The European Policy Quartet: Institutional reforms in times of war – does the Convention still have a chance?

Deutsch

With:

• Minna Ålander, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
• Carmen Descamps, German Embassy, Madrid
• Manuel Müller, University of Duisburg-Essen / Der (europäische) Föderalist, Berlin
• Julian Plottka, University of Passau / University of Bonn
• Sophie Pornschlegel, European Policy Centre, Brussels

This conversation was conducted as an online chat in German. The transcript below has been edited and translated.

It’s high time to restructure the EU! But what if half the European Council doesn’t go along?

Manuel
On 23-24 June, at its last meeting before the summer, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova – a historic step forward for EU enlargement policy. For the friends of a deeper integration, however, the summit was rather disappointing: Although the European Parliament on 9 June had formally called on the heads of state and government to set up a Convention to change the EU treaties, the issue of treaty reform was not even mentioned in the conclusions of the summit. All in all, the European Council dealt with the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe in only three thin and largely empty paragraphs.

Of course, the background of this is the member states’ lack of a common approach towards institutional reforms. Previously, their disagreement had become evident from two opposing non-papers published in May, when thirteen countries (mainly in Northern as well as Central and Eastern Europe) spoke out against treaty reforms and six (in Western and Southern Europe) in favour. The establishment of a Convention, which requires a simple majority in the European Council, would therefore have been possible only in a close vote, if at all.

Even the reform-minded countries shied away from such a move. Shortly before the summit, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock declared that a Convention was only “one possibility” among “many other proposals”. Does that mean that the Convention is dead?

Sophie
To put it very briefly: I’m afraid it is. At least for now. Unless Germany and France give much stronger support to the Convention – and there is not too much headwind, both from the Visegrád and the Nordic states –, there will be no progress in this area.

Carmen
I don’t want to write off the Convention idea yet, even if – like Sophie – I see the chances of it dwindling. This really needs the determined commitment of some key member states, because the verve of some MEPs will unfortunately not be enough. So governments would need to seize the momentum, and quite soon.

Opening Pandora’s Box?

Minna
The Nordic countries are very critical of treaty changes mainly because they think the moment is ill-suited: There is war in Europe, and such a lengthy institutional process would tie up far too much energy and attention for internal EU affairs. Moreover, it would possibly have a divisive effect, which would be dangerous in the current special situation of war and a threat to the national security of the states in Russia’s neighbourhood.

Moreover, it is not certain that all member states would ultimately accept the treaty changes agreed upon in a Convention. Especially where referendums are needed, ratification would be uncertain – just think of the “Lisbon trauma”. From a Nordic perspective, a treaty change process would therefore be a potentially dangerous waste of time because you don’t know how many years it will take and whether a new treaty will really be ratified in all countries in the end. You would rather not open such a Pandora’s box.

Sophie
To me, this sounds very much like a cop-out, because it is never the “right moment”. In reality, it’s just the opposite: With the candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, and thus a possible major EU enlargement, we have no choice but to reform the EU treaties soon.

No one can seriously believe that the EU in its present institutional form would function well if another country with 44 million inhabitants were to be integrated – as we can see, even among 27 compromises have become almost impossible. Calling for enlargement without reform only makes sense if the goal is to make the EU even less capable of acting.

Carmen
I also think that we shouldn’t miss any opportunity right now. The external shock of having an aggressor waging war on the EU’s doorstep may also be an incentive to further unify the community – by reforming it accordingly and making it more resilient.

The perfect moment will never present itself, as everyone has a different subjective idea of it. It is precisely for this reason that the external attack should now be used as an opportunity for internal unification and reform.

No enlargement without institutional reform?

Manuel
In fact, both Baerbock and Olaf Scholz have recently described internal reforms such as more majority decisions as a precondition for the envisioned enlargement of the EU. To me, this seems like an active re-framing: The Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Parliament have treated institutional reforms primarily as a step towards further democratisation of the EU – which some member states see as something nice to have, but not as necessary or urgent. Instead, the German government now emphasises the EU’s ability to act, which must be preserved even after enlargement.

Perhaps this is a useful argument in order to convince some reluctant governments (especially in the northern and eastern member states) – after all, it’s them who is pushing particularly hard for a quick accession of Ukraine. At the same time, however, I also see a risk in this re-framing: the ability to act is not everything, but must go hand in hand with more democratic legitimacy for the EU.

Julian
In my view, it is a mistake to frame the discussion the way we are doing it here and also the way the European Parliament is doing it. We are discussing procedures – and of course everyone is against any unnecessary procedures. If we frame the debate in this way, we lose sight of the real goal.

Instead, we need to discuss the concrete reforms and ask, for example: Do or don’t Poland and Finland want a strengthened Common Security and Defence Policy as the EU’s contribution to NATO? And if they do want it, what is the most sensible way to achieve this goal?

Given the amount of challenges facing the EU, I am convinced that a Convention is the most efficient solution. Do we seriously want another muddle-through approach like during the euro crisis? We don’t have time for that!

Sophie
I find it really astonishing that many EU governments think that we should carry on like this and block progress – national small-mindedness instead of strategic action. I wonder why that is, when they know full well that they would actually benefit from an EU that is capable to act.

Reforms without treaty change?

Minna
I don’t think that the aim of the north-eastern member states really is to block reforms in principle. What they are against is making any changes that would lead to a completely new treaty – for the reasons I have already mentioned.

At least from the point of view of the Nordic states, the prospect of Ukraine’s accession isn’t necessarily linked to a need to open up the treaties either. I would rather say that the clear framing in Russia’s neighbourhood is the security of the states, an objective that outweighs everything else – and that is not just an excuse. Moreover, it is assumed that many necessary changes would already be possible within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, for example through the passerelle clause.

Carmen
An interesting side-note: A team of experts led by the legal scholar Alberto Alemanno estimates that of all the 178 proposals originally put forward by the citizens’ forums at the Conference on the Future of Europe, only 12 percent would require treaty changes. Much can already be achieved through intergovernmental cooperation.

I see the answer in the middle: Even if treaty reforms are not absolutely necessary, depending on the policy field, they can be the optimal solution to better achieve goals. Nevertheless, we also have other instruments on the way.

Julian
Yes, this argument can be heard a lot from government representatives in Germany, too. But only recently I witnessed someone from the German Foreign Office being asked what concrete reforms they wanted to implement within the treaties or through the passerelle. The diplomat didn’t come up with anything.

Sophie
A case of “muddling through – but upwards!” 😉

Regarding the link between enlargement and institutional reform: I don’t know if I would look at treaty reform primarily from a geopolitical angle. These are two different things, and the Nordic countries’ argument that Minna has put forward is based on the fear of Russia and the belief that a treaty reform process could lead to a fragmentation of the EU. But this is a false assumption. Things don’t work well in the EU anyway – we are already fragmented now, and therefore we should definitely not continue the way we have done so far.

For the rest, I agree with Manuel: yes, we need more ability to act, but in a democratic way. That’s why it is so important to look at both issues hand in hand.

Geopolitics and institutional questions

Minna
I do think that linking the institutional debate to the geopolitical situation makes sense. Ignoring the geopolitical component has been the EU’s blind spot in the past. Here again, the different perspectives between the north-eastern member states in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood and the western European countries, or those further away from Russia, become very apparent.

Carmen
Yes – that’s an important point!

Sophie
My impression is, on the contrary, that the war has suddenly made the geopolitical expert community “rediscover” the EU, but that they often lack the institutional perspective. This is where the blind spot is!

But basically, I agree with you – we haven’t seen much of the “geopolitical Commission” so far. A discussion for another quartet! 🙂

Minna
Yes, one would have to combine both: looking at the EU institutionally from a geopolitical perspective …

Julian
And that should not be the topic for another quartet either! I agree with Minna here – the solution to the reform question lies in bringing the two debates together. As long as we keep them separate, we will not get anywhere.

Sophie
I just meant that there would be enough to talk about for two quartets. The debates should definitely be merged, of course!

Julian
At least for two. I thought you wanted to postpone the topic … 😉

Taking the north-eastern member states seriously

Minna
In any case, it would be very dangerous to dismiss the real (and grave!) concerns and worries of the Northern, Central and Eastern European countries as just another cop-out and sign of a general unwillingness to reform. The problem is that these countries feel that their security interests are being ignored by the “big guys” (Germany and France). We already talked about this last time.

Julian
But that’s precisely the crux of the matter! Treaty reform would be the best chance for these countries to be taken seriously. They are much more likely to be bypassed in the current intergovernmental mode.

Manuel
To me, this attitude seems somewhat irrational, too. As Sophie has already said, the EU already is divided over institutional issues today. A Convention could be a way to overcome these divisions through package deals. Avoiding a Convention, on the other hand, won’t make the institutional issues go away, but will leave them as an elephant in the room. In the end, this can paralyse the EU at least as much and will be no less of a risk for foreign, security and enlargement policy.

Disinformation danger?

Minna
Another point against treaty changes at this moment, from a Northern and Central Eastern European perspective, is that a process that touches the EU’s foundations as much as a Treaty Convention could be used by Russia to exert influence through disinformation. And not all EU members are well equipped against this.

Manuel
That may be true. But if we only want to implement treaty changes after Russia has stopped to engage in disinformation, we can wait until the cows come home.

And here, too, I wonder whether openly addressing institutional reforms in a Convention won’t be a better way to counter disinformation. In my view, the danger is greater if these questions are only discussed as a side issue – because then, it will be easier to spread disinformation in the discourses of individual member states without the European public as a whole taking notice and political actors stepping up to counter it.

Minna
The European public? Which European public? 😏 (One of the old problems of the EU …)

Will there be a European Political Community?

Sophie
And the fact remains, especially in the geopolitical context: Without treaty reforms, especially with regard to unanimity rules, we in the EU will lack capability to act. Nor should we forget the fundamental values in the enlargement debate – there is more corruption in Ukraine than in Romania or Bulgaria, and the rule of law was already a problem before the Russian aggression.

So let’s face it: Ukraine has candidate status now, but will probably only become a member in a decade, if ever. If EU treaty reforms are not possible, then we should therefore at least take a closer look at Emmanuel Macron’s proposal on a European Political Community and try to reform enlargement policy.

Adopting the complete acquis communautaire is not an easy task. This opens the question what is most important for the new accession countries – to take part in the single market? Schengen? Climate policy? Depending on the answer, one should try to involve them and bring them closer to the EU in specific policy areas. Macron’s proposal is still very vague and would have to be elaborated, but in any case it offers a new approach to this.

Minna
I think it is important to clarify to what extent the European Political Community will be a binding preliminary stage with real steps towards integration and not just a waiting room to continue keeping the accession candidates at arm’s length.

Manuel
Yes, this debate will certainly occupy us in the near future. To me, it is still completely unclear what the European Political Community is actually supposed to be. As the European Council has recently made clear once again, it is explicitly not meant as an alternative to enlargement. And if we want an organisation that supports the EU, stands for the common democratic values and enables loose intergovernmental cooperation, we already have the Council of Europe. After excluding Russia, the Council of Europe also has pretty much exactly the same member states that are being discussed for the EPC.

Julian
I agree that the buzzword EPC will stay with us for quite a while. But I’m rather sceptical whether this debate will lead to any concrete result in the end. It’s more likely that the EPC will end up as two additional pages in the big archive of integration proposals that have never been realised.

Could differentiated integration be a solution?

Manuel
Then let’s talk again about what happens if institutional reforms become permanently impossible due to the blockade of the northern and eastern member states. I think it is very unlikely that the reform-minded countries and the European Parliament will simply resign themselves to this. Instead, I’d expect the debate on differentiated integration to gain new momentum – be it as a political solution (we will reform, but only with the willing) or as political leverage (after all, most northern and eastern governments do not want to be part of a “second tier”).

Would you say that from the point of view of the reform-minded countries this is a plausible and desirable approach?

Sophie
Yes, definitely. I think that differentiated integration would be a good way to proceed with some more ambition. Especially since – as we have seen – there are big differences of opinion among the 27 regarding the future of the EU.

Minna
Building up such a strong pressure that the Northern and Central Eastern European countries “give in” would not be a desirable approach. This would only confirm once again that the others in the EU neither understand nor take into account the security situation of these states.

Package deals, perhaps – but the problem remains that the Northern and Central Eastern European countries simply do not want the EU to focus its attention on such an uncertain process at the moment. So at the very least, one would first have to agree on a list of priorities, things that are absolutely necessary, and then see how best to go about it, whether through a Convention or some other way.

Security interests

Sophie
But how does differentiated integration mean that the other EU countries do not take into account the security situation of Northern and Central Eastern European countries? The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy takes place in an intergovernmental framework and in cooperation with NATO anyway, doesn’t it?

Minna
Differentiated integration per se is not the problem – there is an interesting recent paper on this by the Finnish think tank FIIA.

But strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy as an alternative to NATO is something the Nordic countries have given up on to some extent, I think. That is why Finland and Sweden are joining NATO now. And of course, security is more complex than just military defence.

Julian
When I look at current developments in the US, trying to rely solely on NATO for security is exactly the kind of short-sighted muddling-through that we had in the Eurozone crisis. It may work until the next crisis (or until the next US presidential election), but probably not beyond. That’s not a permanent solution.

The value of NATO

Minna
Well, NATO is not only the US. For Finland and Sweden, the Nordic dimension and cooperation within NORDEFCO is very important, too.

Julian
But what’s the point of NATO if it becomes uncertain whether the US is still behind it? Without their clear commitment, NATO will only be a nice token of symbol politics.

Sophie
Yes – with all due respect to NORDEFCO, you can’t tell me that the security of Europeans is not (almost) completely dependent on the USA. We are currently not in a position to defend ourselves.

Minna
That is a very German view! Finland is indeed capable of defending itself.

Sophie
The only question is against whom … 😉

Julian
In the end, the real value of NATO is that no one dares to attack as long as the US is on board. If the US becomes unreliable, I wouldn’t be sure that this preventive protection holds any more.

Sophie
Sure. But that’s not a reason not to strengthen the “European pillar” within NATO!

Carmen
Precisely. The US itself has repeatedly called for Europe’s emancipation in terms of strategy and military spending – just think of the two percent goal.

Julian
You’ve got me wrong there. I meant that as an argument in favour of the compelling necessity of a European security and defence policy. (But now we have got a bit off the subject of differentiated integration …)

“Cooperation of the willing” and “exit option light”

Carmen
Back to the initial question: I am not an expert in security policy, but I think that the (partly quite justified) accusation that the other EU countries do not take into account the security situation of the Northern and Central Eastern European states does not justify a categorical rejection of EU reforms.

Especially since differentiated integration explicitly allows for variable alliances and thus cooperation adapted to national circumstances. I consider both to be compatible and, in view of the successive crises in the EU, also necessary before we seriously discuss enlargement.

Julian
I would answer “yes” twice to Manuel’s question above. I see the greatest potential in differentiated integration as a political bargaining chip to get some of the reluctant states on board. At the same time, the EU has now reached such a high level of diversity among its member states that renewing their vows to the treaty obligations would not be a bad idea. Differentiated integration offers the possibility of an exit option light without producing the huge upheavals of a Brexit.

However, whoever stays on board and does not resign to the second row then must also fulfil all obligations. Higher EU budget contributions in the North, rule of law in the East, defence in Central Europe, further economic reforms in the South – I believe this would hurt all member states equally without taking advantage of anyone.

Carmen
That seems desirable to me! Perhaps a cooperation of the willing would also be a way to make reforms more attractive for the Northern and Central Eastern European states. If we don’t proceed on the path of reform with seven-league boots, we should at least make progress in small steps. Because as I said before: we cannot afford to tread water.

Minna
Good point (and nice metaphor)! 🥾

How to design differentiation?

Manuel
Then let’s come back to the question of what this could look like in concrete terms. One problem with differentiated integration is that institutional reforms often affect the structure of the EU as a whole – for example, if you want to reform European electoral law and introduce transnational lists, you can’t do that in a “differentiated” way for just a few member states.

Sophie
I see one central challenge when promoting differentiated integration: How can we simultaneously make the EU more capable of acting, but also ensure that it remains democratic – without further increasing the complexity of a system which already now is quite difficult to understand?

The Eurozone has shown how complicated that is: Its institutions are partly linked to the EU, but not entirely – which is why Piketty wanted a Eurozone parliament. But the creation of new (democratic) institutions is not a silver bullet, because it may also lead to undermining other (democratic) institutions.

The Core Europe model

Manuel
Julian, how would you solve this in the case of the package proposal you outlined before (fiscal union + rule of law + defence + reforms)? A Core European Union with its own institutions?

Julian
The answer depends somewhat on what level of rights and obligations the second-tier countries would want. If some of them can live with the Norwegian solution (which may not be so unattractive especially from the perspective of today’s non-members), then the supranational EU institutions would just move to the core and we would not need any duplicate structures.

If, on the other hand, the second tier is to have more say, new institutions would indeed be needed. In my view, it would then be important to distinguish strictly which institution is responsible for which policy area. It would plunge us into serious transparency problems if in a certain policy area one institution were responsible for some decisions and the other for others. Therefore, when countries decide whether they are in or out, they should only be able to opt in or out whole policy areas.

Two levels of rights and obligations?

Manuel
But in any case that would require that some current member states give up their right to have a say in the supranational institutions, wouldn’t it? In the first scenario, by formally leaving the EU; in the second scenario, by allowing a transfer of competences to the new “core European” bodies. Why would the Hungarian government, for example, agree to that?

(Unless the reform-minded states were prepared to threaten with a complete re-foundation of the EU – i.e. that they all leave the existing EU and conclude a treaty on a new Union only among themselves. But that would probably be a bit too much constitutional hardball, wouldn’t it?)

Julian
The challenge is to create two different levels of rights and obligations to satisfy both the first-tier and second-tier states. If we can achieve this, the outer circle could actually be ready to renounce certain rights, because they would also have fewer obligations.

Would a core EU be equally effective?

Minna
Another question is how to decouple policy areas in a meaningful way and whether a downsized EU would still be as effective. To give just one example: Could EU climate policy still achieve its goals if only a few member states participated in it?

Carmen
I see a certain risk of cherry-picking coming up here. But that would probably be an inevitable part of the deal.

Julian
If climate policy falls into the remit of core Europe, European climate targets will only be set for these countries and implemented by them. On the one hand, it can be argued that European climate policy would make less sense then. But with the same reasoning you could also say that the EU should not engage in climate policy at all if China and the US are not on board. And on the other hand, you can also argue that having and actually implementing ambitious targets for core Europe is worth more and has more effect than a half-baked compromise among all (current) member states.

But indeed, it may be necessary to partially disentangle certain policy areas, and that could be a challenge. Just look at the United Kingdom.

The supplementary treaty model

Manuel
In my view, another form of differentiated institutional reform could be supplementary treaties by which a group of member states commits among themselves to a more integrated line – similar to the original Fiscal Compact. For example, a group of countries could agree among themselves to no longer use their veto in Council votes, but to vote with the majority or abstain from voting on decisions that require unanimity.

A crucial advantage of such a supplementary treaty model would be that the reform-minded states would have the reform in their own hands and the others could not prevent them from it. At the same time, the others wouldn’t be any worse off either, since on the surface nothing would change for them. However, the countries who would insist on their right of veto would mark themselves more strongly as outsiders in the Council – and there would be a chance that in the future, after a change of government, the new government would follow suit and also join the supplementary treaty.

Julian
At least for political leverage, supplementary treaties are certainly a model that should be thought through concretely – if only to motivate hesitant member states to participate in EU reform. And if no compromise is in sight, such differentiation is always better than further delaying reforms.

However, the supplementary treaty should then be one big new treaty and not a hodgepodge of policy-area or measure-specific agreements.

Whatever works

Sophie
In principle, this is a good idea, but I would be very surprised if the member states actually took this step. Which government would willingly give up its veto powers unless everyone else follows suit?

But if it were to happen, I would be in favour of it. By now, I have become very pragmatic about that – whatever works. All options that make the EU more effective without undermining (national and European) democracy are good. And there is already a nice example of how such a supplementary treaty could subsequently be “integrated” into the EU: Schengen also originated outside the EU treaties and was only incorporated into the regular treaty framework with the Amsterdam reform.

Carmen
Yes, whatever works has become the new whatever it takes.

Sophie
It’s just a pity that the member states tend not to follow the whatever-it-takes approach when it comes to the EU’s ability to act. They don’t appear to be really motivated here …

Minna Ålander is a research assistant at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.

Carmen Descamps is Deputy Head of Unit for Economy at the German Embassy in Madrid.

Manuel Müller is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Duisburg-Essen and runs the blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Julian Plottka is a research associate at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics at the University of Passau and at the University of Bonn.

Sophie Pornschlegel is a Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre in Brussels.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

Previous issues of the European Policy Quartet can be found here.

Translation: Manuel Müller.
Pictures: construction site of the Europa building: Riki [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Carmen Descamps: Life Studio [all rights reserved]; portraits Minna Ålander, Manuel Müller, Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel: private [all rights reserved].