national democracy in such a gradual way that the EU could ignore the problem for a few years – and (b) the confidence that, if necessary, he could be reined in using the existing rule of law conditionality instruments, just as was done with Orbán.

At the very least, however, the latter is likely to prove far more challenging in France than in Hungary. If Orbán has repeatedly succeeded in using the threat of a veto to force the EU to release funds, Bardella is likely to encounter even fewer obstacles. “EU-26” arrangements without France would simply have far fewer resources, whether financial, diplomatic, or military. And then there is the fact that, in the event of a conflict, France could simply suspend its own payments into the EU budget. While this would obviously be contrary to EU law, France, as a net contributor, may politically well have the upper hand here.

Sophie
I’m really intrigued to see what will happen if the RN wins the presidential election. One thing is certain: There will be major protests in France. It is still too early to say how an RN government would position itself towards the EU, or how important the EU issue will be for the next French government. In the best-case scenario, an RN government would pay little attention to it and many things would largely continue as before. In the worst-case scenario, they would make Europe one of their ideological driving forces and actively push for the erosion of the EU.

I do think that an RN government would face a certain “reality check” once it comes to power. For example, the party has already abandoned its former stance on leaving the euro. But that is not to say that an RN government would not have serious consequences that would weaken the EU as a whole.

One more point: We should not forget that the MAGA administration in the US supports far-right movements across Europe. After all, this was made quite explicit in last December’s National Security Strategy. It is not yet clear how this will affect the overall picture in the EU over the coming years.

And now?

Manuel
Oh dear … We can see just how quickly European optimism about Orbán’s departure fades as soon as the upcoming election in France is mentioned. So, to conclude on a constructive note: What can, what should the EU be doing to prepare for 2027?

Sophie
Here’s a five-point plan:

1. Invest in strategic foresight so that you have options on the table.
2. Identify, name, and resolve vulnerabilities – for example, in the rules of procedure of the EU institutions.
3. Invest in capacity-building within the EU institutions: Ultimately, it is always people who stand up against authoritarianism.
4. If possible, get the EU budget for 2028-2034 approved before the French election (which unfortunately looks unlikely).
5. Forge democratic coalitions, primarily to ensure qualified majority decisions in the Council – and if that fails: Strengthen frameworks outside the EU institutions so that decisions can still be taken.

Manuel
👍

I myself have repeatedly proposed the idea of a supplementary treaty over the past few years (including once here in a European Policy Quartet), whereby a group of member states would enter into a binding agreement amongst themselves to refrain from exercising their national right of veto in the Council in future.

That would not have helped to rein in Orbán, as he certainly would not have agreed to such a supplementary treaty. But it would have been binding on future governments of the participating countries. For example, if France were on board, this would significantly limit the potential for blackmail by a future Bardella government. Unfortunately, there is probably not enough time left to negotiate such an agreement now.

Julian
I believe the most important thing is for some person, or group of people, to develop a vision for Europe. In my opinion, the current deregulation agenda promoted by von der Leyen and Weber does not constitute such a vision.

However, this holds true regardless of the outcome of the French election. At the moment, I am more concerned that there is nothing a far-right French president could block which a democratic president would be able to achieve.

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Julian Plottka is a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophie Pornschlegel is a Brussels-based policy analyst and a doctoral researcher at the University of Maastricht.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

All issues of the European Policy Quartet can be found here.

Pictures: Orbán: Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU 2024/Julien Nizet [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons [cropped]; portrait Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs/Eeva Amundi [all rights reserved]; portraits Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel: private [all rights reserved].