- European leaders are making an analytical error by treating Hungary’s behaviour as an anomaly rather than a dangerous precedent.
Hungary’s obstructionism has become a routine feature of EU politics. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s actions, such as blocking sanctions against Russia, vowing to prevent Ukraine’s EU accession, and threatening to freeze the Union’s budget, barely make headlines anymore. The European Peace Facility, once central to EU support for Ukraine, has been quietly sidelined due to Hungary’s vetoes. Major progress in institutional development or even treaty reform is being dismissed as impossible to achieve.
Hungary’s behaviour reflects a broader trend of autocratisation in Europe, where illiberal actors exploit institutional vulnerabilities. This threatens the very relevance of the EU: To bypass Orbán’s obstructionism, other member states have already begun replacing regular EU mechanisms with new ad hoc intergovernmental formats, such as “EU-26 statements” or the “Coalition of the Willing” in support of Ukraine.
Wait-and-see approach
The EU has taken some steps. In 2018, the European Parliament triggered Article 7 proceedings against Hungary, which could result in sanctions such as the suspension of its voting rights in the EU Council. In 2022, the Parliament stated that the country is “no longer a full democracy”. Since the same year, the Commission has frozen almost €20 billion in funds under various rule-of-law mechanisms, straining Hungary’s budget and undermining Orbán’s domestic power.
Yet none of these measures have led to significant democratic reforms or made Orbán less obstructionist; if anything, he has become more aggressive with his veto threats, seeking to use them as leverage to unfreeze funds. In 2025, Hungary’s crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights and resistance to Russia sanctions prompted calls for stronger EU action. Still, a Council hearing on Hungary in May ended without producing any results. Despite worsening conditions, many member states prefer a wait-and-see approach.
Orbán is a precedent, not an anomaly
One reason for this passivity may be Hungary’s upcoming 2026 elections. The opposition party TISZA has overtaken Orbán’s Fidesz in the polls, raising hopes for change. However, as the OSCE stated in 2022, elections in Hungary are no longer fair. Opaque campaign financing and a biased media system favour the ruling party, meaning that Orbán may well win again and emerge more authoritarian than ever.
At a more fundamental level, European leaders are making an analytical error by still treating Hungary’s behaviour as an anomaly rather than a dangerous precedent. Among those that have followed its example are Poland from 2017 to 2023, and Slovakia in recent years. Ultimately, no EU member state is immune to the risk of illiberalism, and Orbán has shown other populist leaders how to paralyse European decision-making, even while their parties remain a minority at the EU level.
What the EU can do
So what options does the EU have for coping with – if not resolving – the problem?
As a basic approach, coordinated political pressure can work. Even Hungary has an interest in maintaining transactional intergovernmental cooperation at the EU level. When key member states have used this leverage and pushed back forcefully, they have repeatedly succeeded in persuading Hungary to withdraw its vetoes. Orbán’s curious solo “coffee break”, which allowed the European Council to open accession negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023, is one such example. Ad hoc workarounds, such as the Coalition of the Willing, can also offer short-term fixes.
But relying on these tactics alone is unsustainable. The EU’s political system gives rogue actors so many opportunities for veto threats that other member states are unable to overcome or bypass them all. Instead, the EU must address the structural flaws that allow persistent obstruction.
Suspend voting rights
Article 7 TEU provides an explicit option to suspend a member state’s voting rights for breaches of democratic values. But since this requires unanimity among all other member states, Hungary’s ideological allies could block any move.
A more radical line of thinking even proposes debating Hungary’s expulsion, but this option is legally fraught and would require refounding the Union without Hungary. It would also effectively abandon Hungary’s citizens, depriving them of the protection of EU law.
Reduce veto options
A more viable path could be to abolish national vetoes more widely. Shifting all Council decisions to qualified majority voting would remove any single spoiler state’s blocking power.
As such a rule change would itself require unanimity, some have proposed a “supplementary treaty” under which only willing member states would relinquish their veto powers. Even if Hungary itself did not sign such a treaty now, it would create a lock-in effect for those states that do, providing a long-term safeguard against future obstructionism by illiberal member states within the Union’s deepened core.
At stake is the EU’s survival in an era of far-right populism
The EU’s decision-making procedures were shaped in a post-Cold War era of optimism, when Europe was reunified and democracy seemed to be advancing slowly but surely around the world. In 2025, however, Europe is threatened by Russia’s imperial war in Ukraine, Donald Trump is pushing the US towards authoritarian rule, and global multilateralism is increasingly giving way to power politics. If the EU wants to remain relevant in this new harsh reality, it must adapt and ensure that it is not paralysed by illiberal governments within its own member states.
The problem of illiberal blocking behaviour is unlikely to disappear, but the EU has the tools to address it. While none of these tools are without challenges, the most dangerous course now is passivity. The question is no longer just about Hungary. What is at stake is whether the EU can survive and continue delivering on its fundamental values in an era of far-right populism and democratic stagnation.
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Manuel Müller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and runs the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”. |
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Tyyne Karjalainen is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and doctoral student at the University of Turku. |
This article was first published as a FIIA Comment by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
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