Economic deprivation reduces political trust

Deutsch

By Henrik Serup Christensen and Janette Huttunen

The Horizon Europe project Activating European Citizens’ Trust in Times of Crisis and Polarisation (ActEU) examines questions of political trust and democratic legitimacy in Europe. This article is part of a series in which ActEU researchers present their findings.

“Whether people feel that they are able to cope on their household income is of key importance for political trust in society.”

Political trust is a fundamental precondition for the stability and legitimacy of the political system. For our societies to function smoothly, we need to hold at least some level of trust in the actors and institutions that make authoritative decisions on our behalf. We do not have to agree with everything they do, but a general belief that the system works for the common good is nonetheless favourable. For this reason, the study of political trust has been a central theme within political science.

Trust varies across social groups

Studies show that levels of political trust change across time and place, but it can be difficult to find a common pattern in these developments. All countries experience ups and downs in their levels of trust that are shaped by historical legacies, international crises, and domestic political events. It may therefore be difficult to identify a common trend in these developments.

A more enduring finding is that there seem to be persistent differences in levels of political trust across groups in society. Several studies show that levels of trust differ across factors such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Especially in our times of crises – from the climate crisis to increasing security threats in Europe, rising anti-democratic sentiments, and the competitiveness and innovation gap in EU – the question of how we can sustain different societal groups’ trust in our political system becomes ever more imperative. Without high levels of political trust, democratic states may be incapable of navigating through this turmoil.

Disadvantaged groups are expected to have less trust

Disadvantaged groups are often expected to hold lower levels of political trust. For example, women, young people, and people with lower educational attainment tend to hold lower levels of trust compared to their male, older, and well-educated counterparts. This finding is explained by political economy theories and the “winner hypothesis”, which hold that groups with greater resources in the form of either human (e.g., education, skills, and health) or economic capital (such as income) are most likely to trust political institutions since they benefit most from the status quo of the social and political system.

People in higher social strata have more political influence, which allows them to defend their interests and therefore have more trust in political institutions. Since disadvantaged groups do not benefit as much from the political system they place less trust in these institutions.

This theoretical proposition has been examined in several studies. The findings are generally supportive. For example, higher income is associated with higher levels of political trust, and belonging to the middle or upper class is associated with higher trust in national political institutions, compared to other social classes.

Which factors can really explain differences in trust?

But the extent to which sociodemographic inequalities can account for differences in levels of political trust is still unclear. Furthermore, we still don’t know which of these inequalities are more important in shaping differences in political trust. Within the framework of the Horizon Europe funded project ActEU, we delved into the question of how socio-demographic characters and status affect citizens’ political trust across Europe. With the help of time series data from the European Social Survey (ESS) covering 2002-2023, we mapped the extent to which seven socioeconomic factors can help explain differences in political trust: age, gender, migrant origin, urbanicity, educational attainment, social class, and subjective feelings about household income.

We examined the relationship between these factors and political trust at both the national and European levels of government. Figure 1 shows results of regression analyses where we compare the association of each of these with political trust at the European and national level.

Figure 1: Multilevel regression coefficients, ESS2002-2023 (click to enlarge).

Our analysis shows, first of all, that many of the suggested differences are not that large when taking into account other factors. However, it would be a mistake to interpret this as evidence that socio-demographic factors are largely irrelevant. Instead, it shows that they are closely connected and that certain groups may combine several traits that depress the level of trust.

Subjective income strongly impacts the level of trust

For one factor, however, there are clear differences in levels of trust at both the national and EU institutions: subjective income. This variable concerns the extent to which respondents feel that they can get by on their current household income. Europe has in recent years undergone a string of turmoil that has had a negative effect on average citizens’ spending capacity and depressed their sense of security. Inflation, the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, among others, have tested citizens’ confidence in their personal economy, making the measure especially relevant currently.

The result shows that people who experience difficulties getting by on their current household income on average hold lower levels of trust in the political system at both the national and European government levels. The differences are quite pronounced, and they are all the more remarkable considering that the results adjust for differences in factors such as education and social class. Across all other factors, people who feel that they have difficulties getting by economically express lower levels of political trust. While we are unable to establish causality with our data, this finding suggests that material insecurity is a key driving force explaining differences in political trust.

Since, as for example Thomas Piketty noted in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, economic inequality is at least partially a result of political decisions, its effect on trust in the very institutions responsible for the policymaking is logical. It is nevertheless remarkable that economic hardship manifests itself so clearly in feelings of animosity toward the political system.

The effect is visible across countries …

The pervasive effect of economic hardship is also evident when we examine country-level differences in how economic hardship shape political trust over time. In Figure 2, we show country-by-country bivariate relationships between subjective income feeling and political trust over the time period 2002-2023. To make the comparison easier to follow, we only display differences between the two extreme categories here (Living comfortably vs. Very difficult to get by).

Figure 2: Country-level differences in political trust depending on feelings about income, ESS2002-2023I (click to enlarge).

These results show that those who are living comfortably generally have higher trust at both the European and national level, whereas those who are struggling tend to have lower trust. This pattern is found in all countries, although the magnitude of the differences differs. While some fluctuations occur, the pattern is remarkably consistent across countries. Furthermore, it seems like the gap has been widening in most countries over time. This suggests that the differences are growing even more pronounced over time.

… and holds for trust in the European, national, and regional level

Economic hardship is thus a strong and consistent predictor of lower levels of political trust in both European and national levels across Europe. But what do we find at the regional level? In Figure 3, we visualize the differences in trust between those who are well off and those who are struggling at the regional level. This only shows the situation for the year 2020.

Figure 3: Subjective income ratios of trust at the regional level (NUTS 2 + 3), ESS2020 (click to enlarge).

Ratios around 1 indicate that economic hardship plays less of a role in shaping levels of trust. Ratios above 1 (darker colours) mean that those who experience economic hardship have higher trust than those without problems getting by, while ratios below 1 (lighter colours) indicate that those who experience economic hardship have lower trust. These results clearly demonstrate that both European and national level trust tend to be lower among groups who experience economic hardship in most regions across Europe. Hence economic hardship is a strong predictor for political trust even at the regional level.

Feelings matter

The extent to which people feel that they are able to cope on their household income is therefore of key importance for understanding differences in political trust in society. Economic hardship is a pivotal factor that can undermine levels of trust.

The implications of this finding are manyfold. Perhaps most importantly, it points to concrete solutions for increasing levels of political trust. First of all, it is worth noting that what matters is not only the economic reality of citizens, calculable by euros, i.e., the money they have in their household to spend, but also people’s subjective feelings about their household’s economic state. Improving citizens’ trust in their economic situation is important for increasing political trust. To boost political trust, it is imperative to increase the economic security of the European populations.

Equitable growth, affordable basic commodities, welfare policies

One way to achieve this is increasing the amount of money that households have for their basic needs. Policies that aim to ensure economic growth may be part of the solution since sustained economic growth can make the pie bigger for everyone. But it is essential that this growth benefits those who have a hard time getting by. Economic growth that only benefits those at the top of society may inadvertently damage political trust, since those who do not benefit will feel even worse about their economic situation when others are thriving. A functioning labour market that provides opportunities for all is therefore also part of the solution.

Furthermore, economic fortune is not only about the amount of money in your pocket. It is also about how far that money goes – how well basic human needs can be met. This entails that the prices of basic essentials such as groceries, housing, heating, and healthcare are of primary importance. To increase levels of trust, individuals need to be sure that they will be able to buy these basic commodities. To boost political trust, helpful economic policies may include measures that aim to ensure low and stable inflation, especially on food and basic commodities. Establishing a sense of economic security will also be beneficial. Hence, welfare policies that ensure the basic needs of all can help boost political trust.

These solutions may be costly, but they seem to be decisive if we want to ensure the legitimacy of our political system in the future.

Henrik Serup Christensen is a Senior University Lecturer at Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finland.

Janette Huttunen is a Post-doc Researcher at Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finland.

This article is based on the authors’ contributions to the ActEU project’s “Report on how trends in trust among specific social and political groups, including ethnic and territorial identities, territorial attachment and regime types at subnational level impact on varying levels of trust across European subnational units”, published in March 2025.

Economic deprivation reduces political trust [DE/EN] ● Henrik Serup Christensen and Janette Huttunen

Pictures: Grey buildings: Luca [Unsplash license], via Unsplash [cropped]; graphs: Henrik Serup Christensen, Janette Huttunen; portraits: private [all rights reserved].

Wirtschaftliche Not mindert politisches Vertrauen

Deutsch

Von Henrik Serup Christensen und Janette Huttunen

Das Horizon-Europe-Projekt Activating European Citizens’ Trust in Times of Crisis and Polarisation (ActEU) untersucht Fragen politischen Vertrauens und demokratischer Legitimität in Europa. Dieser Artikel ist Teil einer Serie, in der ActEU-Forscher:innen ihre Ergebnisse präsentieren.

„Ob Menschen das Gefühl haben, mit ihrem Haushaltseinkommen auszukommen, ist für das Niveau politischen Vertrauens von entscheidender Bedeutung.“

 

Politisches Vertrauen ist eine grundlegende Voraussetzung für die Stabilität und Legitimität des politischen Systems. Damit unsere Gesellschaften reibungslos funktionieren können, müssen wir ein gewisses Mindestmaß an Vertrauen in die Akteure und Institutionen haben, die in unserem Namen autoritative Entscheidungen treffen. Wir müssen nicht mit allem einverstanden sein, was sie tun, aber eine allgemeine Überzeugung, dass das System zum Wohle aller funktioniert, ist jedenfalls von Vorteil. Die Untersuchung politischen Vertrauens ist deshalb ein zentrales Thema der Politikwissenschaft.

Studien haben gezeigt, dass das Niveau des politischen Vertrauens je nach Zeit und Ort unterschiedlich ist, wobei es schwierig sein kann, in diesen Schwankungen ein gemeinsames Muster zu finden. Alle Länder erleben in ihrem Vertrauensniveau Höhen und Tiefen, die durch historische Hintergründe, internationale Krisen und innenpolitische Ereignisse geprägt sind. Es fällt deshalb zuweilen schwer, einen gemeinsamen Trend darin zu erkennen.

Vertrauen variiert je nach sozialer Gruppe

Eine bleibende Erkenntnis ist jedoch, dass es zwischen verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen offenbar anhaltende Unterschiede im Ausmaß des politischen Vertrauens gibt. Mehrere Studien weisen auf, dass das Vertrauen je nach Faktoren wie Alter, Geschlecht und ethnischer Zugehörigkeit unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägt ist.

Gerade in Krisenzeiten wie diesen – geprägt von Klimawandel, zunehmenden Sicherheitsbedrohungen in Europa, wachsenden antidemokratischen Tendenzen sowie einer Wettbewerbs- und Innovationslücke in der EU – wird die Frage immer dringlicher, wie wir das Vertrauen verschiedener gesellschaftlicher Gruppen in unser politisches System aufrechterhalten können. Ohne ein hohes Maß an politischem Vertrauen wären demokratische Staaten möglicherweise nicht in der Lage, die aktuellen Turbulenzen zu bewältigen.

Benachteiligte Gruppen haben meist weniger Vertrauen

Von benachteiligten Gruppen wird oft erwartet, dass sie ein geringeres Maß an politischem Vertrauen haben. So neigen beispielsweise Frauen, junge Menschen und Menschen mit geringerem Bildungsniveau dazu, weniger Vertrauen zu haben als ihre männlichen, älteren und gut ausgebildeten Mitbürger:innen. Diese Erkenntnis lässt sich durch politökonomische Theorien und die „Gewinnerhypothese“ erklären, wonach Gruppen mit größeren Ressourcen, sei es in Form von Humankapital (z. B. Bildungsniveau, Fertigkeiten, Gesundheit) oder Wirtschaftskapital (z. B. Einkommen), am ehesten Vertrauen in politische Institutionen haben, da sie vom Status quo des sozialen und politischen Systems am meisten profitieren.

Menschen in höheren sozialen Schichten haben mehr politischen Einfluss, wodurch sie ihre Interessen besser verteidigen können und daher mehr Vertrauen in politische Institutionen haben. Benachteiligte Gruppen hingegen profitieren vom politischen System weniger und haben deshalb auch weniger Vertrauen in diese Institutionen.

Diese theoretische Annahme wurde in mehreren Studien untersucht. Die Ergebnisse sind im Allgemeinen bestätigend. So geht beispielsweise ein höheres Einkommen mit einem höheren Maß an politischem Vertrauen einher, und auch die Zugehörigkeit zur Mittel- oder Oberschicht ist im Vergleich zu anderen sozialen Schichten mit einem höheren Vertrauen in nationale politische Institutionen verbunden.

Welche Faktoren können Unterschiede im Vertrauen wirklich erklären?

Das Ausmaß, in dem soziodemografische Ungleichheiten für Unterschiede im politischen Vertrauen verantwortlich sind, ist jedoch noch unklar. Zudem wissen wir noch nicht, welche dieser Ungleichheiten für die Unterschiede im politischen Vertrauen entscheidend sind. Im Rahmen des von Horizon Europe finanzierten Projekts ActEU haben wir uns mit der Frage befasst, wie soziodemografische Merkmale und der soziale Status das politische Vertrauen der Bürger:innen in Europa beeinflussen. Mithilfe von Zeitreihendaten aus dem European Social Survey (ESS) für den Zeitraum 2002-2023 haben wir untersucht, inwieweit sieben sozioökonomische Faktoren zur Erklärung der Unterschiede im politischen Vertrauen beitragen können: Alter, Geschlecht, Migrationshintergrund, Urbanität, Bildungsniveau, soziale Schicht sowie subjektive Gefühle zum Haushaltseinkommen.

Wir haben den Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Faktoren und dem politischen Vertrauen sowohl in die nationale als auch in die europäische Regierungsebene untersucht. Abbildung 1 zeigt die Ergebnisse der Regressionsanalysen, in denen wir vergleichen, wie weit jeder dieser Faktoren mit dem politischen Vertrauen auf europäischer und nationaler Ebene korreliert.

Abb. 1: Mehrebenen-Regressions-Koeffizienten, ESS2002-2023 (zum Vergrößern anklicken).

Unsere Analyse zeigt zunächst einmal, dass viele der vermuteten Unterschiede unter Berücksichtigung anderer Faktoren gar nicht so groß sind. Es wäre allerdings ein Fehler, dies als Beweis dafür zu interpretieren, dass soziodemografische Faktoren weitgehend irrelevant seien. Vielmehr zeigt es, dass die verschiedenen Faktoren eng miteinander verbunden sind und dass bestimmte Gruppen mehrere Merkmale aufweisen können, die das Vertrauensniveau beeinträchtigen.

Subjektives Einkommen beeinflusst das Vertrauensniveau stark

Ein Faktor jedoch führt zu deutlichen Unterschieden im Vertrauensniveau sowohl gegenüber nationalen als auch gegenüber EU-Institutionen: das subjektive Einkommen. Diese Variable bezieht sich darauf, inwieweit die Befragten das Gefühl haben, mit ihrem aktuellen Haushaltseinkommen auskommen zu können. Europa hat in den letzten Jahren eine Reihe von Turbulenzen erlebt, die sich negativ auf die Kaufkraft der Durchschnittsbürger:innen ausgewirkt und ihr Sicherheitsgefühl beeinträchtigt haben. Inflation, die Corona-Pandemie, der Krieg in der Ukraine, die Energiekrise und andere Faktoren haben das Vertrauen der Bürger:innen in ihre persönliche Wirtschaftslage auf die Probe gestellt, sodass diese Messgröße derzeit besonders relevant ist.

Das Ergebnis zeigt, dass Menschen, die Schwierigkeiten haben, mit ihrem aktuellen Haushaltseinkommen auszukommen, im Durchschnitt weniger Vertrauen in das politische System auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene haben. Die Unterschiede sind recht stark ausgeprägt und umso bemerkenswerter, als die Ergebnisse um Faktoren wie Bildung und soziale Schicht bereinigt sind. Über alle anderen Faktoren hinweg äußern Menschen, die das Gefühl haben, wirtschaftlich Schwierigkeiten zu haben, ein geringeres Maß an politischem Vertrauen. Obwohl wir mit unseren Daten keinen Kausalzusammenhang herstellen können, deutet dieses Ergebnis darauf hin, dass materielle Unsicherheit eine wichtige Triebkraft für die Unterschiede im politischen Vertrauen ist.

Wie beispielsweise Thomas Piketty in „Das Kapital im 21. Jahrhundert“ aufgezeigt hat, ist wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit zumindest teilweise das Ergebnis politischer Entscheidungen. Es ist deshalb nur logisch, dass sie sich auch auf das Vertrauen in die für die Politikgestaltung verantwortlichen Institutionen auswirkt. Dennoch ist es bemerkenswert, dass sich wirtschaftliche Not so deutlich in einem Gefühl der Ablehnung gegenüber dem politischen System äußert.

Der Effekt ist länderübergreifend sichtbar …

Die weitreichenden Auswirkungen wirtschaftlicher Not werden auch deutlich, wenn wir untersuchen, wie sich Länder hinsichtlich der Frage unterscheiden, wie wirtschaftliche Not das politische Vertrauen im Laufe der Zeit beeinflusst. In Abbildung 2 zeigen wir die bivariaten Zusammenhänge zwischen subjektivem Einkommensempfinden und politischem Vertrauen im Zeitraum 2002-2023 für jedes einzelne Land. Um den Vergleich übersichtlicher zu gestalten, zeigen wir hier nur die Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Extremkategorien (komfortables Leben vs. sehr schwieriges Auskommen).

Abb. 2: Länderunterschiede im politischen Vertrauen in Abhängigkeit von der gefühlten Einkommenssituation, ESS2002-2023I (zum Vergrößern anklicken).

Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Menschen, die in komfortablen Verhältnissen leben, im Allgemeinen sowohl in die europäische als auch in die nationale Ebene ein höheres Vertrauen haben, während Menschen, die in wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten sind, tendenziell ein geringeres Vertrauen haben. Dieses Muster ist in allen Ländern zu beobachten, wenn auch in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß. Trotz einiger Schwankungen ist das Muster in allen Ländern bemerkenswert konsistent. Darüber hinaus scheint sich die Kluft in den meisten Ländern im Laufe der Zeit vergrößert zu haben, was darauf hindeutet, dass die Unterschiede mit der Zeit noch deutlicher werden.

… und gilt für Vertrauen in europäische, nationale und regionale Ebene

Wirtschaftliche Not ist somit  in ganz Europa ein starker und konsistenter Prädiktor für ein geringeres politisches Vertrauen sowohl in die europäische als auch in die nationale Ebene. Aber wie sieht es auf regionaler Ebene aus? In Abbildung 3 stellen wir die Unterschiede im Vertrauen zwischen wohlhabenden und weniger wohlhabenden Menschen auf regionaler Ebene dar (in diesem Fall nur für das Jahr 2020).

Abb. 3: Verhältnis zwischen subjektivem Einkommen und Vertrauen auf regionaler Ebene (NUTS 2+3), ESS2020 (zum Vergrößern anklicken).

Werte um 1 herum deuten darauf hin, dass wirtschaftliche Not eine geringere Rolle bei der Bildung von Vertrauen spielt. Werte über 1 (dunklere Farben) bedeuten, dass diejenigen, die wirtschaftliche Not erleben, ein höheres Vertrauen haben als diejenigen, die keine Probleme haben, über die Runden zu kommen. Werte unter 1 (hellere Farben) zeigen hingegen an, dass diejenigen, die wirtschaftliche Not erleben, ein geringeres Vertrauen haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutlich, dass in den meisten Regionen Europas das Vertrauen sowohl in die europäische als auch in die nationale Ebene bei Gruppen, die wirtschaftliche Not erleben, tendenziell geringer ist. Wirtschaftliche Not ist somit selbst auf regionaler Ebene ein starker Prädiktor für politisches Vertrauen.

Gefühle sind wichtig

Das Ausmaß, in dem Menschen das Gefühl haben, mit ihrem Haushaltseinkommen zurechtzukommen, ist also von entscheidender Bedeutung, um die gesellschaftlichen Unterschiede im Niveau des politischen Vertrauens zu verstehen. Wirtschaftliche Not ist ein entscheidender Faktor, der Vertrauen untergraben kann.

Diese Erkenntnis hat mehrere Implikationen. Am wichtigsten ist vielleicht, dass sie konkrete Lösungen für die Stärkung des politischen Vertrauens aufzeigt. Hierfür ist zunächst einmal festzuhalten, dass es nicht nur auf die in Euro bezifferbare wirtschaftliche Realität der Bürger:innen ankommt, d. h. auf das Geld, das sie in ihrem Haushalt zur Verfügung haben, sondern auch auf die subjektiven Gefühle der Menschen hinsichtlich der wirtschaftlichen Lage ihres Haushalts. Das Vertrauen der Bürger:innen in ihre wirtschaftliche Situation zu stärken ist wichtig, um politisches Vertrauen zu erhöhen. Um politisches Vertrauen zu fördern, ist es wesentlich, die wirtschaftliche Sicherheit der Menschen in Europa zu verbessern.

Gerechtes Wachstum, erschwingliche Grundversorgung, Sozialpolitik

Eine Möglichkeit, dies zu erreichen, besteht darin, den Haushalten mehr Geld für ihre Grundbedürfnisse zur Verfügung zu stellen. Maßnahmen zur Sicherung des Wirtschaftswachstums können Teil der Lösung sein, da ein nachhaltiges Wachstum den Kuchen für alle größer machen kann. Es ist jedoch unerlässlich, dass dieses Wachstum auch bei denjenigen ankommt, die es schwer haben, über die Runden zu kommen. Wirtschaftswachstum, das nur Spitzenverdiener:innen zugutekommt, kann unbeabsichtigt sogar das Vertrauen in die Politik untergraben, da diejenigen, die davon nicht profitieren, ihre wirtschaftliche Lage angesichts des Erfolgs der anderen noch negativer einschätzen. Ein funktionierender Arbeitsmarkt, der Chancen für alle bietet, ist daher ebenfalls Teil der Lösung.

Zudem hängt wirtschaftlicher Wohlstand nicht nur davon ab, wie viel Geld ein Mensch in der Tasche hat. Es geht auch darum, wie weit dieses Geld reicht – wie gut grundlegende menschliche Bedürfnisse damit gedeckt werden können. Das bedeutet, dass die Preise für Grundbedürfnisse wie Lebensmittel, Wohnen, Heizung und Gesundheitsversorgung von vorrangiger Bedeutung sind. Damit das Vertrauensniveau steigt, müssen die Menschen sicher sein, dass sie sich diese Grundgüter leisten können. Zur Stärkung des politischen Vertrauens können deshalb beispielsweise auch wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen hilfreich sein, die auf eine niedrige und stabile Inflation abzielen, insbesondere bei Lebensmitteln und Grundgütern. Auch ein Gefühl der wirtschaftlichen Absicherung ist von Vorteil. Sozialpolitiken, die die Grundbedürfnisse aller sichern, können deshalb dazu beitragen, das politische Vertrauen zu stärken.

Diese Lösungen mögen kostspielig sein. Aber sie scheinen entscheidend zu sein, wenn wir die Legitimität unseres politischen Systems in Zukunft sicherstellen wollen.

Henrik Serup Christensen ist Senior University Lecturer an der Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finnland.

Janette Huttunen ist Postdoktorandin an der Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finnland.

Dieser Artikel basiert auf den Beiträgen der Autor:innen zu dem von ActEU veröffentlichten „Report on how trends in trust among specific social and political groups, including ethnic and territorial identities, territorial attachment and regime types at subnational level impact on varying levels of trust across European subnational units“, der im März 2025 erschienen ist.

Wirtschaftliche Not mindert das Vertrauen in die Politik [DE/EN] ● Henrik Serup Christensen und Janette Huttunen

Bilder: Graue Gebäude: Luca [Unsplash license], via Unsplash [cropped]; Grafiken: Henrik Serup Christensen, Janette Huttunen; Porträts: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

EU to go – Wege aus der Krise: Wie die europäische Autoindustrie gerettet werden kann

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

13.000 Stellen bei Bosch, 35.000 bei VW, 7.600 bei ZF Friedrichshafen – die Schlagzeilen der letzten Wochen zeigen: Die Automobilbranche steht unter massivem Druck. Während chinesische Hersteller mit staatlicher Unterstützung den Weltmarkt erobern und die USA unter Donald Trump neue Zölle verhängen, ringt Europa um eine gemeinsame Strategie.

Wie konnte es so weit kommen? Warum hat die deutsche Industrie die E-Mobilität verschlafen? Und was müsste eine europäische Antwort auf die geopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen sein?

In dieser Folge von EU to go spricht Thu Nguyen mit Sander Tordoir, Chefökonom am Centre for European Reform, und Nils Redeker, kommissarischer Co-Direktor des Jacques Delors Centre, über die Zukunft der europäischen Autoindustrie, die Rolle des Binnenmarkts und die Frage, ob eine „Buy European“-Strategie der richtige Weg aus der Krise sein könnte.

Eine Folge über industriepolitische Chancen, geopolitische Realitäten und die Frage, ob Europa den Mut zur gemeinsamen Antwort findet.

European Parliament seat projection (November 2025): Liberal recovery, far-right radicalisation

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	188	79	85	27	31	–
Sep. 25 (B)	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
Nov. 25 (B)	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
Nov. 25 (D)	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 10 November 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 10 November 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)

In recent weeks, the EU saw two national parliamentary elections with seemingly contradictory outcomes: In the Czech election at the beginning of October, the populist far-right ANO (PfE) party scored a clear victory. In the Dutch election at the end of the month, on the other hand, the far-right PVV (PfE) fell short of expectations and was even overtaken by the left-liberal D66 (RE) in the final stages of the campaign. But the “turn to the centre” that some media outlets wanted to see in the Dutch election did not really materialise. The overall share of the far-right vote remained relatively stable, as the PVV’s losses were offset by gains from smaller, even more extreme parties. While there is a good chance that the next Dutch government will be formed by centrist parties, the political mood remains far to the right.

In the current seat projection, a somewhat similar picture emerges for the EU as a whole. The recent electoral success in the Netherlands is boosting the European Liberals, making up for most of the heavy losses that they had suffered in the last projection at the beginning of September. But this is unlikely to represent a democratic turnaround. The two largest centrist groups, the EPP and the S&D, are holding steady at best, while the Greens and the Left are losing ground. Meanwhile, within the far-right spectrum, the relatively moderate ECR group is declining, while the small, radical ESN group as well as non-attached far-right parties continue to rise.

Mixed results for EPP and S&D

Examining the polls in more detail, the outlook for the centre-right EPP group is mixed. In the Netherlands, EPP member parties CDA and BBB experienced a sharp decline in the final stages of the national election campaign, and the BBB would now no longer be represented in the European Parliament. In addition, the EPP is also struggling in other major member states: Germany’s CDU/CSU now only ranks second in national polls behind the AfD (ESN), while Spain’s PP continues to lose ground to the far-right Vox (PfE).

The situation looks somewhat better for EPP member parties in medium-sized member states – such as Greece and Hungary, where ND and Tisza were able to further strengthen their respective national leadership positions. Overall, the EPP group remains largely stable in the seat projection, falling only minimally to 175 seats (–⁠1 compared to September). However, the September projection had already indicated significant losses for the EPP; and the current figure in fact represents its worst result since the 2024 European elections.

The centre-left S&D group also has little reason to celebrate. The Socialists recently gained ground in some major member states, in particular France, Spain, and Romania. But in the Dutch election, the campaign of the social democratic-green alliance GL/PvdA, led by former Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans, fell far short of expectations. Overall, the S&D has only marginally improved its position, now reaching a total of 124 seats (+⁠1).

RE: only partial recovery

The biggest winner in recent weeks has been the liberal RE group, which has benefited above all from the successful election campaigns of its two Dutch member parties, D66 and VVD. In addition, the Estonian KE has also seen an increase in popularity; and in Italy, an alliance between the two small centrist parties IV and +Europa would now narrowly pass the national four per cent threshold again.

However, RE member parties have suffered slight losses in recent polls in several other member states, such as Romania, Portugal, Austria and Finland. While not a dramatic collapse, this development is a continuation of the gradual decline that Liberals have been experiencing across Europe for about three years now. Thanks to the recent success in the Netherlands, RE has made up for a large part of its massive losses from the September projection (71 seats/+5). But this partial recovery should not obscure the fact that this is still its second-worst result in more than a decade.

Left loses previous gains

On the left side of the political spectrum, both the Left group and the Greens/EFA group have suffered losses.

While the Left could celebrate gains in several member states in September, both France’s LFI and Spain’s Podemos have now lost ground to their respective centre-left rivals PS and PSOE (both S&D). Moreover, the Dutch left-wing party SP performed poorly in the national elections and would not win a seat in the European Parliament any more.

In Ireland and Cyprus, on the other hand, the Left is making further gains, now topping the national polls of both countries. Still, the group falls back to an overall result of 51 seats (–⁠4), undoing the gains it made in September.

Greens/EFA smallest group again

The situation looks even more dire for the European Greens. Among other places, they have recently struggled in the Netherlands and in Denmark, and in Luxembourg they would not secure any seat in the European Parliament now. This continues the Greens’ downward trend since the 2024 European Parliament election. With only 37 seats (–⁠3), they are recording their worst result in over three years and are now projected to be the smallest parliamentary group again, even behind the far-right ESN.

The European Greens can take some comfort in the fact that, historically, they have often performed rather poorly in the middle of the European election period, but significantly better in the elections themselves. But European politics is not only determined by European Parliament elections, but also by the member states’ national elections. And here, the Greens are currently facing a strong headwind from the Europe-wide trend.

ECR loses ground, remains strong

At the other end of the political spectrum, all three of the far-right groups – ECR, PfE, and ESN – had reached new historic highs in the September projection. Since then, however, their development has diverged. The most moderate of the three, the ECR, has slid back a bit in recent weeks. These losses can be attributed to its member parties in Poland (PiS), Romania (AUR) and Belgium (N-VA), all of which have lost ground to more extreme parties (KKP/NI, POT/other, and VB/PfE).

By contrast, the ECR made slight gains in Czechia, where the ODS performed slightly better than expected in the national parliamentary elections in October. Moreover, the Finnish PS, which had lost support in the spring due to widespread popular dissatisfaction with the national economic situation, has now managed to reverse the trend in the polls by intensifying its anti-immigration rhetoric. Overall, the ECR now stands at 81 seats (–⁠4), which is still the second-best result the group has ever achieved in the projection.

PfE stable, ESN still on the rise

The largest far-right group, PfE, sees few changes in the current projection. While its member parties in Spain, Belgium and Austria are gaining ground, the group is being dragged down by the poor election results of the Dutch PVV and the weakness of the Hungarian Fidesz. Overall, the PfE remains at the record level of 105 seats (±⁠0) that it achieved in September.

Meanwhile, the smallest and most extreme far-right group, ESN, is projected to gain ground again – for the eighth time in a row. After the 2024 European elections, ESN was founded with 25 MEPs, barely meeting the requirements to form an independent group. Today, it is projected to win 39 seats (+⁠2 compared to September), overtaking the Greens.

These recent gains of the ESN are owed to the Dutch FvD, which is benefitting from the PVV’s weakness. If European elections took place today, the FvD would re-enter the European Parliament, where it was previously represented from 2019 to 2024. While it was part of the ECR group at that time, the party has since moved further to the right, is entertaining ties with the Russian government, and has joined the ESN party.

Non-attached far-right parties strengthened

The radicalisation within the far-right camp is also evident from the recent poll successes of non-aligned far-right parties – namely Poland’s KKP, which holds a mix of monarchist, antisemitic and pro-Russian views, and Luxembourg’s ADR, which was expelled from the ECR group in the summer due to its pro-Russian stance. Unlike in September, both parties would now secure seats in the European Parliament again.

Meanwhile, the non-aligned left-conservative parties, which had made slight gains in the September projection, performed less well this time around. While Germany’s BSW is struggling to maintain its political relevance, the Czech Stačilo failed to secure enough votes in the October national parliamentary elections to be represented in the European Parliament. Overall, non-aligned parties would now hold 24 seats (+⁠3).

Finally, there are the “other” parties, which are not currently represented in the European Parliament and do not belong to any European party, so that they cannot be clearly assigned to any political group. Among them, the Romanian party POT would now narrowly clear the national five-percent threshold again – a far-right populist party that supported the independent pro-Russian candidate, Călin Georgescu, in the annulled Romanian presidential election of 2024. In total, the “other” parties now stand at 13 seats (+⁠1), slightly more than half of which can be attributed to the right-wing populist or far-right camp.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest. In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	188	79	85	27	31	–
Sep. 25 (B)	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
Nov. 25 (B)	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
Nov. 25 (D)	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	9 Linke 1 Tier	11 Grüne 3 Volt	13 SPD	3 FDP 3 FW	22 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			23 AfD	3 BSW 2 Partei 1 PdF
FR	8 LFI		13 PS	14 RE	12 LR		34 RN
IT	11 M5S 2 SI	3 EV	18 PD	3 IV/+E	6 FI 1 SVP	25 FdI	7 Lega
ES	2 Sumar 2 Pod 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	18 PSOE		21 PP	1 SALF	12 Vox		1 Junts
PL			3 Lewica		19 KO	16 PiS	5 Konf	6 Konf	4 KKP
RO			8 PSD	3 USR 1 PMP	5 PNL	14 AUR				2 POT
NL		2 GL	2 PvdA	7 D66 6 VVD	4 CDA		6 PVV	2 FvD
BE	3 PTB	1 Groen	2 Vooruit 2 PS	2 MR 2 LE	2 CD&V 1 CSP	3 N-VA	4 VB
CZ		2 Piráti			2 STAN 1 TOP09 1 KDU-ČSL	4 ODS	8 ANO 1 AUTO	2 SPD
EL	1 Syriza		3 PASOK	1 KD	7 ND	3 EL	1 FL		2 PE 2 KKE	1 MéRA
HU			1 DK		11 TISZA		8 Fidesz	1 MHM
PT		1 Livre	6 PS	1 IL	7 AD		6 Chega
SE	2 V	1 MP	7 S	1 C	4 M 1 KD	5 SD
AT		2 Grüne	4 SPÖ	1 Neos	4 ÖVP		9 FPÖ
BG			2 BSP	2 PP	5 GERB 1 DB			3 V	3 DPS-NN	1 MECh
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	2 V 1 RV	2 LA 1 K	1 DD	1 DF
SK				4 PS	1 KDH 1 D 1 Slov	1 SaS		2 REP	3 Smer 2 Hlas
FI	1 Vas	1 Vihreät	5 SDP	2 Kesk	3 Kok	3 PS
IE	5 SF			3 FF	4 FG					2 SD
HR		2 Možemo	4 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT		2 DSVL	3 LSDP	1 LS	3 TS-LKD	1 LVŽS				1 NA
LV		1 Prog			1 JV	2 NA 1 LRA	2 LPV			1 ZZS 1 ST!
SI			1 SD	3 GS	4 SDS 1 N.Si
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 2 KE	2 Isamaa		1 EKRE
CY	2 AKEL				2 DISY	1 ELAM				1 ALMA
LU			1 LSAP	2 DP	2 CSV				1 ADR
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
25-11-10	51	37	124	71	175	81	105	39	24	13
25-09-01	55	40	123	66	176	85	105	37	21	12
25-07-01	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
25-05-19	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
25-11-10	52	37	126	73	175	86	109	39	23	–
25-09-01	56	40	125	68	177	89	107	37	21	–
25-07-01	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
25-05-19	49	40	132	78	179	82	101	36	23	–
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Repúblicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Czechia: Spolu: TOP09 (1, 3, 5 etc.) and KDU-ČSL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Stačilo: Stačilo (1, 3, 5 etc.) and SOCDEM (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.), RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). In France, some polls combine PS (S&D), EELV (G/EFA), PCF (Left) and sometimes LFI (Left); in these cases, the polling figures are divided between the parties according to the ratio in the last poll in which they were reported separately. In Czechia, some polls combine ODS (ECR), TOP09 and KDU-ČSL (both EPP); in these cases, two thirds of the seats are allocated to the ODS and one third to the alliance of TOP09 and KDU-ČSL. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 3-7/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
France: national polls, 7-8/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Italy: national polls, 22/10-3/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Spain: national polls, 26/10-8/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Poland: national polls, 26/10-5/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Romania: national polls, 26/10-2/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Netherlands: national polls, 8/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, French community: Wallonian polls for the national parliamentary election, 23/9/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, Dutch community: Flemish polls for the national parliamentary election, 23/9/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, German community: European election results, 9/6/2024/
Czechia: national parliamentary election results, 3-4/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Greece: national polls, 20/10-2/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Hungary: national polls, 22-31/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Portugal: national polls, 26-27/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Sweden: national polls, 19-27/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Austria: national polls, 4/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Bulgaria: national polls, 12/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Denmark: national polls, 6-9/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovakia: national polls, 18-20/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Finland: national polls, 4/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Ireland: national polls, 21-31/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Croatia: national polls, 6/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Lithuania: national polls, 27/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Latvia: national polls, Juli 2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovenia: national polls, 29/9-9/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Estonia: national polls, 2/11/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Cyprus: national polls, 22/9/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Luxembourg: national polls, 29/9/2024, source: Wikipedia.
Malta: national polls, 2/10/2025, source: Wikipedia.

Pictures: all graphs: Manuel Müller.