The European Policy Quartet: Cacophonic leadership – who speaks for Europe on the world stage?

English

With:

• Niklas Helwig, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Brussels
• Manuel Müller, Der (europäische) Föderalist, Helsinki
• Julian Plottka, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
• Sophia Russack, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

This conversation was conducted as a written online chat in German. The text below has been edited and translated.

At critical moments, the EU usually speaks with at least three voices. And sometimes these three voices contradict each other.

Manuel
Welcome to the first European Policy Quartet of 2026! Last time, we discussed the potential role that the EU could play in global politics, at a time when major powers such as Russia, China, and the US are trying to expand their spheres of influence more and more aggressively. Now, three weeks after the start of the war in Iran, this question is more pressing than ever. The initial European reactions to the war clearly showed how difficult it still is for the EU to find a common line in such situations.

First, the governments of Germany and France, together with the United Kingdom, issued a statement that criticised only the Iranian retaliatory strikes, but not the US-Israeli attack itself. Then, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE/PES) condemned the attack as a violation of international law, prompting Donald Trump to threaten Spain with trade sanctions. To this, Emmanuel Macron (RE/–) responded quickly with a statement of solidarity for Spain, whereas Friedrich Merz (CDU/EPP) initially remained silent.

Disunity among the member states was followed by division within the institutions: Shortly after the start of the war, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) stated in a speech that the EU could no longer rely on the “rules-based international system”, and that it should instead pursue a “more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy” and “be prepared to project our power more assertively”. However, she was contradicted by both High Representative Kaja Kallas (RE/ALDE) and European Council President António Costa (PS/PES), who both spoke out in favour of maintaining a consistent commitment to international law.

And so, once again, we are faced with the old Kissinger question: Who exactly speaks for the EU on the world stage?

Commission President vs. High Representative

Niklas
Exactly: the EU has failed to develop a single voice. The Treaty of Lisbon once aimed to establish a focal point for European foreign policy by creating the position of High Representative (HR/VP), who would serve both as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission.

In recent years, however, we have instead seen further fragmentation. Under von der Leyen, the Commission has increased its influence over foreign policy, pushing the High Representative and the European External Action Service to the sidelines. At the same time, more and more decisions have been shifted from the ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council to the heads of state and government in the European Council. Kallas and her diplomatic instruments have lost relevance.

Julian
I agree with you about the fragmentation, Niklas. But what is the reason for it? Is it a return to “Old (wo)men make history” – in other words, a question of the ambitions or egos of a new generation of decision-makers? Or is it due to design flaws in the Common Foreign and Security Policy set out in the Treaty of Lisbon? I lean towards the latter explanation. What do you think?

Niklas
Both! The Lisbon Treaty and the dual role of the HR/VP were always just a compromise. Member states did not want to grant the Commission too much power over foreign policy, so they placed the office of the HR/VP and the European External Action Service somewhere between the member states and the Commission. This is a birth defect that continues to have repercussions. At the same time, it is also a matter of personalities: Von der Leyen has made security and defence her own issue and is aggressively staking her claim to it.

Centralisation within the executive

Sophia
Indeed. The rift between the High Representative and the Commission President is nothing new; it's almost institutionalised. But von der Leyen is also actively working to expand her influence.

Here’s a nerdy institutional detail 🤓 to confirm this: Since von der Leyen took office, she has established a new cabinet-level body that deals exclusively with external affairs – the Group for External Coordination (EXCO).This may seem like just a minor technical change, but it could have a significant impact on the balance of power between the Commission President and the High Representative/Vice-President.

I think it’s reasonable to interpret this as von der Leyen trying to bring foreign policy more into the Commission. Only time will tell how effective this will be. But we know from other contexts that such structural changes can work.

Manuel
I’m not sure whether I would describe this trend as “fragmentation”, or rather as “centralization”. We’ve seen this in other areas as well: the more issues that are decided at a supranational level, the more important the executive branch becomes – and within the executive branch, the leader.

We have seen this happening within EU member states, where the growing influence of the European Council has shifted power from the foreign ministries to the heads of state and government. And now we are also seeing it within the EU itself, where von der Leyen is using the argument of ensuring geopolitical effectiveness to assume more and more responsibilities that, according to the Treaty, should fall under the remit of the High Representative.

And, of course, the role of the HR/VP in the Treaty is structurally fraught with tension due to their dual role as both High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission and the resulting lack of clear institutional loyalty. This tension is not particularly problematic as long as all stakeholders have sufficient time and political will to reach a consensus through discursive-deliberative processes. But in crisis situations, it becomes a structural weak point where intra-European disputes can flare up. The only way to truly resolve this would be through federalisation, i.e. by shifting foreign policy to the Commission.

Integrating the EEAS into the Commission?

Niklas
Well, maybe not full-blown federalisation, Manuel – let’s not get ahead of ourselves there. But it would certainly make sense to integrate the European External Action Service more closely with the Commission. This could be achieved even within the existing treaties, and it would help to avoid some of the overlapping structures and turf wars.

As I mentioned, the member states were not particularly keen on such a solution in the past. However, we are now seeing that they are quite willing to work directly with the Commission when it comes to sanctions or the defence industry. So why not integrate the External Action Service into the Commission as well?

Julian
I really like the idea of describing the negotiations in the Council working groups as “discursive-deliberative” – hashtag #Habermas! 😂

I get the impression that the European External Action Service is very much taking its cues from the member states, which is leading to a paralysis of foreign policy. To quote an anonymous source from a discussion I had with representatives of an unnamed Brussels institution: “This is a good idea, but it would have to come from the member states. Otherwise, we can’t do anything.” At the same time, the end of the rotating presidency in the Foreign Affairs Council has disincentivised member states from driving the agenda forward, as it is no longer as prestigious. But there isn’t any other political engine now. So, I like Niklas’ idea of integrating the External Action Service into the Commission and giving it more political weight.

The Commission driving forward the single market for defence

Niklas
In security and defence policy, there are already some areas where the Commission can play a role as an “integration engine”, driving things forward – particularly in the defence industry. However, this is mostly limited to industrial policy, and even then, the Commission’s activities are rather small compared to the investments of the member states. And now, even SAFE has been thrown into turmoil by Polish domestic politics …

Julian
I wonder whether von der Leyen is a genuine federalist trying to strengthen the Commission and establish its role in foreign and security policy? Some authors draw a comparison between the steps taken in the defence single market, including the role of the new Commissioner for Defence, with the Commission’s environmental policy in the 1980s: Starting from a single market competence, entirely new policy areas were developed and later incorporated into the Treaty as conferred powers.

Or is the agenda just crisis-driven, with von der Leyen simply riding the current political wave?

Commission President vs European Council

Sophia
Manuel, you wrote earlier that as supranational issues gain in importance, the executive branch gains power. I certainly agree with that. But here’s the thing: The European Council is also part of the executive branch – some people (not me 😉) would even argue that it is the EU’s core executive.

In this context, I also find it interesting that a rift between von der Leyen and Costa has recently become openly apparent for the first time. Previously, the two had always gone to great lengths to present a united front, issuing joint statements and so on. But we must not underestimate Costa. Like his pre-predecessor, Herman Van Rompuy, he appears to handle matters by quietly working out compromises behind the scenes and avoiding public conflict. This can make the office of Council President appear weaker than it actually is. It seems to me, however, that he is actually fulfilling his institutional role more effectively than his predecessor. This could become more apparent in the future and lead to greater competition with von der Leyen.

Overall, I think von der Leyen is now facing greater difficulties in maintaining her position of power than she did during her first term. This is because a) the issues, problems, and crises that Europe is dealing with increasingly involve also non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom, and b) key heads of state and government, such as Merz and Meloni, are increasingly flirting with intergovernmental mechanisms.

Manuel
That’s interesting: We are witnessing a power shift towards the Commission president – von der Leyen is more active and visible on the geopolitical stage than any of her predecessors – but at the same time, we are also seeing a resurgence of intergovernmentalism.

Sophia
I would say, yes, she is more active and visible than any previous Commission president (and more visible in the public eye than Costa) – but less so than in her first term. Here’s another paradox: Von der Leyen currently appears to be more influential than Costa. But while its president is losing visibility, the European Council itself is gaining importance.

Julian
Manuel’s description brings to mind the crisis in the euro area, when we suddenly saw “enhanced policy coordination”, strengthening both the Commission and the Council and giving crisis politics a clear executive character. Perhaps this is simply a consequence of politics currently operating in crisis mode? The big difference from back then is certainly that there is no one in the European Council with the political clout of Angela Merkel now, meaning the Commission president has more opportunity to take over the leadership role.

Intergovernmental ad hoc formats

Sophia
Von der Leyen is often perceived as trying to establish herself as the EU’s foreign policy leader. Understandably, the heads of state and government in the European Council are not at all happy about this – after all, they see it as a matter for the member states. The tension between the Commission’s leadership role and the European Council’s agenda-setting function is particularly evident in foreign policy at the moment.

But when it comes to the Iran issue in particular, the focus rather seems to be on ad hoc formats such as the E3 (Germany, France, UK), which make it more difficult for von der Leyen to assume a leadership role.

Niklas
But let’s be clear: Ultimately, the issue is not whether the EU will move forward as a supranational or intergovernmental entity, but rather how Europe can develop the capacity to act and exercise autonomy in foreign policy. In this context, intergovernmental frameworks (such as the Coalition of the Willing, E3, E5, NB8, etc.) play a major role. Statements by Merz, Macron and Starmer are also given more weight than those by von der Leyen, Costa or Kallas.

Manuel
That may be true, but that format shopping is also part of a broader trend towards intergovernmentalisation, which always results in a loss of political accountability.

Is diversity the key to Europe’s strength in foreign policy?

Niklas
Is it really a problem if Europe often presents different viewpoints in foreign policy debates? After all, it would be a shame if only politically conservative positions, such as von der Leyen’s, were to remain in the end. I think it is refreshing that Costa (or previously Josep Borrell during his tenure as HR/VP) takes a different stance, focusing more on international law and the “Global South”. Diversity is Europe’s strength!

Manuel
Well, well. But structural discord at the top also means that (a) the EU as a whole loses influence because external partners don’t know whose voice to listen to, and (b) citizens have less democratic control because no one is taking responsibility for political decisions.

Sophia
Niklas, that sounds beautifully pluralistic in theory. But in practice, it can easily mean that no joint decisions are made, and that the EU therefore fails to realise its geopolitical potential.

… or rather its size and cohesion?

Julian
Is it really possible to develop capacity to act in such small formats as the E3 or E5, Niklas? Isn’t the size of the EU one of its few assets, particularly in foreign policy? This is lost when only small groups cooperate. For example, there has been a legitimate debate about whether sanctions decisions made by the EU-26 (i.e. excluding Hungary) are effective.

At the same time, I also don’t see the current formats representing an avant-garde capable of integrating other member states into the policy framework in the medium term. If the aim were to bring as many partners on board as possible, reach compromises and later expand the circle of participants, there would be little to object to. But if small formats prioritise transactional efficiency and lead to cherry-picking, they may facilitate short-term decisions, but in the long term they destroy trust between governments and ultimately even increase fragmentation.

Niklas
OK, I see that you guys aren’t too keen on my view on strength by pluralism …

However, the fact remains that we will continue to have differing foreign policy positions in Europe – anything else would be utopian. And so, in the debate on international law, for example, it is actually a good thing that von der Leyen isn’t the only one setting the tone, and that Sánchez and Costa can express alternative perspectives. This results in more balanced positions than if only one person were setting the course. This is what sets us apart from presidential systems such as that of the United States.

When it comes to small formats, I just don’t see any other option at the moment. In terms of flexibility, it’s the least bad thing.

Manuel
More balanced positions: maybe. But sometimes it simply means that there’s no clear position at all.

And that is precisely where the issue of accountability and democratic control comes in. Personally, I have a fairly different view to von der Leyen on the question of international law. But above all, I would like to know who is responsible for defining the EU’s position, so that we could criticise them more effectively and, if necessary, vote them out of office.

Where does this challenge to international law come from?

Sophia
I also wonder why compliance with international law is being called into question so frequently at the moment. Why is there room for such debate?

There are certainly several reasons, but I immediately think of the far right. After all, what has changed rapidly and uniformly across the EU in our political systems and societies in recent years? The growing influence of far-right parties, which fundamentally challenge the rules-based order. They are normalising the questioning of an issue that had long been considered settled. And even when they aren’t in power, they still significantly shape the discourse through aggressive public communication and through conservative parties adopting their arguments and making them socially acceptable.

Manuel
I find that an interesting theory, but it doesn’t quite convince me.

Of course, it is true that far-right parties often act in ways that undermine the rule of law. Many of them also harbour obvious sympathies for authoritarian leaders who flout international law, such as Putin. However, in the context of Venezuela and Iran, I would argue that the relativisation of international law in Europe has actually come from centrist parties – parties that are deeply committed to defending democracy and that see themselves as embroiled in an existential struggle against a global authoritarian alliance, in which any means are deemed acceptable to overthrow dictators.

Normalisation of far-right positions?

Julian
From an academic perspective, I find the argument that the radicalisation of political debates by far-right actors has now reached the realm of foreign policy fascinating. From a political perspective, I find it alarming.

With a few exceptions, foreign policy has generally been an issue of little salience to the electorate. Has this changed? Has it become so important to voters that politicians are now trying to pander to the far right on this issue as well? Or have far-right positions become so normalised and accepted that they aren’t even used strategically anymore, but are simply adopted without reflection?

Sophia
Both explanations are worrisome!

Niklas
Another reason, of course, is that international law and the multilateral order are currently under attack worldwide, which is causing them to lose relevance. But that should encourage the EU to defend them all the more – not only for ideological reasons, but also in its own security interest. A world in which international law no longer applied would be far more dangerous for Europe.

Two ways of rejecting international law?

Manuel
I think we are currently dealing with two different types of rejection of international law. On the one hand, there is the rejection by far-right parties, particularly those in power in Russia and the US. These parties generally do not value the rule of law and view international law as an unwanted constraint on the expansion of their own national power.

On the other hand, there are the European centrist parties, which find themselves in a sort of apocalyptic mood out of fear of aggressive anti-Western dictatorships, particularly Russia. They see themselves in a boundless struggle between good and evil and refuse to be held back by international law for fear of perishing otherwise. If you perceive Russia as the ultimate threat, it is easy to argue that (a) the transatlantic alliance is not to be jeopardised under any circumstances, and (b) international law may be set aside when it comes to attacks on Russia’s allies, such as Venezuela or Iran.

Julian
Do we still have a transatlantic alliance that might be jeopardised? 😆

Manuel
In my view, this attitude is particularly prevalent in north-eastern EU countries (where people experience the threat from Russia first-hand), and in conservative circles (where there has been a strong attachment to the alliance with the US ever since the Cold War). Therefore, perhaps it is only logical that Pedro Sánchez, a centre-left south-western European, has most clearly taken the opposite position.

Niklas
In the US, too, there are various groups with different reasons for disregarding international law. Trump is driven primarily by personal interests and a hyper-transactional understanding of politics, in which the rule of law (whether domestic or foreign) has little place. JD Vance, on the other hand, harbours a much more ideologically driven aversion to global elites and the rules-based order. To this ideological wing of the American right, the liberal order appears to be the Antichrist (see Peter Thiel), restricting individual freedoms and heralding the end of the world.

So who, then, is speaking for Europe?

Manuel
To wrap things up, let’s return to our opening question: Who speaks for Europe on the global stage? Specifically, if you are a political analyst looking to anticipate how the EU will respond to a newly erupted geopolitical crisis, whose public statements do you pay the most attention to – von der Leyen, Kallas, Costa, Macron, Merz?

Niklas
The focus is clearly on the E3 right now. Whose statements received the most attention after the attack on Iran? Not Kallas, not von der Leyen … Costa who? The E3, on the other hand, seem to have developed a good rapport when it comes to coordinating their statements. So when Trump lands at the Bay of Pigs, we’ll hear the most important message from them.

Julian
I find it interesting that we’ve written so much today about public expressions of opinion, yet so little about political decisions. In my view, foreign policy is shaped more by the latter.

When it comes to expressing opinions, Macron is clearly the one to watch. In his approach to Ukraine, for example, he illustrates particularly well how wide the gap can be between public statements and actual policy. If I’m reading the German press coverage of the past few days correctly, the honeymoon period is likely over for “Foreign Chancellor” Friedrich Merz too, as the discrepancies between his aspirations and the implementation of his foreign policy will increasingly come under scrutiny.

Sophia
I would say that it clearly comes down to the key heads of state and government. Only if certain members of the European Council (let’s say Merz, Meloni, Sánchez, Macron, and Tusk) fail to reach an agreement will a power vacuum emerge, and von der Leyen will be ready and willing to step into it.

That’s how it always is: The president of the Commission only has as much leeway and power as the member states grant them. But when there is no consensus, there are plenty of opportunities to put new ideas on the table – and von der Leyen has proven that she is very good at this.

So, in a nutshell: It’s either Merz or von der Leyen. 😀

Julian
But von der Leyen can only fill this vacuum with rhetoric. To take action, she simply lacks the resources.

Niklas Helwig is a Brussels-based Leading Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).

Manuel Müller is a Helsinki-based EU researcher and editor of the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Julian Plottka is a Scientific Senior Project Manager at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin.

Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.

The contributions reflect solely the personal opinion of the respective authors.

All issues of the European Policy Quartet can be found here.

Translation: Manuel Müller.
Pictures: von der Leyen, Costa, Kallas: European Union (Dati Bendo) 2026 [Conditions of use/CC BY 4.0], via European Commission Audiovisual Service; portrait Niklas Helwig, Manuel Müller: Finnish Institute of International Affairs [all rights reserved]; portrait Julian Plottka, Sophia Russack: private [all rights reserved].