31 März 2022

The European Policy Quartet: What does the Ukraine war mean for the EU?

With:
  • Julian Plottka, University of Passau / University of Bonn
  • Sophie Pornschlegel, European Policy Centre, Brussels
  • Manuel Müller, University of Duisburg-Essen / Der (europäische) Föderalist, Berlin
This conversation was conducted as an online chat in German. The transcript below has been edited and translated.

Demonstrators in Kyiv with Ukrainian and EU flags
On the Maidan in Kyiv, there were European flags in 2013 already.

Manuel
The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has been going on for over a month now. Its most important consequence is, of course, what happens on the ground: the dead and injured, the suffering of the people and the destruction of the cities. But the war also has repercussions for the EU, and that is what we will talk about in today’s European Policy Quartet.

First, at a policy level, the common security and defence policy is gaining new importance. Secondly, the war is also accelerating a shift in the public debate on the meaning of European integration: instead of internal peace, prosperity and democracy, the focus is increasingly on self-assertion against external adversaries. And thirdly, of course, there is also the Ukrainian application for EU membership …

Let’s start with the concrete political measures. The Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin recently published an overview of the changes that the war has triggered – from the breaking of taboos in defence policy to the unprecedented unity in refugee policy and the rather quick agreement on a far-reaching sanctions package (even if there is already another dispute about exceptions for energy sources).

What do you think of these developments? Are we on the verge of a “turn of the times” (Zeitenwende), as it is now repeatedly said? Or are we only witnessing the latest twist in the European “permacrisis”, just as monetary union, migration, climate and the pandemic have dominated European policy debates before?

A turn of the times in defence policy?

Sophie
I don’t know if I would call it a Zeitenwende in defence policy at the European level yet. Sure, the EU is now financing arms deliveries itself for the first time through the
European Peace Facility. But even Germany had already supplied weapons to Syria in the past to support the Kurds. So far, the term is more appropriate for Germany, if the changes in its defence policy continue. But I would not use it for the EU level yet.

I would agree that the EU response was very quick and united, something one would not necessarily have expected. The question now is whether these developments were just a one-off, short-term response to the war in Ukraine or also signify a longer-term reorientation of the EU – possibly with a stronger focus on Macron-style “European sovereignty”.

Julian
I also disagree with the idea that the war in Ukraine as such is a game changer. Rather, I have the impression that the permacrisis brings to a head developments that have been in the offing for some time in various areas, forcing the EU to take some overdue decisions. In the specific situation, this may subjectively appear as a fundamental change and a paradigm shift. But even with regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were enough people who had been warning that such a development was possible since at least 2014. What is new is that their political demands have suddenly become mainstream.

Sophie
When you follow European politics for years, you become wary of predicting great leaps of progress. Perhaps my scepticism about the term “Zeitenwende” has something to do with that. But personally, I am also firmly convinced that a crisis – or a war in this case – alone does not bring positive change: it is only the political response that matters. And finding these political responses at EU level remains a challenge when you have to forge a compromise among 27 member states.

Julian
My guess is that it was rather a short-term agreement that emerged under the impression of the acute shock. By now, the first fault lines between the member states are already reappearing, not only on the issue of energy sanctions. Arms deliveries (“Through Hungary only if they then pass through another NATO country before going to Ukraine”) and procurement (“The Bundestag’s defence committee is already in Israel looking at Arrow-3 missiles”) are not quite coordinated either. Concerning refugees, I would be very surprised if there were quotas this time. This is all still far from “European sovereignty”.

There was one positive thing about the shock reactions, though: they showed that it is possible to make joint decisions in the EU after all, even if there are divides that are difficult to bridge on other issues. Perhaps we have reached a point where the classic package-deal method no longer simplifies solutions, but makes them more difficult. Some serious intra-European conflicts have the potential to permanently block decisions. But under the impact of the war, these problems were temporarily relegated into the background.

On the way to “hard power”?

Manuel
And certainly, if some demands suddenly become capable of gaining majority support, this does have political effects. To me, it seems that we are witnessing a shift in the EU’s priorities that the Ukraine war has not triggered, but certainly accelerated: a “geopolitical” turn in which European domestic politics (the traditional agenda of domestic peace and prosperity and the newer goal of supranational democracy) is losing importance for many politicians, while global issues are becoming more important – and increasingly attempts are being made to solve them through “hard power” in foreign and defence policy.

Sophie
I was also amazed at how quickly the defence policy narrative has changed, especially in Germany – there can no longer be any talk of pacifism here (and for good reasons). However, we should be careful to think in a multilateral and European way when re-equipping the Bundeswehr. At the moment, that is not necessarily the case; we continue to think nationally.

And as far as the European level is concerned, I agree with you, Manuel. But it is a bit too early to know whether we are really moving towards hard power. That would require decisions that I find difficult to imagine so far, given the political situation. As Julian has already mentioned, there are fault lines that are not so easy to overcome. But maybe it will be the comeback of differentiated integration!

Julian
I am sceptical whether the narrative really shifts towards global issues. In the case of the Bundeswehr, I see more of a return to territoriality: since the Kosovo war, the Bundeswehr had been developed more or less successfully (others can judge this better) in the direction of a globally deployable army. Now, the focus is clearly back on territorial defence. This reminds me much more of the Western integration under Konrad Adenauer. The only (admittedly decisive) difference is that we Europeans still have to decide whether we want to be able to defend ourselves without the USA or only with the USA. This question did not arise for Adenauer at the time.

Accordingly, I think that the peace narrative is also very similar to how it was at the founding of the EU. The fact that the idea of peace through integration has since been taken further, even to a global level, is, I believe, rather a peculiarity of our generation, because war in Europe was unthinkable for us anyway. But the EU’s soft power was only possible because of the USA’s hard power. Only since the 1990s there has been a discussion whether soft power is possible without hard power, with rather inconsistent results. In terms of Germany, I would say: without Adenauer, there would be no Brandt – it’s all in the mix.

Cosmopolitan values vs. geopolitical interests?

Manuel
Perhaps it is rather the way the EU deals with global issues that has changed: for a long time, it focused mainly on peaceful multilateral cooperation, strengthening the United Nations and international law, and letting NATO deal with the “hard” questions of power and defence policy. On the one hand, as is now often criticised, this was an easy way for the EU to avoid unpleasant issues.

On the other hand, it also led to a higher credibility of its “cosmopolitan” agenda: Apart from trade policy (where it has always also acted selfishly), one could believe the EU that it actually had a fair, liberal, non-domination-oriented world order in mind. Now, on the other hand, it is putting more emphasis on its own geopolitical interests and their implementation – which sometimes (like in Ukraine) coincide with the values of freedom and democracy, but are not necessarily the same thing.

Sophie
Manuel, isn’t that mainly the German position and view? France has wanted a stronger EU for a long time, especially in defence policy issues.

Manuel
Maybe, but perhaps that has also to do with the rather peculiar French view of NATO …

Sophie
Generally, I don’t think it’s a bad thing either that we are talking about interests again. I have always found it very hypocritical to pretend that we are working for world peace and nothing else. Which, by the way, does not mean that we should throw the EU’s fundamental values out of the window.

Julian
Of course, “Good cop EU, bad cop NATO” is a convenient division of labour. Combining both roles in the EU will be much more difficult.

Sacrificing the rule of law for foreign policy unity?

Manuel
Let’s also talk a bit about the domestic price the EU is paying for short-term unity in the Ukraine war. It looks like the Commission has once again postponed the application of the rule of law mechanism on Hungary and Poland. In my view, this too is a danger of the “geopolitical turn”: that strength and unity gain weight over democratic values and the rule of law.

Sophie
Oh yes! They want to punish Putin, but allow Putin methods within the EU. In the long run, this will backfire and greatly damage the legitimacy of the EU as a legal community.

Julian
Which would be quite ironic with regard to Ukraine: To enable the Ukrainians to fight for European values, we put the enforcement of these values on hold in the EU.

Sophie
By the way, in Poland and Hungary, NGOs, which were previously hindered in their work and even criminalised in Hungary, are now providing crucial refugee aid on the ground – only for the Polish and Hungarian governments to complain to the EU afterwards that they need more funding for this.

Julian
Sophie, how do you see it in Brussels? Did the war make a difference here, or did it just give the Commission the ultimate excuse to do what it wanted to do anyway?

Sophie
That’s a good question. The EU Commission has always been very cautious. Each institution shifts the responsibility away from itself and points to others who supposedly have more efficient instruments to secure fundamental values. The basic problem is and remains that there is no political will to punish authoritarian governments for their actions, because we need them in all other policy areas: digitalisation, climate change, sanctions …

Julian
Personal agency might also play a bit of a role here – if you
owe your election to the European Council …

The Ukrainian application for membership

Manuel
Let’s move on to the Ukrainian application for joining the EU: The Ukrainian government seems ready to
negotiate with Russia on its “neutrality”, which probably means renouncing NATO membership. At the same time, it has not only applied for EU membership, but also asked for a special, accelerated procedure. Georgia and Moldova, which are also struggling with Russian-backed separatists, have followed suit. How should the EU deal with this?

Julian
What I found interesting was that many integration scholars wanted to immediately dismiss the debate on the Ukrainian application with a reference to the high hurdles in art. 49 TEU. I am not convinced of that. If the permacrisis has taught us anything, it is that if there is political will, there is always a way. With a treaty-amending majority (which might require some national referenda), the procedure could be shortened if we wanted to. Whether we want to is another question.

Sophie
If one assumes that the EU is becoming more of a community of interests, then Ukraine’s (as well as Moldova’s and Georgia’s) accession to the EU would be a mistake: Ukraine is an occupied country that is unfortunately no longer sovereign. The
Copenhagen criteria are not met either: Ukraine had huge corruption problems before the war, the institutions and the economy were not ready for EU accession – not to mention that 40 million Ukrainians would drastically change the balance of power within the EU, which does not simplify decision-making.

I am also against politicising the accession process: There is no “accelerated procedure”. We should stick to the procedures we have set up – it would also be unfair for the Western Balkan countries to change the rules now. And finally: EU accession would not help Ukraine in the current war. At worst, the conflict would escalate because of the defence clause in art. 42 (7) TEU. While I see the symbolic value of accession, there is a great danger that we will give Ukraine false hope.

Copenhagen criteria

Manuel
In my view, there are two main arguments in favour of Ukrainian EU accession. First, it is generally better to deal with cross-border issues in supranational democratic institutions than by diplomatic means – so it is a priori desirable that states that are willing and able to join the EU should do so. And secondly, of course, there is the symbolism: In the war, Ukrainians are also fighting for democracy, of which the EU is seen as a guarantor. Slamming the door shut would be just as much a mistake here as it is in the Western Balkans.

And, by the way, it is precisely the experience there that in my view also explains the desire for an accelerated procedure: Northern Macedonia has repeatedly had the EU stopping the accession procedure for mere internal reasons, although the country had actually fulfilled its tasks. In this respect, the accession procedure is already “politicised”.

I totally agree with you on the point of the Copenhagen criteria, though. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has shown a slight improvement for Ukraine over the last ten years, but in 2021 it still had the second lowest score in Europe – only Russia is worse. The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index and the Freedom House Index paint a similar picture. But perhaps a gradual, expedient, well-monitored accession process after the war would be just the right support to initiate the necessary reforms here?

Julian
My impression is that the necessary reforms had already been initiated, and before the war Ukraine had reached the long and laborious path of implementation on which the states of the Western Balkans currently find themselves. The question then is: how do you consistently push ahead with reforms when the carrot seems to be receding further and further into the distance?

Ukrainian sovereignty and European supranationality

Sophie
That’s a valid argument, of course, but it depends on the perspective: Do you look at EU accession more from a foreign policy perspective or from an internal EU perspective?

And then there is another point that has not been mentioned so far: The mood in Ukraine is, for good reasons, very nationalistic right now. The flying flags represent a democracy defending itself against a Russian invasion. But so far, nobody is asking the question whether such nationalism is also compatible and desirable in the long term with the supranational orientation of the EU.

Manuel

Yes, I totally agree here. The war is creating a strong surge of sovereignism and nationalism in Ukraine right now – which is completely understandable under the circumstances and perhaps even necessary to maintain the people’s willingness to resist the aggression, but not a good prerequisite for being a member of the supranational EU.

In the end, national sovereignty and supranational democracy are two different forms of anti-imperialism: both are directed against imperial claims to power, as represented by the Russian government when it sees Ukraine as its “sphere of influence” that it wants to remotely control from Moscow. But in many respects, national sovereignty and supranational democracy are also in conflict with each other, because the latter presupposes that one is prepared to submit to a common, supranational legal order.

Julian
Indeed, nationalism – at least in its excesses – is a challenge. But I would at least see it as an open question whether nationalism and supranationalism must be at odds with each other in Ukraine. If European integration becomes an instrument that helps to restore Ukrainian sovereignty, this could well be a match from the Ukrainian point of view. In contrast to the Central and Eastern European countries, there is no direct transition from independence to European integration in Ukraine, but rather a war in which the EU is seen as a supporter.

Sophie
I think the Ukrainian government sees its application for membership purely in geopolitical terms, not from a supranational perspective. It is concerned with integration into “the West”, not necessarily into a supranational project.

Manuel
... which then raises the question again: does the EU see itself only as a “geopolitical bloc” or as a supranational democratic community? I think this is a debate we urgently need to have – to clarify our attitude towards Ukraine, but also towards world politics in general.



Julian Plottka is a research associate at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics at the University of Passau and at the University of Bonn.


Manuel Müller ist a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Duisburg-Essen and runs the blog „Der (europäische) Föderalist“.

Pictures: Flags: Evgeny Feldman [CC BY-SA 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons; portraits Julian Plottka, Sophie Pornschlegel, Manuel Müller: private [all rights reserved].

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