Vetos illiberaler Mitgliedstaaten bedrohen die EU: Die Union kann und muss reagieren

English

Von Manuel Müller und Tyyne Karjalainen

Es ist ein analytischer Fehler, das Verhalten Ungarns als Anomalie und nicht als gefährlichen Präzedenzfall zu betrachten.

Ungarns Vetostrategie ist zu einem festen Bestandteil der EU-Politik geworden. Wenn Ministerpräsident Viktor Orbán (Fidesz/PfE) Sanktionen gegen Russland aufhält, den EU-Beitritt der Ukraine zu verhindern verspricht oder den Haushalt der Union blockiert, macht das kaum noch Schlagzeilen. Die Europäische Friedensfazilität, einst im Mittelpunkt der EU-Unterstützung für die Ukraine, wurde aufgrund der ungarischen Vetos stillschweigend beiseite geschoben. Nennenswerte Fortschritte bei der institutionellen Weiterentwicklung der Union oder gar Vertragsreformen werden als unerreichbar abgetan.

Das Verhalten der ungarischen Regierung spiegelt einen breiteren Trend der Autokratisierung in Europa wider, bei dem illiberale Akteure institutionelle Schwachstellen ausnutzen. Dies bedroht die Relevanz der EU selbst: Um Orbáns Obstruktionismus zu umgehen, haben andere Mitgliedstaaten bereits reguläre EU-Mechanismen durch neue intergouvernementale Ad-hoc-Formate zu ersetzen begonnen, beispielsweise in Form von „EU-26-Erklärungen” oder der „Koalition der Willigen” zur Unterstützung der Ukraine.

Abwartende Haltung

Die EU ist dabei nicht untätig geblieben. Im Jahr 2018 leitete das Europäische Parlament ein Artikel-7-Verfahren gegen Ungarn ein, das letztlich zu Sanktionen wie der Aussetzung seiner Stimmrechte im EU-Rat führen könnte. Im Jahr 2022 erklärte das Parlament, dass das Land „keine vollständige Demokratie mehr“ sei. Ebenfalls seit 2022 hat die Kommission im Rahmen verschiedener Rechtsstaatlichkeitsmechanismen fast 20 Milliarden Euro an Mitteln eingefroren, was den ungarischen Haushalt belastet und Orbáns innenpolitische Macht untergräbt.

Doch keine dieser Maßnahmen hat zu bedeutenden demokratischen Reformen geführt oder Orbán weniger obstruktiv gemacht. Im Gegenteil: Er wurde eher noch aggressiver bei dem Versuch, Vetodrohungen als Druckmittel zur Freigabe von Geldern einzusetzen. Im Jahr 2025 führten Ungarns Angriffe auf LGBTQ+-Rechte und Orbáns Widerstand gegen Russland-Sanktionen zu Forderungen nach einem härteren Vorgehen der EU. Doch eine Anhörung des Rates zu Ungarn endete im Mai ohne Ergebnisse. Trotz der sich verschlechternden Lage setzen viele Mitgliedstaaten weiter auf eine abwartende Haltung.

Orbán ist ein Präzedenzfall, keine Anomalie

Ein Grund für diese Passivität dürfte die 2026 anstehende ungarische Parlamentswahl sein. Die Oppositionspartei TISZA hat Orbáns Fidesz in den Umfragen überholt und weckt damit Hoffnungen auf einen Machtwechsel. Doch wie die OSZE schon 2022 feststellte, sind Wahlen in Ungarn nicht mehr fair. Undurchsichtige Wahlkampffinanzierung und ein einseitiges Mediensystem begünstigen die Regierungspartei. Es wäre deshalb naiv, sich nicht auf ein Szenario vorzubereiten, in dem Orbán erneut gewinnt und dann noch autoritärer auftritt als bisher.

Auf einer noch grundlegenderen Ebene begehen die europäischen Staats- und Regierungschef:innen einen analytischen Fehler, wenn sie das Verhalten Ungarns weiterhin als Anomalie betrachten und nicht als gefährlichen Präzedenzfall. Zu den Ländern, die dem ungarischen Beispiel gefolgt sind, gehören etwa Polen von 2017 bis 2023 sowie die Slowakei in den letzten Jahren. Letztendlich ist kein EU-Mitgliedstaat immun gegen die Gefahr des Illiberalismus. Orbán hat anderen populistischen Politiker:innen gezeigt, wie sie die Entscheidungsfindung in Europa lahmlegen können, selbst wenn ihre Parteien auf EU-Ebene weiterhin in der Minderheit sind.

Was die EU tun kann

Welche Möglichkeiten hat die EU also, um das Problem zu bewältigen – wenn schon nicht zu lösen?

Als einfachster Ansatz kann schon koordinierter politischer Druck Wirkung zeigen. Auch die ungarische Regierung hat ein Interesse daran, eine transaktionale zwischenstaatliche Zusammenarbeit auf EU-Ebene aufrechtzuerhalten. Wenn wichtige Mitgliedstaaten das als Hebel eingesetzt haben und Orbán energisch entgegengetreten sind, konnten sie ihn wiederholt dazu bringen, Vetos zurückzuziehen. Orbáns denkwürdige Solo-„Kaffeepause”, die es dem Europäischen Rat im Dezember 2023 ermöglichte, Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Ukraine aufzunehmen, ist nur ein Beispiel dafür. Ad-hoc-Lösungen wie die Koalition der Willigen können ebenfalls kurzfristig Abhilfe schaffen.

Sich allein auf solche Taktiken zu verlassen, ist jedoch nicht nachhaltig. Das politische System der EU bietet böswilligen Akteur:innen so viele Möglichkeiten für Vetodrohungen, dass andere Mitgliedstaaten diese nicht alle überwinden oder umgehen können. Stattdessen muss die EU die strukturellen Mängel beheben, die eine anhaltende Blockade ermöglichen.

Stimmrechte entziehen

Artikel 7 EUV sieht ausdrücklich die Möglichkeit vor, einem Mitgliedstaat wegen Verstößen gegen demokratische Werte das Stimmrecht zu entziehen. Da hierfür jedoch die Einstimmigkeit aller anderen Mitgliedstaaten erforderlich ist, könnten Ungarns ideologische Verbündete jeden entsprechenden Vorstoß blockieren.

Ein radikalerer Ansatz schlägt sogar vor, über den Ausschluss Ungarns zu debattieren. Diese Option ist jedoch rechtlich problematisch und würde eine Neugründung der Union ohne Ungarn erfordern. Zudem würde sie bedeuten, die ungarischen Bürger:innen im Stich zu lassen und ihnen den Schutz durch das EU-Recht zu entziehen.

Vetomöglichkeiten abbauen

Ein praktikablerer Weg könnte darin bestehen, nationale Vetorechte allgemein und in größerem Ausmaß abzuschaffen. Wenn alle Ratsbeschlüsse mit qualifizierter Mehrheit getroffen werden könnten, würde die Blockademacht einzelner Staaten entfallen.

Da eine solche Verfahrensänderung allerdings selbst Einstimmigkeit erfordern würde, gibt es Vorschläge, einen „Zusatzvertrag“ abzuschließen, mit dem nur dazu willige Mitgliedstaaten auf ihr Vetorecht verzichten würden. Ungarn selbst würde einen solchen Vertrag derzeit sicher nicht unterzeichnen; doch für die Staaten, die dies tun, würde er einen Lock-in-Effekt schaffen und damit langfristigen Schutz gegen künftige Obstruktionspolitik durch illiberale Mitgliedstaaten innerhalb des vertieften Kerns der Union bieten.

Es geht um das Überleben der EU in einer Zeit des Populismus

Die Entscheidungsverfahren der EU wurden in einer Zeit des Optimismus gestaltet, als Europa nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges wiedervereinigt wurde und die Demokratie sich langsam, aber sicher weltweit auszubreiten schien. Im Jahr 2025 sieht sich Europa hingegen durch den imperialistischen Krieg Russlands in der Ukraine bedroht, Donald Trump treibt die USA in Richtung einer autoritären Herrschaft, und der globale Multilateralismus weicht zunehmend einer Politik der Großmächte. Wenn die EU in dieser neuen, harten Realität relevant bleiben will, muss sie sich anpassen und sicherstellen, dass sie nicht durch illiberale Regierungen innerhalb ihrer eigenen Mitgliedstaaten gelähmt wird.

Das Problem des illiberalen Blockadeverhaltens wird auf absehbare Zeit nicht verschwinden, doch die EU verfügt über Mittel und Wege, um dagegen vorzugehen. Keiner dieser Wege ist einfach, das Gefährlichste aber wäre, jetzt nichts zu tun. Es geht in dieser Frage nicht mehr nur um Ungarn. Auf dem Spiel steht, ob die EU in einer Zeit des rechtsextremen Populismus und der demokratischen Stagnation überleben und sich weiterhin für ihre Grundwerte einsetzen kann.

Manuel Müller ist Senior Research Fellow am Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki und betreibt das Blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Tyyne Karjalainen ist Research Fellow am Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki und Doktorandin an der UniversitätTurku.

Dieser Artikel ist zuerst als FIIA Comment in englischer und finnischer Sprache auf der Webseite des Finnish Institute of International Affairs erschienen..

Bilder: Viktor Orbán: © European Union, 1998–2025 (cropped) [Bedingungen für die Weiterverwendung], via Wikimedia; Porträts Manuel Müller, Tyyne Karjalainen: FIIA [alle Rechte vorbehalten].

Vetoes from illiberal member states threaten the EU: The Union can – and must – respond

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller and Tyyne Karjalainen

European leaders are making an analytical error by treating Hungary’s behaviour as an anomaly rather than a dangerous precedent.

Hungary’s obstructionism has become a routine feature of EU politics. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s actions, such as blocking sanctions against Russia, vowing to prevent Ukraine’s EU accession, and threatening to freeze the Union’s budget, barely make headlines anymore. The European Peace Facility, once central to EU support for Ukraine, has been quietly sidelined due to Hungary’s vetoes. Major progress in institutional development or even treaty reform is being dismissed as impossible to achieve.

Hungary’s behaviour reflects a broader trend of autocratisation in Europe, where illiberal actors exploit institutional vulnerabilities. This threatens the very relevance of the EU: To bypass Orbán’s obstructionism, other member states have already begun replacing regular EU mechanisms with new ad hoc intergovernmental formats, such as “EU-26 statements” or the “Coalition of the Willing” in support of Ukraine.

Wait-and-see approach

The EU has taken some steps. In 2018, the European Parliament triggered Article 7 proceedings against Hungary, which could result in sanctions such as the suspension of its voting rights in the EU Council. In 2022, the Parliament stated that the country is “no longer a full democracy”. Since the same year, the Commission has frozen almost €20 billion in funds under various rule-of-law mechanisms, straining Hungary’s budget and undermining Orbán’s domestic power.

Yet none of these measures have led to significant democratic reforms or made Orbán less obstructionist; if anything, he has become more aggressive with his veto threats, seeking to use them as leverage to unfreeze funds. In 2025, Hungary’s crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights and resistance to Russia sanctions prompted calls for stronger EU action. Still, a Council hearing on Hungary in May ended without producing any results. Despite worsening conditions, many member states prefer a wait-and-see approach.

Orbán is a precedent, not an anomaly

One reason for this passivity may be Hungary’s upcoming 2026 elections. The opposition party TISZA has overtaken Orbán’s Fidesz in the polls, raising hopes for change. However, as the OSCE stated in 2022, elections in Hungary are no longer fair. Opaque campaign financing and a biased media system favour the ruling party, meaning that Orbán may well win again and emerge more authoritarian than ever.

At a more fundamental level, European leaders are making an analytical error by still treating Hungary’s behaviour as an anomaly rather than a dangerous precedent. Among those that have followed its example are Poland from 2017 to 2023, and Slovakia in recent years. Ultimately, no EU member state is immune to the risk of illiberalism, and Orbán has shown other populist leaders how to paralyse European decision-making, even while their parties remain a minority at the EU level.

What the EU can do

So what options does the EU have for coping with – if not resolving – the problem?

As a basic approach, coordinated political pressure can work. Even Hungary has an interest in maintaining transactional intergovernmental cooperation at the EU level. When key member states have used this leverage and pushed back forcefully, they have repeatedly succeeded in persuading Hungary to withdraw its vetoes. Orbán’s curious solo “coffee break”, which allowed the European Council to open accession negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023, is one such example. Ad hoc workarounds, such as the Coalition of the Willing, can also offer short-term fixes.

But relying on these tactics alone is unsustainable. The EU’s political system gives rogue actors so many opportunities for veto threats that other member states are unable to overcome or bypass them all. Instead, the EU must address the structural flaws that allow persistent obstruction.

Suspend voting rights

Article 7 TEU provides an explicit option to suspend a member state’s voting rights for breaches of democratic values. But since this requires unanimity among all other member states, Hungary’s ideological allies could block any move.

A more radical line of thinking even proposes debating Hungary’s expulsion, but this option is legally fraught and would require refounding the Union without Hungary. It would also effectively abandon Hungary’s citizens, depriving them of the protection of EU law.

Reduce veto options

A more viable path could be to abolish national vetoes more widely. Shifting all Council decisions to qualified majority voting would remove any single spoiler state’s blocking power.

As such a rule change would itself require unanimity, some have proposed a “supplementary treaty” under which only willing member states would relinquish their veto powers. Even if Hungary itself did not sign such a treaty now, it would create a lock-in effect for those states that do, providing a long-term safeguard against future obstructionism by illiberal member states within the Union’s deepened core.

At stake is the EU’s survival in an era of far-right populism

The EU’s decision-making procedures were shaped in a post-Cold War era of optimism, when Europe was reunified and democracy seemed to be advancing slowly but surely around the world. In 2025, however, Europe is threatened by Russia’s imperial war in Ukraine, Donald Trump is pushing the US towards authoritarian rule, and global multilateralism is increasingly giving way to power politics. If the EU wants to remain relevant in this new harsh reality, it must adapt and ensure that it is not paralysed by illiberal governments within its own member states.

The problem of illiberal blocking behaviour is unlikely to disappear, but the EU has the tools to address it. While none of these tools are without challenges, the most dangerous course now is passivity. The question is no longer just about Hungary. What is at stake is whether the EU can survive and continue delivering on its fundamental values in an era of far-right populism and democratic stagnation.

Manuel Müller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and runs the blog “Der (europäische) Föderalist”.

Tyyne Karjalainen is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki and doctoral student at the University of Turku.

This article was first published as a FIIA Comment by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Pictures: Viktor Orbán: © European Union, 1998–2025 (cropped) [re-use conditions], via Wikimedia; portraits Manuel Müller, Tyyne Karjalainen: FIIA [all rights reserved].

EU Analytics: July 2025 in review – looking at political developments in the EU institutions

EU Analytics is a new monthly column by Nicolai von Ondarza. It focuses on data-driven analysis of EU institutional affairs, looking at voting in the European Parliament and the (public) votes of the Council of the EU. The articles are cross-posted here from Nicolai’s own newsletter on Substack, where he occasionally also does other institutional analysis.

Highlight of the month: The motion of censure

A vote with two stories this month was the “motion of censure” against the von der Leyen Commission. Brought forward by parts of the far-right, this vote was never expected to succeed, as it required a 2/3 majority of MEPs voting against von der Leyen and all the other Commissioners. What it did, though, was reveal the growing pressure on an EP where the EPP tries to play with two different majorities.

On the one side, in the debate preceding the vote, the political groups from the centre / centre-left blasted both Manfred Weber (CSU/EPP) and Ursula von der Leyen (CDU/EPP) for their increasing appeasement and seeking majorities with the far-right. In particular parts of the S&D publicly toyed with abstaining en bloc, which led von der Leyen to make promises on social funds in the upcoming MFF negotiations.

On the other side, when it came to the actual vote, the “von der Leyen” pro-European majority stood: It was only one of two votes in July in which the majority rested only on the EPP, S&D and Renew, plus the Greens/EFA. In all other votes, at least large parts of the ECR voted with the majority. A propos ECR: Although the motion originated from the ECR, it was completely split: While roughly 50% of its MEPs voted in favour of censuring the Commission – in particular its members from Poland, Romania but also Sweden and Finland (where their party is a junior partner in the government) –, most of the rest decided to not even abstain but just not vote. The whole Italian part of the ECR from Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia opted to just not make any choice.

Together, the vote and debate showed the fragility of this European Parliament: The pro-European majority of EPP, S&D, Renew (plus sometimes the Greens) does not really trust each other anymore, and their divergences are increasing. Yet the far right is only an alternative for the EPP for very few votes, whereas on the major questions it remains inherently split.

Votes in the European Parliament

The EP had one major plenary session (8-11 July 2025) before MEPs went on their summer recess, with a total of 30 final votes recorded at HowTheyVote.eu. The most attention certainly got the motion of censure against von der Leyen, but other votes also highlighted the shifting political landscape in the EP as well.

The shifting majorities were on full display this month. Of the 30 votes, only 2 were carried only on the back of the “pro-European centre” of EPP, S&D, Renew plus Greens: The rejection of the motion of censure against the Commission and a vote on a report on the European Investment banks. Overall, the EPP but also Renew were on the side of the majority in all 30 votes, while the S&D found itself on the losing side on two votes (both rejected objections to a delegated regulation regarding a blacklist of “high-risk third countries” concerning money laundering, and on both the S&D was also split in itself). Interestingly, however, the ECR sided with the majority in 26 out of 30 cases – thus as often as the Greens/EFA group – confirming its position as now often part of the majority, dare I even say mainstream.

The story remains different for the self-appointed “Patriots for Europe” and the AfD-led “Europe of Sovereign Nations” groups. The “Patriots” sided with the majority 17 times, so still more than 50% of the votes, and the ESN in just nine votes (30%).

Far-right watch

But were the far-right groups relevant for any of the majorities, especially with the ECR being almost as often on the side of the majority as the S&D? Here the picture is more complicated.

By my calculation, indeed in both of the cases where the S&D did not vote with the majority, this was formed based on the EPP, Renew plus the ECR, the Patriots for Europe, the ESN and non-aligned MEPs. In both of these cases, the majority would have changed if the ECR, Patriots and ESN had voted differently. Incidentally, both of these votes happened on 9 July, so the day before the vote on the motion of censure. One possible conclusion: Despite pressure from the S&D, the “Venezuela” majority stretching from the EPP to the far-right remains an acceptable option to the EPP.

Public Votes in the Council of the EU

For monitoring the Council votes, the public data always lags a bit behind, so we are looking at the June 2025 votes. Here, the SWP Council Monitor and the public voting records of the Council together show 11 public votes, 9 of which were based on qualified majority. This was a month which highlighted the outsider role of Hungary – it was the only country in the month with no-votes, voting against the majority in three of the nine files with QMV (33%).

The decisions Hungary voted against all were connected to Russia/Foreign Affairs: They included a regulation on the application of customs on Russia and Belarus, a decision concerning the application of agriculture rules for Moldova and Ukraine as well as a regulation suspending certain restrictions for Ukraine. On the latter, Poland also abstained. The many no-votes from Hungary also meant there was a consensus rate of only 50%, whereas only two decisions passed with neither no-votes or abstentions. Another noteworthy vote was on the directive reducing the protection for wolves (a passion for Ursula von der Leyen), on which Belgium, Poland and Spain abstained.

Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the Research Division EU/Europe of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

This article was first published on Nicolai von Ondarza’s newsletter EU Analytics.

Pictures: All graphs: Nicolai von Ondarza; portrait Nicolai von Ondarza: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [all rights reserved].

EU to go: Macht, Musk und Meinungsfreiheit – wer schützt Europas digitalen Diskurs?

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Welche Rolle spielen soziale Medien für unsere Demokratie, und wie kann die EU darauf reagieren?

In dieser Folge von EU to go spricht Thu Nguyen mit Luise Quaritsch (Jacques Delors Centre) und Philipp Darius (Hertie Centre for Digital Governance) über digitale Wahlbeeinflussung, wie Algorithmen Polarisierung verstärken und den Einfluss von Akteuren wie Elon Musk. Im Mittelpunkt steht der Digital Services Act (DSA): das neue EU-Gesetz, das Plattformen wie X, TikTok oder Instagram zu mehr Transparenz und Verantwortung verpflichtet. Was bringt der DSA wirklich? Wie konsequent wird er umgesetzt? Und warum gerät er gerade jetzt in den geopolitischen Schlagabtausch mit den USA?

Eine Folge über Macht, Algorithmen und den Kampf um den digitalen Raum Europas.

Out now: The 2024 European Parliament Elections – A Turn to the Right in the Shadow of War

By Manuel Müller

Out now!

Just over a year ago, the citizens of the European Union went to the polls to elect the tenth European Parliament. For the third time in a row, these European elections were overshadowed by major cross-border events: While the 2014 election took place in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis and the 2019 election was marked by the asylum crisis (as well as, thanks to the Fridays for Future movement, the climate emergency), the 2024 election happened in the wake of two other major events that affected many Europeans even more directly than the previous crises.

First, the Covid-19 pandemic of disrupted everyday life in a way that hardly any EU citizen had experienced before. Then, the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the escalation of the Middle East conflict not only brought questions of war and peace back onto the political agenda, but also led to an acute cost-of-living crisis. The mood during the election could hardly have been more dire: According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted eight months before the election, almost three-quarters of respondents said that their standard of living had fallen or was likely to fall over the next year.

The elections themselves saw a significant surge in support for the far right. The populist radical right and extreme right parties, which had already gained ground in 2014 and 2019, achieved a new record high. Compared to 2019, each of the three far-right groups, as well as the non-attached far-right MEPs, increased their number of seats. In total, the far-right bloc achieved both its highest ever increase in seats and its strongest ever result in a European election.

An edited volume on the European election

But the rise of the far right is not the only story of this European election. To name just a few examples, it was also the first election in which an incumbent Commission President stood as the lead candidate for a European party. It was the first election in a long while in which EU enlargement was seriously debated. It was the first European election in which 16- and 17-year-olds were allowed to vote in Germany and Belgium. It was the election that followed the 2022 Qatargate corruption scandal. It was the election in which the small transnational Volt party achieved its best result to date.

It was the first election in which the proportion of women among MEPs fell rather than rose. It was the European election most heavily influenced by social media campaigns to date. It was the second European election in a row to see an increase in voter turnout (although less than expected). And it was, once again, a second-order election that lagged far behind national elections in terms of public perception.

To provide academic analysis of this wide range of facets, Michael Kaeding, Alex Hoppe and I have edited a volume, which has now been published by Springer Nature. Spanning 38 chapters, the book features contributions from 67 authors, who explore various aspects of the election. In order to do justice to the election’s cross-border importance, all contributions adopt a supranational or comparative perspective.

38 chapters, 67 authors

The edited volume is available as an e-book or in print. It builds on two German-language predecessor volumes on the 2014 and 2019 European elections (by Michael Kaeding and Niko Switek, and by Michael Kaeding, Manuel Müller and Julia Schmälter, respectively), but is even more comprehensive than these. In addition, the authors are more international, and this time the book is being published in English first – although a German translation is also planned for autumn.

To offer a “sneak preview” of the individual chapters, some authors have created short videos summarising their findings. These videos will gradually appear on this blog over the next few weeks. To access the book itself, please follow this link.

Chapter videos

Alexander Hoppe (for the editors): Introduction

Oliver Schwarz: From 27 to 37: A possible scenario for the composition of the European Parliament in a fully enlarged European Union

Tyyne Karjalainen: EU enlargement in the EP election campaigns: Comparison between national parties and political groups

Matilde Ceron (also for Vera Beloshitzkaya and Zoe Lefkofridi): Gendered shades of right? Gender+ equality issues in the economic right EP2024 political agenda

Michael Kaeding, Manuel Müller, Alexander Hoppe (eds.): The 2024 European Parliament Elections. A Turn to the Right in the Shadow of War, Cham (Springer Nature Switzerland) 2025.

EU to go: Unter die Omnibus-Räder – die Deregulierungsagenda der EU

In der Podcastserie „EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ präsentiert das Jacques Delors Centre kompakte Hintergründe zur Europapolitik. Einmal im Monat analysieren Moderatorin Thu Nguyen und ihre Gäste in 20 bis 30 Minuten ein aktuelles Thema.

„EU to go – Der Podcast für Europapolitik“ erscheint hier im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit dem Jacques Delors Centre. Er ist auch auf der Homepage des Jacques Delors Centre selbst sowie auf allen bekannten Podcast-Kanälen zu finden.

Die EU-Kommission kündigte umfassende Gesetzespakete an, um Europas Wirtschaft zu entlasten: Weniger Bürokratie, mehr Wettbewerbsfähigkeit – so das Versprechen. Doch was genau steckt hinter dieser „Flotte von Omnibussen“? Und gerät dabei womöglich der Schutz von Klima, Menschenrechten und Rechtsstaatlichkeit unter die Räder?

In dieser Folge von EU to go diskutiert Thu Nguyen mit Julia Symon (Finance Watch) und Sebastian Mack (Jacques Delors Centre) über die neue Simplifizierungsagenda der EU-Kommission unter Ursula von der Leyen: die sogenannten Omnibus-Pakete. Gemeinsam sprechen die drei über die geplanten Änderungen im Bereich der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung und Finanzmarktregulierung und fragen, ob Europa dabei ist, seine eigenen Prinzipien zu opfern.

Ein Podcast über die feinen Unterschiede zwischen Simplifizierung und Deregulierung – und darüber, warum gute Regeln kein Bremsklotz, sondern ein Standortvorteil sein können.

European Parliament seat projection (July 2025): Could the “von der Leyen coalition” lose its majority?

Deutsch

By Manuel Müller

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	188	79	85	27	31	–
May 25 (B)	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
July 25 (B)	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
July 25 (D)	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–

Baseline scenario,
as of 1 July 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)

Dynamic scenario,
as of 1 July 2025.
(Click to enlarge.)

The mood within the von der Leyen coalition in the European Parliament has become very tense recently. The centrist alliance of the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the Liberals (RE), which paved the way to the election of the European Commission in autumn 2024, has never functioned particularly well. The three groups reached a basic coalition agreement known as the “Platform Cooperation Statement”. In practice, however, the EPP has increasingly been using the alternative “Venezuela majority”, i.e. an alliance with the three far-right groups ECR, PfE and ESN.

An ultimatum of sorts

Recently, even the EPP-led Commission moved towards the demands of the far right on some environmental policy issues. In response, both the S&D and RE publicly stated their disagreement and gave von der Leyen an ultimatum of sorts. By the State of the Union address in September at the latest, she must send a clear signal that the EPP and the Commission continue to support the agenda of the pro-European centre.

Should this signal fail to materialise, however, the S&D and RE will have few options for action. A vote of no confidence in the Commission requires a two-thirds majority, meaning that the S&D and RE would themselves need to join forces with the far-right groups (who, in fact, have just tabled such a vote for next week). And even if this were to happen, the next Commission President would still be proposed by the European Council, where the EPP is the largest group. An end to the pro-European alliance in the European Parliament would therefore only lead to a permanent deadlock – so we can safely assume that the EPP, S&D and RE will find a way to work together again.

Weakened von der Leyen alliance

Amidst all the coalition wrangling, one thing that is always taken for granted is that the three centrist groups together have a majority in Parliament. Until the 2019 European election, the EPP and S&D had always been able to form a majority together; since then, they have needed the Liberals as a third partner. This expanded grand coalition held firm in the 2024 European election. So far, the success of the von der Leyen coalition has depended solely on the political will of its member parties, rather than on their seat numbers in the Parliament.

But for how much longer? In the seat projection, the values of the far-right bloc have risen almost continuously in recent months. The ECR, PfE and ESN climbed from a combined total of 187 seats in the June 2024 election to 196 seats in October, 200 seats in December, 211 seats in March, and 214 seats in May. In contrast, the figures for the von der Leyen coalition have continued to fall. While the EPP, S&D and RE had a total of 401 seats at the European election, this figure fell to 396 in January and then to 385 in May.

No reliable majority

In the current seat projection, the far-right bloc continues to rise, reaching 215 seats, while the centrist alliance loses ground once again. With 378 seats in the base projection, it reaches an all-time low, representing only just over half of the 720 seats in the Parliament. Taking into account that group cohesion is weaker than in national parliaments, the von der Leyen coalition would no longer have a reliable majority (unlike the “Venezuela” alliance, which stands at 396 seats).

A lot still needs to happen before the pro-European center in Parliament really becomes a minority. Firstly, it is likely that the EPP, S&D and RE will include new parties after the next European election that are not currently represented in Parliament. In the dynamic seat projection scenario, which takes this into account, the three groups together still hold 382 seats.

With the Greens – or the ECR?

Secondly, there are the Greens, who also belong to the pro-European centre and are generally willing to cooperate with the von der Leyen coalition. In fact, the Greens/EFA group is the biggest winner in the current projection, achieving one of their best results in this election period after a long dry spell. The EPP, S&D, RE and Greens/EFA currently have a combined total of 422 seats in the base scenario of the projection – not an overwhelming majority, but still a comfortable one.

However, the EPP would probably push for closer cooperation between the three centrist parties and the ECR instead. From the perspective of the current EPP leader Manfred Weber, at least, the ECR can apparently also be considered “pro-European” – even though this view is not supported by other EPP members, particularly the Polish PO.

Of course, the 2029 European elections are still a long way off. If recent trends continue, however, the “eternal grand coalition” could then be faced with the question of which direction it wants to expand in: whether it prefers to bring the ECR or the Greens on board as regular cooperation partners. This is unlikely to make the conflicts that already exist between the EPP, S&D and RE today any easier to resolve.

EPP: mixed balance

Taking a detailed look at the polling results of the last two months, the picture for the EPP is mixed. It has strengthened its position as the strongest national force in Germany, Spain and Estonia, and the Hungarian EPP member party Tisza’s lead over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz (PfE) continues to grow.

On the other hand, the Polish governing party PO, led by Donald Tusk, is falling behind in the polls following the debacle in the national presidential election in June. Meanwhile, the smaller Polish EPP member, PSL, would no longer be represented in the European Parliament at all following the end of its electoral alliance with the centrist PL2050 (RE). Overall, therefore, the EPP only made slight gains, standing at 181 seats (+2 compared to May).

S&D: new all-time low

The centre-left S&D group has been the biggest loser in recent weeks. In Spain, the PSOE has been rocked by a corruption scandal and is falling behind. In Portugal, the PS continues to lose ground in the first polls since its defeat in the national parliamentary elections in May. In Romania, the PSD has also slipped further following the resignation of party leader and Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu in May.

In  Hungary, the DK, which has lost many of its voters to Tisza and has also experienced the departure of its long-standing party leader, Ferenc Gyurcsány, would now no longer be represented in the European Parliament. In total, the S&D falls back to 124 seats (–⁠6) in the projection – a new historic low.

RE: further losses

The liberal-centrist RE group also suffers further losses in the projection. In Poland, the split from the PSL (EPP) means that PL2050 would now also fail to reach the national 5% threshold. In the Netherlands, the VVD is seeking a new direction following the collapse of the governing coalition with the far-right PVV (PfE), and ahead of the snap national parliamentary elections in November. In Bulgaria, the APS left the national governing coalition in April and would currently no longer win a seat in the European Parliament.

On the other hand, the Liberals made slight gains in Romania (where their supported candidate, Nicușor Dan, won the national presidential election in May), as well as in France and Portugal. Nevertheless, the RE falls to 73 seats (–⁠3) in the projection, one of its weakest figures in ten years.

Greens and Left on the rise

Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, the Greens are making gains. In the Czech Republic, the G/EFA member party Piráti is benefiting from an electoral alliance recently agreed with the small Green party Zelení (EGP). In Portugal, the animal rights party PAN would now be represented in the European Parliament for the first time in a long time. The Greens are also making slight gains in Germany and Croatia, albeit only due to minimal fluctuations in the polls. Overall, the group has now 44 seats (+4) in the projection.

The Left group also saw modest increases. Due in particular to slightly improved figures for LFI in France, the Left now stands at 51 seats (+2).

ESN grows for the sixth time in a row

For far-right groups, the projection shows few changes. The ECR has gained ground in Poland and Romania, strengthening its position as the dominant national force in both countries. In Denmark, however, it has fallen back slightly due to small fluctuations in the polls. Overall, this brings the ECR to 80 seats (+1), its highest figure in this electoral term to date.

The PfE group made gains in Poland, where the far-right Konfederacja party saw significant growth following the national presidential election. The Belgian VB, on the other hand, fell back slightly, as did the PfE member parties from France and the Czech Republic, again due to minor poll fluctuations. Overall, the PfE therefore recorded a slight loss (99 seats/–⁠1).

Within the small ESN group, the German AfD lost support but this was more than offset by the strong gains made by the Polish Konfederacja. Overall, the ESN climbed to 36 seats (+1). This is the sixth time in a row that it has gained seats in the seat projection, bringing it to almost one and a half times its level in the 2024 European election.

Non-attached and “other” parties

Among the non-attached parties, the German left-wing conservative BSW recorded slight losses. Additionally, the Czech left-wing populist Stačilo alliance and the Greek right-wing NIKI party would now both fail to meet the national thresholds. As a result, the non-attached parties together hold only 20 seats now (–⁠3).

By contrast, the “other” parties (which are not currently represented in the European Parliament and do not belong to any European party, meaning that they cannot be clearly assigned to any political group) increase to 12 seats in the projection (+3). Some parties that had not appeared in the table for some time have now returned:

• Following the addition of former State Secretary Ingrid Coenradie (previously PVV/PfE), the Dutch right-wing party JA21 has made gains in the national polls and would now win back a seat. JA21 previously belonged to the ECR group and could rejoin it.
• In Greece, the left-wing party MéRA25 would once again just surpass the national three-percent threshold.
• The Bulgarian far-right party MECh would now also narrowly win a seat in the Parliament again. Given its Russia-friendly stance, the party is most likely to join the PfE or ESN group.

The overview

The following table breaks down the projected distribution of seats by individual national parties. The table follows the baseline scenario, in which each national party is attributed to its current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of its European political party) and parties without a clear attribution are labelled as “other”.

In contrast, the dynamic scenario of the seat projection assigns each “other” party to the parliamentary group to which it is politically closest. In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account likely future group changes of parties that are already represented in the Parliament. In the table, the changes from the baseline to the dynamic scenario are indicated by coloured text and in the mouse-over text. The mouse-over text also lists any alternative groups that the party in question might plausibly join.

In the absence of pan-European election polls, the projection is based on an aggregation of national polls and election results from all member states. The specific data basis for each country is explained in the small print below the table. For more information on European parties and political groups in the European Parliament, click here.

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
EP2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–
EP today	46	53	136	75	188	79	85	27	31	–
May 25 (B)	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
July 25 (B)	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
July 25 (D)	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
DE	9 Linke 1 Tier	11 Grüne 3 Volt	13 SPD	3 FDP 3 FW	25 Union 1 Familie 1 ÖDP			20 AfD	3 BSW 2 Partei 1 PdF
FR	9 LFI	4 EELV	11 PS	15 RE	10 LR		32 RN
IT	10 M5S 2 SI	3 EV	18 PD	4 IV/+E	7 FI 1 SVP	24 FdI	7 Lega
ES	2 Sumar 2 Pod 1 Bildu	2 Sumar 1 ERC	18 PSOE	1 PNV	23 PP	1 SALF	9 Vox		1 Junts
PL			4 Lewica		17 KO	19 PiS	6 Konf	7 Konf
RO			7 PSD	4 USR 1 PMP	5 PNL	14 AUR
NL	1 SP 1 PvdD	3 GL	4 PvdA	7 VVD 3 D66	4 CDA		8 PVV
BE	3 PTB	1 Groen	2 Vooruit 2 PS	2 MR 2 LE	2 CD&V 1 CSP	4 N-VA	3 VB
CZ		2 Piráti			3 STAN 1 TOP09 1 KDU-ČSL	3 ODS	8 ANO	3 SPD
EL	1 Syriza		3 PASOK	1 KD	7 ND	2 EL	1 FL		3 PE 2 KKE	1 MéRA
HU					11 TISZA		9 Fidesz	1 MHM
PT		1 Livre 1 PAN	5 PS	2 IL	7 AD		5 Chega
SE	2 V	1 MP	8 S	1 C	4 M 1 KD	4 SD
AT		2 Grüne	4 SPÖ	2 Neos	5 ÖVP		7 FPÖ
BG			2 BSP	2 PP	5 GERB 1 DB			3 V	3 DPS-NN	1 MECh
DK	1 Enhl.	2 SF	4 S	2 V 1 RV	2 LA 1 K	1 DD	1 DF
SK				4 PS	2 Slov 1 KDH	1 SaS		2 REP	3 Smer 2 Hlas
FI	1 Vas	1 Vihreät	5 SDP	3 Kesk	3 Kok	2 PS
IE	4 SF			4 FF	4 FG					2 SD
HR		2 Možemo	4 SDP		5 HDZ					1 Most
LT		2 DSVL	3 LSDP	1 LS	2 TS-LKD	1 LVŽS				2 NA
LV		1 Prog			1 JV	2 NA 1 LRA	2 LPV			1 ZZS 1 ST!
SI			1 SD	3 GS	4 SDS					1 Res
EE			1 SDE	1 RE 1 KE	3 Isamaa		1 EKRE
CY	1 AKEL		1 DIKO		2 DISY	1 ELAM				1 ALMA
LU		1 Gréng	1 LSAP	2 DP	2 CSV
MT			3 PL		3 PN

Timeline (baseline scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
25-07-01	51	44	124	73	181	80	99	36	20	12
25-05-19	49	40	130	76	179	79	100	35	23	9
25-03-24	52	41	131	73	177	79	99	33	24	11
25-01-27	48	43	130	81	185	77	93	29	24	10
24-12-02	43	41	131	83	186	73	100	27	24	12
24-10-07	44	41	136	79	186	74	96	26	29	9
24-08-12	44	45	137	77	191	73	88	25	31	9
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

Timeline (dynamic scenario)

	Left	G/EFA	S&D	RE	EPP	ECR	PfE	ESN	NI	other
25-07-01	52	44	126	75	181	84	101	37	20	–
25-05-19	49	40	132	78	179	82	101	36	23	–
25-03-24	52	41	132	74	179	82	103	33	24	–
25-01-27	49	43	132	82	185	80	96	29	24	–
24-12-02	43	42	133	82	186	77	104	27	26	–
24-10-07	46	41	137	79	187	77	97	26	30	–
24-08-12	45	46	138	78	191	76	89	25	32	–
EP 2024	46	53	136	77	188	78	84	25	33	–

The “EP 2024” line indicates the distribution of seats as of July 16, 2024, when the European Parliament was constituted following the election in June 2019.
Overviews of older seat projections from previous legislative terms can be found here (2014-2019) and here (2019-2024).

Attribution of national parties to parliamentary groups

Baseline scenario: The projection assigns parties that are already represented in the European Parliament to their current parliamentary group. National parties that are not currently represented in the European Parliament but belong to a European political party, are attributed to the parliamentary group of that party. In cases where the members of a national electoral list are expected to split up and join different political groups after the election, the projection uses the allocation that seems most plausible in each case (see below). Parties for which the allocation to a specific parliamentary group is unclear are classified as “other” in the baseline scenario.

According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the member states (i.e. 7 out of 27) are required to form a parliamentary group. Groupings that do not meet these conditions would therefore have to win over additional MEPs in order to be able to constitute themselves as a parliamentary group.

Dynamic scenario: In the dynamic scenario, all “other” parties are assigned to an already existing parliamentary group (or to the group of non-attached members). In addition, the dynamic scenario also takes into account other group changes that appear politically plausible, even if the respective parties have not yet been publicly announced them. To highlight these changes from the baseline scenario, parties that are assigned a different parliamentary group in the dynamic scenario are marked in the colour of that group. Moreover, the name of the group appears in the mouse-over text. Since the attributions in the dynamic scenario are partly based on a subjective assessment of the political orientation and strategy of the parties, they can be quite uncertain in detail. From an overall perspective, however, the dynamic scenario may be closer to the real distribution of seats after the next European election than the baseline scenario.

The full names of the political groups and of the national parties appear as mouse-over text when the mouse pointer is held still over the name in the table. In the case of “other” parties and parties that are likely to change group after the next European elections, the mouse-over text also lists the groups that the party might join. The group to which the party is assigned in the dynamic scenario is listed first.

Data source

If available, the most recent poll of voting intentions for the European Parliament is used to calculate the seat distribution for each country. In case that more than one poll has been published, the average of all polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent poll is calculated, taking into account only the most recent poll from each polling institute. The cut-off date for taking a survey into account is the last day of its fieldwork, if known, otherwise the day of its publication.

For countries where the last specific European election poll was published more than a fortnight ago or where significantly fewer polls for European than for national parliamentary elections were published in the last two weeks, the most recent available poll for the national parliamentary election or the average of all national or European parliamentary polls from the two weeks preceding the most recent available poll is used instead. For countries where there are no recent polls for parliamentary elections, polls for presidential elections may be used instead, with the presidential candidates’ polling figures assigned to their respective parties (this concerns France and Cyprus in particular). For member states for which no recent polls can be found at all, the results of the last national or European elections are used.

As a rule, the national poll results of the parties are directly projected to the total number of seats in the country. For countries where the election is held in regional constituencies without interregional proportional compensation (currently Belgium and Ireland), regional polling data is used where available. Where this is not the case, the number of seats is calculated for each constituency using the overall national polling data. National electoral thresholds are taken into account in the projection where they exist.

In Belgium, constituencies in the European election correspond to language communities, while polls are usually conducted at the regional level. The projection uses polling data from Wallonia for the French-speaking community and polling data from Flanders for the Dutch-speaking community. For the German-speaking community, it uses the result of the last European election (1 seat for CSP).

In countries where it is common for several parties to run as an electoral alliance on a common list, the projection makes a plausibility assumption about the composition of these lists. In the table, such multi-party lists are usually grouped under the name of the electoral alliance or of its best-known member party. Sometimes, however, the parties of an electoral alliance split up after the election and join different political groups in the European Parliament. In this case, the parties are listed individually and a plausibility assumption is made about the distribution of list places (usually based on the 2024 European election results). This includes the following cases: Spain: Sumar: Sumar (place 1 and 6 on the list), CatComù (2), Compromís (3), IU (4) and Más País (5); Ahora Republicas: ERC (1, 4), Bildu (2) and BNG (3); CEUS: PNV (1) and CC (2); Romania: ADU: USR (1-2, 4-5, 7-9), PMP (3) and FD (6); Netherlands: PvdA (1, 3, 5 etc.) and GL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Czechia: TOP09 (1, 3, 5 etc.) and KDU-ČSL (2, 4, 6 etc.); Hungary: DK (1-4, 6, 8), MSZP (5) and PM (7). When the election comes closer and the parties announce their candidates, the projection uses the distribution on the actual list instead. In some countries, the exact distribution of seats within an electoral alliance depends on preference votes and/or regional constituency results, so that only a plausible assumption can be made in advance. This concerns the following cases: Italy: AVS: SI (1, 3) and EV (2, 4); Poland: Konfederacja: NN (1, 3, 5 etc.), RN (2, 4, 6 etc.). In Czechia, some polls combine ODS (ECR), TOP09 and KDU-ČSL (both EPP); in these cases, two thirds of the seats are allocated to the ODS and one third to the alliance of TOP09 and KDU-ČSL. In Italy, a special rule allows minority parties to enter the Parliament with only a low number of votes, provided they form an alliance with a larger party. The projection assumes such an alliance between FI and the SVP.

Since there is no electoral threshold for European elections in Germany, parties can win a seat in the European Parliament with less than 1 per cent of the vote. Since German polling institutes do not usually report values for very small parties, the projection includes them based on their results in the last European election (3 seats each for Volt and FW, 2 seats for Partei, 1 seat each for Tierschutzpartei, ÖDP, Familienpartei, and PdF). If a small party achieves a better value in current polls than in the last European election, the poll rating is used instead. For Slovenia, the seat projection assumes that MEP Vladimir Prebilič will run for the Vesna party as in 2024; if polls show values for a hypothetical party of Prebilič’s own, these are attributed to Vesna.

The following overview lists the data source for each member state. The dates refer to the last day of the fieldwork; if this is not known, to the day of publication of the polls:

Germany: national polls, 17-30/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
France: national polls, 4-5/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Italy: national polls, 19-30/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Spain: national polls, 17-27/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Poland: national polls, 24-29/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Romania: national polls, 28-30/5/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Netherlands: national polls, 16-23/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, Dutch community: polls for the national parliamentary election in Wallonia, 23/5-3/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, French community: polls for the national parliamentary election in Flanders, 23/5-3/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Belgium, German community: Results of the European Parliament election, 9/6/2024.
Czechia: national polls, 20-29/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Greece: national polls, 13-26/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Hungary: national polls, 17-27/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Portugal: national polls, 15/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Sweden: national polls, 13-24/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Austria: national polls, 26/5-7/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Bulgaria: national polls, 4-11/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Denmark: national polls, 19-30/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovakia: national polls, 8-19/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Finland: national polls, 16/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Ireland: national polls, 25/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Croatia: national polls, 25/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Lithuania: national polls, 12-18/5/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Latvia: national polls, April 2025, source: Wikipedia.
Slovenia: national polls, 19-30/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Estonia: national polls, 13-22/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Cyprus: national polls, 11-21/3/2025, source: Wikipedia.
Luxembourg: national polls, 24/4/2024, source: Wikipedia.
Malta: national polls, 6/6/2025, source: Wikipedia.

Pictures: All graphs: Manuel Müller.