EU Analytics: August 2025 – a year of Council votes in review

By Nicolai von Ondarza

Viktor Orbán presenting the programme for the 2024 Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament.

August has been far from a quiet summer month in European and global politics, but at least one thing has been as it has for years: The EU institutions themselves largely went on summer break, with no public Council votes or European Parliament sessions. This does not mean that EU institutions were absent – we had an emergency (video) session of the Foreign Affairs Council and lots to chew upon for the permanent representatives in Brussels surrounding the talks on Ukraine. But as there were no public Council votes or European Parliament sessions, I’ve decided to use the August edition to take a look back at the Council votes in the last 12 months, so from July 2024 to June 2025. As previously, all the data comes from the SWP EU Council Monitor and only covers the public Council votes.

I have compiled this data for the last couple of years for the Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration, for which I have written, together with Dominik Rehbaum, the chapter on the Council of the EU. Its voting patterns match the institutional cycle, with the time after the European elections usually with less votes. So in the time span covered, we are looking at 74 public votes under qualified majority (QMV). From these, five aspects stand out.

1. Still a high consensus

Despite the continuous notion in the public of growing splits in the EU, the consensus rate remains surprisingly high: Despite voting under QMV, 82.4% of the votes were passed either unanimously or with only abstentions. This means that at least at the end of negotiations, the national governments in four of five cases still find broad consensus in the EU. In none of the 74 votes were there more than two countries voting no.

2. Outlier Hungary

The biggest outlier remains Hungary, which was outvoted 5 times (4 no votes and 1 abstention. This means that Hungary, under Orbán, still voted in favour of more than 90+% of the dossiers. For recent years, that is actually a high degree of support for Council votes by Hungary. In fact, ever since the UK has left the EU, Hungary has been the country most often in opposition in public Council votes. The twist is that Hungary actually had the Council Presidency in the second half of 2024, and still let itself be outvoted twice (1 no vote, 1 abstention) at a time it could set the agenda.

I use the phrase ‘let itself be outvoted’ deliberatedly, as other governments often negotiate until they get at least part of their aims and then vote in favour even if they do not support all aspects. Orbán, in contrast, seems to prefer to lose visibly in Brussels and then blame the EU for ‘dictating’ decisions to Hungary. If we just look at the (rather few) public votes in the first half of 2025, Hungary was outvoted 20% of the time.

3. German vote

The public votes also show the ‘German vote’, i.e. when Berlin, due to differences of positions within the coalition, abstains in the Council. The time period of July 2024 to June 2025 was one where Germany was for the most part without a functional government. And, as expected, together with Czechia it was the country which abstained the most, for a total of 4 abstentions. In the case for Germany, they all happened in the second half of 2024. With the new German government having promised to avoid any more German votes, it will be curious to see this statistic next year.

4. Eight governments voting always in favour

A total of eight national governments voted in favour of every single Council decision, neither abstaining or voting against a single time. Geographically and politically, they came from all different parts of the Union – Western Europe (France, Ireland), Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece), Central/Eastern Europe (Romania, Slovenia, Croatia), North-Eastern Europe (Lithuania).

5. Abstentions and no votes: V4 and Frugals stand out

There were two distinct blocs of countries who make up the bulk of the no votes and abstentions: the Visegrad Four (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and (what used to be) the Frugals (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden). For the V4, this is both because Slovakia is partially catching up with Hungary in terms of outlier status, whereas the more pro-European governments in Czechia and Poland abstain more often when they neither fully reject nor embrace an EU decision. In case of the Frugals, it is often budget or protectionist economic decisions part of them reject.

Taken together, the V4 make up ~28% of abstentions, with the Frugals clocking in at ~23%, so a total of 51% of all abstentions in the last 12 months. For the ‘no votes’, the figures are even higher: 43.8% of no votes comes from the V4, and 31.3% from the Frugals. Together, the V4 and Frugals thus account for 75% of all no votes in the last 12 months. Note: This is about their share of the no votes/abstentions. Individually, the countries all still vote for Council decisions 90+% of the time. Nevertheless, the size of this finding really surprised me and underlines that there are two groups of countries much more often in opposition. Finally, it has to be noted that in no single vote more than two countries voted against, so neither the V4 nor the Frugals voted as a block against a proposal in the last 12 months.

This concludes my August review with a closer look at the Council votes in the last year. With EU institutions resuming normal sessions – including the ‘State of the Union’ speech in the EP – the next edition of EU Analytics will continue with the regular schedule.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

EU Analytics is a monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the public votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.

Pictures: Viktor Orbán in the EP: European Parliament [CC BY 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons; graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

Vetoes from illiberal member states threaten the EU: The Union can – and must – respond

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller and Tyyne Karjalainen

European leaders are making an analytical error by treating Hungary’s behaviour as an anomaly rather than a dangerous precedent.

Hungary’s obstructionism has become a routine feature of EU politics. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s actions, such as blocking sanctions against Russia, vowing to prevent Ukraine’s EU accession, and threatening to freeze the Union’s budget, barely make headlines anymore. The European Peace Facility, once central to EU support for Ukraine, has been quietly sidelined due to Hungary’s vetoes. Major progress in institutional development or even treaty reform is being dismissed as impossible to achieve.

Hungary’s behaviour reflects a broader trend of autocratisation in Europe, where illiberal actors exploit institutional vulnerabilities. This threatens the very relevance of the EU: To bypass Orbán’s obstructionism, other member states have already begun replacing regular EU mechanisms with new ad hoc intergovernmental formats, such as “EU-26 statements” or the “Coalition of the Willing” in support of Ukraine.

Wait-and-see approach

The EU has taken some steps. In 2018, the European Parliament triggered Article 7 proceedings against Hungary, which could result in sanctions such as the suspension of its voting rights in the EU Council. In 2022, the Parliament stated that the country is “no longer a full democracy”. Since the same year, the Commission has frozen almost €20 billion in funds under various rule-of-law mechanisms, straining Hungary’s budget and undermining Orbán’s domestic power.

Yet none of these measures have led to significant democratic reforms or made Orbán less obstructionist; if anything, he has become more aggressive with his veto threats, seeking to use them as leverage to unfreeze funds. In 2025, Hungary’s crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights and resistance to Russia sanctions prompted calls for stronger EU action. Still, a Council hearing on Hungary in May ended without producing any results. Despite worsening conditions, many member states prefer a wait-and-see approach.

Orbán is a precedent, not an anomaly

One reason for this passivity may be Hungary’s upcoming 2026 elections. The opposition party TISZA has overtaken Orbán’s Fidesz in the polls, raising hopes for change. However, as the OSCE stated in 2022, elections in Hungary are no longer fair. Opaque campaign financing and a biased media system favour the ruling party, meaning that Orbán may well win again and emerge more authoritarian than ever.

At a more fundamental level, European leaders are making an analytical error by still treating Hungary’s behaviour as an anomaly rather than a dangerous precedent. Among those that have followed its example are Poland from 2017 to 2023, and Slovakia in recent years. Ultimately, no EU member state is immune to the risk of illiberalism, and Orbán has shown other populist leaders how to paralyse European decision-making, even while their parties remain a minority at the EU level.

What the EU can do

So what options does the EU have for coping with – if not resolving – the problem?

As a basic approach, coordinated political pressure can work. Even Hungary has an interest in maintaining transactional intergovernmental cooperation at the EU level. When key member states have used this leverage and pushed back forcefully, they have repeatedly succeeded in persuading Hungary to withdraw its vetoes. Orbán’s curious solo “coffee break”, which allowed the European Council to open accession negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023, is one such example. Ad hoc workarounds, such as the Coalition of the Willing, can also offer short-term fixes.

But relying on these tactics alone is unsustainable. The EU’s political system gives rogue actors so many opportunities for veto threats that other member states are unable to overcome or bypass them all. Instead, the EU must address the structural flaws that allow persistent obstruction.

Suspend voting rights

Article 7 TEU provides an explicit option to suspend a member state’s voting rights for breaches of democratic values. But since this requires unanimity among all other member states, Hungary’s ideological allies could block any move.

A more radical line of thinking even proposes debating Hungary’s expulsion, but this option is legally fraught and would require refounding the Union without Hungary. It would also effectively abandon Hungary’s citizens, depriving them of the protection of EU law.

Reduce veto options

A more viable path could be to abolish national vetoes more widely. Shifting all Council decisions to qualified majority voting would remove any single spoiler state’s blocking power.

As such a rule change would itself require unanimity, some have proposed a “supplementary treaty” under which only willing member states would relinquish their veto powers. Even if Hungary itself did not sign such a treaty now, it would create a lock-in effect for those states that do, providing a long-term safeguard against future obstructionism by illiberal member states within the Union’s deepened core.

At stake is the EU’s survival in an era of far-right populism

The EU’s decision-making procedures were shaped in a post-Cold War era of optimism, when Europe was reunified and democracy seemed to be advancing slowly but surely around the world. In 2025, however, Europe is threatened by Russia’s imperial war in Ukraine, Donald Trump is pushing the US towards authoritarian rule, and global multilateralism is increasingly giving way to power politics. If the EU wants to remain relevant in this new harsh reality, it must adapt and ensure that it is not paralysed by illiberal governments within its own member states.

The problem of illiberal blocking behaviour is unlikely to disappear, but the EU has the tools to address it. While none of these tools are without challenges, the most dangerous course now is passivity. The question is no longer just about Hungary. What is at stake is whether the EU can survive and continue delivering on its fundamental values in an era of far-right populism and democratic stagnation.

Manuel Müller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and runs the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Tyyne Karjalainen is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and doctoral student at the University of Turku.

This article was first published as a FIIA Comment by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Pictures: Viktor Orbán: © European Union, 1998–2025 (cropped) [re-use conditions], via Wikimedia; portraits Manuel Müller, Tyyne Karjalainen: FIIA [all rights reserved].

Vetos illiberaler Mitgliedstaaten bedrohen die EU: Die Union kann und muss reagieren

English

Von Manuel Müller und Tyyne Karjalainen

Es ist ein analytischer Fehler, das Verhalten Ungarns als Anomalie und nicht als gefährlichen Präzedenzfall zu betrachten.

Ungarns Vetostrategie ist zu einem festen Bestandteil der EU-Politik geworden. Wenn Ministerpräsident Viktor Orbán (Fidesz/PfE) Sanktionen gegen Russland aufhält, den EU-Beitritt der Ukraine zu verhindern verspricht oder den Haushalt der Union blockiert, macht das kaum noch Schlagzeilen. Die Europäische Friedensfazilität, einst im Mittelpunkt der EU-Unterstützung für die Ukraine, wurde aufgrund der ungarischen Vetos stillschweigend beiseite geschoben. Nennenswerte Fortschritte bei der institutionellen Weiterentwicklung der Union oder gar Vertragsreformen werden als unerreichbar abgetan.

Das Verhalten der ungarischen Regierung spiegelt einen breiteren Trend der Autokratisierung in Europa wider, bei dem illiberale Akteure institutionelle Schwachstellen ausnutzen. Dies bedroht die Relevanz der EU selbst: Um Orbáns Obstruktionismus zu umgehen, haben andere Mitgliedstaaten bereits reguläre EU-Mechanismen durch neue intergouvernementale Ad-hoc-Formate zu ersetzen begonnen, beispielsweise in Form von „EU-26-Erklärungen” oder der „Koalition der Willigen” zur Unterstützung der Ukraine.

Abwartende Haltung

Die EU ist dabei nicht untätig geblieben. Im Jahr 2018 leitete das Europäische Parlament ein Artikel-7-Verfahren gegen Ungarn ein, das letztlich zu Sanktionen wie der Aussetzung seiner Stimmrechte im EU-Rat führen könnte. Im Jahr 2022 erklärte das Parlament, dass das Land „keine vollständige Demokratie mehr“ sei. Ebenfalls seit 2022 hat die Kommission im Rahmen verschiedener Rechtsstaatlichkeitsmechanismen fast 20 Milliarden Euro an Mitteln eingefroren, was den ungarischen Haushalt belastet und Orbáns innenpolitische Macht untergräbt.

Doch keine dieser Maßnahmen hat zu bedeutenden demokratischen Reformen geführt oder Orbán weniger obstruktiv gemacht. Im Gegenteil: Er wurde eher noch aggressiver bei dem Versuch, Vetodrohungen als Druckmittel zur Freigabe von Geldern einzusetzen. Im Jahr 2025 führten Ungarns Angriffe auf LGBTQ+-Rechte und Orbáns Widerstand gegen Russland-Sanktionen zu Forderungen nach einem härteren Vorgehen der EU. Doch eine Anhörung des Rates zu Ungarn endete im Mai ohne Ergebnisse. Trotz der sich verschlechternden Lage setzen viele Mitgliedstaaten weiter auf eine abwartende Haltung.

Orbán ist ein Präzedenzfall, keine Anomalie

Ein Grund für diese Passivität dürfte die 2026 anstehende ungarische Parlamentswahl sein. Die Oppositionspartei TISZA hat Orbáns Fidesz in den Umfragen überholt und weckt damit Hoffnungen auf einen Machtwechsel. Doch wie die OSZE schon 2022 feststellte, sind Wahlen in Ungarn nicht mehr fair. Undurchsichtige Wahlkampffinanzierung und ein einseitiges Mediensystem begünstigen die Regierungspartei. Es wäre deshalb naiv, sich nicht auf ein Szenario vorzubereiten, in dem Orbán erneut gewinnt und dann noch autoritärer auftritt als bisher.

Auf einer noch grundlegenderen Ebene begehen die europäischen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen einen analytischen Fehler, wenn sie das Verhalten Ungarns weiterhin als Anomalie betrachten und nicht als gefährlichen Präzedenzfall. Zu den Ländern, die dem ungarischen Beispiel gefolgt sind, gehören etwa Polen von 2017 bis 2023 sowie die Slowakei in den letzten Jahren. Letztendlich ist kein EU-Mitgliedstaat immun gegen die Gefahr des Illiberalismus. Orbán hat anderen populistischen Politiker:innen gezeigt, wie sie die Entscheidungsfindung in Europa lahmlegen können, selbst wenn ihre Parteien auf EU-Ebene weiterhin in der Minderheit sind.

Was die EU tun kann

Welche Möglichkeiten hat die EU also, um das Problem zu bewältigen – wenn schon nicht zu lösen?

Als einfachster Ansatz kann schon koordinierter politischer Druck Wirkung zeigen. Auch die ungarische Regierung hat ein Interesse daran, eine transaktionale zwischenstaatliche Zusammenarbeit auf EU-Ebene aufrechtzuerhalten. Wenn wichtige Mitgliedstaaten das als Hebel eingesetzt haben und Orbán energisch entgegengetreten sind, konnten sie ihn wiederholt dazu bringen, Vetos zurückzuziehen. Orbáns denkwürdige Solo-„Kaffeepause”, die es dem Europäischen Rat im Dezember 2023 ermöglichte, Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Ukraine aufzunehmen, ist nur ein Beispiel dafür. Ad-hoc-Lösungen wie die Koalition der Willigen können ebenfalls kurzfristig Abhilfe schaffen.

Sich allein auf solche Taktiken zu verlassen, ist jedoch nicht nachhaltig. Das politische System der EU bietet böswilligen Akteur:innen so viele Möglichkeiten für Vetodrohungen, dass andere Mitgliedstaaten diese nicht alle überwinden oder umgehen können. Stattdessen muss die EU die strukturellen Mängel beheben, die eine anhaltende Blockade ermöglichen.

Stimmrechte entziehen

Artikel 7 EUV sieht ausdrücklich die Möglichkeit vor, einem Mitgliedstaat wegen Verstößen gegen demokratische Werte das Stimmrecht zu entziehen. Da hierfür jedoch die Einstimmigkeit aller anderen Mitgliedstaaten erforderlich ist, könnten Ungarns ideologische Verbündete jeden entsprechenden Vorstoß blockieren.

Ein radikalerer Ansatz schlägt sogar vor, über den Ausschluss Ungarns zu debattieren. Diese Option ist jedoch rechtlich problematisch und würde eine Neugründung der Union ohne Ungarn erfordern. Zudem würde sie bedeuten, die ungarischen Bürger:innen im Stich zu lassen und ihnen den Schutz durch das EU-Recht zu entziehen.

Vetomöglichkeiten abbauen

Ein praktikablerer Weg könnte darin bestehen, nationale Vetorechte allgemein und in größerem Ausmaß abzuschaffen. Wenn alle Ratsbeschlüsse mit qualifizierter Mehrheit getroffen werden könnten, würde die Blockademacht einzelner Staaten entfallen.

Da eine solche Verfahrensänderung allerdings selbst Einstimmigkeit erfordern würde, gibt es Vorschläge, einen „Zusatzvertrag“ abzuschließen, mit dem nur dazu willige Mitgliedstaaten auf ihr Vetorecht verzichten würden. Ungarn selbst würde einen solchen Vertrag derzeit sicher nicht unterzeichnen; doch für die Staaten, die dies tun, würde er einen Lock-in-Effekt schaffen und damit langfristigen Schutz gegen künftige Obstruktionspolitik durch illiberale Mitgliedstaaten innerhalb des vertieften Kerns der Union bieten.

Es geht um das Überleben der EU in einer Zeit des Populismus

Die Entscheidungsverfahren der EU wurden in einer Zeit des Optimismus gestaltet, als Europa nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges wiedervereinigt wurde und die Demokratie sich langsam, aber sicher weltweit auszubreiten schien. Im Jahr 2025 sieht sich Europa hingegen durch den imperialistischen Krieg Russlands in der Ukraine bedroht, Donald Trump treibt die USA in Richtung einer autoritären Herrschaft, und der globale Multilateralismus weicht zunehmend einer Politik der Großmächte. Wenn die EU in dieser neuen, harten Realität relevant bleiben will, muss sie sich anpassen und sicherstellen, dass sie nicht durch illiberale Regierungen innerhalb ihrer eigenen Mitgliedstaaten gelähmt wird.

Das Problem des illiberalen Blockadeverhaltens wird auf absehbare Zeit nicht verschwinden, doch die EU verfügt über Mittel und Wege, um dagegen vorzugehen. Keiner dieser Wege ist einfach, das Gefährlichste aber wäre, jetzt nichts zu tun. Es geht in dieser Frage nicht mehr nur um Ungarn. Auf dem Spiel steht, ob die EU in einer Zeit des rechtsextremen Populismus und der demokratischen Stagnation überleben und sich weiterhin für ihre Grundwerte einsetzen kann.

Manuel Müller ist Senior Research Fellow am Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki und betreibt das Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Tyyne Karjalainen ist Research Fellow am Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki und Doktorandin an der UniversitätTurku.

Dieser Artikel ist zuerst als FIIA Comment in englischer und finnischer Sprache auf der Webseite des Finnish Institute of International Affairs erschienen..

Bilder: Viktor Orbán: © European Union, 1998–2025 (cropped) [Bedingungen für die Weiterverwendung], via Wikimedia; Porträts Manuel Müller, Tyyne Karjalainen: FIIA [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

EU Analytics: July 2025 in review – looking at political developments in the EU institutions

EU Analytics is a new monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the (public) votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.

Highlight of the month: The motion of censure

A vote with two stories this month was the “motion of censure” against the von der Leyen Commission. Brought forward by parts of the far-right, this vote was never expected to succeed, as it required a 2/3 majority of MEPs voting against von der Leyen and all the other Commissioners. What it did, though, was reveal the growing pressure on an EP where the EPP tries to play with two different majorities.

On the one side, in the debate preceding the vote, the political groups from the centre / centre-left blasted both Manfred Weber (CSU/EPP) and Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) for their increasing appeasement and seeking majorities with the far-right. In particular parts of the S&D publicly toyed with abstaining en bloc, which led von der Leyen to make promises on social funds in the upcoming MFF negotiations.

On the other side, when it came to the actual vote, the “von der Leyen” pro-European majority stood: It was only one of two votes in July in which the majority rested only on the EPP, S&D and Renew, plus the Greens/EFA. In all other votes, at least large parts of the ECR voted with the majority. A propos ECR: Although the motion originated from the ECR, it was completely split: While roughly 50% of its MEPs voted in favour of censuring the Commission – in particular its members from Poland, Romania but also Sweden and Finland (where their party is a junior partner in the government) –, most of the rest decided to not even abstain but just not vote. The whole Italian part of the ECR from Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia opted to just not make any choice.

Together, the vote and debate showed the fragility of this European Parliament: The pro-European majority of EPP, S&D, Renew (plus sometimes the Greens) does not really trust each other anymore, and their divergences are increasing. Yet the far right is only an alternative for the EPP for very few votes, whereas on the major questions it remains inherently split.

Votes in the European Parliament

The EP had one major plenary session (8-11 July 2025) before MEPs went on their summer recess, with a total of 30 final votes recorded at HowTheyVote.eu. The most attention certainly got the motion of censure against von der Leyen, but other votes also highlighted the shifting political landscape in the EP as well.

The shifting majorities were on full display this month. Of the 30 votes, only 2 were carried only on the back of the “pro-European centre” of EPP, S&D, Renew plus Greens: The rejection of the motion of censure against the Commission and a vote on a report on the European Investment banks. Overall, the EPP but also Renew were on the side of the majority in all 30 votes, while the S&D found itself on the losing side on two votes (both rejected objections to a delegated regulation regarding a blacklist of “high-risk third countries” concerning money laundering, and on both the S&D was also split in itself). Interestingly, however, the ECR sided with the majority in 26 out of 30 cases – thus as often as the Greens/EFA group – confirming its position as now often part of the majority, dare I even say mainstream.

The story remains different for the self-appointed “Patriots for Europe” and the AfD-led “Europe of Sovereign Nations” groups. The “Patriots” sided with the majority 17 times, so still more than 50% of the votes, and the ESN in just nine votes (30%).

Far-right watch

But were the far-right groups relevant for any of the majorities, especially with the ECR being almost as often on the side of the majority as the S&D? Here the picture is more complicated.

By my calculation, indeed in both of the cases where the S&D did not vote with the majority, this was formed based on the EPP, Renew plus the ECR, the Patriots for Europe, the ESN and non-aligned MEPs. In both of these cases, the majority would have changed if the ECR, Patriots and ESN had voted differently. Incidentally, both of these votes happened on 9 July, so the day before the vote on the motion of censure. One possible conclusion: Despite pressure from the S&D, the “Venezuela” majority stretching from the EPP to the far-right remains an acceptable option to the EPP.

Public Votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the public data always lags a bit behind, so we are looking at the June 2025 votes. Here, the SWP Council Monitor and the public voting records of the Council together show 11 public votes, 9 of which were based on qualified majority. This was a month which highlighted the outsider role of Hungary – it was the only country in the month with no-votes, voting against the majority in three of the nine files with QMV (33%).

The decisions Hungary voted against all were connected to Russia/Foreign Affairs: They included a regulation on the application of customs on Russia and Belarus, a decision concerning the application of agriculture rules for Moldova and Ukraine as well as a regulation suspending certain restrictions for Ukraine. On the latter, Poland also abstained. The many no-votes from Hungary also meant there was a consensus rate of only 50%, whereas only two decisions passed with neither no-votes or abstentions. Another noteworthy vote was on the directive reducing the protection for wolves (a passion for Ursula von der Leyen), on which Belgium, Poland and Spain abstained.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

This article was first published on Nicolai von Ondarza’s newsletter EU Analytics.

Pictures: All graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

EU to go: Macht, Musk und Meinungsfreiheit – wer schützt Europas digitalen Diskurs?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Welche Rolle spielen soziale Medien für unsere Demokratie, und wie kann die EU darauf reagieren?

In dieser Folge von EU to go spricht Thu Nguyen mit Luise Quaritsch (Jacques Delors Centre) und Philipp Darius (Hertie Centre for Digital Governance) über digitale Wahlbeeinflussung, wie Algorithmen Polarisierung verstärken und den Einfluss von Akteuren wie Elon Musk. Im Mittelpunkt steht der Digital Services Act (DSA): das neue EU-Gesetz, das Plattformen wie X, TikTok oder Instagram zu mehr Transparenz und Verantwortung verpflichtet. Was bringt der DSA wirklich? Wie konsequent wird er umgesetzt? Und warum gerät er gerade jetzt in den geopolitischen Schlagabtausch mit den USA?

Eine Folge über Macht, Algorithmen und den Kampf um den digitalen Raum Europas.

Out now: The 2024 European Parliament Elections – A Turn to the Right in the Shadow of War

By Manuel Müller

Out now!

Just over a year ago, the citizens of the European Union went to the polls to elect the tenth European Parliament. For the third time in a row, these European elections were overshadowed by major cross-border events: While the 2014 election took place in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis and the 2019 election was marked by the asylum crisis (as well as, thanks to the Fridays for Future movement, the climate emergency), the 2024 election happened in the wake of two other major events that affected many Europeans even more directly than the previous crises.

First, the Covid-19 pandemic of disrupted everyday life in a way that hardly any EU citizen had experienced before. Then, the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the escalation of the Middle East conflict not only brought questions of war and peace back onto the political agenda, but also led to an acute cost-of-living crisis. The mood during the election could hardly have been more dire: According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted eight months before the election, almost three-quarters of respondents said that their standard of living had fallen or was likely to fall over the next year.

The elections themselves saw a significant surge in support for the far right. The populist radical right and extreme right parties, which had already gained ground in 2014 and 2019, achieved a new record high. Compared to 2019, each of the three far-right groups, as well as the non-attached far-right MEPs, increased their number of seats. In total, the far-right bloc achieved both its highest ever increase in seats and its strongest ever result in a European election.

An edited volume on the European election

But the rise of the far right is not the only story of this European election. To name just a few examples, it was also the first election in which an incumbent Commission President stood as the lead candidate for a European party. It was the first election in a long while in which EU enlargement was seriously debated. It was the first European election in which 16- and 17-year-olds were allowed to vote in Germany and Belgium. It was the election that followed the 2022 Qatargate corruption scandal. It was the election in which the small transnational Volt party achieved its best result to date.

It was the first election in which the proportion of women among MEPs fell rather than rose. It was the European election most heavily influenced by social media campaigns to date. It was the second European election in a row to see an increase in voter turnout (although less than expected). And it was, once again, a second-order election that lagged far behind national elections in terms of public perception.

To provide academic analysis of this wide range of facets, Michael Kaeding, Alex Hoppe and I have edited a volume, which has now been published by Springer Nature. Spanning 38 chapters, the book features contributions from 67 authors, who explore various aspects of the election. In order to do justice to the election’s cross-border importance, all contributions adopt a supranational or comparative perspective.

38 chapters, 67 authors

The edited volume is available as an e-book or in print. It builds on two German-language predecessor volumes on the 2014 and 2019 European elections (by Michael Kaeding and Niko Switek, and by Michael Kaeding, Manuel Müller and Julia Schmälter, respectively), but is even more comprehensive than these. In addition, the authors are more international, and this time the book is being published in English first – although a German translation is also planned for autumn.

To offer a “sneak preview” of the individual chapters, some authors have created short videos summarising their findings. These videos will gradually appear on this blog over the next few weeks. To access the book itself, please follow this link.

Chapter videos

Alexander Hoppe (for the editors): Introduction

Oliver Schwarz: From 27 to 37: A possible scenario for the composition of the European Parliament in a fully enlarged European Union

Tyyne Karjalainen: EU enlargement in the EP election campaigns: Comparison between national parties and political groups

Matilde Ceron (also for Vera Beloshitzkaya and Zoe Lefkofridi): Gendered shades of right? Gender+ equality issues in the economic right EP2024 political agenda

Gabriele Abels: Gender and descriptive representation: What’s new after the 2024 election?

Michael Kaeding, Manuel Müller, Alexander Hoppe (eds.): The 2024 European Parliament Elections. A Turn to the Right in the Shadow of War, Cham (Springer Nature Switzerland) 2025.

EU to go: Unter die Omnibus-Räder – die Deregulierungsagenda der EU

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Die EU-Kommission kündigte umfassende Gesetzespakete an, um Europas Wirtschaft zu entlasten: Weniger Bürokratie, mehr Wettbewerbsfähigkeit – so das Versprechen. Doch was genau steckt hinter dieser „Flotte von Omnibussen“? Und gerät dabei womöglich der Schutz von Klima, Menschenrechten und Rechtsstaatlichkeit unter die Räder?

In dieser Folge von EU to go diskutiert Thu Nguyen mit Julia Symon (Finance Watch) und Sebastian Mack (Jacques Delors Centre) über die neue Simplifizierungsagenda der EU-Kommission unter Ursula von der Leyen: die sogenannten Omnibus-Pakete. Gemeinsam sprechen die drei über die geplanten Änderungen im Bereich der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung und Finanzmarktregulierung und fragen, ob Europa dabei ist, seine eigenen Prinzipien zu opfern.

Ein Podcast über die feinen Unterschiede zwischen Simplifizierung und Deregulierung – und darüber, warum gute Regeln kein Bremsklotz, sondern ein Standortvorteil sein können.