The European Policy Quartet: Cacophonic leadership – who speaks for Europe on the world stage?

English

With:

• Niklas Helwig, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Brussels
• Manuel Müller, Der (europäische) Föderalist, Helsinki
• Julian Plottka, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
• Sophia Russack, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

This conversation was conducted as a written online chat in German. The text below has been edited and translated.

At critical moments, the EU usually speaks with at least three voices. And sometimes these three voices contradict each other.

Manuel
Welcome to the first European Policy Quartet of 2026! Last time, we discussed the potential role that the EU could play in global politics, at a time when major powers such as Russia, China, and the US are trying to expand their spheres of influence more and more aggressively. Now, three weeks after the start of the war in Iran, this question is more pressing than ever. The initial European reactions to the war clearly showed how difficult it still is for the EU to find a common line in such situations.

First, the governments of Germany and France, together with the United Kingdom, issued a statement that criticised only the Iranian retaliatory strikes, but not the US-Israeli attack itself. Then, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/PES) condemned the attack as a violation of international law, prompting Donald Trump to threaten Spain with trade sanctions. To this, Emmanuel Macron (RE/–) responded quickly with a statement of solidarity for Spain, whereas Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP) initially remained silent.

Disunity among the member states was followed by division within the institutions: Shortly after the start of the war, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) stated in a speech that the EU could no longer rely on the “rules-based international system”, and that it should instead pursue a “more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy” and “be prepared to project our power more assertively”. However, she was contradicted by both High Representative Kaja Kallas (RE/ALDE) and European Council President António Costa (PS/PES), who both spoke out in favour of maintaining a consistent commitment to international law.

And so, once again, we are faced with the old Kissinger question: Who exactly speaks for the EU on the world stage?

Commission President vs. High Representative

Niklas
Exactly: the EU has failed to develop a single voice. The Treaty of Lisbon once aimed to establish a focal point for European foreign policy by creating the position of High Representative (HR/VP), who would serve both as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission.

In recent years, however, we have instead seen further fragmentation. Under von der Leyen, the Commission has increased its influence over foreign policy, pushing the High Representative and the European External Action Service to the sidelines. At the same time, more and more decisions have been shifted from the ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council to the heads of state and government in the European Council. Kallas and her diplomatic instruments have lost relevance.

Julian
I agree with you about the fragmentation, Niklas. But what is the reason for it? Is it a return to “Old (wo)men make history” – in other words, a question of the ambitions or egos of a new generation of decision-makers? Or is it due to design flaws in the Common Foreign and Security Policy set out in the Treaty of Lisbon? I lean towards the latter explanation. What do you think?

Niklas
Both! The Lisbon Treaty and the dual role of the HR/VP were always just a compromise. Member states did not want to grant the Commission too much power over foreign policy, so they placed the office of the HR/VP and the European External Action Service somewhere between the member states and the Commission. This is a birth defect that continues to have repercussions. At the same time, it is also a matter of personalities: Von der Leyen has made security and defence her own issue and is aggressively staking her claim to it.

Centralisation within the executive

Sophia
Indeed. The rift between the High Representative and the Commission President is nothing new; it's almost institutionalised. But von der Leyen is also actively working to expand her influence.

Here’s a nerdy institutional detail 🤓 to confirm this: Since von der Leyen took office, she has established a new cabinet-level body that deals exclusively with external affairs – the Group for External Coordination (EXCO).This may seem like just a minor technical change, but it could have a significant impact on the balance of power between the Commission President and the High Representative/Vice-President.

I think it’s reasonable to interpret this as von der Leyen trying to bring foreign policy more into the Commission. Only time will tell how effective this will be. But we know from other contexts that such structural changes can work.

Manuel
I’m not sure whether I would describe this trend as “fragmentation”, or rather as “centralization”. We’ve seen this in other areas as well: the more issues that are decided at a supranational level, the more important the executive branch becomes – and within the executive branch, the leader.

We have seen this happening within EU member states, where the growing influence of the European Council has shifted power from the foreign ministries to the heads of state and government. And now we are also seeing it within the EU itself, where von der Leyen is using the argument of ensuring geopolitical effectiveness to assume more and more responsibilities that, according to the Treaty, should fall under the remit of the High Representative.

And, of course, the role of the HR/VP in the Treaty is structurally fraught with tension due to their dual role as both High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission and the resulting lack of clear institutional loyalty. This tension is not particularly problematic as long as all stakeholders have sufficient time and political will to reach a consensus through discursive-deliberative processes. But in crisis situations, it becomes a structural weak point where intra-European disputes can flare up. The only way to truly resolve this would be through federalisation, i.e. by shifting foreign policy to the Commission.

Integrating the EEAS into the Commission?

Niklas
Well, maybe not full-blown federalisation, Manuel – let’s not get ahead of ourselves there. But it would certainly make sense to integrate the European External Action Service more closely with the Commission. This could be achieved even within the existing treaties, and it would help to avoid some of the overlapping structures and turf wars.

As I mentioned, the member states were not particularly keen on such a solution in the past. However, we are now seeing that they are quite willing to work directly with the Commission when it comes to sanctions or the defence industry. So why not integrate the External Action Service into the Commission as well?

Julian
I really like the idea of describing the negotiations in the Council working groups as “discursive-deliberative” – hashtag #Habermas! 😂

I get the impression that the European External Action Service is very much taking its cues from the member states, which is leading to a paralysis of foreign policy. To quote an anonymous source from a discussion I had with representatives of an unnamed Brussels institution: “This is a good idea, but it would have to come from the member states. Otherwise, we can’t do anything.” At the same time, the end of the rotating presidency in the Foreign Affairs Council has disincentivised member states from driving the agenda forward, as it is no longer as prestigious. But there isn’t any other political engine now. So, I like Niklas’ idea of integrating the External Action Service into the Commission and giving it more political weight.

The Commission driving forward the single market for defence

Niklas
In security and defence policy, there are already some areas where the Commission can play a role as an “integration engine”, driving things forward – particularly in the defence industry. However, this is mostly limited to industrial policy, and even then, the Commission’s activities are rather small compared to the investments of the member states. And now, even SAFE has been thrown into turmoil by Polish domestic politics …

Julian
I wonder whether von der Leyen is a genuine federalist trying to strengthen the Commission and establish its role in foreign and security policy? Some authors draw a comparison between the steps taken in the defence single market, including the role of the new Commissioner for Defence, with the Commission’s environmental policy in the 1980s: Starting from a single market competence, entirely new policy areas were developed and later incorporated into the Treaty as conferred powers.

Or is the agenda just crisis-driven, with von der Leyen simply riding the current political wave?

Commission President vs European Council

Sophia
Manuel, you wrote earlier that as supranational issues gain in importance, the executive branch gains power. I certainly agree with that. But here’s the thing: The European Council is also part of the executive branch – some people (not me 😉) would even argue that it is the EU’s core executive.

In this context, I also find it interesting that a rift between von der Leyen and Costa has recently become openly apparent for the first time. Previously, the two had always gone to great lengths to present a united front, issuing joint statements and so on. But we must not underestimate Costa. Like his pre-predecessor, Herman Van Rompuy, he appears to handle matters by quietly working out compromises behind the scenes and avoiding public conflict. This can make the office of Council President appear weaker than it actually is. It seems to me, however, that he is actually fulfilling his institutional role more effectively than his predecessor. This could become more apparent in the future and lead to greater competition with von der Leyen.

Overall, I think von der Leyen is now facing greater difficulties in maintaining her position of power than she did during her first term. This is because a) the issues, problems, and crises that Europe is dealing with increasingly involve also non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom, and b) key heads of state and government, such as Merz and Meloni, are increasingly flirting with intergovernmental mechanisms.

Manuel
That’s interesting: We are witnessing a power shift towards the Commission president – von der Leyen is more active and visible on the geopolitical stage than any of her predecessors – but at the same time, we are also seeing a resurgence of intergovernmentalism.

Sophia
I would say, yes, she is more active and visible than any previous Commission president (and more visible in the public eye than Costa) – but less so than in her first term. Here’s another paradox: Von der Leyen currently appears to be more influential than Costa. But while its president is losing visibility, the European Council itself is gaining importance.

Julian
Manuel’s description brings to mind the crisis in the euro area, when we suddenly saw “enhanced policy coordination”, strengthening both the Commission and the Council and giving crisis politics a clear executive character. Perhaps this is simply a consequence of politics currently operating in crisis mode? The big difference from back then is certainly that there is no one in the European Council with the political clout of Angela Merkel now, meaning the Commission president has more opportunity to take over the leadership role.

Intergovernmental ad hoc formats

Sophia
Von der Leyen is often perceived as trying to establish herself as the EU’s foreign policy leader. Understandably, the heads of state and government in the European Council are not at all happy about this – after all, they see it as a matter for the member states. The tension between the Commission’s leadership role and the European Council’s agenda-setting function is particularly evident in foreign policy at the moment.

But when it comes to the Iran issue in particular, the focus rather seems to be on ad hoc formats such as the E3 (Germany, France, UK), which make it more difficult for von der Leyen to assume a leadership role.

Niklas
But let’s be clear: Ultimately, the issue is not whether the EU will move forward as a supranational or intergovernmental entity, but rather how Europe can develop the capacity to act and exercise autonomy in foreign policy. In this context, intergovernmental frameworks (such as the Coalition of the Willing, E3, E5, NB8, etc.) play a major role. Statements by Merz, Macron and Starmer are also given more weight than those by von der Leyen, Costa or Kallas.

Manuel
That may be true, but that format shopping is also part of a broader trend towards intergovernmentalisation, which always results in a loss of political accountability.

Is diversity the key to Europe’s strength in foreign policy?

Niklas
Is it really a problem if Europe often presents different viewpoints in foreign policy debates? After all, it would be a shame if only politically conservative positions, such as von der Leyen’s, were to remain in the end. I think it is refreshing that Costa (or previously Josep Borrell during his tenure as HR/VP) takes a different stance, focusing more on international law and the “Global South”. Diversity is Europe’s strength!

Manuel
Well, well. But structural discord at the top also means that (a) the EU as a whole loses influence because external partners don’t know whose voice to listen to, and (b) citizens have less democratic control because no one is taking responsibility for political decisions.

Sophia
Niklas, that sounds beautifully pluralistic in theory. But in practice, it can easily mean that no joint decisions are made, and that the EU therefore fails to realise its geopolitical potential.

… or rather its size and cohesion?

Julian
Is it really possible to develop capacity to act in such small formats as the E3 or E5, Niklas? Isn’t the size of the EU one of its few assets, particularly in foreign policy? This is lost when only small groups cooperate. For example, there has been a legitimate debate about whether sanctions decisions made by the EU-26 (i.e. excluding Hungary) are effective.

At the same time, I also don’t see the current formats representing an avant-garde capable of integrating other member states into the policy framework in the medium term. If the aim were to bring as many partners on board as possible, reach compromises and later expand the circle of participants, there would be little to object to. But if small formats prioritise transactional efficiency and lead to cherry-picking, they may facilitate short-term decisions, but in the long term they destroy trust between governments and ultimately even increase fragmentation.

Niklas
OK, I see that you guys aren’t too keen on my view on strength by pluralism …

However, the fact remains that we will continue to have differing foreign policy positions in Europe – anything else would be utopian. And so, in the debate on international law, for example, it is actually a good thing that von der Leyen isn’t the only one setting the tone, and that Sánchez and Costa can express alternative perspectives. This results in more balanced positions than if only one person were setting the course. This is what sets us apart from presidential systems such as that of the United States.

When it comes to small formats, I just don’t see any other option at the moment. In terms of flexibility, it’s the least bad thing.

Manuel
More balanced positions: maybe. But sometimes it simply means that there’s no clear position at all.

And that is precisely where the issue of accountability and democratic control comes in. Personally, I have a fairly different view to von der Leyen on the question of international law. But above all, I would like to know who is responsible for defining the EU’s position, so that we could criticise them more effectively and, if necessary, vote them out of office.

Where does this challenge to international law come from?

Sophia
I also wonder why compliance with international law is being called into question so frequently at the moment. Why is there room for such debate?

There are certainly several reasons, but I immediately think of the far right. After all, what has changed rapidly and uniformly across the EU in our political systems and societies in recent years? The growing influence of far-right parties, which fundamentally challenge the rules-based order. They are normalising the questioning of an issue that had long been considered settled. And even when they aren’t in power, they still significantly shape the discourse through aggressive public communication and through conservative parties adopting their arguments and making them socially acceptable.

Manuel
I find that an interesting theory, but it doesn’t quite convince me.

Of course, it is true that far-right parties often act in ways that undermine the rule of law. Many of them also harbour obvious sympathies for authoritarian leaders who flout international law, such as Putin. However, in the context of Venezuela and Iran, I would argue that the relativisation of international law in Europe has actually come from centrist parties – parties that are deeply committed to defending democracy and that see themselves as embroiled in an existential struggle against a global authoritarian alliance, in which any means are deemed acceptable to overthrow dictators.

Normalisation of far-right positions?

Julian
From an academic perspective, I find the argument that the radicalisation of political debates by far-right actors has now reached the realm of foreign policy fascinating. From a political perspective, I find it alarming.

With a few exceptions, foreign policy has generally been an issue of little salience to the electorate. Has this changed? Has it become so important to voters that politicians are now trying to pander to the far right on this issue as well? Or have far-right positions become so normalised and accepted that they aren’t even used strategically anymore, but are simply adopted without reflection?

Sophia
Both explanations are worrisome!

Niklas
Another reason, of course, is that international law and the multilateral order are currently under attack worldwide, which is causing them to lose relevance. But that should encourage the EU to defend them all the more – not only for ideological reasons, but also in its own security interest. A world in which international law no longer applied would be far more dangerous for Europe.

Two ways of rejecting international law?

Manuel
I think we are currently dealing with two different types of rejection of international law. On the one hand, there is the rejection by far-right parties, particularly those in power in Russia and the US. These parties generally do not value the rule of law and view international law as an unwanted constraint on the expansion of their own national power.

On the other hand, there are the European centrist parties, which find themselves in a sort of apocalyptic mood out of fear of aggressive anti-Western dictatorships, particularly Russia. They see themselves in a boundless struggle between good and evil and refuse to be held back by international law for fear of perishing otherwise. If you perceive Russia as the ultimate threat, it is easy to argue that (a) the transatlantic alliance is not to be jeopardised under any circumstances, and (b) international law may be set aside when it comes to attacks on Russia’s allies, such as Venezuela or Iran.

Julian
Do we still have a transatlantic alliance that might be jeopardised? 😆

Manuel
In my view, this attitude is particularly prevalent in north-eastern EU countries (where people experience the threat from Russia first-hand), and in conservative circles (where there has been a strong attachment to the alliance with the US ever since the Cold War). Therefore, perhaps it is only logical that Pedro Sánchez, a centre-left south-western European, has most clearly taken the opposite position.

Niklas
In the US, too, there are various groups with different reasons for disregarding international law. Trump is driven primarily by personal interests and a hyper-transactional understanding of politics, in which the rule of law (whether domestic or foreign) has little place. JD Vance, on the other hand, harbours a much more ideologically driven aversion to global elites and the rules-based order. To this ideological wing of the American right, the liberal order appears to be the Antichrist (see Peter Thiel), restricting individual freedoms and heralding the end of the world.

So who, then, is speaking for Europe?

Manuel
To wrap things up, let’s return to our opening question: Who speaks for Europe on the global stage? Specifically, if you are a political analyst looking to anticipate how the EU will respond to a newly erupted geopolitical crisis, whose public statements do you pay the most attention to – von der Leyen, Kallas, Costa, Macron, Merz?

Niklas
The focus is clearly on the E3 right now. Whose statements received the most attention after the attack on Iran? Not Kallas, not von der Leyen … Costa who? The E3, on the other hand, seem to have developed a good rapport when it comes to coordinating their statements. So when Trump lands at the Bay of Pigs, we’ll hear the most important message from them.

Julian
I find it interesting that we’ve written so much today about public expressions of opinion, yet so little about political decisions. In my view, foreign policy is shaped more by the latter.

When it comes to expressing opinions, Macron is clearly the one to watch. In his approach to Ukraine, for example, he illustrates particularly well how wide the gap can be between public statements and actual policy. If I’m reading the German press coverage of the past few days correctly, the honeymoon period is likely over for “Foreign Chancellor” Friedrich Merz too, as the discrepancies between his aspirations and the implementation of his foreign policy will increasingly come under scrutiny.

Sophia
I would say that it clearly comes down to the key heads of state and government. Only if certain members of the European Council (let’s say Merz, Meloni, Sánchez, Macron, and Tusk) fail to reach an agreement will a power vacuum emerge, and von der Leyen will be ready and willing to step into it.

That’s how it always is: The president of the Commission only has as much leeway and power as the member states grant them. But when there is no consensus, there are plenty of opportunities to put new ideas on the table – and von der Leyen has proven that she is very good at this.

So, in a nutshell: It’s either Merz or von der Leyen. 😀

Julian
But von der Leyen can only fill this vacuum with rhetoric. To take action, she simply lacks the resources.

Niklas Helwig is a Brussels-based Leading Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Julian Plottka is a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

All issues of the European Policy Quartet can be found here.

Translation: Manuel Müller.
Pictures: von der Leyen, Costa, Kallas: European Union (Dati Bendo) 2026 [Conditions of use/CC BY 4.0], via European Commission Audiovisual Service; portrait Niklas Helwig, Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved]; portrait Julian Plottka, Sophia Russack: private [all rights reserved].

Das europapolitische Quartett: Kakophonie an der Spitze – wer ist Europas Stimme in der Weltpolitik?

English

Mit:

• Niklas Helwig, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Brüssel
• Manuel Müller, Der (europäische) Föderalist, Helsinki
• Julian Plottka, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
• Sophia Russack, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brüssel

Dieses Gespräch entstand als Online-Chat und wurde redaktionell bearbeitet.

Wenn es drauf ankommt, tritt die EU meistens mindestens dreiköpfig auf. Und nicht selten sagen die drei Köpfe unterschiedliche Dinge.

Manuel
Herzlich willkommen zum ersten europapolitischen Quartett im Jahr 2026. Beim letzten Mal haben wir darüber gesprochen, welche Rolle der EU in einer Weltpolitik spielen kann, in der Großmächte wie Russland, China und die USA immer aggressiver ihre Einflusssphären auszudehnen versuchen. Jetzt, drei Wochen nach Beginn des Irankriegs, stellt sich diese Frage drängender denn je. An den ersten europäischen Reaktionen auf den Krieg konnte man gut erkennen, wie schwer es der EU immer noch fällt, in solchen Situationen eine gemeinsame Linie zu finden.

Erst formulierten die Regierungen von Deutschland und Frankreich zusammen mit Großbritannien eine Stellungnahme, in der sie nur die iranischen Gegenschläge, nicht aber den amerikanisch-israelischen Angriff selbst kritisierten. Dann verurteilte der spanische Regierungschef Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/SPE) den Angriff als völkerrechtswidrig, woraufhin Donald Trump dem Land mit Handelssanktionen drohte. Darauf wiederum reagierte Emmanuel Macron (RE/–) schnell mit einer Solidaritätserklärung für Spanien, während Friedrich Merz (CDU/EVP) Trump erst einmal nur schweigend zuhörte.

Auf die Uneinigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten folgte die der Institutionen: Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EVP) erklärte in einer Rede, die EU könne sich nicht mehr auf die „regelbasierte Weltordnung“ verlassen, sondern müsse eine „realistischere und stärker interessengeleitete Außenpolitik“ betreiben und „bereit sein, unsere Macht selbstbewusster einzusetzen“. Dem widersprachen sowohl die Hohe Vertreterin Kaja Kallas (RE/ALDE) als auch Ratspräsident António Costa (PS/SPE), die sich beide für eine konsequente Völkerrechtsorientierung aussprachen.

Und so stellt sich wieder einmal die alte Kissinger-Frage: Wer ist eigentlich die Stimme der EU in der Weltpolitik?

Kommissionspräsident:in vs. Hohe Vertreter:in

Niklas
Genau, die EU hat es nicht geschafft, eine einheitliche Stimme zu entwickeln. Im Vertrag von Lissabon gab es mal die große Ambition, ein Gravitationszentrum der europäischen Außenpolitik aufzubauen – mit der Schaffung der Position der Hohen Vertreter:in (HR/VP) und ihrer verschiedenen „Hüte“ als Vizepräsident:in der Kommission und Vorsitzenden des EU-Außenministerrates.

In den letzten Jahren haben wir stattdessen aber eine weitere Fragmentierung gesehen. Die Kommission hat unter von der Leyen an außenpolitischer Strahlkraft gewonnen und die Hohe Vertreterin und den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst zur Seite gedrückt. Gleichzeitig wurden mehr und mehr Entscheidungen vom Außenministerrat auf die Ebene der Staats- und Regierungschef:innen im Europäischen Rat gehoben. Kallas und ihre diplomatischen Instrumente haben an Relevanz verloren.

Julian
Hinsichtlich der Fragmentierung stimme ich Dir zu, Niklas. Aber was ist der Grund dafür? Ist es eine Rückkehr zu „Old (wo-)men make history“ – also eine Frage der Ambitionen oder Egos einer neuen Generation von Entscheidungstragenden? Oder wurden bei der Konstruktion der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Vertrag von Lissabon eklatante Fehler gemacht? Ich tendiere eher zu letzterer Erklärung, wie seht ihr das?

Niklas
Beides! Der Lissabonner Vertrag und die Idee des Doppelhuts waren immer nur ein Kompromiss. Die Mitgliedstaaten wollten der Kommission nicht zu viel Macht in der Außenpolitik einräumen und platzierten das Amt der HR/VP und den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst deshalb zwischen Mitgliedstaaten und Kommission. Das war ein Geburtsfehler, der nachwirkt. Gleichzeitig geht es aber auch um Persönlichkeiten: Von der Leyen hat das Thema Sicherheit und Verteidigung für sich entdeckt und besetzt es aggressiv.

Zentralisierung innerhalb der Exekutive

Sophia
In der Tat: Der Riss zwischen Hoher Vertreter:in und Kommissionspräsident:in ist nicht neu und fast schon institutionell angelegt, aber von der Leyen arbeitet auch aktiv daran, ihren Einfluss auszuweiten.

Dazu noch ein nerdy institutional detail 🤓: Seit sie das Amt übernommen hat, gibt es auf Kabinetts-Ebene eine neue Formation, die sich ausschließlich mit Außen-Themen beschäftigt: die Group for External Coordination (EXCO). Das ist scheinbar nur eine kleine technische Neuerung, hat aber potenziell große Wirkung, wenn es um die Machtverteilung zwischen Kommissionspräsident:in und HR/VP geht.

Ich denke, man kann das schon so deuten, dass von der Leyen dadurch versucht, Außenpolitik mehr in die Kommission hineinzuziehen. Wie effektiv das ist, bleibt abzuwarten/zu erforschen. Aber aus anderen Kontexten wissen wir, dass solche Strukturänderungen durchaus wirksam sein können.

Manuel
Ich weiß nicht, ob ich diese Entwicklung als „Fragmentierung“ oder nicht eher als „Zentralisierung“ bezeichnen würde. Man kennt das ja auch aus anderen Bereichen: Je mehr Fragen überstaatlich entschieden werden, desto wichtiger wird die Exekutive, und innerhalb der Exekutive die Chef:in.

Wir sehen das innerhalb der EU-Mitgliedstaaten, wo sich durch den Bedeutungsgewinn des Europäischen Rates Macht von den Außenministerien zu den Staats- und Regierungsspitzen verschiebt. Und wir sehen es jetzt auch in der EU selbst, wo von der Leyen mit dem Argument der geopolitischen Handlungsfähigkeit zunehmend Aufgaben an sich zieht, für die nach der Konzeption des Vertrags eigentlich die Hohen Vertreter:in zuständig wäre.

Und natürlich ist die Rolle der HR/VP im EU-Vertrag durch den Rat-Kommission-Doppelhut und die damit verbundene unklare institutionelle Loyalität schon strukturell spannungsreich angelegt. Dieses Spannungsverhältnis ist nicht so problematisch, solange alle Akteur:innen genügend Zeit und politisches Interesse haben, diskursiv-deliberativ zu einer gemeinsamen Linie zu finden. Aber in Krisensituationen wird es zu einer Sollbruchstelle, an der sich innereuropäische Streitigkeiten entzünden können. Wirklich auflösen könnte man es wohl nur durch eine Föderalisierung, also eine Verlagerung der Außenpolitik auf die Kommission.

Den EAD in die Kommission eingliedern?

Niklas
Na ja, vielleicht nicht gleich Föderalisierung, Manuel – lassen wir mal die Kirche im Dorf. Aber es macht durchaus Sinn, den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst stärker an die Kommission anzugliedern. Das wäre auch innerhalb der bestehenden Verträge möglich, und man könnte damit einige Doppelstrukturen und Grabenkämpfe vermeiden.

In der Vergangenheit waren die Mitgliedstaaten, wie gesagt, nicht scharf auf eine solche Lösung. Inzwischen sehen wir aber faktisch, dass die Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich Sanktionen oder Verteidigungsindustrie durchaus bereit sind, direkt mit der Kommission zu arbeiten. Also warum dann nicht auch den Auswärtigen Dienst in die Kommission eingliedern?

Julian
Die Verhandlungen in den Ratsarbeitsgruppen als diskursiv-deliberative Prozesse zu beschreiben, finde ich sehr schön – Hashtag #Habermas 😂

Ich habe den Eindruck, dass der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst sich sehr deutlich an den Mitgliedstaaten orientiert, was zu einer Lähmung der Außenpolitik führt. Ich zitiere mal ohne Quelle aus einer Diskussion mit Vertreter:innen einer namentlich nicht zu nennenden Brüsseler Institution: „Schöne Idee, aber die müsste von den Mitgliedstaaten kommen, sonst können wir da nichts machen.“ Gleichzeitig haben die Mitgliedstaaten, seitdem es im Außenministerrat keinen rotierenden Vorsitz mehr gibt, ein geringeres Interesse, die Agenda voranzutreiben, weil das Prestige fehlt. Ein anderer politischer Motor ist aber aktuell nicht vorhanden. Deshalb finde ich Niklas’ Idee gut, den Auswärtigen Dienst in die Kommission zu integrieren und ihm damit politisch mehr Gewicht zu geben.

Die Kommission als Impulsgeber im Verteidigungsbinnenmarkt

Niklas
Im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik gibt es ja schon jetzt durchaus Felder, in denen die Kommission als „Motor der Integration“ wichtige Impulse setzen kann – insbesondere in der Verteidigungsindustrie. Aber das bleibt eben weitgehend auf den Teilbereich Industriepolitik beschränkt, und auch dort sind ihre Tätigkeiten im Vergleich zu den Investitionen der Mitgliedstaaten noch relativ klein. Jetzt ist auch noch SAFE an der polnischen Innenpolitik ins Wanken geraten …

Julian
Ich frage mich, ob von der Leyen wirklich eine Föderalistin ist, die versucht, die Kommission zu stärken und langfristig in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu verankern? Einige Autor:innen vergleichen ja insbesondere die Schritte im Verteidigungsbinnenmarkt und hier auch die Rolle des neuen Verteidigungskommissars mit der Umweltpolitik der Kommission in den 1980er Jahren: Aus einer Binnenmarktkompetenz heraus wurden auf einmal ganz neue Kompetenzen entwickelt, später gar als begrenzte Einzelermächtigungen im Vertrag aufgenommen.

Oder ist die Agenda doch krisengetrieben und von der Leyen reitet eher die aktuelle politische Welle?

Kommissionspräsident:in vs. Europäischer Rat

Sophia
Manuel, du hast vorhin geschrieben, dass bei einem Bedeutungsgewinn überstaatlicher Fragen die Exekutive an Macht gewinnt. Da stimme ich durchaus zu. Nur: Der Europäische Rat ist ja auch Exekutive – manche (nicht ich 😉) würden sogar sagen, die EU-Kernexekutive.

In diesem Zusammenhang finde ich es auch spannend, dass zuletzt zum ersten Mal eine Spaltung zwischen von der Leyen und Costa offen erkennbar wurde. Die beiden hatten sich ja vorher immer große Mühe gegeben, geschlossen aufzutreten, gemeinsame Erklärungen abzugeben etc. Allerdings dürfen wir Costa auch nicht unterschätzen. Es scheint, dass er die Dinge ähnlich wie sein Vorvorgänger Herman Van Rompuy regelt: also still im Hintergrund an Kompromissen tüftelt und öffentliche Konflikte vermeidet. Dadurch kann das Amt des Ratspräsidenten schwächer wirken, als es tatsächlich ist. Mir scheint aber, dass er seine institutionelle Rolle in Wirklichkeit stärker ausfüllt als sein Vorgänger. Das könnte in Zukunft deutlicher erkennbar werden und dann auch zu mehr Konkurrenz mit von der Leyen führen.

Insgesamt denke ich, dass von der Leyen jetzt größere Schwierigkeiten hat, ihre Machtposition zu halten, als in ihrer ersten Amtszeit. Das liegt daran, dass a) die Themen/Probleme/Krisen vermehrt auch Nicht-EU-Staaten wie Großbritannien einbeziehen und b) zentrale Staats- und Regierungschef:innen wie Merz und Meloni mit mehr intergouvernementalen Mechanismen liebäugeln.

Manuel
Das finde ich interessant: Wir sehen eine Machtverschiebung hin zur Kommissionspräsidentin – von der Leyen ist geopolitisch aktiver und präsenter als jeder ihrer Vorgänger –, aber gleichzeitig auch ein Wiederaufleben des Intergouvernementalismus.

Sophia
Ich würde sagen, ja, sie ist geopolitisch aktiver und präsenter als je ein Kommissionspräsident zuvor (und auch öffentlich präsenter als Costa) – aber wenn man sie mit sich selbst in der ersten Amtszeit vergleicht, weniger. Noch ein anderes Paradoxon: Von der Leyen wirkt derzeit einflussreicher als Costa. Aber während sein Präsident an Sichtbarkeit verliert, gewinnt der Europäische Rat selbst an Bedeutung.

Julian
Manuels Beschreibung erinnert mich ein wenig an die Krise in der Eurozone. Da haben wir ja auf einmal die enhanced policy coordination gesehen: Die Kommission und der Rat wurden gestärkt, wir hatten eine Exekutivierung der Krisenpolitik. Vielleicht ist das einfach ein Ergebnis des Krisenmodus, in dem sich die Politik zurzeit befindet? Der große Unterschied zu damals ist sicherlich, dass es im Europäischen Rat niemanden vom Gewicht Angela Merkels gibt, sodass der Raum für die Führungsrolle leichter von der Kommissionspräsidentin besetzt werden kann.

Zwischenstaatliche Ad-hoc-Formate

Sophia
Von der Leyen wird oft so wahrgenommen, dass sie sich zur Außenpolitik-Chefin aufschwingt. Das mögen die Staats- und Regierungschef:innen im Europäischen Rat natürlich gar nicht – ist ja schließlich Sache der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Spannung zwischen der Führungsrolle der Kommission und der Agenda-Setting-Funktion des Europäischen Rates ist in der Außenpolitik gerade besonders sichtbar.

Aber gerade in der Iran-Frage scheint der Fokus gerade auf Ad-hoc-Formate wie die E3 (Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien) gerichtet zu sein, die es von der Leyen schwerer machen, eine Führungsrolle zu übernehmen.

Niklas
Am Ende geht es doch weniger um die Frage, ob sich die EU supranational oder intergouvernemental weiterentwickelt, sondern darum, wie Europa Handlungsfähigkeit und außenpolitische Agency entwickeln kann. Da spielen zwischenstaatliche Formate (Koalition der Willigen, E3, E5, NB8 usw.) eine große Rolle. Statements von Merz, Macron und Starmer werden auch stärker wahrgenommen als solche von von der Leyen, Costa oder Kallas.

Manuel
Mag sein, aber dieses Formate-Shopping ist schon auch Teil einer breiteren Tendenz zur Intergouvernementalisierung, die am Ende immer auch mit einem Verlust von politischer Accountability, also Zurechenbarkeit und Verantwortung, einhergeht.

Ist Europas außenpolitische Stärke die Vielfalt?

Niklas
Ist es denn überhaupt ein Problem, wenn Europa in der Außenpolitik öfters unterschiedliche Positionen in die Debatte wirft? Es wäre ja schlimm, wenn am Ende nur eine politisch eher konservative Position wie die von von der Leyen übrigbleibt. Da ist es doch erfrischend, dass Costa (oder früher während seiner Amtszeit als HR/VP Josep Borrell) eine andere Position vertreten, die stärker auf internationales Recht oder den „globalen Süden“ eingeht. Die Vielfalt ist Europas Stärke!

Manuel
Na ja, aber strukturelle Kakophonie an der Spitze führt schon dazu, dass (a) die EU insgesamt an Einfluss verliert, weil externe Partner nicht wissen, welcher Stimme sie denn nun zuhören sollen, und (b) die Bürger:innen weniger demokratische Steuerungsmöglichkeiten haben, weil für jede politische Entscheidung im Zweifel immer jemand anderes verantwortlich ist.

Sophia
Niklas, das klingt in der Theorie schön pluralistisch. Aber in der Praxis bedeutet es leicht, dass keine gemeinsamen Entscheidungen gefällt werden und die EU daher ihr geopolitisches Potential nicht ausschöpft.

… oder doch die Größe und Geschlossenheit?

Julian
Lässt sich in solch kleinen Formaten wie den E3 oder E5 denn wirklich Handlungsfähigkeit entwickeln, Niklas? Ist nicht gerade in der Außenpolitik eines der wenigen Pfunde, die die EU hat, ihre Größe? Das geht verloren, wenn nur kleine Gruppen kooperieren. Es ist ja zum Beispiel auch zu Recht diskutiert worden, ob Sanktionsbeschlüsse der EU-26 (also ohne Ungarn) überhaupt Sinn machen.

Gleichzeitig sehe ich in den aktuellen Formaten auch keine Avantgarde, die die anderen Mitgliedstaaten zumindest mittelfristig in die Politik integrieren könnte. Wenn es ein Bemühen gäbe, möglichst viele Partner mit an Bord zu bekommen, Kompromisse zu schließen und später den teilnehmenden Kreis zu erweitern, dann spräche sicherlich wenig dagegen. Wenn kleine Formate aber aus einer transaktionalistischen Perspektive allein der Effizienz dienen und zu einem Rosinenpicken führen, dann mögen sie kurzfristig Entscheidungen erleichtern, langfristig zerstören sie aber das Vertrauen zwischen den Regierungen. Und dann führen sie am Ende erst recht zu Fragmentierung.

Niklas
OK, ich sehe, meine Meinung zur Stärke durch Pluralismus kommt bei euch nicht gut an …

Es wird aber weiterhin so bleiben, dass wir in der unterschiedliche außenpolitische Positionen in Europa haben – alles andere wäre utopisch. Und dann ist es zum Beispiel in der Völkerrechtsdebatte eben gut, dass von der Leyen nicht alleine den Ton angibt, sondern Sánchez oder Costa widersprechen. Am Ende steht als Resultat eine ausgeglichenere Position, als wenn nur eine die Richtung vorgibt. Das unterscheidet uns von präsidentiellen Systemen wie den USA.

Und zu den kleinen Formaten sehe ich gerade einfach keine Alternative. Es ist die am wenigsten schlechte Option im Sinne der Handlungsfähigkeit.

Manuel
Ausgeglichenere Position: vielleicht. Aber manchmal gibt es dadurch eben auch überhaupt keine klare Position.

Und gerade da liegt ja auch das Problem mit der Accountability und demokratischen Einflussmöglichkeit. Ich selbst bin in der Völkerrechtsfrage ziemlich anderer Meinung als von der Leyen. Aber vor allem würde ich mir wünschen, dass man wüsste, wer hier für die Definition der EU-Linie verantwortlich ist, damit man sie gezielter kritisieren (und gegebenenfalls auch abwählen) könnte.

Woher kommt die Infragestellung des Völkerrechts?

Sophia
Ich frage mich auch, wieso zurzeit überhaupt die Einhaltung des Völkerrechts so in Frage gestellt wird? Warum gibt es Raum für eine solche Debatte?

Es gibt sicher mehrere Gründe, aber ich denke dabei sofort an Rechtsaußen. Denn was hat sich in unseren politischen Systemen und Gesellschaften in den letzten Jahren rasant und EU-weit relativ einheitlich verändert? Der wachsende Einfluss von Rechtsaußenparteien, die im Kern die regelbasierte Ordnung in Frage stellen. Sie normalisieren ein Fragezeichen, das lange keines war. Und selbst wenn sie gerade nicht regieren, dann prägen sie doch ganz maßgeblich den Diskurs – durch aggressive Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und durch konservative Parteien, die ihre Argumente aufgreifen und salonfähig machen.

Manuel
Das finde ich eine interessante These, aber ganz überzeugt sie mich nicht.

Natürlich ist es richtig, dass Rechtsaußenparteien oft rechtsstaatsfeindlich unterwegs sind, und viele von ihnen hegen auch offenkundige Sympathien für Völkerrechtsverächter wie Putin. Aber im Zusammenhang mit Venezuela und Iran ging die Relativierung des Völkerrechts in Europa aus meiner Sicht eher von Parteien der Mitte aus, denen eigentlich viel an der Verteidigung der Demokratie liegt und die sich im Kampf mit einer globalen autoritären Allianz wähnen, in dem für den Sturz von Diktatoren jedes Mittel Recht ist.

Normalisierung von Rechtsaußenpositionen?

Julian
Die These, dass die Radikalisierung der politischen Debatten durch rechtsextreme Akteur:innen inzwischen auch die Außenpolitik erreicht hat, finde ich aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht spannend und aus politischer Sicht besorgniserregend.

Von Ausnahmen abgesehen war Außenpolitik eigentlich immer ein Thema, das beim Wahlvolk nur eine geringe Salienz hatte. Hat sich dies geändert, ist das Thema bei den Wählenden so wichtig geworden, dass die Politiker:innen versuchen, auch hier den Rechten nachzulaufen? Oder sind rechtsradikale Positionen inzwischen so normal und akzeptiert, dass sie gar nicht mehr strategisch verwendet, sondern einfach unreflektiert übernommen werden?

Sophia
Beide Erklärungen sind besorgniserregend!

Niklas
Ein weiterer Grund ist natürlich, dass das Völkerrecht und die multilaterale Ordnung gerade weltweit in die Mangel genommen werden und somit an Relevanz verlieren. Aber das sollte für die EU eher ein Grund sein, sie zu verteidigen – nicht einmal nur aus ideologischen Gründen, sondern aus ihrem eigenen Sicherheitsinteresse heraus. Eine Welt, in der das Völkerrecht nicht gilt, ist ungleich gefährlicher für Europa.

Zwei Arten von Ablehnung des Völkerrechts?

Manuel
Ich denke, wir haben es gerade mit zwei verschiedenen Arten von Völkerrechtsablehnung zu tun: einerseits die der Rechtsaußenparteien (insbesondere der Regierungsparteien in Russland und den USA), die allgemein nicht viel auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit geben und die das Völkerrecht als unerwünschte Einschränkung bei ihrer eigenen nationalen Machtausweitung sehen.

Und andererseits die der europäischen Mitte-Parteien, die sich aus Angst vor aggressiven antiwestlichen Diktaturen – speziell Russland – in einer Art Endzeitstimmung fühlen, einem entgrenzten Kampf zwischen Gut und Böse, in dem man sich vom Völkerrecht nicht zurückhalten lassen will, weil man sonst unterzugehen fürchtet. Wenn man Russland als die ultimative Bedrohung wahrnimmt, dann leuchtet es leicht ein, dass man (a) das transatlantische Bündnis auf keinen Fall gefährden will und (b) bei Angriffen auf mit Russland verbündete Diktaturen wie Venezuela oder Iran auch mal das Völkerrecht zu relativieren bereit ist.

Julian
Wir haben noch ein transatlantisches Bündnis, das sich gefährden ließe? 😆

Manuel
Verbreitet ist diese Haltung ist nach meinem Eindruck besonders in den nordöstlichen EU-Ländern (wo man die von Russland ausgehende Gefahr sehr nahe miterlebt) und in konservativen Kreisen (wo man seit der Zeit des Kalten Kriegs besonders an der Allianz mit den USA hängt). Und deshalb ist es vielleicht nur schlüssig, dass mit Pedro Sánchez ein Südwest-Europäer aus dem Mitte-links-Lager am deutlichsten die Gegenposition dazu vertreten hat.

Niklas
Auch in den USA gibt es unterschiedliche Strömungen, die dazu führen, das Völkerrecht zu missachten. Trump ist eher geleitet von persönlichem Interesse und einem hyper-transaktionalen Verständnis von Politik, in dem Recht (ob innen oder außen) wenig Platz hat. J.D. Vance hingegen hat eine viel ideologischer geprägte Abneigung gegen globale Eliten und die regelbasierte Ordnung. Diesem ideologischen Teil der amerikanischen Rechten erscheint die liberale Ordnung als Antichrist (siehe Peter Thiel), der das Ende der Welt einläutet und die Freiheiten des Einzelnen einschränkt.

Und wer ist nun die Stimme Europas in der Welt?

Manuel
Kommen wir zum Abschluss noch einmal auf die Einstiegsfrage zurück, wer die Stimme Europas in der Weltpolitik ist. Ganz konkret: Wenn ihr als Thinktanker:innen antizipieren wollt, wie die EU sich zu einer frisch ausgebrochenen geopolitischen Krise positionieren wird, auf wessen öffentliche Äußerungen achtet ihr dann am meisten – von der Leyen, Kallas, Costa, Macron, Merz?

Niklas
Das Augenmerk liegt derzeit ganz klar auf den E3. Welche Erklärungen haben denn nach dem Angriff auf Iran am meisten Aufmerksamkeit erregt? Nicht Kallas, nicht von der Leyen … Costa wer? Die E3 hingegen scheinen sich auch bei der Koordination ihrer Statements gut eingespielt zu haben. Wenn also Trump an der Schweinebucht landet, werden wir das wichtigste Signal von ihnen hören.

Julian
Ich finde es spannend, dass wir heute viel über öffentliche Meinungsäußerungen geschrieben haben und wenig über politische Entscheidungen. Außenpolitische Handlungsfähigkeit wird meiner Ansicht nach eher durch Letzteres konstituiert.

Wenn es also um Meinungsäußerungen geht, dann ganz klar Macron – in der Ukraine-Politik zum Beispiel, zeigt er besonders schön, wie groß der Graben zwischen öffentlichen Erklärungen und praktischer Politik sein kann. Wenn ich die deutsche Presseberichterstattung in den letzten Tagen richtig deute, dann dürfte auch für den „Außenkanzler“ Friedrich Merz die Schonzeit vorbei sein und die in seiner Außenpolitik zu findenden Unterschiede zwischen Anspruch und Umsetzung zunehmend thematisiert werden.

Sophia
Ich würde sagen, dass es ganz klar auf die zentralen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen ankommt. Nur wenn bestimmte Mitglieder des Europäischen Rates (sagen wir Merz, Meloni, Sánchez, Macron und Tusk) nicht übereinstimmen, dann entsteht da ein Machtvakuum, in das von der Leyen reingehen kann und reingehen wird.

So ist es doch immer: Die Kommissionspräsident:in hat immer so viel Spielraum und Macht, wie die Mitgliedstaaten ihr geben. Wenn man sich aber nicht einigt, dann gibt es viel Raum, um neue Ideen auf den Tisch zu legen – und von der Leyen hat bewiesen, dass sie das gut kann.

Also ganz kurz gesagt: entweder Merz oder von der Leyen. 😀

Julian
Aber dieses Vakuum kann von der Leyen nur rhetorisch füllen. Um zu handeln, fehlen ihr halt die Ressourcen.

Niklas Helwig ist ein in Brüssel ansässiger Leading Researcher am Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).

Manuel Müller ist ein in Helsinki ansässiger Europawissenschaftler und Herausgeber des Blogs „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Julian Plottka ist wissenschaftlicher Senior-Projektmanager am Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophia Russack ist Research Fellow am Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brüssel.

Die Beiträge geben allein die persönliche Meinung der jeweiligen Autor:innen wieder.

Alle Ausgaben des europapolitischen Quartetts sind hier zu finden.

Bilder: von der Leyen, Costa, Kallas: European Union (Dati Bendo) 2026 [Conditions of use/CC BY 4.0], via European Commission Audiovisual Service; Porträt Niklas Helwig, Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [alle Rechte vorbehalten]; Porträt Julian Plottka, Sophia Russack: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

“Chefsache” no more: What the European Union would look like without the European Council

Deutsch

By Lucas Schramm

“The lesson that governments seem to have learned is that the biggest – and increasingly even the not so big – questions should be decided at the top.”

On 19 March 2026, the EU’s national heads of state or government met for the third time this year as the European Council. Originally scheduled to discuss economic competitiveness, the summit was overtaken by the hostilities in the Middle East and their implications for European security and energy supply. Internally, the European Council was – again – paralysed by the threat of Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán (Fidesz/Patriots) to veto the €90bn EU financial support package for Ukraine that national leaders had actually agreed on in December last year.

Given its internal susceptibility to blockage and apparent incapacity to focus on the EU’s long-term priorities, the question appears whether the European Council still fulfils the functions that proponents attribute to it and that formed the basis of its creation in the 1970s. Indeed, while the European Parliament criticises the European Council for exceeding its Treaty-based mandate, scholars warn that the institution regularly falls short of meeting its self-declared objectives and timelines.

How would the EU look and operate without the European Council? Even though this question might seem practically irrelevant, it is worth investigating how the European Council’s development and current performance affects EU policymaking and polity development.

How the European Council has become the EU’s political centre

The starting point for examining the European Council’s trajectory and current role is legal and constitutional. In the treaties, it is supposed to provide the Union with “the necessary impetus for its development and define its general political directions and priorities” (Art. 15 TEU). It is explicitly not meant to exercise legislative functions.

That division of labour matters. The European Commission is supposed to promote the general interest of the Union and initiate legislation. The Council of the EU and the European Parliament are supposed to legislate and decide the budget. The Court of Justice is supposed to ensure that the law is observed. The European Council was therefore never designed to act like a standing executive steering committee above the rest of the system. Yet that is increasingly how it operates in practice. The gap between formal role and practical influence is the core problem.

Agenda control

Why has the European Council become so dominant? The first reason is agenda control. Every institutional cycle now begins with national leaders agreeing on a strategic agenda that guides the work of the Union for five years. This gives the European Council a powerful first-mover advantage. It tells the Commission what the big priorities are supposed to be, signals to ministers what compromises are politically possible, and frames public expectations about where the Union is going. In theory, that is only broad orientation.

In practice, it often becomes the outer boundary of what the EU institutions are expected to do. This matters because agenda-setting is power. An institution does not need to legislate directly if it can define the menu from which others must choose.

Control over appointments

The second reason is control over appointments. The European Council proposes the candidate for Commission President and is central to the package deals over the Union’s top jobs. That allows national leaders to shape not only policy priorities but also the political leadership that will implement them.

The consequence is that the Commission enters office already marked by a bargain struck among heads of state or government. Even when Parliament retains the formal power to elect the Commission President and approve the College, the real political starting point has often already been fixed at summit level. This weakens the link between Union-wide electoral contestation and executive leadership. It also reinforces the idea that the European Council stands above the ordinary institutional balance rather than within it.

Crisis management

The third reason for the European Council’s dominance is crisis management. During the euro crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, the pandemic, and Russia’s war against Ukraine, it became the arena in which the crucial political bargains were struck. This happened for understandable reasons. When governments face existential distributional conflict, leaders want to negotiate personally. They can trade across issues, absorb domestic costs and present outcomes as national victories.

But repeated crisis management has transformed a temporary emergency role into a permanent model of governance. The lesson that governments seem to have learned is that the biggest – and increasingly even the not so big – questions should be decided at the top. That lesson is politically convenient, but constitutionally corrosive. It shifts the centre of gravity away from lawmaking by the ordinary institutions and toward summit bargaining among executives.

Authority

The fourth reason is the practical authority of European Council conclusions. These conclusions are not ordinary legislation, but they often function as if they were. Once national leaders have endorsed a line, it becomes difficult for ministers, the Commission or Parliament to depart from it without appearing to challenge the collective will of the heads of state or government.

This is how the European Council exercises influence beyond its formal competences. It rarely says, “we legislate.” Instead, it sets out the political package, leaves the legal drafting to others, and then constrains their room for manoeuvre. The other institutions remain formally important, but their autonomy is narrowed before the ordinary process even begins. Therefore, the European Council is no longer just a body that gives broad strategic guidance. It has become the Union’s political command post.

Why this changes EU decisions and weakens the other institutions

This dominance has real consequences for the kind of decisions the EU makes. The first consequence is that decisions become more intergovernmental in substance. Because the European Council is composed of national leaders, its compromises reflect what governments can jointly sell at home.

That tends to privilege short-term political manageability over long-term institutional coherence. It also favours solutions that can be framed as state bargains rather than as genuinely supranational choices, in other words: policies with “European added value”. The Union does not stop integrating, but it integrates in a more selective way: more when security concerns, crises or geopolitical necessities force leaders to act, and less when stable, rule-based policy development would require supranational initiative. The European Council does not stop integration, but it filters it through the logic of national executives.

Reactiveness and lack of stamina

The second consequence is that EU decisions become more reactive and less programmatic. The European Council is strongest when a crisis has already arrived, and leaders must break a deadlock. It is much weaker at sustained implementation over time. This helps explain why it often produces bold declarations, ambitious targets and headline bargains, yet struggles when the task is to deliver detailed, durable and internally coherent policy.

The Lisbon Strategy is the classic example for this. In 2000, leaders declared that the EU should become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010, and later backed a target of spending 3 per cent of GDP on research and development. The rhetoric was grand, but delivery never matched it. More than two decades later, EU R&D intensity still remains below that target.

The same pattern appears in the European banking union. During the euro crisis, leaders were central to the political decision to build new crisis-management tools and to launch a banking union. The June 2012 summit language about breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns became one of the defining formulas of that period. Yet the project remains incomplete. A European Deposit Insurance Scheme was proposed years ago but has still not been adopted.

That is not a trivial technical delay. It is evidence of a structural weakness. The European Council can push through the opening move of a major integration project when pressure is maximal, but it often cannot finish what it starts once the crisis atmosphere recedes and the distributive details become politically uncomfortable.

Delay and blackmail

A third consequence of European Council-driven EU policymaking is delay. Because it works by consensus, every high-salience file carries the risk that one government will hold up the whole Union. This creates a politics of leverage and sometimes outright blackmail. Leaders know that a summit is where pressure peaks and visibility is highest, so veto threats become especially valuable.

The 2023-2024 fight over the revision of the EU budget and the Ukraine Facility illustrated the point. One government could block an urgently needed collective decision that the others broadly supported, forcing the issue into another summit. Agreement eventually came, but only after delay, extra drama and renewed side-payments. This is not an isolated malfunction. It is a predictable feature of a system that concentrates too much political authority in an unanimity-based body at the top.

Weakening the other EU institutions

The effect on the other institutions is serious. The Commission loses agenda autonomy. Formally, it still holds the right of initiative in the normal case and remains indispensable for turning political bargains into legal acts and implementation plans. In practice, however, it increasingly works inside a framework set by the European Council. “Invitations” from leaders become quasi-mandates. Political entrepreneurs in the Berlaymont can still shape details, sequencing and packaging, but the space for independent initiative narrows when the central lines have already been drawn above them. A Commission that constantly waits for summit direction is not acting as the guardian and motor of the Union. It becomes more of a technocratic executive for bargains struck elsewhere.

The European Parliament also loses, even though its formal treaty powers remain extensive. In the ordinary legislative procedure, Parliament is a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council. But if the decisive political trade-offs have already been settled by leaders, Parliament is often left negotiating inside a package it did not shape. This matters not only for institutional pride but for democracy. Parliament is the only directly elected Union-wide chamber. When the European Council dominates the politically salient stages of decision-making, the most visible choices are shifted away from the institution that most clearly represents EU citizens as citizens.

The Council of the EU is affected in a different way. In theory, it remains one of the Union’s two central legislative bodies. In practice, it is often asked to operationalise summit bargains already struck by national leaders. That reduces its space for autonomous compromise-building and makes it look less like an independent co-legislator and more like the delivery belt of the European Council. This is especially problematic because the Council, unlike the European Council, can often decide by qualified majority. Once politics is shifted upward to leaders, a forum that could have taken decisions under majority voting is replaced by one that needs unanimity. That is not an efficiency gain. It is a political choice in favour of higher-level veto power.

Together, these developments have made EU policymaking more centralised, more intergovernmental, more crisis-driven and less balanced institutionally.

Why the European Council has drifted beyond its original purpose

All of this represents a clear deviation from the original purpose of the European Council. The body was created in 1974 because the Community needed a forum for overall direction at a time of upcoming enlargement and economic turbulence. It was meant to supply top-level coordination where the existing machinery seemed too fragmented or too technical.

That original rationale still has some force. The EU arguably does need a place where leaders can settle exceptionally difficult conflicts. But the crucial word is “exceptionally.” The European Council was not created to dominate the routine politics of the Union but to provide broad steering and overall consistency. The more it moves from strategic orientation into detailed intervention, the more it departs from the reason it was established.

Mismatch between political centrality and governing capacity

That mission drift is aggravated by institutional design. The European Council has visibility, authority and media attention, but it does not have the administrative machinery of a real executive. It relies on a comparatively small secretariat and on the Commission, the Council system and national administrations to do the substantive follow-up.

This creates a mismatch between political centrality and governing capacity. Leaders can make announcements, broker packages and impose deadlines, but they cannot themselves supervise the dense everyday work of lawmaking, enforcement and implementation across the Union’s policy system. That is one reason why summit government so often produces a combination of over-centralisation and under-delivery.

A fire brigade that has taken over the city hall

It is also why the European Council’s defenders often confuse two different claims. One claim is that the body is useful in moments of acute crisis. That is true. Another claim is that because it is useful in crises, it should sit at the centre of EU governance more generally. That is much harder to defend.

Crisis leadership and day-to-day institutional balance are not the same thing. A fire brigade is indispensable when a building is burning, but that does not mean it should replace the city’s normal administrative system. The European Council is strongest as the Union’s political fire brigade. The problem is that it increasingly behaves as if permanent firefighting were the normal model of government. The development has also created an illusion of control. Heads of state or government often pre-structure the choices of the other institutions, but they do not have the administrative capacity, legal instruments or democratic design to govern the Union from the centre.

What a Union without the European Council would look like

A European Union without the European Council would therefore look different, but not unrecognisable.

The biggest relative winner in everyday policymaking would be the Commission. Without a standing summit centre that regularly pre-empts initiative, the Commission would have more room to act as a genuine agenda-setter and broker. It could build coalitions with Parliament, test options with national ministers, and structure legislative bargains through the ordinary process rather than through prior leader-level settlements. That would not make the Commission omnipotent. It would still depend on legislative agreement and on member state support for implementation. But it would recover some of the strategic initiative that summit politics has eroded.

The European Parliament would also gain. Without the European Council, the main visible conflict in EU lawmaking would more clearly pit a directly elected chamber against the government ministers gathered in the Council of the EU. That would likely increase the political salience of parliamentary debate, committee work and party competition at EU level. It could also strengthen the electoral logic behind the choice of Commission President, because the office would be less obviously embedded in a leader-level package deal. Put differently, a Union without the European Council would not automatically become fully parliamentary, but it would become more parliamentarisable.

Other institutions could cover the European Council’s tasks

The Council would (again) become the central intergovernmental arena. This is the key institutional shift. Much of the bargaining that currently takes place among prime ministers, chancellors and presidents would move down to ministers, ambassadors and the rotating presidency. In routine files, that could actually improve decision-making, because many issues could then be settled, ultimately, by qualified majority. The price would be that ministers are less able than leaders to make grand bargains across unrelated issues or absorb very large political risks. A Union without the European Council would thus probably be more balanced and more workable in ordinary lawmaking. At most, leaders might have to be called in to produce dramatic all-in-one packages at moments of very high conflict.

The Court of Justice would become more important indirectly. Some disputes currently contained politically at summit level would instead surface as legal and institutional conflicts among the Commission, Parliament and Council. That would make the Court a more visible arbiter of competences and procedure. Yet this would not be a full substitute for political leadership. Courts can enforce law and clarify institutional boundaries, but they cannot create geopolitical strategy or distribute political pain across member states. An EU without the European Council would therefore be more rule-bound; where political questions cannot easily be juridified, national leaders would come in.

Without the European Council, policymaking would be better

Would such a Union be better? On balance, probably yes, at least in ordinary policymaking. It would likely be less dominated by national executives, less dependent on unanimity at the top, and more faithful to the treaty logic that separates strategic guidance from legislation. The Commission would recover initiative, Parliament would gain visibility, and the Council would matter more as the actual legislative partner it is supposed to be.

That would not solve all EU problems. It would not eliminate conflict, disagreement or slow decision-making. But it would make those conflicts play out in institutions that are better designed to handle lawmaking and scrutiny than a summit body of 27 national leaders.

Limiting the European Council to its treaty role

The main counterargument is serious. Without the European Council, the EU would be weaker at high politics: treaty change, major fiscal bargains, foreign-policy crises, enlargement decisions, war-related solidarity and questions that cut across many sectors at once. That is true. But it does not rescue the current model. It merely shows that the European Council has a specific comparative advantage. The right conclusion is not that the EU should let it dominate everything. The right conclusion is that it should be used sparingly and kept closer to its treaty role. The problem today is not that the European Council exists. The problem is that it increasingly acts as though the Union cannot govern without constant intervention from its top table.

Another point is crucial, too. Even if the European Council disappeared formally, leader politics would not vanish. National leaders would still meet, just as they did before the European Council was created. Leaders would likely recreate informal summits whenever the stakes were high enough.

That means the realistic lesson of this counterfactual thinking is not abolition for its own sake. It is that formalising summit dominance inside the EU’s institutional core has costs. Once leaders are permanently installed at the top of the system, every difficult issue is tempted upward. A forum that should be exceptional becomes habitual. A body that should define general priorities starts shaping operational outcomes. And institutions that are supposed to legislate and scrutinise are pushed into second-order roles.

Conclusion

The EU would not collapse if there were no European Council. It would still have a Commission that can propose legislation, a Council and a European Parliament that can adopt it, and a Court of Justice that can police the rules. In fact, in many areas the Union would become more recognisably parliamentary, more legalistic and more faithful to the Community method. The real question is therefore not whether the EU could function without the European Council, but what kind of Union would emerge if summit politics stopped dominating the centre of EU policymaking.

The EU needs less summit government, not more. The European Council should remain a body for broad political direction, constitutional moments and genuine emergencies. It should not continue to function as the de facto command centre of the Union. That role distorts the institutional balance, encourages delay and veto politics, weakens parliamentary democracy, narrows the Commission’s autonomy, and creates a gap between grand political deals and actual delivery.

A Union without the European Council would be less spectacular and sometimes less decisive in moments of acute crisis. But in its everyday lawmaking it would likely be healthier, more balanced and more faithful to the logic of shared European government. The real policy lesson is therefore straightforward: The EU does not need to abolish the European Council tomorrow, but it does need to de-centre it. The more the Union depends on summit politics, the more it undermines the institutions that were actually built to govern Europe.

Lucas Schramm is a senior researcher and lecturer at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

Pictures: Reserved for leaders: European Union (European Council) [license], via European Council Newsroom; portrait Lucas Schramm: private [all rights reserved].