Powering up Europe: New drive for the Franco-German engine

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By Sabine Hoscislawski

The Franco-German engine has not been running smoothly and needs to be restored.

Franco-German cooperation has shaped European integration since its very beginning. In the past, it was the strong political leadership by France and Germany – the so-called Franco-German engine – that enabled the EU to overcome difficult situations. Achievements in recent years – such as the signing of the Aachen Treaty in 2019, the agreement on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the November 2024 initiative for security policy coordination among representatives of the defence ministries of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom (the “Group of Five”) – are a testament to the Franco-German engine.

The size and economic, diplomatic and international capacities of these two founding EU members make them indispensable for European leadership. Their strongly institutionalised bilateral relationship requires continuous dialogue between the two partners and supports their EU leadership potential.

Engine not running smoothly

In the past, it has been their differences that enabled them to act as a motor to further European projects or deal with crises. They were often able to reach compromises that worked for all EU partners. However, the engine can only drive the EU forward if it is running smoothly in the first place. Over the last few years, this has not been the case.

The issues that have traditionally been controversial between the two partners – for example, nuclear energy, the Mercosur agreement, Eurobonds and defence procurement – have remained so until recently. This has made it more difficult to arrive at joint European answers. The snap elections in France in summer 2024 and the coalition breakdown in Germany in autumn 2024 marked a low point in their EU leadership, as both states were preoccupied with their own domestic challenges.

Urgent need for a restart

European unity is strongly needed. In addition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the return of the Trump administration, both of which have had consequences for Europe’s security and trade architecture, there are a range of other issues requiring a joint and strong European response: the climate and ecological crisis, the digital revolution and internal European challenges like rule-of-law infringements and rising right-wing extremism. This also applies to the negotiations on the Commission’s proposal for the next EU multiannual financial framework published in July 2025.

Therefore, the Franco-German engine needs to be restored. With the “restart” of Franco-German relations under the new German government, there is now momentum for change.

The missing answer to the Sorbonne speech

The inauguration of the pro-European President Emmanuel Macron in 2017 could have been a boon to the Franco-German cooperation and European integration. Indeed, shortly after taking office, he explicitly addressed Germany in his landmark Sorbonne speech about his ideas for the future of the EU. An adequate answer was never forthcoming from Chancellor Angela Merkel. In a European speech given by her successor, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague in summer 2022, which was seen by some observers as a late answer to Macron’s Sorbonne speech, he did not even mention the Franco-German relationship.

It reached a low point in October 2022, when the meeting of the Franco-German council of ministers was postponed at the last minute – an unusual move given the regularity of the relationship. Even though the two partners subsequently engaged in public demonstrations of their willingness to cooperate – for instance, with Macron’s well-orchestrated state visit to Germany and the government consultations in May 2024 – the impetus many expected to come from Chancellor Scholz’s coalition did not materialise.

Germany’s preoccupation with domestic and internal affairs

The Franco-German engine was further weakened by internal disputes within the German coalition. It was the first instance of a German federal coalition between the Social Democratic, Green and Liberal parties, but differences quickly became apparent.

At EU level, the coalition not only often abstained from votes in the Council because of internal disagreements (the so-called German vote) but even surprised its European partners several times by refusing to vote on an issue that had already been settled. This made it more difficult for all of Germany’s partners to coordinate with it – including France.

A new hope

On 6 May 2025, the new German government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, consisting of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, took office. The new government has a small majority, which will not make governing easy, and early disputes – for instance, about the nomination of judges to the Federal Constitutional Court – are already revealing cracks in the coalition. However, the first months of Merz’s chancellorship have given reason to hope for a German “comeback” at EU level as the new chancellor represents a new style in Franco-German relations and German European policy.

Indeed, the Atlanticist Merz is a committed pro-European and Francophile. He had already visited Macron as opposition leader and intensified his efforts after his party won the federal elections in February 2025. The French president and the new chancellor seem to connect on a personal level, which is always relevant for a successful Franco-German relationship.

There was a new warmth surrounding Merz’s first trip abroad as chancellor to Paris on his first day in office. In a guest contribution in Die Welt and Le Figaro, Merz and Macron called for a “Franco-German new start for Europe”, underlining their commitment to closer Franco-German cooperation. At the Franco-German Council of Ministers in Toulon on 29 August 2025, both partners presented a number of common initiatives and projects especially in the fields of economic policy and security.

Getting the Franco-German engine back on the European road

At a rhetorical and symbolic level, the new chancellor has shown his commitment to Franco-German relations and European cooperation – on visits to, for example, France, Poland and Ukraine. This positive start now needs to be filled with substance. The following points are important:

1. Get out of the crisis mode

The Franco-German coupling needs to get out of crisis mode and set the agenda for long-term EU projects. Merz’s and Macron’s common contribution “Franco-German new start for Europe” and its further elaboration that was presented on the Council of Ministers can be seen as a starting point.

However, a detailed implementation schedule is missing and key issues like the climate crisis and the rise of right-wing extremists and populists are not given sufficient attention. France and Germany should ensure these topics are at the heart of their agenda and put their plans in concrete terms quickly.

2. Prepare for the French extreme right

Germany needs to prepare for the French extreme right to enter high state offices. The fall of the second government over the budget within ten months in France shows the difficult political and economic situation of the country. By 2027 at the latest, Macron could be followed by a more Eurosceptic, protectionist and anti-German president. Therefore, Chancellor Merz should use the current window of opportunity and take the initiative to set important projects in motion with his French partners. At EU level, this includes an agreement on the next MFF, the completion of the capital markets union and preparation for further EU enlargement.

At a bilateral level and beyond high politics, Germany should strengthen the multiple Franco-German channels within civil society. Funding for Franco-German civic formats such as the Franco-German Citizens Fund or the Franco-German “Zukunftswerk” should be ensured, along with the different exchange formats of the Franco-German Youth Office and common university and research structures like the Franco-German University. Weak points in the relationship, such as steadily declining language acquisition rates of the respective neighbouring languages, must be improved.

3. Stay on track with the other European partners

Last but not least, the new government needs to stay on track with its other European partners, especially in the East. With their pre-2022 Russia policies, France and Germany neglected the perspectives of their Eastern and Nordic-Baltic partners and lost their trust. Germany should work closely with them, listen to their concerns and treat them as equal partners. Merz’s visit to Warsaw directly after his first meeting as chancellor with Macron in Paris and his visits to Lithuania and Finland in May underline the importance the new chancellor attaches to the East.

Merz needs to continue on this chosen path. Especially with Poland, the road already seems bumpy. The German and Polish governments are arguing over border controls, and the new Polish right-wing President Karol Nawrocki looks set to hamper the new momentum hoped for the Weimar Triangle. Even if it will not be easy, Germany should nevertheless try to foster Franco-Polish-German cooperation in policy fields like security or enlargement in order to give the Franco-German engine a broader perspective encompassing Eastern Europe.

Can Germany and France end the EU leadership vacuum?

After the first months in office of the new German government, the Franco-German engine seems to be running better than before. Beyond the positive signals, its strength will also depend on how the two parties deal with their differences. Their respective domestic political situations will also be decisive. Only time will tell if the currently high speed of the Franco-German engine can end the leadership vacuum at EU level.

Sabine Hoscislawski is a Research Associate at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin and editor of the journal integration.

This article was first published in the Berlin Perspectives series of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP).

Pictures: Car repair: François GOGLINS [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons; portrait Sabine Hoscislawski: IEP [all rights reserved].