Between crisis narratives and limited power: Deliberative forums as a way out of the European Parliament’s structural dilemma

Deutsch

By Richard Steinberg

“Deliberative formats could offer the Parliament an opportunity to live up to its self-expectation through means that bypass treaty constraints.”

In times of crisis, democratically elected parliaments often face a structural dilemma: Precisely when swift and visible decisions are called for, the importance of executive arenas grows, and parliament risks being politically sidelined – most recently during the financial and sovereign debt crisis, the pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, or in the face of rising geopolitical tensions.

The European Parliament is particularly exposed to this dynamic. While it has steadily expanded its competences since its foundation, it still lacks meaningful parliamentary control in many areas. Most notably, it lacks a right of legislative initiative and has only limited budgetary authority. This historically entrenched dilemma between high parliamentary ambitions and limited steering capacity is most acutely visible in times of crisis. How can it be resolved short of treaty reform, which currently appears politically out of reach?

“Crises” strengthen the executive – but not only

The concept of “crisis” is not merely an analytical category. It also functions as a political interpretive framework that generates pressure to act, and at EU level can legitimize both institutional development and a greater concentration of decision-making power. For the European Parliament, crises have historically served as a justification for demands to strengthen its own role and to pursue institutional reform in a federalist direction. At the same time, under time pressure and in the face of complex problems, decision-making processes tend to become more executive-driven, while parliamentary, civil society, and public deliberation lose weight.

This output-oriented logic carries a structural risk: The more decisions are accelerated and taken within small institutional arenas, the greater the danger that democratic participation and public deliberation are pushed to the margins. The recent omnibus procedures offer a telling example. Citing the (supposed) pressure of geopolitical and economic crises, the Commission bundled far-reaching amendments to core sustainability legislation into a single package, bypassing procedural rules on impact assessment and public participation. Even though the Parliament is formally involved, the pace and logic of the process remain executive-driven.

A claim to representation without the power to govern

A historical look at the 1970s shows that this tension is far from new. A succession of economic, political, and institutional crises, including the oil price shocks, gave rise to a broad-based discourse within the European Parliament about a “Crisis of the Community.”

This discourse had paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it strengthened the Parliament’s institutional self-image across party lines and provided a central argumentative basis for demands for a stronger role as a democratic crisis platform. On the other hand, its political impact remained limited. Despite ambitious reform initiatives, intergovernmental decision-making structures were instead consolidated – most notably through the establishment of the European Council at the 1974 Paris Summit and the development of a common foreign policy framework within European Political Cooperation.

Even at this early stage, the fundamental tension that continues to shape the Parliament’s role today was already apparent: a high claim to democratic representation combined with limited political steering capacity.

A familiar constellation: the Parliament in the long 1970s

The 1970s bear numerous parallels to today’s perceptions of crisis, which are often captured by terms such as “polycrisis,” “multicrisis,” or “permacrisis.” The close discursive connection between crisis and European integration that continues to shape our understanding of the EU to this day first crystallised during this period.

The years from the 1969 Hague Summit to the Single European Act of 1986 were marked by a succession of economic, monetary, social, and institutional crises affecting both the member states and the Community itself. Empirical analyses of the European Parliament’s plenary debates during this period reveal that a cross-party interpretive pattern emerged – a shared discourse of “Community crisis”, that durably structured the Parliament’s self-positioning as a legitimate crisis platform, particularly in contrast to the European Council. While individual crises initially prompted specific policy debates, an overarching crisis discourse gradually took hold over the course of the decade, becoming the dominant interpretive frame for the political presence.

This discourse shaped the Parliament’s self-understanding as an independent actor, defined above all in contrast to the newly established European Council, but also vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers and the Commission. Members of Parliament used crisis narratives across party lines to press for institutional reform, in particular, a strengthening of the Parliament itself. The insufficient legitimacy of intergovernmental decision-making, they argued, had produced a crisis of confidence that could only be addressed by elevating the Parliament to the role of a central democratic crisis-resolution forum.

Effects of the crisis discourse

The frequently invoked image of “productive crises,” however, falls short in the case of the European Parliament. The crisis discourse had its strongest effects internally. It served as a cross-party frame of reference, enabled shared problem interpretations, and strengthened the institutional identity and self-confidence of MEPs. Particularly after the first direct elections in 1979, the Parliament increasingly positioned itself as “the only democratically legitimate institution” at the European level, deliberately deploying crisis narratives to underpin demands for reform and expanded competences.

In contrast to this normative self-positioning, however, actual gains in structural power remained modest. Intergovernmental decision-making structures continued to consolidate. The 1984 Spinelli draft constitution, for instance, found only limited reflection in the Single European Act adopted two years later. The limited impact of parliamentary reform efforts led to growing frustration among MEPs throughout the 1980s.

The structural dilemma today: deliberative formats as a way forward?

This tension between high representational ambitions and limited steering capacity continues to shape the European Parliament’s role today. Key political decisions in recent crises were again primarily prepared in executive and intergovernmental settings. Following the cautious reformist momentum generated by the Conference on the Future of Europe, the window of opportunity for fundamental debates on strengthening the Parliament now appears largely closed. Given the limited possibilities for treaty reform, it is unlikely that the structural dilemma that has persisted since the 1970s can be resolved through new formal competences.

If formal increases in power are off the table, the strategic question becomes what alternative paths to strengthening political relevance remain. Deliberative citizen formats at the European level could play an important role here. The Parliament recognised this as early as 2020, in its resolution on the Conference on the Future of Europe, which envisaged institutionalised deliberative citizen formats as a tool of democratic engagement.

Paradoxically, however, the EU’s new deliberative formats have initially deepened rather than eased the Parliament’s dilemma. The European Citizens’ Panels established after the Conference on the Future of Europe to address key EU initiatives – such as the EU budgetary framework and the tackling hate in society – are primarily anchored in the European Commission. The European Parliament has, for the most part, remained a bystander.

What role can the European Parliament play today?

Deliberative formats could offer the Parliament an opportunity to live up to its self-expectation through means that bypass treaty constraints. With the Youth Citizens’ Assembly on Pollinators, the Parliament has recently taken the initiative itself, launching a deliberative process. Drawing on the experience of the European Citizens’ Panels, 100 young people from all EU member states worked together over three months to develop recommendations on protecting pollinators and on strengthening the ongoing participation of young people in EU decision-making.

Yet the democratic impact of such processes depends less on how they are organised than on how their results are taken up politically. If citizens’ recommendations remain confined to the administrative sphere, they risk becoming mere consultative contributions with limited political consequences. Here, the European Parliament has a dual role to play: as the initiator of deliberative processes on key questions arising from its own legislative work as with the Youth Citizens’ Assembly, and as the binding institutional recipient of the outcomes of deliberative processes initiated by others.

Concretely, this means three things:

• First, the European Parliament should act more consistently as the initiator of deliberative citizen formats. As the directly elected body, it can raise issues that are grounded in its legislative agenda and its connection to European society, setting them independently of executive priorities.
• Second, structured hearings with members of citizens’ forums both those convened by the Commission and those initiated by the Parliament itself should be embedded in the work of the relevant EP committees.
• Third, mandatory statements responding to the outcomes of each forum should be required. Such institutional linkages would anchor European deliberative initiatives more firmly in the political process and tie them to democratic accountability and visibility.

From passive bystander to translation space

Historical experience shows that crisis narratives have strengthened the European Parliament’s sense of institutional identity but have produced only limited expansions of its formal competences. The structural tension between high democratic aspirations and limited institutional steering capacity will probably persist for the foreseeable future.

Unlike in the 1970s, however, there is now a format that offers a structural point of attachment outside the treaties that allows the Parliament to begin living up to its own aspirations. If deliberative processes are systematically incorporated into parliamentary debates and decision-making, the Parliament can become the place where the outcomes of deliberative procedures are not merely heard, but politically translated, openly contested, and democratically accounted for.

In a Union in a state of permanent crisis, the significance of the European Parliament will therefore depend less on further shifts in formal competence than on its ability to make societal debates visible and to carry them into European policy.

Richard Steinberg is a historian and political consultant at ifok GmbH, specialising in citizen participation and deliberative democracy. His book “The European Parliament in Crisis? Perceptions of Crisis and Crisis Discourses in the European Parliament during the Long 1970s” was published in 2025.

Pictures: Youth Citizens’ Assembly on Pollinators: European Union (European Commission) [CC BY 4.0, copyright notice], via EU website; portrait Richard Steinberg: private [all rights reserved].

Zwischen Krisennarrativ und begrenzter Macht: Deliberative Foren als Ausweg aus dem strukturellen Dilemma des Europäischen Parlaments

English

Von Richard Steinberg

„Deliberative Bürgerformate bieten dem Europäischen Parlament eine Chance, seinem Selbstanspruch als Zentrum der demokratischen Debatte gerecht zu werden.“

In Krisenzeiten stehen demokratisch gewählte Parlamente oftmals vor einem strukturellen Dilemma: Gerade dann, wenn schnelle und sichtbare Entscheidungen gefragt sind, wächst die Bedeutung der Exekutive und das Parlament droht politisch an den Rand gedrängt zu werden – jüngst etwa während der Finanz- und Staatsschuldenkrise, der Pandemie, des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine oder angesichts zunehmender geopolitischer Spannungen.

Das Europäische Parlament ist von dieser Dynamik besonders stark betroffen. Einerseits versteht es sich als zentrale Arena der demokratischen Debatte auf europäischer Ebene. Andererseits fehlt ihm in vielen Bereichen nach wie vor parlamentarische Steuerungsmacht, so z.B. mit Blick auf das fehlende Initiativrecht und die begrenzte Haushaltskompetenz. Das historisch gewachsene Dilemma zwischen einem hohen parlamentarischen Selbstanspruch und mangelnder Steuerungsmacht offenbart sich besonders in Krisenzeiten. Wie lässt es sich jenseits von Vertragsreformen auflösen, die politisch momentan unrealistisch erscheinen?

„Krisen“ stärken die Exekutive – aber nicht nur

Der Begriff der „Krise“ beschreibt nicht nur Problemlagen, sondern fungiert als politischer Deutungsrahmen, der Handlungsdruck erzeugt. Auf EU-Ebene kann er sowohl institutionelle Weiterentwicklung als auch eine stärkere Konzentration von Entscheidungsbefugnissen legitimieren. Für das Europäische Parlament sind Krisen oftmals Argument für eine Stärkung der eigenen Befugnisse und institutionelle Reformen im föderalistischen Sinne. Gleichzeitig sind unter Zeitdruck und angesichts komplexer Problemlagen Entscheidungsprozesse oftmals stärker exekutiv geprägt, während parlamentarische, zivilgesellschaftliche und öffentliche Auseinandersetzungen an Gewicht verlieren.

Diese Output-Orientierung erzeugt jedoch ein strukturelles Risiko: Je stärker Entscheidungen beschleunigt und in kleinen institutionellen Arenen getroffen werden, desto größer wird die Gefahr, dass demokratische Beteiligung und öffentliche Deliberation an den Rand gedrängt werden. Jüngste Beispiele sind die Omnibus-Verfahren: Unter dem (vermeintlichen) Druck geopolitischer und wirtschaftlicher Krisen hat die Kommission weitreichende Änderungen zentraler Nachhaltigkeitsregeln in einem Paket gebündelt und damit Verfahrensregeln zur Folgenabschätzung und Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung umgangen. Auch wenn das Parlament formal eingebunden ist, sind das Tempo und die Logik der Entscheidung exekutiv geprägt.

Repräsentationsanspruch ohne Steuerungsmacht

Ein historischer Blick auf die 1970er Jahre zeigt, dass diese Spannung kein neues Phänomen ist. Mehrere wirtschaftliche, politische und institutionelle Krisen, u.a. die sogenannten Ölpreiskrisen, führten in dieser Zeit im Europäischen Parlament zu einem übergreifenden Diskurs über eine „Krise der Gemeinschaft“.

Dieser Diskurs hatte paradoxe Folgen: Einerseits stärkte er fraktionsübergreifend das institutionelle Selbstverständnis des Parlaments und diente als zentrale argumentative Grundlage für Forderungen nach einer stärkeren Rolle als demokratische Krisenplattform. Andererseits blieb die politische Wirkung jedoch begrenzt. Trotz ambitionierter Reforminitiativen verfestigten sich vielmehr intergouvernementale Entscheidungsstrukturen – so zum Beispiel durch die Etablierung des Europäischen Rats auf der Pariser Gipfelkonferenz 1974 und der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik im Rahmen der Europäischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit.

Bereits hier zeigte sich also das grundlegende Spannungsverhältnis, das die Rolle des Parlaments bis heute prägt: ein hoher demokratischer Repräsentationsanspruch bei gleichzeitig begrenzter politischer Steuerungsmacht.

Eine bekannte Konstellation: Das Parlament in den langen 1970ern

Die 1970er Jahre weisen zahlreiche Parallelen zu heutigen Krisenwahrnehmungen auf, die oftmals mit den Begriffen „Polykrise“, „Multikrise“ oder „Permakrise“ bezeichnet werden. Der enge diskursive Zusammenhang zwischen Krise und europäischer Integration, der bis heute unseren Blick auf die EU maßgeblich prägt, manifestierte sich in dieser Zeit zum ersten Mal.

Die Zeit vom Gipfel von Den Haag 1969 bis zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte 1986 war geprägt von einer Abfolge wirtschaftlicher, währungspolitischer, sozialer und institutioneller Krisen, die sowohl die Mitgliedstaaten als auch die Gemeinschaft selbst betrafen. Empirische Analysen der Plenardebatten des Europäischen Parlaments in diesem Zeitraum zeigen, dass sich ein fraktionsübergreifend geteiltes Deutungsmuster einer „Krise der Gemeinschaft“ entwickelte, das die parlamentarische Selbstverortung als legitime Krisenplattform in Abgrenzung vor allem zum Europäischen Rat nachhaltig strukturierte. Während zunächst einzelne Krisen zu spezifischen Problemdiskussionen führten, etablierte sich im Laufe des Jahrzehnts ein übergreifender Krisendiskurs, der zunehmend zum dominanten Interpretationsrahmen der politischen Gegenwart wurde.

Dieser Diskurs prägte das Selbstverständnis des Parlaments als eigenständiger Akteur vor allem in Abgrenzung zum neu etablierten Europäischen Rat, aber auch gegenüber Ministerrat und Kommission. Die Abgeordneten nutzten Krisennarrative, um institutionelle Reformforderungen zu begründen – insbesondere eine Stärkung des Europäischen Parlaments. Die unzureichende Legitimität intergouvernementaler Entscheidungsprozesse, so die Abgeordneten, habe zu einer Vertrauenskrise geführt. Um sie zu überwinden, müsse das Parlament zur zentralen demokratischen Krisenlösungsplattform aufgewertet werden.

Wirkungen des Krisendiskurses

Das häufig genutzte Bild „produktiver Krisen“ greift im Fall des Europäischen Parlaments jedoch zu kurz. Der Krisendiskurs entfaltete vor allem nach innen eine starke Wirkung. Er fungierte als fraktionsübergreifender Referenzrahmen, ermöglichte gemeinsame Probleminterpretationen und stärkte die institutionelle Identität und das Selbstbewusstsein der Europaabgeordneten. Insbesondere nach der ersten Direktwahl 1979 positionierte sich das Parlament zunehmend als „einzig demokratisch legitimierte Institution“ auf europäischer Ebene und nutzte Krisennarrative gezielt, um Reform- und Kompetenzforderungen zu untermauern.

Im Kontrast zu dieser normativen Selbstpositionierung blieb der tatsächliche strukturelle Machtgewinn jedoch begrenzt. Intergouvernementale Entscheidungsstrukturen gewannen weiter an Bedeutung. So fand der Spinelli-Verfassungsentwurf von 1984 nur in geringem Umfang Eingang in die zwei Jahre später verabschiedete Einheitliche Europäische Akte. Die begrenzte Wirkung parlamentarischer Reforminitiativen führte in den 1980er Jahren zunehmend zu Frustration unter den Abgeordneten.

Das strukturelle Dilemma heute: Deliberative Formate als Lösung?

Dieses Spannungsverhältnis zwischen hohem Repräsentationsanspruch und begrenzter Steuerungsmacht prägt die Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments bis heute. Auch in jüngeren Krisen wurden zentrale politische Weichenstellungen vor allem in exekutiven und intergouvernementalen Formaten vorbereitet. Nach der verhaltenen Aufbruchsstimmung im Rahmen der Konferenz zur Zukunft Europas scheint das Möglichkeitsfenster für grundlegende Reformdebatten zur Stärkung des Parlaments inzwischen jedoch weitgehend geschlossen. Angesichts der geringen Bereitschaft zu Vertragsreformen ist nicht zu erwarten, dass das seit den 1970er Jahren bestehende strukturelle Dilemma durch neue Kompetenzen aufgelöst werden kann.

Wenn formale Machtzuwächse unwahrscheinlich sind, stellt sich die strategische Frage nach alternativen Wegen politischer Relevanz. Hier können deliberative Bürgerformate auf europäischer Ebene eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Das hat das Parlament bereits 2020 in seinem Beschluss zur Konferenz zur Zukunft Europas erkannt, in dem es institutionalisierte deliberative Bürgerformate als Instrument vorsah.

Paradoxerweise verstärkten die neuen deliberativen Formate der Europäischen Union das Dilemma des Parlaments zunächst jedoch noch zusätzlich. Die nach der Konferenz zur Zukunft Europas etablierten Europäischen Bürgerforen zu zentralen EU-Vorhaben – wie dem EU-Haushaltsrahmen und dem Umgang mit Hass in der Gesellschaft – sind primär an die Europäische Kommission angebunden, während das Parlament bisher weitestgehend Zuschauer bleibt.

Welche Rolle kann das Europäische Parlament heute spielen?

Dabei könnten deliberative Formate dem Parlament die Chance bieten, seinem Selbstanspruch als Zentrum der demokratischen Debatte auch außerhalb der vertraglichen Verfahren gerecht zu werden. Mit der Jugendbürgerversammlung zu Bestäubern ist das Parlament zuletzt auch selbst als Initiator eines deliberativen Prozesses aufgetreten. Basierend auf den Erfahrungen der Europäischen Bürgerforen haben 100 junge Menschen aus allen EU-Mitgliedstaaten über drei Monate gemeinsam an Empfehlungen zur Rettung von Bestäubern sowie zur kontinuierlichen Beteiligung von jungen Menschen in der EU gearbeitet.

Die demokratische Wirkung solcher Verfahren entscheidet sich jedoch weniger in ihrer Organisation als in ihrer politischen Verarbeitung. Bleiben Bürgerempfehlungen im administrativen Raum, drohen sie zu konsultativen Beiträgen, mit eingeschränkten politischen Konsequenzen zu werden. Hier kommt dem Europäischen Parlament eine doppelte Rolle zu: als Initiator deliberativer Prozesse zu zentralen Fragen seiner eigenen Gesetzgebungsarbeit – wie zuletzt mit der Jugendbürgerversammlung zu Bestäubern – und als verbindlicher institutioneller Adressat der Ergebnisse anderer deliberativer Prozesse, unabhängig davon, wer sie initiiert hat.

Konkret bedeutet das dreierlei:

• Erstens sollte das Europäische Parlament selbst verstärkt als Initiator von deliberativen Bürgerformaten auftreten. Neben den parlamentarischen Initiativberichten kann es so eigenständig Themen einbringen, die sich aus seiner Gesetzgebungsarbeit und seiner gesellschaftlichen Verankerung begründen lassen und unabhängig von exekutiven Prioritäten gesetzt werden.
• Zweitens sollte eine strukturierte Anhörung von Mitgliedern der Bürgerforen – sowohl der existierenden Bürgerforen der Kommission als auch von EP-initiierten Prozessen – in den zuständigen EP-Ausschüssen vorgesehen werden.
• Drittens sollte es verpflichtende Stellungnahmen zu den Ergebnissen jedes Forums geben. Eine solche Verknüpfung würde europäische deliberative Initiativen politisch noch stärker verankern und mit demokratischer Verantwortlichkeit sowie Sichtbarkeit verbinden.

Vom passiven Zuschauer zum Übersetzungsraum

Die historische Erfahrung zeigt: Krisennarrative haben das Selbstverständnis des Europäischen Parlaments gestärkt, aber nur begrenzt zu einer Ausweitung seiner formalen Kompetenzen geführt. Das strukturelle Spannungsverhältnis zwischen hohen demokratischen Erwartungen und begrenzter institutioneller Steuerungsmacht wird daher auf absehbare Zeit bestehen bleiben.

Im Gegensatz zu den 1970er Jahren existiert heute aber ein Format, das einen strukturellen Anknüpfungspunkt außerhalb der Verträge liefert, um dem Selbstanspruch des Parlaments dennoch gerecht zu werden. Wenn deliberative Bürgerprozesse systematisch in parlamentarische Debatten und Entscheidungsprozesse einfließen, kann das Parlament zu dem Ort werden, an dem die Ergebnisse deliberativer Verfahren nicht nur gehört, sondern politisch übersetzt, kontrovers verhandelt und demokratisch verantwortet werden.

In einer Union im permanenten Krisenmodus wird die Bedeutung des Europäischen Parlaments daher weniger von weiteren Kompetenzverschiebungen abhängen als von seiner Fähigkeit, gesellschaftliche Debatten sichtbar in europäische Politik zu überführen.

Richard Steinberg ist Historiker und politischer Berater bei der ifok GmbH mit Schwerpunkt auf Bürgerbeteiligung und deliberativer Demokratie. Sein Buch „Das Europäische Parlament in der Krise? Krisenwahrnehmung und -diskurse im Europäischen Parlament in den langen 1970er Jahren“ ist 2025 erschienen.

Bilder: Jugendbürgerversammlung zu Bestäubern: European Union (European Commission) [CC BY 4.0, Lizenzinformation], via EU website; Porträt Richard Steinberg: privat [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

EU to go – Made in Europe: Rettungsanker für die Industrie?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

In der neuen Folge von EU to go sprechen Thu Nguyen und Philipp Jäger über den Zustand der europäischen Industrie – und darüber, ob der neue Vorschlag der EU‑Kommission, der Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), tatsächlich Antworten auf ihre tiefgreifenden Schwierigkeiten liefert.

Europas Industrie steht unter massivem Druck: Hohe Energiepreise, ein zunehmend fragmentierter Welthandel und der „zweite China‑Schock“ setzen besonders Branchen wie Automobil, Chemie, Stahl und Maschinenbau zu. Arbeitsplätze gehen verloren, Investitionen bleiben aus und zugleich wächst der politische Anspruch, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Klimaschutz miteinander zu verbinden.

Der IAA soll hier ansetzen: mit Planungsbeschleunigung, neuen Buy‑European- und Low‑Carbon-Klauseln sowie strengeren Bedingungen für ausländische Investitionen. Doch wie groß ist der tatsächliche Paradigmenwechsel? Welche Branchen profitieren wirklich und wo bleibt die Wirkung begrenzt? Und wie passt das alles zu den aktuellen Debatten über Bürokratieabbau und die Zukunft des EU‑Emissionshandels?

Towards a new era of representative democracy: The ActEU legacy in one book

By Daniela Braun, Alex Hartland, Michael Kaeding, Zoe Lefkofridi, and Kristina Weissenbach

The Horizon Europe project Activating European Citizens’ Trust in Times of Crisis and Polarisation (ActEU) examined questions of political trust and democratic legitimacy in Europe. This article is part of a series in which ActEU researchers present their findings.

Out now!

Over the past years, Der (europäische) Föderalist has accompanied the ActEU project as a recurring point of reference for debates on the state of democracy in Europe. ActEU researchers – a consortium of twelve European partner institutions – investigated political trust and legitimacy in Europe, focusing on citizen attitudes, participation, and the representation of policy preferences. Their overall aim was to map persistent problems of declining trust in the EU’s multi-level governance system and develop a toolbox of remedial actions for policymakers, civil society, and the educational sector to enhance political trust.

Across multiple contributions in this blog, ActEU researchers have invited us to look beyond headline indicators of democratic decline and to ask more fine‑grained questions about trust, legitimacy and representation in Europe’s multi‑level political system. This has included analysis of trust and economic deprivation, trust and local government, polarisation and climate protests, representation, and the 2024 European Parliament elections, as well as details of the project’s youth outreach activities.

With the publication of the open‑access edited volume Activating European Citizens’ Trust in Times of Crisis and Polarization: Towards a New Era of Representative Democracy, this intellectual journey now reaches its culmination. The book brings together the central theoretical reflections and empirical findings of the Horizon Europe-funded ActEU project and translates them into a coherent analytical framework.

Trust is not a by-product, but an indispensable resource for democracy

The timing of this publication could hardly be more appropriate. European democracies are operating under conditions of permanent stress: successive crises, intensified geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty and deepening social and political polarisation. In such contexts, political trust is often treated as a diffuse sentiment that simply “falls” during crises. The volume starts from a different premise: Trust and legitimacy are not residual by‑products of democratic politics, but indispensable resources without which representative democracy cannot function in the first place.

Political trust, we argue, is a crucial yet underestimated element in Europe’s representative democracies. A trusting relationship between citizens and the institutions of the state ensures the functioning of democratic systems, reduces transaction costs and facilitates the justification of political decisions. Without the commitment of a critical mass, democratic governments cannot gain legitimacy among the populace.

While a stable relationship of trust between citizens and the state through political parties is a prerequisite for representative democracies in normal times, it is even more important in times of significant democratic change and turmoil, i.e., when democracies are in flux. Periods of crisis reveal not only whether citizens trust institutions, but also whether they feel represented, heard and able to participate meaningfully in political life.

The ActEU triangle: attitudes, behaviour, representation

At the conceptual core of the book lies the ActEU triangle, which provides a novel starting point for analysing trust and legitimacy in Europe. Instead of relying on single survey items asking citizens how much they trust “politics” or “parliament”, the triangle connects three analytically distinct yet empirically intertwined dimensions: political attitudes, political behaviour and political representation.

The ActEU triangle. (Click to enlarge.)

By linking what citizens think, how they act and how their preferences are represented in political outcomes, the framework allows for a more precise diagnosis of democratic strengths and weaknesses in Europe’s multi‑level systems.

Declining trust is often rooted in concrete experiences of exclusion

Building on this framework, the empirical chapters of the volume draw on original ActEU survey data and complementary qualitative evidence to map trust and legitimacy across different European contexts. Within seven multi-level case studies – Austria, Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain – the book covers a wide range of political systems and democratic traditions and explicitly takes into account the interaction between regional, national and European levels of governance. Across cases, a central finding stands out: Trust deficits are rarely uniform. They differ across institutions, policy areas and political levels, and they are often closely linked to perceived gaps in political representation.

Polarising policy fields such as migration, climate change or gender equality emerge as particularly revealing stress tests for representative democracy. In these areas, citizens’ attitudes, participatory behaviour and experiences of representation often diverge in ways that conventional trust indicators fail to capture. The ActEU approach shows that declining trust is frequently rooted not in general scepticism towards democracy, but in concrete experiences of misrepresentation or exclusion. This insight can be studied in much more detail in future research drawing on our innovative data sources, such as the ActEU Citizens’ Emotions & Trust Focus Group Dataset as well as the ActEU Digital Political Discourse Dataset.

Democratic renewal begins with careful analysis

Importantly, Activating European Citizens’ Trust does not stop at diagnosis. Throughout the volume, the authors emphasise that trust is not a fixed end‑state but a dynamic relationship that can be strengthened or weakened by institutional design, political practices and modes of representation. By systematically linking attitudes, participation and representation, the ActEU framework opens up space for targeted democratic reforms – from improving representational responsiveness to strengthening participatory channels suited to Europe’s complex multi‑level reality.

As the final contribution to the ActEU series on Der (europäische) Föderalist, this book thus provides a fitting conclusion. It encapsulates the project’s core ambition: not merely to document declining political trust, but to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how representative democracy in Europe can adapt, recover and endure under conditions of crisis and polarisation. At a moment when democratic pessimism often dominates public debate, the volume is a timely reminder that democratic renewal begins with careful analysis – and with taking citizens’ trust seriously.

Daniela Braun is Professor of Political Science with a specialisation in European Integration and International Relations at Saarland University.

Alex Hartland is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of European Social Research at Saarland University.

Michael Kaeding is Professor of European Integration and European Policy at the University of Duisburg-Essen and Director of Studies of the European Political and Governance Studies Department at the College of Europe in Bruges.

Zoe Lefkofridi is Professor of Politics & Gender, Diversity & Equality at the Department of Political Science of the University of Salzburg.

Kristina Weissenbach is substitute professor for Ethics in Political Management and Society at the University of Duisburg-Essen and co-director of the NRW School of Governance.

Daniela Braun, Alexander Hartland, Michael Kaeding, Zoe Lefkofridi, Kristina Weissenbach (eds.): Activating European Citizens’ Trust in Times of Crisis and Polarization: Towards a New Era of Representative Democracy, Cham: Springer Nature 2026 (open access).

Economic deprivation reduces political trust [DE/EN] ● Henrik Serup Christensen and Janette Huttunen Multi-level democracy and political trust in Europe: The role of the subnational level [DE/EN] ● Felix-Christopher von Nostitz Out of step? The EU’s difficult election dance [DE/EN] ● Alex Hartland, Daniela Braun, Giuseppe Carteny, Rosa M. Navarrete, and Ann-Kathrin Reinl What’s trust got to do with it? Political trust, polarized opinions and climate protest in Europe [DE/EN] ● Louisa Parks From seats to sentiments: What Austria teaches us about trust and representation in a multi-level Europe [DE/EN] ● Ermela Gianna, Matilde Ceron, and Zoe Lefkofridi ActEU Youth Democracy Labs: A young perspective on politics and political education in the EU [DE/EN] ● Alex Hoppe Towards a new era of representative democracy: The ActEU legacy in one book [EN] ● Daniela Braun, Alex Hartland, Michael Kaeding, Zoe Lefkofridi, and Kristina Weissenbach

Pictures: Book cover: Springer Nature; authors’ portraits: private [all rights reserved].

EU Analytics – March 2026 review: EU policy making under the shadow of war

By Nicolai von Ondarza

On the EU-US trade “deal”, EPP and S&D showed their ability to compromise, whereas the far-right was divided.

March 2026 was another month of two-faced European politics. In high politics, the EU agenda was dominated by the US/Israel war against Iran and the fallout on energy prices, security, the NATO alliance, Ukraine and much more. On the other side, a lot had already been planned for the regular institutions in March: A European Council focused on competitiveness, two plenaries of the European Parliament with crucial votes on migration, trade policy and more, as well as new trade and security partnerships, for instance with Australia, Iceland or Ghana.

Both faces were also visible in the votes in the EP, which had most votes dominated by the ‘von der Leyen’ majority, but a crucial far-right enabled policy change on migration. In the Council, we had very few public votes, but the one on the EU’s climate goals revealed an area where the Visegrád Four, from Poland to Hungary, were united against the rest of the EU.

Time to dive in:

Highlight of the month: Implementation of the EU-US trade “deal”

Amongst several interesting votes this month I choose the EP votes adopting two aspects of the EU-US Turnberry trade “deal”, specifically implementing the lowering of tariffs on specific US goods. The votes were interesting to me for three reasons:

For one, they showed the power the EP has on trade policy, as it had postponed the vote several times in face of Trump’s threats over Greenland and the quickly changing US trade policy. The version that was finally adopted includes safeguards, so that the EU can suspend the agreement if Trump returns to threatening the EU or its member states, for instance by reimposing new tariffs. In practical terms, I’d argue that currently the EU Parliament is stronger on trade than the US Congress.

Secondly, it was also a vote that tested the ability of the EPP and the S&D, in particular, to find a compromise on trade policy. The S&D was much more reluctant to adopt the implementation, but grudgingly accepted it with the suspension clause (full voting data at HowTheyVote.EU). Equally interesting, Trump’s supposed “Patriotic allies” in Europe are becoming deeply uncomfortable with being too strongly associated with him. In consequence, here it was the far-right that was split: The ECR mostly voted for the implementation, while the majority of the “Patriots for Europe” voted against or abstained, as did the AfD-led ESN (which still courts the MAGA republicans). From the Patriots, this included all of Hungary’s Fidesz abstaining, despite Orbán seeking Trump’s and Vance’s endorsement ahead of the crucial upcoming elections.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

In turn, this thirdly also creates an interesting map if you look at voting of MEPs by member state. The Turnberry deal got the majority of support across most of Europe, with particularly high levels of favourable votes in Central, Eastern and Northern Europe, while it got 0 per cent of support from Hungary, almost none from France and only about a third each from Austria and Slovakia.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Final votes in the European Parliament

In March 2026, the EP had two plenary sessions, one from 9-12 March in Strasbourg and one from 25-26 March in Brussels. Both plenary sessions together had 44 votes recorded at HowTheyVote.EU. Looking at the data from these votes, a contradictory picture emerges.

On first sight, these were two plenaries where the usual “von der Leyen” platform of EPP, S&D and Renew won the day. If you look at which party groups were most often in the majority and thus won most votes, these were the EPP (97.7%), the S&D and Renew (95.5% each). In contrast, the ESN stood at 25% of the votes, and even the ECR (70.5%) was below the Greens (84.1%).

On top of that, the three pro-European groups from the centre voted together 93.2% of the time, showing that, in principle, the centre can stand together. These included high-profile votes such as on the application of the EU-US trade deal, over which the EPP and the S&D had discussed controversially before. The three groups also had the highest overlap in terms of co-voting, with the S&D and Renew even voting together 100% of the time.

Data source: HowTheyVote.EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Only one of the plenary votes was won by the “Venezuela majority” of EPP with the far-right groups. That vote, however, carried a special weight. It was the vote on the return hubs, and thus a continuation of the EPP voting with the far-right on EU migration policy. On this vote specifically, the German press agency DPA had previously reported evidence that the EPP did not only vote with the far-right from committee level to fending off all amendments at the plenary, but also coordinated with all three far-right groups via WhatsApp and physical meetings beforehand. This reportedly also included taking on some of their proposed changes.

What’s more, after the vote on return hubs was adopted in the plenary, the far-right stood up for standing ovations, later celebrating that “the era of deportations has begun”. So, in quantitative terms, the far-right was relevant for the majority in only one vote, but this was a vote that really changes EU policy.

Public votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the analysis builds upon the public votes published, which are always fewer. For March 2026, eleven public votes have been recorded. Of these, four were adopted by unanimity and five with only abstentions, signalling a usual degree of consensus. Still, a few interesting bits:

• The most noteworthy vote was certainly the one on the EU climate target for 2040. Contrary to the dismantling/simplification of much of the Green Deal regulation, here the EU Parliament and majority of the Council stuck to ambitious goals. In the Council, the full “Visegrád Four” – Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – voted together against this, while Belgium abstained. Despite the differences between Poland and the rest of the V4 on other issues, on anti-climate legislation they find a common ground.
• Estonia abstained on three interlinked votes, all concerning reforms of the Crisis Management and Deposit Scheme as part of the resolution mechanism for the EU’s (still not completed) banking union.
• Hungary voted no twice and abstained twice, so was in the minority at roughly a third of the votes. The other No vote was on the implementation of bilateral safeguard clauses on the Mercosur Trade Agreement. This is in contrast to the other Mercosur-sceptics, who either abstained (Austria, Belgium) or voted in favour (e.g. France, Poland) of the safeguard.

Public vote on an amending regulation concerning the setting of a Union intermediate climate target for 2040. Source: Council of the EU. (Click to enlarge.)

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.

Pictures: all graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

The European Policy Quartet: Cacophonic leadership – who speaks for Europe on the world stage?

Deutsch

With:

• Niklas Helwig, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Brussels
• Manuel Müller, Der (europäische) Föderalist, Helsinki
• Julian Plottka, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
• Sophia Russack, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

This conversation was conducted as a written online chat in German. The text below has been edited and translated.

At critical moments, the EU usually speaks with at least three voices. And sometimes these three voices contradict each other.

Manuel
Welcome to the first European Policy Quartet of 2026! Last time, we discussed the potential role that the EU could play in global politics, at a time when major powers such as Russia, China, and the US are trying to expand their spheres of influence more and more aggressively. Now, three weeks after the start of the war in Iran, this question is more pressing than ever. The initial European reactions to the war clearly showed how difficult it still is for the EU to find a common line in such situations.

First, the governments of Germany and France, together with the United Kingdom, issued a statement that criticised only the Iranian retaliatory strikes, but not the US-Israeli attack itself. Then, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/PES) condemned the attack as a violation of international law, prompting Donald Trump to threaten Spain with trade sanctions. To this, Emmanuel Macron (RE/–) responded quickly with a statement of solidarity for Spain, whereas Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP) initially remained silent.

Disunity among the member states was followed by division within the institutions: Shortly after the start of the war, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) stated in a speech that the EU could no longer rely on the “rules-based international system”, and that it should instead pursue a “more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy” and “be prepared to project our power more assertively”. However, she was contradicted by both High Representative Kaja Kallas (RE/ALDE) and European Council President António Costa (PS/PES), who both spoke out in favour of maintaining a consistent commitment to international law.

And so, once again, we are faced with the old Kissinger question: Who exactly speaks for the EU on the world stage?

Commission President vs. High Representative

Niklas
Exactly: the EU has failed to develop a single voice. The Treaty of Lisbon once aimed to establish a focal point for European foreign policy by creating the position of High Representative (HR/VP), who would serve both as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission.

In recent years, however, we have instead seen further fragmentation. Under von der Leyen, the Commission has increased its influence over foreign policy, pushing the High Representative and the European External Action Service to the sidelines. At the same time, more and more decisions have been shifted from the ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council to the heads of state and government in the European Council. Kallas and her diplomatic instruments have lost relevance.

Julian
I agree with you about the fragmentation, Niklas. But what is the reason for it? Is it a return to “Old (wo)men make history” – in other words, a question of the ambitions or egos of a new generation of decision-makers? Or is it due to design flaws in the Common Foreign and Security Policy set out in the Treaty of Lisbon? I lean towards the latter explanation. What do you think?

Niklas
Both! The Lisbon Treaty and the dual role of the HR/VP were always just a compromise. Member states did not want to grant the Commission too much power over foreign policy, so they placed the office of the HR/VP and the European External Action Service somewhere between the member states and the Commission. This is a birth defect that continues to have repercussions. At the same time, it is also a matter of personalities: Von der Leyen has made security and defence her own issue and is aggressively staking her claim to it.

Centralisation within the executive

Sophia
Indeed. The rift between the High Representative and the Commission President is nothing new; it's almost institutionalised. But von der Leyen is also actively working to expand her influence.

Here’s a nerdy institutional detail 🤓 to confirm this: Since von der Leyen took office, she has established a new cabinet-level body that deals exclusively with external affairs – the Group for External Coordination (EXCO).This may seem like just a minor technical change, but it could have a significant impact on the balance of power between the Commission President and the High Representative/Vice-President.

I think it’s reasonable to interpret this as von der Leyen trying to bring foreign policy more into the Commission. Only time will tell how effective this will be. But we know from other contexts that such structural changes can work.

Manuel
I’m not sure whether I would describe this trend as “fragmentation”, or rather as “centralization”. We’ve seen this in other areas as well: the more issues that are decided at a supranational level, the more important the executive branch becomes – and within the executive branch, the leader.

We have seen this happening within EU member states, where the growing influence of the European Council has shifted power from the foreign ministries to the heads of state and government. And now we are also seeing it within the EU itself, where von der Leyen is using the argument of ensuring geopolitical effectiveness to assume more and more responsibilities that, according to the Treaty, should fall under the remit of the High Representative.

And, of course, the role of the HR/VP in the Treaty is structurally fraught with tension due to their dual role as both High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission and the resulting lack of clear institutional loyalty. This tension is not particularly problematic as long as all stakeholders have sufficient time and political will to reach a consensus through discursive-deliberative processes. But in crisis situations, it becomes a structural weak point where intra-European disputes can flare up. The only way to truly resolve this would be through federalisation, i.e. by shifting foreign policy to the Commission.

Integrating the EEAS into the Commission?

Niklas
Well, maybe not full-blown federalisation, Manuel – let’s not get ahead of ourselves there. But it would certainly make sense to integrate the European External Action Service more closely with the Commission. This could be achieved even within the existing treaties, and it would help to avoid some of the overlapping structures and turf wars.

As I mentioned, the member states were not particularly keen on such a solution in the past. However, we are now seeing that they are quite willing to work directly with the Commission when it comes to sanctions or the defence industry. So why not integrate the External Action Service into the Commission as well?

Julian
I really like the idea of describing the negotiations in the Council working groups as “discursive-deliberative” – hashtag #Habermas! 😂

I get the impression that the European External Action Service is very much taking its cues from the member states, which is leading to a paralysis of foreign policy. To quote an anonymous source from a discussion I had with representatives of an unnamed Brussels institution: “This is a good idea, but it would have to come from the member states. Otherwise, we can’t do anything.” At the same time, the end of the rotating presidency in the Foreign Affairs Council has disincentivised member states from driving the agenda forward, as it is no longer as prestigious. But there isn’t any other political engine now. So, I like Niklas’ idea of integrating the External Action Service into the Commission and giving it more political weight.

The Commission driving forward the single market for defence

Niklas
In security and defence policy, there are already some areas where the Commission can play a role as an “integration engine”, driving things forward – particularly in the defence industry. However, this is mostly limited to industrial policy, and even then, the Commission’s activities are rather small compared to the investments of the member states. And now, even SAFE has been thrown into turmoil by Polish domestic politics …

Julian
I wonder whether von der Leyen is a genuine federalist trying to strengthen the Commission and establish its role in foreign and security policy? Some authors draw a comparison between the steps taken in the defence single market, including the role of the new Commissioner for Defence, with the Commission’s environmental policy in the 1980s: Starting from a single market competence, entirely new policy areas were developed and later incorporated into the Treaty as conferred powers.

Or is the agenda just crisis-driven, with von der Leyen simply riding the current political wave?

Commission President vs European Council

Sophia
Manuel, you wrote earlier that as supranational issues gain in importance, the executive branch gains power. I certainly agree with that. But here’s the thing: The European Council is also part of the executive branch – some people (not me 😉) would even argue that it is the EU’s core executive.

In this context, I also find it interesting that a rift between von der Leyen and Costa has recently become openly apparent for the first time. Previously, the two had always gone to great lengths to present a united front, issuing joint statements and so on. But we must not underestimate Costa. Like his pre-predecessor, Herman Van Rompuy, he appears to handle matters by quietly working out compromises behind the scenes and avoiding public conflict. This can make the office of Council President appear weaker than it actually is. It seems to me, however, that he is actually fulfilling his institutional role more effectively than his predecessor. This could become more apparent in the future and lead to greater competition with von der Leyen.

Overall, I think von der Leyen is now facing greater difficulties in maintaining her position of power than she did during her first term. This is because a) the issues, problems, and crises that Europe is dealing with increasingly involve also non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom, and b) key heads of state and government, such as Merz and Meloni, are increasingly flirting with intergovernmental mechanisms.

Manuel
That’s interesting: We are witnessing a power shift towards the Commission president – von der Leyen is more active and visible on the geopolitical stage than any of her predecessors – but at the same time, we are also seeing a resurgence of intergovernmentalism.

Sophia
I would say, yes, she is more active and visible than any previous Commission president (and more visible in the public eye than Costa) – but less so than in her first term. Here’s another paradox: Von der Leyen currently appears to be more influential than Costa. But while its president is losing visibility, the European Council itself is gaining importance.

Julian
Manuel’s description brings to mind the crisis in the euro area, when we suddenly saw “enhanced policy coordination”, strengthening both the Commission and the Council and giving crisis politics a clear executive character. Perhaps this is simply a consequence of politics currently operating in crisis mode? The big difference from back then is certainly that there is no one in the European Council with the political clout of Angela Merkel now, meaning the Commission president has more opportunity to take over the leadership role.

Intergovernmental ad hoc formats

Sophia
Von der Leyen is often perceived as trying to establish herself as the EU’s foreign policy leader. Understandably, the heads of state and government in the European Council are not at all happy about this – after all, they see it as a matter for the member states. The tension between the Commission’s leadership role and the European Council’s agenda-setting function is particularly evident in foreign policy at the moment.

But when it comes to the Iran issue in particular, the focus rather seems to be on ad hoc formats such as the E3 (Germany, France, UK), which make it more difficult for von der Leyen to assume a leadership role.

Niklas
But let’s be clear: Ultimately, the issue is not whether the EU will move forward as a supranational or intergovernmental entity, but rather how Europe can develop the capacity to act and exercise autonomy in foreign policy. In this context, intergovernmental frameworks (such as the Coalition of the Willing, E3, E5, NB8, etc.) play a major role. Statements by Merz, Macron and Starmer are also given more weight than those by von der Leyen, Costa or Kallas.

Manuel
That may be true, but that format shopping is also part of a broader trend towards intergovernmentalisation, which always results in a loss of political accountability.

Is diversity the key to Europe’s strength in foreign policy?

Niklas
Is it really a problem if Europe often presents different viewpoints in foreign policy debates? After all, it would be a shame if only politically conservative positions, such as von der Leyen’s, were to remain in the end. I think it is refreshing that Costa (or previously Josep Borrell during his tenure as HR/VP) takes a different stance, focusing more on international law and the “Global South”. Diversity is Europe’s strength!

Manuel
Well, well. But structural discord at the top also means that (a) the EU as a whole loses influence because external partners don’t know whose voice to listen to, and (b) citizens have less democratic control because no one is taking responsibility for political decisions.

Sophia
Niklas, that sounds beautifully pluralistic in theory. But in practice, it can easily mean that no joint decisions are made, and that the EU therefore fails to realise its geopolitical potential.

… or rather its size and cohesion?

Julian
Is it really possible to develop capacity to act in such small formats as the E3 or E5, Niklas? Isn’t the size of the EU one of its few assets, particularly in foreign policy? This is lost when only small groups cooperate. For example, there has been a legitimate debate about whether sanctions decisions made by the EU-26 (i.e. excluding Hungary) are effective.

At the same time, I also don’t see the current formats representing an avant-garde capable of integrating other member states into the policy framework in the medium term. If the aim were to bring as many partners on board as possible, reach compromises and later expand the circle of participants, there would be little to object to. But if small formats prioritise transactional efficiency and lead to cherry-picking, they may facilitate short-term decisions, but in the long term they destroy trust between governments and ultimately even increase fragmentation.

Niklas
OK, I see that you guys aren’t too keen on my view on strength by pluralism …

However, the fact remains that we will continue to have differing foreign policy positions in Europe – anything else would be utopian. And so, in the debate on international law, for example, it is actually a good thing that von der Leyen isn’t the only one setting the tone, and that Sánchez and Costa can express alternative perspectives. This results in more balanced positions than if only one person were setting the course. This is what sets us apart from presidential systems such as that of the United States.

When it comes to small formats, I just don’t see any other option at the moment. In terms of flexibility, it’s the least bad thing.

Manuel
More balanced positions: maybe. But sometimes it simply means that there’s no clear position at all.

And that is precisely where the issue of accountability and democratic control comes in. Personally, I have a fairly different view to von der Leyen on the question of international law. But above all, I would like to know who is responsible for defining the EU’s position, so that we could criticise them more effectively and, if necessary, vote them out of office.

Where does this challenge to international law come from?

Sophia
I also wonder why compliance with international law is being called into question so frequently at the moment. Why is there room for such debate?

There are certainly several reasons, but I immediately think of the far right. After all, what has changed rapidly and uniformly across the EU in our political systems and societies in recent years? The growing influence of far-right parties, which fundamentally challenge the rules-based order. They are normalising the questioning of an issue that had long been considered settled. And even when they aren’t in power, they still significantly shape the discourse through aggressive public communication and through conservative parties adopting their arguments and making them socially acceptable.

Manuel
I find that an interesting theory, but it doesn’t quite convince me.

Of course, it is true that far-right parties often act in ways that undermine the rule of law. Many of them also harbour obvious sympathies for authoritarian leaders who flout international law, such as Putin. However, in the context of Venezuela and Iran, I would argue that the relativisation of international law in Europe has actually come from centrist parties – parties that are deeply committed to defending democracy and that see themselves as embroiled in an existential struggle against a global authoritarian alliance, in which any means are deemed acceptable to overthrow dictators.

Normalisation of far-right positions?

Julian
From an academic perspective, I find the argument that the radicalisation of political debates by far-right actors has now reached the realm of foreign policy fascinating. From a political perspective, I find it alarming.

With a few exceptions, foreign policy has generally been an issue of little salience to the electorate. Has this changed? Has it become so important to voters that politicians are now trying to pander to the far right on this issue as well? Or have far-right positions become so normalised and accepted that they aren’t even used strategically anymore, but are simply adopted without reflection?

Sophia
Both explanations are worrisome!

Niklas
Another reason, of course, is that international law and the multilateral order are currently under attack worldwide, which is causing them to lose relevance. But that should encourage the EU to defend them all the more – not only for ideological reasons, but also in its own security interest. A world in which international law no longer applied would be far more dangerous for Europe.

Two ways of rejecting international law?

Manuel
I think we are currently dealing with two different types of rejection of international law. On the one hand, there is the rejection by far-right parties, particularly those in power in Russia and the US. These parties generally do not value the rule of law and view international law as an unwanted constraint on the expansion of their own national power.

On the other hand, there are the European centrist parties, which find themselves in a sort of apocalyptic mood out of fear of aggressive anti-Western dictatorships, particularly Russia. They see themselves in a boundless struggle between good and evil and refuse to be held back by international law for fear of perishing otherwise. If you perceive Russia as the ultimate threat, it is easy to argue that (a) the transatlantic alliance is not to be jeopardised under any circumstances, and (b) international law may be set aside when it comes to attacks on Russia’s allies, such as Venezuela or Iran.

Julian
Do we still have a transatlantic alliance that might be jeopardised? 😆

Manuel
In my view, this attitude is particularly prevalent in north-eastern EU countries (where people experience the threat from Russia first-hand), and in conservative circles (where there has been a strong attachment to the alliance with the US ever since the Cold War). Therefore, perhaps it is only logical that Pedro Sánchez, a centre-left south-western European, has most clearly taken the opposite position.

Niklas
In the US, too, there are various groups with different reasons for disregarding international law. Trump is driven primarily by personal interests and a hyper-transactional understanding of politics, in which the rule of law (whether domestic or foreign) has little place. JD Vance, on the other hand, harbours a much more ideologically driven aversion to global elites and the rules-based order. To this ideological wing of the American right, the liberal order appears to be the Antichrist (see Peter Thiel), restricting individual freedoms and heralding the end of the world.

So who, then, is speaking for Europe?

Manuel
To wrap things up, let’s return to our opening question: Who speaks for Europe on the global stage? Specifically, if you are a political analyst looking to anticipate how the EU will respond to a newly erupted geopolitical crisis, whose public statements do you pay the most attention to – von der Leyen, Kallas, Costa, Macron, Merz?

Niklas
The focus is clearly on the E3 right now. Whose statements received the most attention after the attack on Iran? Not Kallas, not von der Leyen … Costa who? The E3, on the other hand, seem to have developed a good rapport when it comes to coordinating their statements. So when Trump lands at the Bay of Pigs, we’ll hear the most important message from them.

Julian
I find it interesting that we’ve written so much today about public expressions of opinion, yet so little about political decisions. In my view, foreign policy is shaped more by the latter.

When it comes to expressing opinions, Macron is clearly the one to watch. In his approach to Ukraine, for example, he illustrates particularly well how wide the gap can be between public statements and actual policy. If I’m reading the German press coverage of the past few days correctly, the honeymoon period is likely over for “Foreign Chancellor” Friedrich Merz too, as the discrepancies between his aspirations and the implementation of his foreign policy will increasingly come under scrutiny.

Sophia
I would say that it clearly comes down to the key heads of state and government. Only if certain members of the European Council (let’s say Merz, Meloni, Sánchez, Macron, and Tusk) fail to reach an agreement will a power vacuum emerge, and von der Leyen will be ready and willing to step into it.

That’s how it always is: The president of the Commission only has as much leeway and power as the member states grant them. But when there is no consensus, there are plenty of opportunities to put new ideas on the table – and von der Leyen has proven that she is very good at this.

So, in a nutshell: It’s either Merz or von der Leyen. 😀

Julian
But von der Leyen can only fill this vacuum with rhetoric. To take action, she simply lacks the resources.

Niklas Helwig is a Brussels-based Leading Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Julian Plottka is a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

All issues of the European Policy Quartet can be found here.

Translation: Manuel Müller.
Pictures: von der Leyen, Costa, Kallas: European Union (Dati Bendo) 2026 [Conditions of use/CC BY 4.0], via European Commission Audiovisual Service; portrait Niklas Helwig, Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved]; portrait Julian Plottka, Sophia Russack: private [all rights reserved].